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4About the author
David Doyle was sworn in as Her Majesty’s Second Deemster in the Isle of
Man on the 21st March 2003. As Second Deemster he has presided over
preliminary hearings, criminal trials and sentencing hearings in the Court of
General Gaol Delivery. He also presides over preliminary hearings and civil
trials in the High Court of Justice in the Isle of Man and sits in the Appeal
Division as and when required. He has an active interest in Manx law past,
present and future. He also has an active interest in the role of the Island in
the wider international community. On the 8th October 2005 he presented a
paper on the Island’s legal system and judiciary to the Legal Wales
conference at Cardiff University. On the 3rd October 2007 he presented a
paper on the Island’s constitutional position and its legal system at Harvard
Law School in Boston.
5Foreword
Ready access to judicial decisions is fundamental not only to the proper
accountability of judges but also to the fairness of any legal system and its
future development. Although this might pose problems for a compact
jurisdiction such as the Isle of Man, the Island has always been well served
by its permanent judiciary and those Deemsters with whom I have served as
Judge of Appeal have contributed much to avoiding such problems. His
Honour Deemster Cain was the inspiration for the Manx Law Reports. His
Honour Deemster Kerruish was responsible for Manx judgments on line,
something which allows every person ready access to what the courts
decide. Now His Honour Deemster Doyle, following in this excellent
tradition, has produced his weighty tome on Manx criminal law.
I first met David Doyle shortly after I became Judge of Appeal. A few years
later I read an article by him in the Journal of the Commonwealth Lawyers`
Association as whether prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act
2001 reference could be made to the European Convention on Human Rights
to inform the exercise of an administrative, as opposed to a judicial,
discretion. In so far as he concluded that it was preferable to follow
decisions of the Staff of Government Division, to which I had been a party,
rather than decisions of the House of Lords, I have always applauded his
judgment. That view must have been shared by many others because soon
afterwards he was appointed as Her Majesty’s Second Deemster, an office
which he has since held with great distinction.
It is fair to say that on his appointment David’s knowledge of the criminal
law was somewhat less than intimate, no doubt reflecting George Bernard
Shaw’s dictum that ‘the criminal law is no use to decent people’. Over the
subsequent years I became aware that his thorough preparation for cases
which he was about to hear had produced voluminous notes to cover
whatever problem might present itself in the Court of General Gaol
Delivery. So it was that I expressed the view, initially in humour but later
seriously, that such notes might form the basis for a book which might offer
guidance for all criminal practitioners and judges. Hence this book was
created. It is a work of unadulterated thoroughness and detail covering every
aspect of the subject which seamlessly combines both scholarship and
practicality. Anyone involved in criminal law in the Island would do well to
read it and I warmly commend it.
Geoffrey Tattersall QC
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Preface and acknowledgments
1. This book is intended to assist trainee and newly qualified Manx
advocates and others who wish to consider further certain basic points
in respect of proceedings before the Court of General Gaol Delivery
and beyond in the Appeal Division and the Privy Council. This book
was conceived during my preparation for trials and during my talks to
trainee advocates over the last seven years. The bulk of the material in
this book started off as notes for those talks.
2. The nature of the work of the Court of General Gaol Delivery attracts
much public interest and the proceedings before the court are
frequently covered by the local newspapers, radio stations and various
websites. It is important that material is available in respect of Manx
criminal law and procedure in the Court of General Gaol Delivery and
beyond so that those with an interest in such matters can be duly
informed. Former First Deemster William Cain has from time to time
called for further literature to be published on various areas of Manx
law. The publication of this book is in part an endeavour to answer
that call in the area of Manx criminal law and procedure.
3. This book should be of assistance to prosecution and defence
advocates and indeed to those facing criminal charges, those who
have been victims of criminal offences, those who have been
convicted of criminal offences, the media, the police, politicians,
probation officers, witness and victim support agencies and all others
interested in Manx criminal law and procedure. It should assist them
to understand the legal and procedural issues that may arise in the
Court of General Gaol Delivery and beyond. It may also assist judges,
lawyers, academics and students in other jurisdictions who wish to
consider issues of Manx criminal law and procedure. Hopefully in
years to come this publication may be regarded as a useful historical
record of Manx criminal law and procedure in the early 21st century.
4. It is important however that the many limitations of this book be
recognised. This book does not cover all relevant areas of Manx
criminal law and procedure and the areas the book does cover are not
always dealt with in any depth. This book covers the more common
areas which arise in the Court of General Gaol Delivery in everyday
practice. This book does not purport to be authoritative or to carry any
great academic weight. It should simply be treated as a reference for
further informed research.
18
5. I note and adopt the wise words of Lightman J (The Withers Lecture
2003The Trustees’ duty to provide information to Beneficiaries) who
expressed the dangers of relying on observations from judges who
have not benefited from submissions on the point as follows:
“I should however add a word of caution to those who hear or read this lecture. A
judge who expresses his view of the law without the assistance of counsel’s
argument is like a mariner who sails dangerous straits without a pilot. He has no
such warning as he is accustomed to receiving from that source of shoals or other
navigational hazards. Not merely may it be unsafe to rely on what I say without
such assistance, but it should not be assumed that, if ever an issue such as is
touched on in this lecture comes before me in my judicial capacity, possessed
with that assistance even I shall take the same view.”
6. There are a number of people who have assisted in respect of this
book and I would like to thank them for their assistance.
7. I thank the numerous trainee advocates who have attended my talks
on criminal law and procedure over the years. I have benefited from
their input and their questioning minds.
8. I thank all those advocates who have appeared before me and argued
with skill and eloquence various points of law and procedure. I have
benefited from their submissions on a vast variety of interesting points
of criminal law and procedure.
9. Deemster Kerrruish, Her Majesty’s former First Deemster and Clerk
of the Rolls (the Island’s Chief Justice), who sadly died on the 14th
July 2010, permitted me to preside over the Court of General Gaol
Delivery over many years and thus exposed me to stimulating
challenges and interesting legal issues. I am grateful to him for that
and for his guidance and support. Deemster Kerruish’s contribution to
the administration of justice on the Island has been immense. I thank
Judge of Appeal Tattersall for his suggestion that the notes I had
compiled from time to time in respect of my preparations for trials
and my talks to trainee advocates be developed into a book. This book
is in large part the result of that suggestion.
10. Deemster Kerruish and Judge of Appeal Tattersall have been
responsible for producing many of the leading judgments of the
Appeal Division referred to in this book. I am grateful to them, as we
all should be, for their massive contribution to the development of
Manx jurisprudence some of which this book endeavours to cover.
Many of the Manx judgments referred to in this book may be accessed
at www.judgments.im
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11. It is important that as an Island we continue to develop our own
jurisprudence to suit our own needs and that such jurisprudence is
easily accessible and well known. Of course we should have regard to
developments in other jurisdictions but we should never slavishly
follow them. Whilst enthusiastically continuing to comply with our
international obligations we should always have regard to our own
local conditions.
12. In developing our own jurisprudence and Manx identity it is important
that books on matters Manx continue to be published. Charles Guard
and the Manx Heritage Foundation have been instrumental in the
publication of such books including this one.
13. I thank Charles Guard and the Manx Heritage Foundation for their
encouragement and for their work in arranging for the publication of
this book. Charles has over many years been a supportive friend and
an inspirational source of encouragement. Our respective professional
paths first crossed on the 19th February 1986 when as a young
advocate at short notice I was instructed to act for Radio Manx
Limited. Charles (who was a young Manx Radio presenter at the time)
had been summoned to appear at the Bar of Tynwald to show reason
why he should not answer a summons to produce certain information
relevant to the telecommunications industry on the Island. There were
no findings of contempt against Charles and no journalistic sources
had to be revealed but it was an exciting 24 hours. I also had the
subsequent privilege of assisting Charles in co-hosting the Month in
Politics series of radio programmes broadcast by Manx Radio. It was
during that time that I fully appreciated the professionalism and the
pursuit of perfection which were the hallmarks of Charles Guard. It
was a real joy to work with him. The Island is very fortunate to have
such an asset and I am grateful for his contribution to the publication
of this book.
14. I thank the Isle of Man Law Society for funding the publication of this
book. Without their generosity this publication would not have been
possible. Jonathan Wild has presided over an important period in the
Society’s history. The Society in 2009 celebrated 150 years of
existence. I am glad to see it continue in such a healthy state. Without
the contribution of skilled, dedicated, well informed and well
prepared advocates the administration of justice on this Island would
suffer. We should not lose sight of the fact that in addition to the
remunerative fee paying work advocates undertake many advocates
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also undertake pro bono work and assist the more vulnerable members
of our community here on the Island.
15. I thank Nora Lees who has spent much time and effort in producing
numerous drafts of this book together with its predecessor notes and
amending such drafts from time to time. I thank my clerks Tricia
Cocker and Jacqui Brogan for the valuable support they have
provided to the Court of General Gaol Delivery and to me personally
over many years. I thank all those within court administration who on
a daily basis provide the courts with support and assistance.
16. I thank my family for tolerating and supporting a husband and a father
who spends far too much of his time immersed in the depths of Manx
law and procedure and far too little time with his family.
17. I thank Eleanor Dangerfield for enthusiastically undertaking the
enormous tasks of proof reading and the preparation of the Tables of
Acts of Tynwald, Secondary Legislation, Manx cases and the Index.
A book is of limited assistance without an accurate and
comprehensive index. Eleanor’s valuable input is most appreciated.
Any errors that remain are, of course, my responsibility. I apologise in
advance for any such errors.
18. Michael Kirby (formerly a Justice of the High Court of Australia) in
his foreword (June 2009) to Australian Criminal Justice 4th edition by
Findlay, Odgers and Yeo stated:
“It is not easy to compress within the manageable space of an accessible text, the
main contours of the law and practice that need to be understood to grasp the
essence of our peculiar system of criminal justice.”
19. I have endeavoured within the restraints of time and intellect to
compress within a manageable space the main contours of Manx
criminal law and procedure. Whether I have succeeded in that
endeavour will be for others to judge.
20. I have attempted to state the relevant Manx criminal law and
procedure as at 31st December 2009 incorporating some further
developments since that date where possible prior to publication.
David Doyle
Isle of Man
October 2010
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The Court of General Gaol Delivery
21. The Court of General Gaol Delivery deals with the most serious
criminal cases arising in the Isle of Man. The main work of the court
is focused on jury trials and the sentencing of those defendants who
have been found guilty by a jury or who have pleaded guilty. In
addition numerous legal issues have to be determined from time to
time. These issues range from matters such as the admissibility of
evidence to the stopping of proceedings on the grounds of abuse of
process or on the basis of no case to answer submissions. A vast
variety of legal issues are put before the Court of General Gaol
Delivery for determination.
22. The work of the Court of General Gaol Delivery includes cases
involving serious acts of violence ranging from assaults to murders,
controlled drugs, sexual offences, dishonesty offences, causing death
by dangerous driving, firearms offences, damage to property,
unlawful detention and numerous other serious criminal offences.
Frequently the cases which are dealt with by the Court of General
Gaol Delivery are drug and/or alcohol related. The extensive
sentencing powers of the Court of General Gaol Delivery range from
the imposition of an absolute discharge to life imprisonment.
23. The Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 deals with the Court of General
Gaol Delivery. In particular it deals with jurisdictional and procedural
matters. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides
that the Courts of General Gaol Delivery shall continue to sit for the
purpose of (a) trying offences on information; (b) dealing with
offenders committed for sentence under section 17 of the Summary
Jurisdiction Act 1989; and (c) exercising any other jurisdiction
conferred on them by any statutory provision. See for example the
provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 which give the Court of
General Gaol Delivery jurisdiction to deal with various matters.
Section 1(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that the
president of the High Court shall from time to time assign a judge of
the High Court to be a judge of such a court. The Criminal
Jurisdiction Act 1993 also contains provisions dealing with
informations, pleas, procedure, evidence, verdicts, sentences, appeals,
retrials, costs, mentally disordered persons and miscellaneous and
supplemental matters. Section 56A of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act
1993 provides that the seal of the Court of General Gaol Delivery
shall be the same as the seal of the High Court.
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24. The Custody Act 1995 deals with matters relevant to imprisonment,
detention, custody and other sentencing matters.
25. Paragraphs 99-109 of the judgment in R v Glover, Glover and
Priestnal (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment delivered 25th
August 2006) 2005-06 MLR 463 deal very briefly with the history of
the Court of General Gaol Delivery and its constitution. R v Kelly
1522-1920 MLR 27 provides a useful insight into the constitution of
the Court of General Gaol Delivery in 1824.
26. Consider also Edge’s Manx Public Law (1997) in particular Part III
for an historical and useful account of the development of Manx
criminal law. Manx law has largely been influenced by England and
Scottish law. William Cain one of the Island’s former First Deemsters
in his foreword to Edge’s outstanding work stated: “It has long been the
aim of most of those involved in Manx affairs to ensure that the Isle of Man keeps
pace with developments elsewhere, in legal as in other matters, while at the same
time emphasising, and where possible, enlarging the Island’s autonomy.”
Information, amendment, joinder and severance
27. Proceedings in the Court of General Gaol Delivery are commenced by
an information (a document specifying the charges against a
defendant) preferred by the Attorney General in the name and on
behalf of Her Majesty. The Interpretation Act 1976 defines Her
Majesty and the Crown as Her Majesty the Queen Sovereign for the
time being of the United Kingdom. On occasions the information is
stated to be signed for and on behalf of the Attorney General under
authority delegated pursuant to paragraph 2, Schedule 8 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2001.
28. Under section 2(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 the
information (in England and Wales referred to as the indictment) shall
be lodged in the General Registry and 14 clear days before the date on
which the defendant is arraigned a certified copy shall be served on
the defendant or sent to him by registered post or the recorded
delivery service, and a certified copy shall be sent to his advocate (if
any).
29. In Baines v The Attorney General (judgment delivered on the 14th
May 2009) Deemster Kerruish at paragraph [36] agreed with counsel:
“that the Court of General Gaol Delivery becomes seised of a case when an
information has been filed in the General Registry, or to be more precise when the
information has been processed with the first appearance date and time having
been endorsed thereon.” At paragraph [37] the learned Deemster
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continued: “Thus before arraignment a defendant and, if he is represented, his
advocate have fourteen clear days to consider the information. I consider that
such period not only provides a defendant with the information to duly consider
his position and the advantages of an early plea whatever that plea may be, but
also in the case where the Attorney General has issued a certificate under section
2 of the 1993 Act to consider whether such certificate ought to be challenged.”
30. In King (judgment delivered 2nd April 2009) Acting Deemster
Sullivan considered section 2 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993
and the requirement to serve the information on the defendant 14 clear
days before the date on which the defendant is arraigned. Acting
Deemster Sullivan stated:
“7. The provisions of section 2 of the 1993 Act are clearly intended to ensure
that a defendant has sufficient notice of the proceedings to be able to
properly defend them …
8. … On a purposive interpretation I am satisfied that section 2 of the 1993
Act is not mandatory and that the Court therefore has a discretion to abridge
the time if justice so demands.”
31. An information may be preferred by the Attorney General (a) on
committal of the defendant in accordance with Part II of the Summary
Jurisdiction Act 1989 (b) on a direction given by the Appeal Division
under section 33(3)(b) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 or (c) of
his own motion.
32. An information may not be preferred under section 2(3)(c) unless the
Attorney General certifies in writing that in his opinion the evidence
of the offence charged (a) would be sufficient for the defendant to be
committed for trial; and (b) reveals a case of such seriousness or
complexity that its management should without delay be taken over
by the court; and such certificate shall not be subject to appeal or
liable to be questioned in any court. See Petition of Attorney General
and Chief Constable (judgment delivered 22nd September 2006) in
respect of the purported ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts.
Section 10(2) of the High Court Act 1991 states that for the avoidance
of doubt, it is declared that the High Court does not have jurisdiction
to hear and determine petitions of doleance in respect of any matter
in, or proceedings of, the Court of General Gaol Delivery.
33. In respect of informations filed with the Court of General Gaol
Delivery by the Attorney General pursuant to section 2(3) (c) and (5)
of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 see the Appeal Division
judgment in R v Devo and Riedel (delivered 29th October 2008) at
paragraph 49 where the following is stated:
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“…The Attorney General exercised his right, as to which we make no criticism, to
place the matter before the Court of General Gaol Delivery without committal
proceedings.”
34. In Baines v The Attorney General (judgment of Deemster Kerruish
delivered on the 14th May 2009) John Trevor Roche Baines sought an
order that a certificate issued by the Attorney General under section
2(5) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 be quashed or in the
alternative an order requiring the Attorney General to reconsider the
issue and maintenance of the certificate in the light of all material
considerations including the consequence of a judgment of Deemster
Doyle of the 24th November 2008 in criminal proceedings brought by
the Attorney General against Mr Baines and Wendy Nicolau De
Almeida Baines. The learned Deemster dismissed the petition. It was
held that if a section 2(5) certificate was lawfully issued the court did
not have jurisdiction to subsequently review the Attorney General’s
maintenance of the certificate or to require him to reconsider the
maintenance of such certificate. The learned Deemster held that the
certificate was lawfully issued and declined to quash the certificate or
to grant an order that the Attorney General reconsider the issue and
maintenance of the certificate.
35. In Humphreys v The Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda
(judgment delivered on the 11th December 2008) the Privy Council
considered the position of a new system of committal proceedings in
Antigua and Barbuda. Lord Hoffmann at paragraph 9 of the judgment
stated that the question was not the extent to which the new committal
proceedings differ from the old preliminary inquiries but whether the
new system of committal proceedings and trial, taken as a whole,
satisfied the requirements of section 15(1) of the Constitution of
Antigua and Barbuda. Lord Hoffmann stated:
“It is one thing to say that if the procedure for bringing someone accused of an
indictable offence to trial includes a preliminary inquiry, that inquiry must be
conducted fairly, by an impartial court and so forth, it is another thing altogether
to say that one cannot have a fair hearing without a preliminary inquiry.”
36. Section 3(1) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that an
information shall contain a statement of the specific offence or
offences of which the defendant is charged, together with such
particulars as are necessary for giving reasonable information as to the
nature of the charge. See also the Criminal Code (Informations) Act
1920.
37. Section 4 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides as follows:
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“4 Amendment of information
(1) Where before trial or at any stage of the trial, it appears to the court that an
information is defective, the court shall make such order for the amendment of the
information as it thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case, unless the
required amendments cannot be made without injustice.
(2) Where an information is amended, a note of the order under subsection (1) shall
be endorsed on the information, which shall be treated for the purposes of the trial and all
proceedings in connection with the trial as if it had always been in its amended form.
(3) Where before trial or at any stage of the trial, it appears to the court-
(a) that a defendant may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by reason
of being charged with more than one offence in the same information, or
(b) that for any other reason it is desirable to direct that he should be tried
separately for any one or more offences in the information,
the court may order a separate trial of any count or counts in the information.
(4) Where before trial or at any stage of the trial, it appears to the court that the trial
ought to be postponed as a consequence of an order under subsection (1) or (3), the court
shall make such order as to the postponement of the trial as appears necessary.
(5) Where the court makes an order under subsection (3) or (4)-
(a) if the order is made during a trial, the court may order that the jury be
discharged from giving a verdict on the count or counts the trial of which is postponed or
on the information, as the case may be;
(b) the procedure on a separate trial of a count shall be the same in all respects
as if the count had been found on a separate information;
(c) the procedure on a postponed trial (if the jury has been discharged) shall be
the same in all respects as if the trial had not commenced;
(d) the court may make such order as to costs, the admission of the defendant to
bail, the enlargement of recognizances and otherwise as the court thinks fit.
(6) Any power of the court under this section is in addition to and not in derogation
of any other power of the court for the same or similar purposes.”
38. Collister (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 16th December
2003) concerned the requirements as to the contents of an information
and the ability to order the prosecution to specify in detail the
particulars of the offences. The defendant is entitled to know what
case he has to meet. See also section 49 of the Criminal Jurisdiction
Act 1993 in respect of costs of a defective information.
39. Lord Ackner in R v Savage [1992] 1 AC 699 at 737 (HL) stated:
“Clearly, if an accused considers that he is entitled to further particulars of the
offence with which he is charged, he can seek those from the prosecution and if
unreasonably refused, he can obtain an order from the court.”
40. From time to time the court has to consider applications by the
prosecution for joinder of charges, joinder of defendants and
applications from the defence for severance of charges or for separate
trials. If the prosecution make a late application for joinder which
risks trial dates being vacated that militates against permitting joinder
unless the interests of justice require otherwise.
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41. I briefly referred to some of the relevant law in respect of joinder of
charges in one information in Johnson (judgment delivered 16th April
2007) as follows:
“The Law
30. Rule 3 of the Criminal Code (Informations) Act 1920 is headed “Joining of
charges in one information” and states:
“Charges for any offences, whether felonies or misdemeanours, may be joined in
the same information if those charges are founded on the same facts, or form or
are part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character”.
31. This rule is similar to rule 8 of the English Indictment Rules 1971.
32. Section 4(3) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that where before
trial or at any stage of the trial it appears to the court —
(a) that a defendant may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by reason of
being charged with more than one offence in the same information, or
(b) that for any other reason it is desirable to direct that he should be tried
separately for any one or more offences in the information,
the court may order a separate trial of any count or counts in the information.
33. It is important to consider the topics of joinder and severance separately but it
is nevertheless of interest to consider the approach of the Court of General Gaol
Delivery on severance in R v Moroney and others 1987-89 MLR 422 usefully
brought to the attention of the court by Mr Taubitz. In that case the court held that
the charges against the applicant were sufficiently related to charges against other
accused to indicate that the interests of justice would be best served by their being
tried together and the applicant had not proved to the courts’ satisfaction that he
would be so severely prejudiced by the joint trial that he could not expect to
receive proper justice. The court followed the judgment of Sachs J in R v Assim
[1966] 2 QB 249. Sachs J stated:
“... Where, however, the matters which constitute the individual offences of the
several offenders are, on the evidence, so related, whether in time or by other
factors, that the interests of justice are best served by their being tried together,
then they can properly be the subject of counts in one indictment and can, subject
always to the discretion of the Court, be tried together. Such a rule includes, but is
not limited to, cases where there is evidence that the several offenders acted in
concert”.
34. Acting Deemster Field-Fisher at page 425 added:
“Joint trials are appropriate to incidents which, irrespective of being the subject of
a joint charge on the indictment, are contemporaneous, as in cases relating to
affray, or successive, as in protection racket cases, or linked in a similar manner ...
As in all applications of this kind, one has to do a balancing test. I ask myself
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whether Mr Moroney is going to be so severely prejudiced in any way by being
tried jointly on this indictment that he cannot expect to receive proper justice. I
am unable to reach that conclusion.”
35. Archbold 2007 from paragraph 1-154 onward deals with the topic of “Joinder
of counts in one indictment”.
36. In Kray 53 Cr App R 412 and 569 it was held that (a) two offences may
constitute a ‘series’ within the meaning of the rule and (b) although the relevant
part of the rule does not require the offences to arise out of the same facts or be
part of a system of conduct before joinder can be sanctioned, a sufficient nexus
must nevertheless exist between the relevant offences. Such a nexus is clearly
established if evidence of one offence would be admissible on the trial of the
other but the rule is not confined to such cases. All that is necessary to satisfy the
rule is that the offences should exhibit such similar features as to establish a prima
facie case that they can be properly and conveniently tried together in the interests
of justice, which include, in addition to the interests of the defendants, those of
the Crown, witnesses and the public. A further relevant factor is the prejudice
likely to arise in the second trial from extensive press reports of the first trial if the
offences are tried separately. It was further held that it is not desirable that the rule
should be given an unduly restricted meaning, since any risk of injustice can be
avoided by the exercise of the judge’s discretion to sever the indictment.
37. In Ludlow v Metropolitan Police Commissioners [1971] AC 29 the House of
Lords held that (a) two offences can constitute a series and (b) both the law and
the facts should be taken into account when deciding whether offences are similar
or dissimilar in character. They concluded that there must be some nexus between
the offences. Nexus is a feature of similarity which in all the circumstances of the
case enables the offences to be described as a series. Their Lordships also cited,
with implicit approval, the dictum in Kray that the operation of the rule is not
restricted to cases where the evidence on one charge is admissible on the other(s)
and expressly the dictum that the rule should not be given an unduly restricted
meaning.
38. Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2003 from D10.24 deals with “Joinders of
Counts in Indictment” and from D10.29 “Joinder of Accused”. At paragraph
D10.25 reference is made to Barrell (1979) 69 Cr App R 250 and it is stated that
the rule extends to situations “where later offences would not have been
committed but for the prior commission of an earlier offence”. Shaw LJ at pages
252-3:
“..The test is whether the charges have a common factual origin. If ... the
subsidiary charge is one that could not have been alleged but for the facts which
give rise to .. the primary charge, then it is true to say for the purposes of rule 9
that those charges are founded, that is to say have their origin, in the same facts
and can legitimately be joined in the same indictment”.
39. Reference is also made to the interesting case of Bellman [1989] AC 836 and
counts that are mutually destructive.
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40. I have considered the relevant statutory provisions including sections 4 and 5
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1976 and sections 1, 45 and 46 of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1996. I do not set those provisions out in full in this judgment but
I have full regard to them and the relevant caselaw. I have also considered R v
Montila [2005] 1 Cr App R 26.”
42. In Purvis v Hopwood (judgment delivered 24th July 2007) I stated the
following:
“Law
18. Section 4(3) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that: “Where
before trial or at any stage of the trial, it appears to the court –
(a) that a defendant may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his
defence by reason of being charged with more than one offence in the same
information; or
(b) that for any other reason it is desirable to direct that he should be tried
separately for any one or more offences in the information
the court may order a separate trial of any count or counts in the information.” …
Determination of the Application
20. Having considered all the circumstances of this case, the Application, the
submissions and the relevant law I am not persuaded that Miss Hopwood would
be unduly prejudiced or embarrassed if she faced trial on the information with Mr
Purvis. Nor have I been persuaded that for any other reason it is desirable to direct
that Miss Hopwood should be tried separately for any one or more offences in the
information or separately from Mr Purvis.
21. I have concluded that it is not in the interests of justice to order a separate trial
of any of the counts in the information. I have concluded that it is not in the
interests of justice to order separate trials of the defendants.
22. In my judgment all the counts in the information against the defendants can be
properly and conveniently tried together in the interests of justice. The jury will
be directed, as appropriate, to consider the case against each defendant and upon
each count separately. Moreover the jury will be directed, as appropriate, to
decide their verdicts on the basis of the evidence and not on the basis of any
inferences of guilt by association. The trial Deemster can no doubt hear
submissions from counsel at the trial as to any necessary directions. The jury can
be trusted to decide the charges on the evidence and to pay full regard to any
appropriate directions from the trial Deemster.
23. I therefore dismiss the Application.”
43. In R v Moroney and others 1987-89 MLR 422 Acting Deemster Field-
Fisher stated at pages 424-423:
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“Of the authorities to which I have been referred it seems to me that the matter is
put clearest in the case of R. v. Assim (2), where the headnote, made up essentially
of extracts from the judgment given by Sachs, J., reads (50 Cr. App. R. at 224-
225):
“Questions of joinder, whether of offences or of offenders, are matters of practice
on which the Court has, unless restrained by statute, inherent power both to
formulate its own rules and to vary them in the light of current experience and the
needs of justice. ..
As a general rule it is no more proper to have tried by the same jury several
offenders on charges of committing individual offences that have nothing to do
with each other than it is to try together distinct offences committed by the same
person. Where, however, the matters which constitute the individual offences of
the several offenders are, on the evidence, so related, whether in time or by other
factors, that the interests of justice are best served by their being tried together,
then they can properly be the subject of counts in one indictment and can, subject
always to the discretion of the Court, be tried together. Such a rule includes, but is
not limited to, cases where there is evidence that the several offenders acted in
concert.”
Joint trials are appropriate to incidents which, irrespective of being the subject of
a joint charge on the indictment, are contemporaneous, as in cases relating to
affray, or successive, as in protection racket cases, or linked in a similar manner.
That judgment of the Court of Appeal, the observations contained in it and the
tests laid down in it were clearly approved in the case of Chief Constable of
Norfolk v. Clayton .
As in all applications of this kind, one has to do a balancing test. I ask myself
whether Mr. Moroney is going to be so severely prejudiced in any way by being
tried jointly on this indictment that he cannot expect to receive proper justice. I
am unable to reach that conclusion. I have taken into consideration the matters
which have been urged upon me and in my view this is a perfectly proper case for
those matters to be dealt with jointly on a joint trial. I have already indicated that I
think questions as to whether the complexity of the trial, and therefore the
resultant length, can be properly reduced without any overall diminution of the
right to justice, of both individuals and the public, may well have to be considered
at a later stage. I say no more about that.”
44. In respect of joinder of defendants see R v Assim [1966] 2 QB 249,
Sachs J at pages 261-262:
“Again, while the court has in mind the classes of case that have been particularly
the subject of discussion before, it, such as incidents which, irrespective of there
appearing a joint charge in the indictment, are contemporaneous (as where there
has been something in the nature of an affray), or successive (as in protection
racket cases), or linked in a similar manner, as where two persons individually in
the course of the same trial commit perjury as regards the same or a closely
connected fact, the court does not intend the operation of the rule to be restricted
so as to apply only to such cases as have been discussed before it.
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If examples are needed it is sufficient to say whilst it would be obviously irregular
to charge two men in separate counts of the same indictment with burglary simply
and solely because they had purely by coincidence separately broken into the
same house at different times on the same night, this court, as already indicated,
sees nothing in the facts in Reg. v. Leigh & Harrison which in principle prevented
the joint trial of such closely related counts for perjury as were there separately
laid against the two accused.
The last-named decision is overruled; whilst it accorded with the two cases that
appear in the books of 1731 and have been consistently cited in Archbold, it was,
of course, reached without the trial judge having the benefit of that considerable
review of authorities which is so often impracticable on circuit. Save for that case,
however, the court has not deemed it necessary as regards each of the many
authorities cited to state seriatim whether it does or does not accord with the rules
of practice as above formulated.
The court has already emphasised, and desires to repeat, that it is the interests of
justice as a whole that must be the governing factor and that amongst those
interests are those of the accused. It is essentially a matter for the discretion of the
court whether several offenders can properly be tried together at the same time
and it is necessary for the trial judge to scrutinise matters closely with the same
degree of care that is applied in dealing with the question whether a single person
can be charged with several offences before the same jury.”
45. Acting Deemster Sullivan in King (judgment delivered 2nd April
2009) referred to various authorities in respect of two informations
being tried together and commented as follows:
“10. If the Court holds that time should be abridged Mr. Neale seeks leave to
have the two Informations tried together. The relevant provision is Rule 3 of the
Criminal Code (Informations) Act 1920:
"Charges for any offences, whether felonies or misdemeanours, may be joined in
the same information if those charges are founded on the same facts, or form or
are part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character."
Mr.Neale referred to several English authorities the most pertinent of which is
Barrell and Wilson (1979) 60 Cr App R 250. B,W and M were charged with
affray in a discotheque and they were released on bail, M absconded but W alone
visited the manager of the discotheque and it was alleged offered money to the
manager to change his evidence. Application was made to sever the count of
attempting to pervert the course of justice from the affray count. Shaw LJ held
that the counts could be tried together stating that the test to be applied was:
"whether the charges have a common factual origin. If the charge described by
counsel as a subsidiary charge is one that could not have been alleged but for the
facts which give rise to what he called the primary charge, then it is true to say for
the purpose of rule 9 that those charges are founded, that is to say have their
origin, in the same facts and can legitimately be joined in the same indictment."
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For these purposes "rule 9" is in identical terms to the 1920 Criminal Code. Mr.
Justice Toulson amplified this test in Regina v James Cox [2001] EWCA Crim
728 where, at paragraphs 21 and 22 he said:
" 21. We accept and follow the construction placed on the words of this court in
Barrell and Wilson. Of course the words "have a common factual origin" are
broad. The degree of overlap could range from something very tenuous to, at the
other extreme, a situation where the facts are identical. A slight or tenuous
connection would not be sufficient, but nor on the other hand need the facts be
identical. We consider the two offences may fairly be said to be founded on the
same facts or evidence where there is sufficient factual or evidential overlap to
make it both just and convenient for them to be tried together. Here the evidence
of P.C. Tucker on the trial ( if there had been one) for witness intimidation would
properly have included the history of dealings with the applicant, including his
arrest of the applicant on the same day as driving whilst disqualified. Mr. Fitton
sought to tie the alleged threat closely to the events of some months earlier and to
exclude the driving whilst disqualified from part of the relevant narrative. We do
not regard that as a realistic approach. Had the prosecution sought to lead the
evidence of P.C. Tucker about the events of the day in question we have no doubt
that such evidence would have been properly admissible.
22. Where evidence of facts going to establish the offence- that is to say, in this
case, the offence of driving whilst disqualified- were properly admissible as part
of the narrative events leading to the commission of the offence of witness
intimidation, it must follow that there was sufficient factual and evidential overlap
to meet the requirements of section 40. It was plainly just and convenient for the
two matters to be tried together, rather than that P.C. Tucker should be called
twice over in different courts to give substantially overlapping evidence about the
events of the same day and be cross-examined twice."
Mr. O'Neill relied upon the Manx authority of The Attorney General v. John Alan
Johnson et al CRIM 2007/14. In that case Deemster Doyle declined to join several
counts of supply of and possession of controlled drugs with intent to supply
against Johnson with several counts of drug trafficking against Johnson and
several other defendants. Every case must be considered on its own facts and I
find nothing in that case of relevance to this. Mr. O'Neill also submitted that the
joinder would cause prejudice to the Defendant. That is a necessary consequence
in this case and was recognised as such in Barrell and Wilson, but there did not
prevent joinder, nor should it here in my judgment.
11. Having considered the authorities I am satisfied that there is sufficient
connection between the evidence on the count of witness intimidation and the
evidence on the other counts to make joinder in the interest of justice. In this
particular case the Complainant's ordeal of having to give evidence twice should
joinder not be allowed is more compelling a reason than in Cox where a police
officer would have had to have given evidence twice if joinder was not
permitted.”
46. In R v Haytner [2005] UKHL 6 Lord Steyn stated:
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“6 The practice favouring joint criminal trials is clear. It has been accepted for a
long time in English practice that, subject to a judge’s discretion to order separate
trials in the interests of justice, there are powerful public reasons why joint
offences should be tried jointly: R v Lake (1976) 64 Cr App R 172, 175 , per
Widgery CJ. While considerations of the avoidance of delay, costs and
convenience, can be cited in favour of joint trials this is not the prime basis of the
practice. Instead it is founded principally on the perception that a just outcome is
more likely to be established in a joint trial than in separate trials. The topic is
intimately connected with public confidence in jury trials. Subject to a judge’s
discretion to order otherwise, joint trials of those involved in a joint criminal case
are in the public interest and are the norm.”
47. Bridge L J in Novac [1977] 65 Cr App R 107 criticised the
overloading of indictments. At pages 118-119 he stated:
“We cannot conclude this judgment without pointing out that, in our opinion,
most of the difficulties which have bedevilled this trial, and which have led in the
end to the quashing of all convictions except on the conspiracy and related counts,
arose directly out of the overloading of the indictment. How much worse the
difficulties would have been if the case had proceeded to trial on the original
indictment containing 38 counts, does not bear contemplation. But even in its
reduced form the indictment of 19 counts against four defendants resulted, as is
now plain, in a trial of quite unnecessary length and complexity. If the specific
offence counts against Novac, Raywood, and Andrew-Cohen and all the counts
against Archer had been tried separately, the main trial of the conspiracy and
related counts would have been reasonably manageable and the four separate
trials would have been short and straightforward. Quite apart from the question
whether the prosecution could find legal justification for joining all these counts
in one indictment and resisting severance, the wider and more important question
has to be asked whether in such a case the interests of justice were likely to be
better served by one very long trial; or by one moderately long and four short
separate trials.
We answer unhesitatingly that whatever advantages were expected to accrue from
one long trial, the precise character of which has never been apparent to us, they
were heavily outweighed by the disadvantages. A trial of such dimensions puts an
immense burden on both judge and jury. In the course of a four or five day
summing-up the most careful and conscientious judge may so easily overlook
some essential matter. Even if the summing-up is faultless, it is by no means
cynical to doubt whether the average juror can be expected to take it all in and
apply all the directions given. Some criminal prosecutions involve consideration
of matters so plainly inextricable and indivisible that a long and complex trial is
an ineluctable necessity. But we are convinced that nothing short of the criterion
of absolute necessity can justify the imposition of the burdens of a very long trial
on the Court.
In making these comments we are by no means criticising the learned judge in the
instant case. When, at the outset, he had to consider the question of severance, to
the limited extent that it was canvassed before him, he had no opportunity to
consider the voluminous committal papers and could only decide on the basis of
such arguments presented to him. He certainly had no opportunity to apply his
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mind to the wider questions to which we have drawn attention. It must always be
the responsibility of those who have the conduct of a prosecution of any
magnitude to consider those wider questions. It is quite wrong for prosecuting
authorities to charge, in a single indictment, numerous offenders and offences,
simply because some nexus may be discoverable between them, leaving it to the
Court to determine any application to sever which may be made by the defence. If
multiplicity of defendants and charges threatens undue length and complexity of
trial then a heavy responsibility must rest on the prosecution in the first place to
consider whether joinder is essential in the interests of justice or whether the can
reasonably be sub-divided or otherwise abbreviated and simplified. In jury trial
brevity and simplicity are the hand-maidens of justice, length and complexity its
enemies.”
48. In R v Roberts [2008] EWCA Crim 1304 [2008] Crim LR 895 it was
held that the requirement that the charges were “founded on the same
facts” could be satisfied where the factual connection was established
by the coincidence of time and place e.g. a search of premises locating
cocaine, cannabis and air rifles. The propriety of the indictment had to
be judged when it was drawn. See the useful judgment of the Privy
Council in Ferrell [2010] UKPC 20 (judgment 29th July 2010) where
the question was whether, in the circumstances of that case, there was
sufficient nexus between the offences charged in money laundering
counts and the drugs counts. In that case the court held that the just
course was for the jury to consider all the counts together.
49. See R v Oates (judgment 14th February 2007) in respect of deleting
reference to a count a defendant had pleaded guilty to from other
contested counts in an information being put before a jury.
50. The prosecution should ensure where appropriate that all relevant
alternatives are included in the information from the outset for
example, if appropriate, section 33 and section 35 of the Criminal
Code 1872 as amended offences and in drugs cases possession with
intent to supply and simple possession again if appropriate on the
facts and circumstances of the case. If there are to be pleas to the
lesser count these pleas should be made at the earliest possible time
and not left to the first day of the trial or shortly before the trial. If
they are left late this will adversely effect any available sentencing
discount and may attract adverse costs awards if time and costs have
been wasted.
51. It is the responsibility of counsel to ensure that the information is in
proper form before arraignment (Hodgson and Pollin [2008] EWCA
Crim 895; R v Newland [1988] QB 402). Informations should be
drafted to reflect the criminality of the case and to avoid
complications (R v N (P) and others [2010] EWCA Crim 941).
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52. See R v Chargot Limited (t/a Contract Services) [2008] UKHL 73 in
respect of proceedings against employers under section 2 of the
Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 and whether it is necessary for the
prosecution to identify, allege and prove specific failures on the
employer’s part and as to whether a Brown direction (in conformity
with R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115) was also required.
53. In Taylor v Oake 1996-98 MLR N 8 (judgment delivered on the 5th
March 1998) the Appeal Division (Deemster Cain and Deemster
Kerruish) dealt with an appeal which concerned the summary court
enquiring of the prosecution as to whether they wished to amend a
complaint which referred to one registration number of a vehicle
whereas the evidence plainly referred to another. The Appeal
Division, in the particular circumstances of that case, stated that the
correct procedure is for the court to invite the prosecution to amend
the complaint and, if necessary, to require the prosecution to amend
the complaint to bring it into line with the evidence. An adjournment
may be necessary if the defence are taken by surprise.
54. See Clarke v McDaid [2008] UKHL 8 on the need for formalities to
be followed in respect of indictments in England and Wales.
55. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Clothier and Deemster Eason)
in Kerruish v IOM Water and Gas Authority 1972-77 MLR 286 held
that the count in that case was not bad for duplicity.
56. See Canavan [1998] 1 Cr App R 79 and more recent cases such as R v
Thompson [2004] 2 Cr App R 16 in respect of specimen charges and
sample counts. See also Tyack (Privy Council judgment delivered 29th
March 2006) and Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice at
paragraph 5-68 and paragraph 1-131 onwards. I refer in this book to
that most useful publication simply as Archbold.
Attempts
57. Section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1981 provides as follows:
“9 Attempt to commit an offence to be deemed an offence
(1) A provision which constitutes an offence shall, unless the contrary intention
appears, be deemed to provide also that an attempt to commit such offence shall
be an offence against that provision, punishable as if the offence itself had been
committed.
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(2) A person attempts to commit an offence if he does an act which is more than
merely preparatory to the commission of the offence.
(3) A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence even though the
facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.
(4) In any case where-
(a) apart from this subsection a person’s intention would not be regarded as
having amounted to an intent to commit an offence, but
(b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would
be so regarded,
then, for the purposes of subsection (1), he shall be regarded as having had an
intent to commit that offence.”
58. See Myers (Appeal Division judgment 26th November 2008) in
respect of sentencing for the commission of an offence of an attempt
to commit an offence.
First appearance at Court of General Gaol Delivery
59. The defence advocate should ensure that arrangements have been
made for the defendant to attend the hearing. Advocates should ensure
that all relevant information has been obtained prior to the
commencement of the court hearing. Advocates should not delay the
hearing with unnecessary requests for short adjournments or delayed
starts while late instructions are taken or late advice is given. It is
appreciated that on occasions clients facing serious criminal charges
can be difficult but advocates should make every effort to obtain full
instructions before the relevant court hearing.
60. If the defendant is on bail the defence advocate should ensure that the
defendant is aware of the time, date and place where his attendance
will be required. The defendant should where necessary be reminded
the day before the hearing. The defence advocate should have all the
necessary contact details – mobile phone, email address etc. If the
defendant fails to attend court, a bench warrant not backed for bail (or
backed for bail in cases where it appears the accused may have had a
reasonable cause to be absent) may be issued directing the police to
arrest the defendant. A breach of bail and a failure to attend court may
also affect the granting of bail in the future and will reflect badly upon
the defendant.
61. Consider the attendance of a defendant in person or, where
appropriate, by live television link. See the Criminal Jurisdiction
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(Live Television Link) Rules 2008 (SD No 707/08). Section 29 of the
Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 provides that in any
proceedings for an offence, a court may, after hearing representations
from the parties and with the consent of the accused direct that the
accused shall be treated as being present in the court for any particular
hearing before the start of the trial if during that hearing the accused is
held in custody in a prison or other institution and whether by means
of a live television link or otherwise the accused is able to see and
hear clearly and to be clearly seen and heard by it. If the court decides
not to give such a direction it shall give its reasons for not doing so.
The “start of the trial” shall be taken to occur (a) when the court begins
to hear evidence for the prosecution at the trial; or (b) if the court
accepts a plea of guilty without proceeding as in (a) when that plea is
accepted.
62. The defendant should be in a position to enter a plea at his first
appearance. If the plea is to be not guilty prosecution and defence
counsel should file non availability and likely duration of trial and
suggestions for any necessary case management directions in advance
of the first appearance so that trial dates can be set without further
delay. Defendants, witnesses and counsel should treat court
proceedings as a priority and where necessary rearrange their other
commitments in order to accommodate early trial dates. If the plea is
to be a guilty plea counsel should file with the court prior to first
appearance a signed agreed prosecution summary of facts together
with any agreed basis of plea. Any agreements on facts and the basis
of plea should take place promptly and, where possible, prior to the
first appearance at the Court of General Gaol Delivery.
63. If a guilty plea is to be entered then defence counsel should ensure
that the prosecution case or a summary of facts and a written basis of
plea is agreed or if there is disagreement on a substantial issue that
would effect the sentence a Newton hearing requested. Defence
counsel should also request, where appropriate, social enquiry report
and any other relevant and necessary reports. Reports over and above
social enquiry reports such as psychiatric reports from the Drug and
Alcohol Team will not be ordered as a matter of course and need to be
justified. If the defendant has previously been engaged with the Drug
and Alcohol Team and there is a psychiatric issue to highlight which
may affect the sentencing process then a report from the Drug and
Alcohol Team may be of assistance. If there is no mental health issue
to consider then a psychiatric report will not generally be of much
assistance.
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64. Defence and prosecution advocates should sign an agreed prosecution
case or summary of facts and agreed basis of plea. To avoid or
minimise any future disputes it is prudent to obtain defendant’s
signature to the agreed summary of facts and basis of plea. The
defence should in advance of the effective sentencing hearing file and
serve a written outline of mitigation and any other documents they
wish to rely on in mitigation together with recommendations as to
sentence and any guideline cases. The prosecution should ensure that
an up to date list of previous convictions is filed with the court and
served on the defence. The prosecution should refer to any breaches
of suspended sentences or offences committed whilst on bail and
other matters relevant to the sentencing process. The prosecution
should highlight any aggravating factors and supply copies of any
guideline cases and give their recommendations as to sentence.
Prosecution and defence counsel should indicate their views on
appropriate starting points to assist the court. The Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) in Goodman
(judgment 1st June 2007) dealt with the desirability of stating starting
points of sentence that is the starting point on the basis of a contested
trial and without reflecting any mitigation.
65. Counsel should endeavour to ensure that guilty pleas are not left to the
last minute. Prosecution counsel should ensure that any appropriate
alternative counts are included in the information from the outset e.g.
section 33 of Criminal Code 1872 as amended and section 35
alternative and possession of controlled drugs with intent to supply
and simple possession alternative.
66. Undue delay is not in the interests of justice but as Lord Rodger
pointed out in Dyer v Watson [2002] UKPC 1 at paragraph 157 many
accused persons who are in fact guilty may prefer to dwell in the
interim state of uncertainty rather than march steadily on to the end of
their case where that state of uncertainty may be replaced by
something worse. Advocates should take a firm grip of the case from
the outset and ensure that expeditious progress is made.
67. In respect of any applications before, at or after the first appearance
relating to the security of the defendant consider Horden [2009]
EWCA Crim 388 in which it was held by the English Court of Appeal
that the contractors who had brought H to court had been wrong to
apply for an order that he be handcuffed in court, and the trial judge
had been wrong to allow it. The fact that it might be wise for the
prison to warn a contractor that there was some risk of a prisoner
escaping (by means of ticking an “escape marker” on the Prisoner Escort
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Record form) did not automatically mean that such a risk was strong
enough to justify handcuffs in court. The contractor to whom the
prison gave the warning would have to handle the prisoner in a
number of different situations, including, for example, into and out of
vehicles in the open air, near to other prisoners, and in some courts
close to public areas. The situation in a courtroom was different.
While a determined attempt to escape was very occasionally made
from a court-room, it was a very public and a very unusual thing to
do. Further, a mere “marker” such as in Horden was not by itself a
sufficient basis for an application for handcuffs. Full supporting
information ought to have been before the judge. Had it been, the
judge would have refused the application (the Court of Appeal had
sought further information from the prison and so had more
information before it). The judge should have been given further
information by the contractors. If not given it, he ought to have asked
for it. The law was clear that a prisoner should not be visibly
restrained in front of the jury unless there was sufficient reason,
usually a real risk of violence or escape, and even if there was such a
risk, alternative means of avoiding it should be preferred: Vratsides
[1988] Crim. L.R 251; Mullen [2000] All E.R.(D.) 618. While the
situation was less acute in the case of appearances without the jury or
after conviction, even then physical restraint should be ordered only
when necessary. H’s conviction was not, however, rendered unsafe -
his bad character was before the jury, overbearing any damage done
to his standing by virtue of the handcuffs; the judge directed the jury
not to take account of the handcuffs; and the Crown’s case was
overwhelming.
Communications with court administration
68. Advocates should ensure that they respond promptly and fully to any
communications from court administration. Counsel should ensure
that someone within their office is available to take urgent calls from
court administration or to call back within 24 hours or sooner where
appropriate.
69. In the normal course of events any written or electronic
communications to the clerk to the court should be copied by the
prosecution to the defence and by the defence to the prosecution and
this should be clearly marked on the face of the communication. In
the normal course of events the court should only see what all the
parties see. In the Petition of Attorney General and Chief Constable
(judgment 31st January 2006) I stated:
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“13. I have regard to the important and fundamental principle of open justice
that a judge should not receive representations from one side which are not copied
to the other. (See for example the decision of the High Court of Australia in Re
JRL ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342). Save and except in rare and exceptional
cases such as public interest immunity matters, it is important that the court sees
and hears no more than what all parties to the proceedings see and hear. Any
communications with the court (such as correspondence to the clerk to the court)
should be copied to all other parties to the proceedings. The Deemster should not
see what the parties have not seen. The parties should see everything that the
Deemster has seen. Justice must not only be done it must be seen to be done.
14. A central element in the system of justice administered by our courts is
that it should be fair and this means that it must be open, transparent impartial and
even-handed. It is for this reason that one of the cardinal principles of the law is
that a judge hears the case before him on the evidence and arguments presented to
him in open court by the parties or their legal representatives. It would be
inconsistent with basic notions of fairness that a judge should take account or
even receive communications which are not copied to all parties to the
proceedings.”
70. In the Privy Council case of Dr Anneliese Diedrichs-Shurland v
Talanga-Stiftung (judgment 6th December 2006) Lord Hoffmann
described letter communications by one party to the court with no
copy being sent to the other parties as “grossly improper”.
71. In Parton (General Gaol Delivery judgment delivered on the 30th July
2009) I concluded that the prosecution in the normal course of events
should be permitted access to and copies of social enquiry reports,
psychiatric reports, defence written submissions and other
documentation filed in mitigation in respect of a sentencing hearing in
the Court of General Gaol Delivery subject to certain restrictions on
the use and disclosure of information contained in such
documentation. It was again stressed that, in principle, what the court
sees the parties should also see. It was accepted that public interest
immunity matters were important exceptions to this general principle.
R v R [2010] EWCA Crim 924 confirms the importance of the
defence being given access to material relied on by the prosecution.
72. Prior to the first appearance at the Court of General Gaol Delivery a
letter along the following lines is sent out by court administration:
“I write to inform you that the above named matter has been listed for < >.
I should be grateful if you would provide the Court with the following
information:
1. What are the likely pleas? The Court expects defendants to enter pleas on their
first appearance at the Court of General Gaol Delivery and for the matter to be
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progressed by way of directions for trial or directions for the effective sentencing
hearing.
2. If there is likely to be a trial:-
How long is it likely to take?
How many witnesses do you intend to call?
Are any points of law likely to arise? If so, please list any authorities upon
which you intend to rely and provide copies of the same.
Are any questions of admissibility of evidence likely to arise?
Is there any other significant matter which might affect the trial of the
case?
Please file defence and prosecution counsel and witness non-availability,
estimates as to duration and suggestions for any future case management
directions. Please also liaise with court administration as to appropriate
trial dates.
3. If guilty pleas are to be entered the court would expect an agreed factual basis
of plea to be submitted together with a written outline of mitigation and any other
documents the Defence propose to rely on in mitigation well in advance of the
effective sentencing hearing. In cases where material facts are disputed counsel
should give notification of a request for a Newton hearing.
4. If the Defendant is seeking bail please file an application setting out the
grounds for such application and specify the conditions the Defence consider
appropriate together with a note of any conditions imposed by the Summary
Court.
I would appreciate your reply within 7 days of the date hereof.”
73. Advocates should ensure that a prompt and substantive response is
sent to such letter and indeed any other communications from court
administration. It is prima facie professional misconduct to fail to
respond on a timely basis to communications from court
administration. Advocates should, in advance of receipt of the pre-
first appearance letter, have obtained all necessary information to deal
with all relevant issues and to progress the case without undue delay.
Children in Court of General Gaol Delivery and media coverage
74. Section 74 Children and Young Persons Act 2001 provides as
follows:
“74 Children in court during trials
(1) No child (other than an infant in arms) shall be permitted to be present in court
during –
(a) the trial of any other person charged with an offence, or
(b) during any proceedings preliminary thereto, except during such time as his
presence is required as a witness or otherwise for the purposes of justice.
(2) Where any child is present in court when he is not to be permitted to be so
under subsection (1), he shall be ordered to be removed.”
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75. A child except in Part 8 is referred to in the Children and Young
Persons Act 2001 as an individual under 18. Sections 74 and 80 are
within Part 8. Section 3 of the Interpretation Act 1976 refers to a
“young person” being over 14 and under 17 and “Child” as a person
under 14.
76. Section 80 Children and Young Persons Act 2001 provides as
follows:
“80 Identification of child or young person in media
(1) Subject to subsection (3), no written report of any proceedings in any court
shall be published in the Island, and no report of any such proceedings shall be
included in a relevant programme for reception in the Island, which-
(a) reveals the name, address or school, or
(b) includes any particulars calculated to lead to the identification,
of any child or young person concerned in those proceedings, either as being the
person against or in respect of whom the proceedings are taken or as being a
witness therein.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), no picture shall be published in any newspaper or
periodical or included in a relevant programme as being or including a picture of
any child or young person so concerned in any such proceedings.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a court may in any case by order dispense with the
requirements of subsection (1) or (2) to such extent as may be specified in the
order.
(4) A juvenile court shall not exercise the power conferred by subsection (3)
unless it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so.
(5) If a report or picture is published or included in a relevant programme in
contravention of this section, each of the following persons-
(a) in the case of a publication of a written report as part of, or of a
picture in, a newspaper or periodical, any proprietor, editor or publisher of the
newspaper or periodical;
(b) in the case of a publication of a written report otherwise than as part
of a newspaper or periodical, the person who published it;
(c) in the case of the inclusion of a report or picture in a relevant
programme, any body corporate which is engaged in providing the service in
which the programme is included and any person having functions in relation to
the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper;
is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£2,000.
(6) Proceedings for an offence under this section shall not be instituted otherwise
than by or with the consent of the Attorney General.
(7) In this section 'relevant programme' means a programme included in a
programme service (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Broadcasting Act 1993).”
77. See In re Application of Isle of Man Newspapers 1999-01 MLR N 14
where Deemster Kerruish dealt with an application under section 34
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1966. In that case it was held
that although the full reporting of a crime is in the public interest, the
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court had to consider not only the immediate effect of publicity on the
child’s welfare but also the effect in the foreseeable future. R v
Croydon Crown Court ex parte Trinity Mirror plc [2008] EWCA
Crim 50 dealt with two conflicting principles namely the protection
and well being of children and open justice in courts exercising
criminal jurisdiction. See also Crawford v DPP (English Queen’s
Bench Divisional Court The Times 20th February 2008) under the
headlingMedia consultation before publication ban imposed.
78. Section 34 of the Sexual Offences Act 1992 provides that Schedule 2
of the Act shall have effect in relation to the anonymity of the
complainant in proceedings for rape and related offences.
Trial directions
79. Counsel should submit suggestions as to case management directions
to assist in preparation for and smooth conduct of trial. Counsel are
under a duty to assist by early identification of the real issues in the
case and have an obligation actively to assist the court and to
cooperate in the progress of the case (Robinson v Abergavenny
Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 2005).
80. In R v McCluskey and others (judgment delivered 24th July 2007) at
paragraph 65 I stated:
“65 Furthermore this court is satisfied that with the good sense and appropriate
cooperation of the prosecution and the defence the hearing of all counts together
will remain manageable and easily understandable by the jury. Where evidence
can be agreed in advance of the trial then it should be agreed. Where admissions
can be made in advance of the trial then they should be made. The hearing should
focus on the main issues in dispute between the prosecution and the defence. Rule
19(1) of the Advocates’ Practice Rules 2001 provides that:
“Advocates have an overriding duty to the Court to ensure, in the public interest,
that the proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved; they must assist
the Court in justice…” ”
81. The courts have stressed that counsel should focus on the main issues
in dispute and provide realistic estimates as to the duration of the trial
and only require necessary witnesses to be called. I reiterated the
position in Dobbie (judgment delivered on the 23rd March 2009). The
following are extracts from the judgment:
“5. The prosecution and defence counsel must actively focus on the main
issues in dispute in this case. Where admissions can properly be made and where
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evidence can properly be agreed admissions should be made and evidence should
be agreed.
6. Thomas LJ speaking extra-judicially in the Lord Merlyn-Rees Lecture
2009 on the 5th March 2009 put it well when he stressed:
“We have to forgo the notion that it takes as long as it takes”.
7. There should be proper cooperation with counsel and with the court. A
concerted effort must be made to keep the information essential and not to
overload the jury. Sensible concessions should be made and cross examination
should be short and to the point.
8. It is only in most exceptional cases that more than 3 or 4 weeks of court
time should be allocated to cases. Exceptional in the sense of the number of
defendants and charges. This is not an exceptional case in those terms.
9. Speaking judicially in L [2007] EWCA Crim 764 Thomas LJ stated:
“Time is not unlimited. No one should assume that trials can continue to take as
long or use up as much time as either or both sides may wish, or think, or assert,
they need. The entitlement to a fair trial is not inconsistent with proper judicial
control over the use of time”.
10. Counsel in this case need to focus on the critical issues rather than
peripheral issues. I echoed Thomas LJ’s comments in L in my judgment in R v
Glover Glover and Priestnal reported at 2005-2006 MLR 463 at pages 474-475
and paragraphs 28-31:
“28. In R v C 2003-05 MLR N16 I endeavoured in general terms to outline the
duties of advocates to the court. MTM (Tax Consultants) Limited v Jones and
Morris (CLA 2001/103 judgment 16th February 2006) at paragraphs 88-101
outlined the duties of advocates in respect of the discovery process. Advocates, in
civil and criminal matters, have an overriding duty to the court. Rule 19(1) of the
Advocates' Practice Rules 2001 provides that: "Advocates have an overriding
duty to the Court to ensure, in the public interest, that the proper and efficient
administration of justice is achieved; they must assist the Court in justice and
must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the Court".
29. Advocates have a duty not to waste time and money and to bring a case to
hearing as quickly as possible (in the civil context see Brennan v Brighton BC
The Times 24th July 1996, and Blyth Valley BC v Henderson (1996) PIQR 64).
English solicitors have been held to have a duty to give reasonable estimates of
the length of hearings and may be held responsible for costs where adjournments
are caused by non-compliance with that duty (Ibbs v Holloway Bros Pty Ltd
[1952] 1 All ER 220). Advocates should take reasonable and timely steps to
ensure that adjournments are not unnecessarily brought about.
30. Moreover counsel should not assume that the amount of time available for a
trial is indefinite. When trial dates are set counsel should ensure that the
availability of all concerned in the case has been carefully checked. Commitments
in other cases will be considered but it should not be assumed that simply because
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counsel or witnesses may want to take holidays or be off island on courses or
conferences that such commitments can be accommodated. Court commitments
must take priority if cases are to proceed without undue delay. I should also add
that I can see no reason why defendants should not be expected to enter pleas at
their first appearance at the Court of General Gaol Delivery. Prior to the matter
being listed at the Court of General Gaol Delivery the defendant since arrest and
committal would have had ample time to consider his position. The norm
therefore should be to expect pleas at the first appearance in the Court of General
Gaol Delivery. Let all defendants and defence counsel be aware of that. There are
far too many unnecessary applications for adjournments. Moreover late guilty
pleas may not attract as significant a sentencing discount as early guilty pleas. If a
defendant is guilty the sooner a guilty plea is entered the better for all concerned.
31. It is well established that as part of his responsibility for the management of a
trial a Deemster is expected to control the timetable and is entitled to direct that
the trial ought to be concluded by a specific date. If need be limitations have to be
placed on the time witnesses are to spend in the witness box. Counsel should
concentrate on the main issues. Evidence not in real dispute should be agreed and
sensible concessions made on both sides. No one should assume that trials will be
permitted to take as long or use up as much time as either or both sides might
wish, or think, or assert they need. Time is not unlimited. The entitlement to a fair
trial is not inconsistent with proper judicial control of time. Time is often wasted
by unnecessary applications for adjournments. This case is an unfortunate
example of that.”
11. I referred in that case to rule 19(1) of the Advocates Practice Rules 2001
which indicated that advocates have an overriding duty to the court to ensure that
the proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved. They must assist the
court in justice.
12. Bridge LJ put it well some many years ago now in Novac [1977] 65 Cr
App R 107 at 119 when he stated:-
“In jury trial brevity and simplicity are the hand-maidens of justice, length and
complexity its enemies”.
13. In this case I invite counsel to focus on the main critical issues. A blanket
defence request that all witnesses are required without due regard to the main
issues in the case does not assist in the proper and efficient administration of
justice. If too much time is given to one case other cases then suffer. Counsel
must be reasonable in their time estimates and must be reasonable in their
requests for witnesses and they must focus on the main issues in the case.”
82. The English Court of Appeal in R v O’Dowd [2009] EWCA Crim 905
stressed that trial judges should employ their case management
powers to control the length of trials and to conduct them in a way
that enables juries to retain and assess the evidence which they have
heard. The process should not be diverted by the introduction of
satellite issues. Experienced and competent defence counsel also
recognise that it is in the defendant’s best interests for sensible
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dialogue and negotiation with the prosecution to take place and for
sensible admissions to be made at an early stage. Michael Mansfield
QC in Memoirs of a Radical Lawyer (June 2009) at page 97 put the
position well when he stated:
“A great deal can be achieved by sensible dialogue and negotiation, whether it’s a
contested trial or a guilty plea. The most obvious example is agreeing what
evidence can be read without challenge, or can be reduced to admissions to save
court time and money. Another is giving notice of legal submissions and
attempting to distil the core issues out of court. If you don’t, it merely leads to
unnecessary argument and hostility - and an adjournment in any event. Neither
judges nor juries appreciate trials that are consumed with personal duels fought
out in public, so I have studiously tried to avoid these.”
83. In McVey (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 30th October
2009) I stated:
“Justice is not a game to be played with defendants trying to unreasonably require
attendance of unnecessary witnesses and trying unreasonably to delay trial dates
in the hope that the case against them will disappear. These cases will not
disappear. These cases will go to trial and justice will be done.”
84. Counsel should ensure that any applications they make identify
precisely what it is they wish the court to do and the jurisdiction of the
court to do what they are asking the court to do. Moreover counsel
should refer the court to the relevant authorities. Hughes L J in R v N
Ltd and C Ltd [2008] EWCA 1223 at paragraph 7:
“With hindsight, it can be seen that the difficulties which have ensued might have
been avoided if the discussion had been structured around an identifiable
application to the Judge to do something specific.”
85. Counsel should consider the necessary orders and directions which
the court may be minded to make in respect of the trial including:
(1) Matter be set down for jury trial at < > <x days
allocated; specify Deemster to preside> [See Dobbie judgment
delivered 23rd March 2009 in respect of counsel’s duty regarding trial
duration estimates and the need to focus on the main issues; consider
certificate of readiness or adjourning to date 28 days prior to trial for
further mention and to ensure order complied with and no last minute
developments immediately prior to trial which may necessitate vacation of
trial dates]
(2) A jury be duly summoned
(3) The defence to indicate in writing to the prosecution by <
> the witnesses they reasonably require to be called [see
McVey judgment delivered 30th October 2009]
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(4) Thereafter the prosecution to ensure that all reasonably required
prosecution witnesses are to be duly summoned
(5) Defence to indicate to prosecution whether any transcripts of
Defendant’s interviews are agreed and if not to specify the areas
of disagreement by <
>. The prosecution to respond by < >
(6) The defence to indicate to the prosecution any evidence that is
agreed and in the event of agreement formal admissions to be
filed by < >
(7) The defence to liaise with the prosecution and make
representations to the prosecution as to the contents of the trial
bundles by < >
(8) The prosecution to file and serve duly paginated court and jury
bundles, opening note, list of witnesses and a schedule detailing
approximate duration of evidence of each witness and
specifying any statements that are to be read, any admissions
and any other relevant matters by < > [see separate section in
this book dealing with trial bundles and general preparation in relation to
the contents of the court and jury bundles]
(9) Any expert evidence to be relied upon at trial on behalf of
prosecution or defence to be exchanged and filed by < >.
The experts to set out their qualifications and experience and
direct their admissible evidence to the relevant disputed issue or
issues in the case upon which they are able to express their
opinions. In the event of a substantial disagreement the
experts to consult with each other and file and serve a schedule
setting out the areas of agreement and disagreement with a
summary of their reasons for disagreement by < > or
[Prosecution to file and serve any expert evidence it intends to rely upon at
trial by < > and defence to file and serve any expert evidence it
intends to rely upon at trial by < >]
[(10) Prosecution and defence to liaise with court administration to ensure that
if any technical support needs to be available for trial it is available]
[(11) any site view necessary? If so make submissions and suggest any
appropriate directions]
(12) Prosecution and defence to be at liberty to submit in written
form suggestions (if possible on an agreed basis) in respect of
any appropriate directions to the jury on any issues arising
(13) Any applications for preliminary and other issues including
issues as to the admissibility of evidence to be determined by
the court prior to trial to be filed and served together with
written submissions and authorities in support by < >
with written submissions and authorities in response to be filed
and served by < > or within 14 days of filing and serving
of application whichever date is sooner
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(14) The defence to be at liberty to indicate in writing by serving on
the prosecution and filing a copy with the court the general
nature of any issues to be raised on behalf of the Defendant [As
to the position in England and Wales in respect of defence statements see
sections 5, (the duty to file) 6A (the contents) and 11 (Non compliance
and adverse inferences) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996, Roderick Denyer QC Circuit Judge, Cardiff Crown Court “The
Defence Statement” [2009] Crim LR 340 and volume 173 of Criminal
Law & Justice Weekly 22 August 2009 Essa [2009] EWCA Crim 43]
(15) Prosecution and the defence to file duly signed certificate of
readiness for trial 21/28 days prior to the date of the trial
(16) Bail/Custody.
<Consider any other necessary directions;
Counsel to highlight any other relevant issues>
Sentence directions
86. Counsel should consider the necessary orders and directions which
the court may be minded to make in respect of the sentencing hearing
including:
(1) Adjourn matter to < > for sentence <no longer than 6
weeks>.
(2) Social Enquiry Report to be prepared, filed with the court and
served on prosecution and defence by 4pm < > [normally
within 28 days, consider whether any other reports necessary such as a
psychiatric report from Drug and Alcohol Team: the court prior to
ordering the production of a psychiatric report will be required to be
satisfied that there is a relevant psychiatric issue that needs to be addressed
prior to sentencing]
(3) If on bail – in the normal course of events there would be an
additional condition of bail imposed namely that Defendant
attend as required appointments to enable the preparation and
completion of a Social Enquiry Report and any other reports
that have been ordered.
(4) Prosecution and defence to agree sign and file written summary
of facts/prosecution case and any agreed basis of plea by < >
[normally within 7 days if not already filed].
(5) Defence to file and serve written outline of mitigation, and any
other documents which the defence wish to rely on in
mitigation, any recommendations as to sentence together with
copies of any guideline cases by 4pm on < >[normally at
least 7 days before court. Defence should provide copies to prosecution in
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advance so prosecution can check them out. Discourage defendants from
filing documents/letters etc on the day of sentencing – they should be filed
and served well in advance].
(6) Prosecution to file and serve by 4pm on < > [normally at least 10
days before hearing] the prosecution’s recommendations as to
sentence, the sentencing options available to the court, copies of
any guideline cases and a note detailing what the prosecution
consider to be the aggravating factors in the case together with
any other documents upon which the prosecution intend to rely
upon at the sentencing hearing.
(7) Matter adjourned to < >. Defendant remanded in custody/on
bail in the meantime.
Bail
87. Advocates and defendants should not assume simply because bail has
been granted by the court of summary jurisdiction that the Court of
General Gaol will also grant bail or if it does that it will be on the
same conditions as those imposed by the court of summary
jurisdiction. It is not a case of renewing or continuing the bail granted
in the summary court. It is a matter of applying for bail afresh at the
first appearance in the Court of General Gaol Delivery. The same
applies even where bail has previously been granted by a Deemster in
the High Court in an appeal against a refusal of a summary court to
grant bail. Moreover it should not be assumed simply because the
summary court has refused to grant bail that the Court of General
Gaol Delivery will also refuse to grant bail.
88. If the defence wish the defendant to be granted bail then a fresh
written application should be made which can be heard during the
defendant’s first appearance at the Court of General Gaol Delivery.
The necessary details should be set out in a written bail application
including the charges, previous convictions, proposed bail address,
proposed conditions, proposed surety, connections with the Island and
the full grounds of the application.
89. Defence counsel should ensure that all the factors referred to in
McStein 2001-03 MLR N 36 are covered. Defence counsel should
contact the prosecution in respect of the bail application and consider
conditions and whether agreement is possible. If not counsel should
endeavour to narrow the areas of dispute. Counsel should ensure that
any potential surety is present in court and understands the obligations
they are about to enter and the likely consequences if the defendant
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breaches bail and fails to attend court. Defence advocates should
inform the Deemster of the terms of bail issued by the summary court
and the terms that the defence propose be granted by the Court of
General Gaol Delivery. Defence advocates should notify the
prosecution of the proposed bail conditions and ensure that the
prosecution are given adequate time to check out the proposed address
of residence of the defendant and the suitability of any proposed
surety and any other relevant matters. If the prosecution are
suggesting certain conditions then they should indicate the reasons for
the imposition of the conditions suggested.
90. If defence advocates subsequently apply to vary conditions they
should ensure that the prosecution is contacted and in the application
attach the prosecution’s written agreement or indicate that the
application is not agreed. Defence counsel should ensure that any
applications to vary conditions are made in good time. For example if
the application is for permission to depart the jurisdiction do not make
the application on the day of the proposed departure. Counsel should
endeavour to give at least 7 days notice to the prosecution and the
court unless it is not possible to give such notice in the particular
circumstances of the case. Counsel should ensure that defendants are
aware of the need for prompt instructions to be given in respect of any
desired variations to bail conditions.
91. In R(Ajaib) v Birmingham Magistrates’ Court [2009] EWCA Crim
2127 an officer stated in respect of an application to vary police bail
conditions that the police had information from a source he was
unwilling to identify that indicated that A was a flight risk, and the
deputy district judge took this material into account in refusing the
application. The English Court of Appeal held that she was right to do
so. No procedure had been laid down for such proceedings, and it had
been right to follow the procedure contemplated by R(DPP) v
Havering Magistrates’ Court [2001] Cr App R 2 (breach
proceedings). Without deciding it, the court assumed that Article 5 of
the European Convention on Human Rights applied as for breach
proceedings, but the information given did amount to the essence of
the allegation (Home Secretary v AF (No 3) [2008] EWCA Civ 1148)
and A could have countered it either by way of submissions or
evidence on oath. The Court rejected a defence suggestion that a
special advocate procedure should be adopted.
92. In respect of the prosecution’s duty to disclose material relevant to
bail applications see R(Raissi) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2008] EWCA Civ 72. That authority is also useful in
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respect of bail applications where the charges are simply “holding
charges” and other more serious charges may follow.
93. Lord Bingham, whose mother’s family were Manx, in Hurnam v The
State [2005] UKPC 49 at paragraph 1 usefully outlined in general
terms the principal issues in respect of bail as follows:
“In Mauritius, as else where, the courts are routinely called upon to consider
whether an unconvicted suspect or defendant should be released on bail, subject
to conditions, pending his trial. Such decisions very often raise questions of
importance both to the individual suspect or defendant and to the community as a
whole. The interest of the individual is of course to remain at liberty, unless or
until he is convicted of a crime sufficiently serious to justify depriving him of his
liberty. Any loss of liberty before that time, particularly if he is acquitted or never
tried, will inevitably prejudice him and, in many cases, his livelihood and family.
But the community has a countervailing interest, in seeking to ensure that the
course of justice is not thwarted by the flight of the suspect or defendant or
perverted by his interference with witnesses or evidence, and that he does not take
advantage of the inevitable delay before trial to commit further offences.”
Granting or refusing bail
94. A remand in custody followed by an acquittal or a remand in custody
for a period longer than the eventual sentence imposes a manifest,
sometimes an unavoidable, injustice. The importance of the liberty of
the subject should not be underestimated and neither should the
importance of the protection of the community.
95. In Alberta v Ell 2003 SCC 35 the Supreme Court of Canada at
paragraph 453 referred to the comments of Professor Friedland in
relation to the value of individual liberty. Custody during the period
before trial not only affects the mental, social and physical life of the
defendant and his family but also may have a substantial impact on
the result of the trial itself. We should all abhor any unnecessary
deprivation of liberty and positive steps should be taken to ensure that
detention before trial is kept to a minimum.
96. In Fardon [2004] HCA 46 Kirby J in the High Court of Australia
(their final appeal court) observed:
“The Bail Act expressly provides for consideration, in bail decisions, of whether
there is an unacceptable risk that, whilst released, the accused will commit an
offence, that is a future offence … it is enough to point to the great difference
between refusal of bail in respect of a pending charge of a past offence and refusal
of liberty, potentially for very long intervals of time, in respect of estimations of
future offending, based on predictions of propensity and submitted to proof
otherwise than by reference to the criminal standard of proof.”
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97. In Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33 (2nd August 2007) Kirby J
emphasised the value of liberty and stated at paragraph 338 that:
“the protection of the community is only one of a great number of otherwise strict
and ascertainable criteria to be considered in bail proceedings. It is not the only
factor.”
98. In R v Bell 2005-06 MLR 327 I also endeavoured to emphasise the
importance of the liberty of the subject. At paragraph 31 I stated:
“The liberty of the subject has always had a special place in the jurisprudence of
common law jurisdictions. Dalton’s The Country Justice (1742), reflects this
when dealing with arrest and imprisonment by stating (op.cit., at 406): “The
Liberty of a Man is a Thing Specially favoured by the Common Law”.”
99. In addition to having regard to the importance of the liberty of the
subject the courts should also have regard to the protection of the
community.
100. As a matter of domestic Manx law bail should be granted unless the
court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that
the defendant if released on bail would:
(a) fail to attend court;
(b) commit an offence while on bail;
(c) interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course
of justice, whether in relation to himself or any other
person.
101. The Court should consider all the circumstances of the particular case
and adopt a balanced approach. In particular the court should
consider:
(a) the seriousness of the offence and the probable
sentence if the defendant was convicted (although the
risk of absconding cannot be gauged solely on the basis
of the severity of the sentence faced by the defendant);
(b) the defendant’s character, his home, occupation,
assets, associations, community ties and links to the Isle
of Man;
(c) his record for answering bail in the past;
(d) the strength of the evidence against him;
(e) the length of time to the trial;
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The Court must undertake a balancing exercise that takes into account
many factors including the importance of the liberty of the subject and
the protection of the community.
102. Any decision to refuse bail should only be taken where this can be
justified both under domestic law, principally the Bail Act 1952 and
the authorities on the provisions of that Act and under the European
Convention on Human Rights.
103. In Gault v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth
Section : November 20, 2007) [2008] Crim LR 476 it was stated that
the European Court’s approach to Article 5(3) requires “that a judge
must examine all the facts arguing for and against the existence of a genuine
requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the presumption of
innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for the accused’s liberty.” At
paragraph 22 of the report at (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 48 it is stated:
“.. the court recalls that the risk of absconding cannot be gauged solely on the
basis of the severity of the sentence faced by the applicant.”
104. A person charged with an offence should be released pending trial
unless the prosecution can show that there are relevant and sufficient
reasons to justify continued detention.
105. A decision whether or not to grant bail requires the exercise of
judicial discretion. A defendant should only be refused bail where this
is necessary to avoid a real and substantial risk that were the
defendant released:
(1) he would
(a) fail to attend trial; or;
(b) interfere with evidence or witnesses, or otherwise
obstruct the course of justice; or;
(c) commit an offence while on bail; or;
(d) be at risk of harm against which he would be
inadequately protected; or
(2) a disturbance to public order would result.
106. Detention will only be necessary if the risk cannot be adequately
addressed by the imposition of appropriate bail conditions that would
make detention unnecessary. In many cases the risk can be adequately
addressed by the imposition of appropriate bail conditions.
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107. Any court refusing bail should give reasons that explain why
detention is necessary. Those reasons should be closely related to the
individual circumstances of the defendant. Any court granting bail
should also give reasons for such decision.
108. In R (Fergus) v Southampton Crown Court [2008] EWHC 3273 Silber
J stressed that in withdrawing or refusing bail it was particularly
important that the judge specify detailed reasons. The reasons must be
more than merely reciting one of the statutory grounds. The reasons
must relate to the particular facts of the case. Particular care should be
taken where the prosecution are not asking for bail to be revoked but
the court is considering whether to withdraw bail on its own initiative.
Silber J set out the position under English law as follows:
“17 Under the Bail Act 1976 a court must grant bail unless there is a significant
risk of the defendant failing to surrender, committing further offences whilst on
bail or interfering with witnesses or otherwise obstructing the course of justice. In
this case, as I have explained, the reasoning of the judge was “I am worried about
both of you failing to attend.” There were two facts that might have justified a
decision to withdraw bail. They related first to the seriousness of the offences
with which he was charged, relating as they do to class A drugs and, second, the
relevant previous convictions of the claimant. The first was in 2000 when he was
sentenced to a fine of £10 for failing to surrender. The second was in 2007 for
failing to surrender to custody at the appointed time, presumably because he was
late, for which he received a sentence of one day’s imprisonment.
18 On the other hand, in this case there are many factors in favour of continuing
bail. First, the prosecution had not opposed bail. Second, the claimant had been
admitted to bail four months earlier and since then had abided by his conditions of
residence and reporting to a specified police station. Third, there was no evidence
that the claimant had committed further offences while on bail. Fourth, the
claimant had surrendered to bail when required to do so at the magistrates’ court
on 29 August 2008. Fifth, his bail had been enlarged when he was absent through
ill health and he provided medical evidence to support the reason why he could
not attend court. Finally, he had surrendered bail on 31 October 2008 even though
he knew he would be re-arrested for further questioning on related matters.
19 Mr Rhodes, who appeared today on behalf of the claimant, drew my attention
to the decision of Mr Justice Collins, sitting in this court, in R (on application of
Thompson) v Central Criminal Court, a decision given on 6 October 2005 in
which he said at paragraph 10:
“The approach under the Bail Act is entirely consistent with the approach of the
European Court as regarded proper under Article 5, namely there must be a grant
of bail unless there are good reasons to refuse. The approach therefore really is
not should there be bail granted but should custody be opposed, that is, is it
necessary for the defendant to be in custody. That is the approach that the court
should take. Only if persuaded that it is necessary should a remand in custody
take place. It would be necessary if the court decides that whatever conditions can
be reasonably imposed in relation to bail there are nevertheless substantial
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grounds for believing that the defendant will either fail to surrender to custody,
commit an offence, interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct justice.”
On that basis Mr Rhodes contends that the critical test for determining whether or
not custody should be imposed was whether it was necessary for the defendant to
be in custody.
20 Drawing all these strings together, it seems to me that - bearing in mind the
presumption in favour of granting bail and the high threshold that a defendant
should only be remanded in custody if it was “necessary” - there are very
significant factors here which cause concern. First, the defendant had been on bail
for more than four months. Second, he complied with all reporting and residence
conditions of bail. Third, he surrendered to bail when required to do so.
21 To my mind, certain consequences flow from that. First, it is not reasonable for
a court to withdraw bail unless it is necessary to do so especially as any decision
to withdraw bail engages rights under Article 5. Second, any such reason
justifying the decision to withdraw bail must be stated by the decision maker
explaining why bail should be withdrawn and that reason must relate to the facts.
Such a reason must be more than merely reciting that one of the statutory grounds
has been made out. The underlying facts have to be put forward.
22 In this case no good reason has been put forward by the judge nor by the
Crown Prosecution Service to establish one of the statutory grounds as to why
bail should be refused.
23 In those circumstances it follows, in my view, that the claim that the judges
decision to withdraw bail based on irrationality has been made out when one
considers the presumption, the history in this case and the failure of the judge to
give any reason to justify his conclusion. I therefore quash the decision of the
Southampton Crown Court withdrawing the claimant’s bail.”
109. The following are extracts from the Bail Act 1952:
“2 Bail in offences triable by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction
Where any person is charged with any offence before a Court of Summary
Jurisdiction, the Court which is trying the charge, if it shall see fit, or if it shall
refuse to do so, one of the Judges of the High Court of Justice, if he shall see fit,
may, at any time, admit such accused person to bail by recognizance, with or
without a surety or sureties, conditioned that he will appear at the time and place
when and where the charge is to be further inquired into, or when or where he is
to be tried for such offence, and that he will surrender and take his trial, and will
not depart the court without leave.
3 Bail in offences triable on information
(1) Where any person is charged with an offence triable on information before
a justice or justices of the peace, the justice or justices, if he or they shall see fit,
may, at any time, admit such accused person to bail by recognizance, with or
without a surety or sureties, conditioned that he will appear at the time and place
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when or where the charge is to be further inquired into, or when or where he is to
be tried, for such offence, and that he will surrender and take his trial, and will not
depart the court without leave.
(2)…
(3) Where any person is charged with an offence triable on information before a
justice or justices of the peace, one of the judges of the High Court may, at any
time (whether the justice or justices has or have refused to do so or not) admit
such accused person to bail by recognizance with or without a surety or sureties,
conditioned that he will appear at the time and place when or where the charge is
to be further inquired into, or when or where he is to be tried for such offence, and
that he will surrender and take his trial, and will not depart the court without
leave.
3A Conditions for bail
(1) A Court may require a person to comply, before release on bail or later, with
such requirements as appear to the court to be necessary to secure that-
(a) he surrenders to custody;
(b) he does not commit an offence while on bail;
(c) he does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice
whether in relation to himself or any other person;
(d) he makes himself available for the purpose of enabling inquiries or a report to
be made to assist the court in dealing with him for the offences.
(2) If it appears to the court that a person who is to be released on bail is unlikely
to remain in the Isle of Man until the time appointed to him to surrender to
custody, that person may be required, before release on bail, to give security for
his surrender to custody.”
110. Schedule 1 of the Rules of the High Court of Justice 2009 refers to
claims for which the chancery procedure in the Civil Division of the
High Court is the normal procedure. Paragraph 5(b) of Schedule 5.1
refers to applications for bail or forfeiture of recognizance. It would
appear that applications to a judge of the High Court of Justice under
section 2 of the Bail Act 1952 should be made to the Civil Division
using the chancery procedure.
The imposition of conditions
111. Before imposing conditions of bail the court should consider whether
such conditions are necessary, proportionate and fair. Some
conditions of bail (for example curfew) can amount to a serious
interference with the liberty of the subject.
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112. A court may require a person to comply with such requirements as
appear to the court to be necessary to secure that:
(1) he surrenders to custody;
(2) he does not commit an offence while on bail;
(3) he does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the
course of justice whether in relation to himself or any other
person;
(4) he makes himself available for the purpose of enabling inquiries
or a report to be made to assist the court in dealing with him for
the offence.
113. Various conditions can be considered. For example:
(1) defendant’s own recognizance;
(2) surety;
(3) requirement to attend court and not depart
without leave of the court;
(4) not depart the Isle of Man without leave of the
court;
(5) residence;
(6) report in person to Douglas Police Headquarters
every day/specific days between specified hours;
(7) not approach or communicate in any way (directly
or indirectly) with any prosecution witnesses specified in a list
to be supplied to the defendant by the prosecution and filed
with the court; not to approach or communicate in any way
(directly or indirectly) with any co-defendants [N.B. consider
Article 8 of the Convention and ensure such conditions do not cover
members of family unless such is justified];
(8) observe a curfew between specified hours with a
doorstep condition namely a requirement that the defendant
presents himself at the open door of the premises upon the
request of a police officer during the hours of curfew [consider
also electronic monitoring];
(9) surrender passport or declare that he does not have
one and will not make an application for one;
(10) not to enter on-licensed premises;
(11) not to enter the area marked red on the plan
annexed to the bail bond [counsel to provide plan]
(12) to attend appointments as required for the
preparation and completion of a social enquiry report and any
other reports ordered by the court [relevant where defendant entered
guilty plea and reports ordered].
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114. The court and defence counsel should explain clearly to the defendant
the conditions imposed and the need to strictly comply with such
conditions and the consequences of a breach of a bail condition which
can include loss of liberty. Moreover it should be made plain to the
defendant that if he fails to attend court the matter may proceed in his
absence and without the benefit of defence legal representation. In
respect of applications to vary bail conditions see R (Ajaib) v
Birmingham Magistrates’ Court [2009] EWHC 2127 (Admin).
115. Where a surety is required in an endeavour to reduce any flight risk
the defence should ensure that the surety attends court and fully
understands the obligations he is entering into and the consequences if
the defendant fails to attend court which may include the forfeiture of
the entire sum put forward by the surety even in cases where no
culpability attaches to the surety. The surety will be required to sign
the relevant bail bond. The court and defence counsel should warn
surety of the consequences if the defendant breaches his bail and fails
to attend trial. In considering whether a proposed surety is suitable
regard may be had to his financial resources; his character and
previous convictions; and his relationship to the person for whom he
stands surety.
116. Counsel should check the financial position of surety before putting
surety forward to the court to act as surety. Counsel should be
satisfied that the proposed surety is “good for the money”. Kennedy L J
in Birmingham Crown Court ex parte Rashid Ali (1999) 163 JP 145
stated that:
“it is irresponsible (and possibly a matter for consideration by a professional
disciplinary body) for a qualified lawyer or legal executive to tender anyone as
surety unless he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that the surety will, if
necessary, be able to meet his or her financial undertaking.”
117. For the position of the surety where a defendant absconds see Spring
2001-03 MLR N37 (judgment 23rd April 2003). The starting point is
the forfeiture of the full recognizance. Absence of culpability on the
part of the surety is a factor but not in itself a reason to reduce or set
aside the obligation. There is jurisdiction to order part only to be
forfeited.
Breach of bail conditions
118. In respect of the procedure to be adopted when dealing with
allegations of breach of bail conditions see Fitzsimmons (Court of
General Gaol Delivery judgment 14th December 2009). In short
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summary a constable who has reasonable cause to suspect that a
person is breaking or has broken a condition of bail may arrest that
person and must bring him before a Justice as soon as practicable and
in any event within twenty-four hours of his arrest. See section 5 of
the Criminal Law Act 1981. Under section 36 of the Interpretation
Act 1976 it would appear that you do not count Sundays, Christmas
Days, Good Fridays, bank holidays and days appointed for public
thanksgiving or mourning.
119. Section 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1981 provides as follows:
“5 Arrest of persons granted bail
(1) A constable may arrest without warrant any person who has been admitted to
bail-
(a) if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that that
person is likely to break the condition that he will appear at the time and place
required or any other condition on which he was admitted to bail, or has
reasonable cause to suspect that that person is breaking or has broken any such
other condition; or
(b) on being notified in writing by any surety for that person that the
surety believes that that person is likely to break the first-mentioned condition and
for that reason the surety wishes to be relieved of his obligations as a surety.
(2) A person arrested under subsection (1)-
(a) shall, except where he was so arrested within the period of twenty-
four hours immediately preceding an occasion on which he is required by virtue
of a condition of his bail to appear before any court, be brought as soon as
practicable and in any event within twenty-four hours after his arrest before any
justice of the peace; and
(b) in the said excepted case, shall be brought before the court before
which he is required to appear as aforesaid.
(3) A justice of the peace before whom a person is brought under subsection (2)
may, if of the opinion that that person has broken or is likely to break any
condition on which he was admitted to bail, remand him in custody or commit
him to custody, as the case may require, or alternatively release him on his
original recognizance or on a new recognizance, with or without sureties, and if
not of that opinion shall release him on his original recognizance.”
120. The matter must be dealt with by the Justice within twenty-four hours
of arrest or, it would appear, there is no jurisdiction (R (Culley) v The
Crown Court sitting at Dorchester [2007] EWHC 109 (Admin) and R
v Liverpool City Justices ex parte DPP [1992] 3 WLR 20).
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121. Section 3(1) of the Justices Act 1982 provides that a person holding
the office of Deemster shall also be a justice.
122. Section 111 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 provides as
follows:
“(1) Any jurisdiction, power or authority conferred by any statutory provision on
a court of summary jurisdiction may be exercised by a Deemster, who shall (as
nearly as may be) in so doing follow the like procedure as applies in such courts.
(2) Any party to proceedings before a Deemster by virtue of this section shall be
entitled to the like rights, remedies and privileges as those to which he would be
entitled before a court of summary jurisdiction.”
123. The defendant must be given a full opportunity to answer the
allegation of breach of bail.
124. A Justice is required to ensure that the defendant has a full and fair
opportunity to comment on and answer the material put before the
court by the prosecution in respect of the alleged breach of bail. If that
material includes oral evidence the defendant should be given an
opportunity to cross examine the witness and if the defendant desires
to give oral evidence himself he is entitled to do so.
125. The Justice when forming his opinion must take proper account of the
quality of the material upon which he is asked to adjudicate. The
material is likely to range from mere assertion at the one end of the
spectrum which is unlikely to have any probative effect, to
documentary proof at the other end of the spectrum (Latham L J in R
v Havering Magistrates’ Court [2001] 1 WLR 805).
126. The Justice is obliged to come to an honest and rational opinion on
the material put before the Justice. In doing so the Justice must
evaluate the material carefully and bear in mind the consequences to
the defendant, namely the fact that the defendant is at risk of losing
his liberty in the context of the presumption of innocence. The Justice
should also bear in mind any consequences adverse to the protection
of the community. The Justice should seek to provide fairness to the
defendant on the one hand but securing the objectives of justice and
the protection of the public during the period up to and including the
trial on the other.
127. The Justice should consider:
(1) has there been a breach (admitted or proved to the Justice’s
satisfaction)?
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(2) if the Justice reaches the conclusion that a condition of
bail has been breached the Justice must decide whether to grant
fresh bail and if so on what conditions or to remand in custody.
128. The Justice should consider the nature and seriousness of the breach
and all other circumstances. For example was the defendant caught
attempting to flee the Island on a boat the day before his trial was due
to commence or was he 5 minutes late reporting at Douglas Police
Headquarters? It does not automatically follow that simply because a
defendant has breached a condition of bail that his bail should be
revoked and he should be remanded in custody. Breach of bail is only
one factor to be considered when considering whether to admit the
bailed person to bail again.
129. In R v Havering Magistrates’ Court [2001] 1 WLR 805 Latham L J at
pages 816-817 stated that breach of bail proceedings were by their
very nature emergency proceedings to determine whether or not a
person, who was not considered to present the risks which would have
justified remanding in custody in the first instance none the less does
now present one or other of those risks. The mere fact of a breach
cannot justify detention. Such a finding only gives the Justice the
power to detain and not the duty to detain. Latham L J continued:
“it seems to me that in exercising that power the justice would not be entitled to
order detention by reason simply of the finding of a breach … To hold that breach
of a condition was ipso facto a ground for detention would, it is agreed by all
parties, be a decision taken on a ground outside the purposes which the European
Court of Human Rights has determined justify detention under article 5. The fact
of a breach of a condition may be some evidence, even powerful evidence, of a
relevant risk arising. But it is no more than one of the factors which a justice must
consider in exercising his discretion …”
130. In McKeown [2001] 1 WLR 805 the English Divisional Court
concluded that if the Bail Act 1976 was interpreted so as to entitle a
court to deny a defendant bail simply on the basis that he had been
arrested for breaking conditions of bail this may be incompatible with
Article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
131. See also R (Thomas) v Greenwich Magistrates Court [2009] EWHC
1180 (Admin) where Hickinbottom J provides a useful summary of
the approach to be taken and the relevant law in respect of dealing
with allegations of breach of bail conditions.
61
132. The following are extracts from the judgment of Refshauge J in
Raeyers [2009] ACTSC 88 (10th July 2009) sitting in the Supreme
Court of the Australian Capital Territory:
“1. Nicholas Raeyers, the applicant, has sought bail for one day to visit his
girlfriend, Serena Patricia Condon-Reid, in hospital. She is in hospital
because she was injured seriously in a motor vehicle accident caused when
the applicant drove a car away from police who wished to pull him over and
question him. At the time he was on bail for offences, a condition of which
required him not to drive a motor vehicle, be in the driving seat of a motor
vehicle or possess the keys of a motor vehicle.
2. These facts would be sufficient to justify refusing bail and this indeed I did
this morning, on the basis that Mr Raeyers posed too great a risk to the
community.
3. He has a long history of offending including failure to comply with court
orders which comprised failures to answer bail and other matters. He has
never, however, breached bail granted by the Supreme Court.
4. Although he has not been convicted of any offences for the previous two
years, he is currently facing two series of charges, one for which he was
originally on bail and the current offences which, as I have mentioned,
include offences, to the majority of which he has pleaded guilty, arising out
of the motor vehicle accident in which his girlfriend was seriously injured.
5. There were real risks that Mr Raeyers would not appear to take his trial or
that he would commit further offences. I could also not be satisfied that he
would comply with his conditions of bail. Bail is granted on conditions that
need to be obeyed for they are the protection that the court considers
necessary to justify the liberty of an applicant for bail. Breach negatives that
justification and entitles the court to remand the person in custody.”
133. The following are extracts from the judgment of Refshauge J in
Asgari [2009] ACTSC 74 (23 June 2009) sitting in the Supreme Court
of the Australian Capital Territory:
“7. Given the level of intoxication and the fact that the police officers described
him as having watery eyes, slurred speech and as being breathless, it is probably
true that his faculties were so impaired that he did not in fact know that he had
passed the curfew time. This is an explanation but, of course, no excuse. The fact
that he clearly was self-intoxicated meant that he had put himself in a position
where he was at risk of breaching his bail conditions.
8. It is, of course, clear that he was blatantly in breach of his bail. It was one hour
and 50 minutes after the curfew time had started. It is also probably a notorious
fact that drug dealers do their work sometimes at night, especially in relation to
what might be called party drugs. Suspicion, however, is not a sure basis on
which to decide this issue of whether bail should be revoked and whether bail
should be granted again, although that risk is no doubt the reason why the curfew
was imposed in the first place and why a breach of it is so relatively serious.
9. I am also aware that Mr Asgari is to be sentenced by the Chief Justice on 9 July
2009, only about three weeks away. In Burton v R (1974) 3 ACTR 77, Fox J
relied on the fact that sentencing was to take place shortly thereafter to refuse bail
in that case.
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10. Ms J Campbell, who appeared for the DPP, fairly put the case. She noted that
the charges that Mr Asgari is facing are ones where a jail sentence would be well
within range. Mr K Saeedi, who said all that could be possibly said on behalf of
Mr Asgari, agreed to this assessment.
11. Were the offence committed by Mr Asgari in the commission of the breach of
bail to have been of a kind that Mr Asgari is facing in this court, I would have had
no hesitation in refusing him bail. This is a borderline case. Courts, as MrAsgari
must realise, impose bail conditions in a way that is intended to satisfy the court
that the liberty of the offender bailed can be granted in the context of the
objectives of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) (see s 22) and that those objectives,
including the attendance of the defendant at court, the protection of the
community against the commission of further offences and the interests of the
offender and other persons, can be properly protected. Mr Asgari must realise that
he cannot automatically expect that bail will not be revoked where he breaches
conditions that the courts expect him to obey.
12. I have said it is a borderline case and Mr Saeedi has relied upon the undoubted
fact that this is the first occasion on which Mr Asgari comes before the courts for
drug offences. Had he a history of drug offending, which he will now have by
virtue of the pleas of guilty that he has entered into, breaches of conditions such
as a curfew, imposed obviously because of the nature of the offences, would also
justify the court in refusing to allow him further bail.
13. On balance, however, I am prepared to grant him bail again, but on conditions
that are, on this occasion, somewhat stricter than those that have already been
granted…”
134. When revoking bail subsequent to a breach of a bail condition the
court should give reasons for such decision and ensure that such
revocation is necessary, proportionate and fair.
Factual basis of sentence
135. In the Fleming appeal (judgment delivered by the Appeal Division on
the 29th July 2005 reported at 2005-06 MLR N 4 and N 5) the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) made
some useful observations in relation to basis of pleas and Newton
hearings. The following are extracts from the judgment :
“24. Before leaving this issue we feel it is necessary that we should say
something about the procedure which should be adopted when a defendant
intends to plead guilty on a particular basis of fact, particularly where such
is likely to have a substantial impact on the appropriate sentence.
25. This situation was considered by the Court of Appeal in Smythe. Judge
Mellor stated:
‘If the material available to the Crown indicates that a basis of plea may
well be true, the Crown should clearly accept that basis. If the Crown
takes the view that the evidence or circumstances are such that it could not
properly support any suggestion that the version put forward by the
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defence is wrong, it should make that clear. If the Crown feels unable to
go that far, it should leave it to the defence to put forward its version and
to the judge to decide whether or not to accept it or enquire further by way
of a Newton hearing or otherwise. The interests of justice are not furthered
by the words ‘we cannot gainsay’, followed by the introduction of
material, the only relevance of which can be to seek to demonstrate the
opposite’.
26. Moreover in R v Beswick [1999] 1 Cr App R (S) 343 the Court of Appeal
indicated that it was always open to the sentencing judge to refuse to
accept a plea of guilty which is tendered to him on an artificial basis.
27. We entirely agree with such observations. If the Crown accept that the
proposed basis of plea is true or probably true, it is entirely proper that
they should indicate that position and the sentencing judge will no doubt
invariably accept such basis of plea and sentence on that basis. By contrast
if the Crown dispute the truth of the proposed basis of plea, they should
robustly say so and, unless he things that there is no significant impact on
the appropriate sentence, the sentencing judge will no doubt invariably
conduct a Newton hearing to resolve such dispute before sentencing. In the
residual class of cases where the Crown simply does not know whether the
proposed basis of plea is true, they should so inform the sentencing judge
and it will be for him to determine whether it is appropriate that there
should be a Newton hearing. In a case such as this, justice may well
require the sentencing judge to determine whether he accepts that this was
a case of true non-commercial supply or whether the offender was in
effect a retail supplier of drugs to his friends.
28. For the avoidance of any doubt, we add that any agreed basis of plea
should always be set out in writing – R v Tolera [1999] 1 Cr App R (S)
25.”
136. See also R v Underwood [2005] 1 Cr App R(S) 90 and [2005] 1 Cr
App R 13 at 178 (judgment delivered the day after the Appeal
Division’s judgment in Fleming). The following are extracts from the
headnote :
“The essential principle in relation to sentencing was that the judge must do
justice. So far as possible the offender should be sentenced on a basis which
accurately reflected the facts of the individual case. Where the defendant pleaded
guilty on a factual basis different from that which appeared from the Crown’s
case, the responsibility for taking any initiative and alerting the prosecutor to the
areas of dispute rested with the defence. If the Crown accepted the defendant’s
account a written agreement, signed by both advocates, should be made available
to the judge, if possible before the acceptance of any plea or pleas. The judge was
not bound by any agreement between counsel and was entitled of his own motion
to insist on a Newton hearing (R v Newton (1983) 77 Cr. App. R. 13). Where the
prosecution disputed the defence version or where it was ignorant of facts raised
by the defence the court should be notified in writing of the points in issue. If the
defendant was denying that a specific criminal offence had been committed, the
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tribunal for deciding whether the offence had been proved was the jury and a
Newton hearing would in inappropriate. Where the impact of the dispute on the
eventual sentencing decision was minimal, a Newton hearing was unnecessary.
Where a Newton hearing was appropriate it should be held immediately, unless
that was impracticable for some reason. The defendant should be called to give
evidence in support of facts which were exclusively within his knowledge. If he
did not, then, subject to any explanation, the judge might draw such inferences as
he thought fit from that fact. The judge might reject assertions advanced by the
defence even if the Crown did not offer positive contradictory evidence. The
judge was entitled to decline to hear evidence about disputed facts if the case
advanced by the defendant was absurd or obviously untenable. If so, the judge
should explain why he had reached that conclusion.
At the end of the Newton hearing the judge should direct himself in accordance
with ordinary principles and explain his conclusions in a judgment. He could not
make findings of fact and sentence on a basis which was inconsistent with the
pleas to counts which had already been approved by the court. Where there were a
number of defendants to a joint enterprise, the judge, while reflecting on the
individual basis of pleas, should bear in mind the relative seriousness of the joint
enterprise in which the defendants were involved. He should also take care not to
regard a written basis of plea offered by one defendant, without more, as evidence
justifying an adverse conclusion against another defendant. If the issues were
wholly resolved in the defendant’s favour the credit due to him for a guilty plea
should not be reduced. If, however, the defendant was disbelieved or a
prosecution witness suffered unnecessary or inappropriate distress as a result of
unfounded cross-examination then the judge should reduce the discount to that to
which the defendant would otherwise have been entitled.”
137. The following are relevant extracts from Archbold :
“ The Crown case
5-72 In R v Tolera [1999] 1 Cr.App.R.29, C.A, Lord Bingham C.J. considered
the procedure to be adopted on a plea of guilty. Ordinarily, sentence would
be passed on the basis of the facts disclosed in the witness statements of
the prosecution and the facts opened on behalf of the prosecution, which
together could be called the “Crown case”, unless the plea was the
subject of a written statement of the basis of the plea which the Crown
accepted. The Crown should consider such a written basis carefully, taking
account of the position of any other relevant defendant and with a
reasonable measure of scepticism…
The defence case
5-73 In Tolera, ante, Lord Bingham continued by saying that if the defendant
wished to ask the court to pass sentence on any other basis than that
disclosed in the Crown case, it was necessary for the defendant to make
that clear,. If the Crown did not accept the defence account, and if the
discrepancy between the two accounts was such as to have a potentially
significant effect on the level of sentence, then consideration must be
given to the holding of a Newton hearing (post, 5-74) to resolve the issue.
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The initiative rested with the defence which was asking the court to
sentence on a basis other than that disclosed by the Crown case.
His Lordship said that it often happened that when a defendant described
the facts of an offence to a probation officer for purposes of a pre-sentence
report, he gave an account which differed from that which emerged from
the Crown case, usually by glossing over, omitting or misdescribing the
more incriminating features of the offence. While the sentencing judge
would read this part of the pre-sentence report, he would not in the
ordinary way pay attention for purposes of sentence to any account of the
crime given by the defendant to the probation officer where it conflicted
with the Crown case. If the defendant wanted to rely on such an account
by asking the court to treat it as the basis of sentence, it was necessary that
the defence should expressly draw the relevant paragraphs to the attention
of the court and ask that it be treated as the basis of sentence. The
prosecution should be forewarned of this request, even though they would
now ordinarily see the report. The issue could then be resolved, if
necessary by calling evidence.
If the defendant, having pleaded guilty, advanced an account of the
offence which the prosecution did not, or felt they could not, challenge,
but which the court felt unable to accept, whether because it conflicted
with the facts disclosed in the Crown case or because it was inherently
incredible and defied common sense, it was desirable that the court should
make it clear that it did not accept the defence account and why. There
was an obvious risk of injustice if the defendant did not learn until
sentence was passed that his version of the facts was rejected because he
could not then seek to persuade the court to adopt a different view. The
court should therefore make its views known and, failing any other
resolution, a hearing could be held, and evidence called, to resolve the
matter. That would usually involve calling the defendant, and the
prosecutor should ask appropriate questions to test the defendant’s
evidence, adopting for this purpose the role of an amicus, exploring
matters which the court wished to be explored. It was not generally
desirable that the prosecutor, on the ground that he had no evidence to
contradict that of the defendant, should leave the questioning to the judge.
In R v Myers [1996] 1 Cr.App. R(S) 187, the Court of Appeal commended
the practice of writing down the basis on which the plea was accepted. But
in R v Beswick [1996] 1 Cr.App R(S) 343, C.A, it was held that the
sentencer is not bound by a version of the facts agreed between the parties.
He is entitled to direct that a Newton hearing (post) takes place. If he does
so, this does not provide a basis for withdrawing a plea of guilty,
providing it was clear that the accused was admitting guilt of the offence
charged. If the judge directs a Newton hearing, it is the duty of the
prosecution to assist the court by calling evidence and testing any
evidence called on behalf of the defence. The issues to be tried should be
clearly identified and there should be agreement as to which prosecution
witnesses were to be called and which to be read. See also R v Lester, 63
Cr. App.R. 144, CA.
In Att-Gen’s Reference (No. 81 of 2000) (R v Jacobs) [2001] 2
Cr.App.R.(S) 16, C.A, and in Att-Gen’s Reference (N0 58 of 2000) (R. v.
Wynne) [2001] 2 Cr.App.R.(S) 19, C.A, the court commented on the
undesirability of accepting a basis of plea which did not reflect the
evidence and which restricted the sentencing options of the judge. In R v
66
Robotham, [2001] 2 Cr. App. R(S) 69, C.A, it was held that the decision of
a judge to adjourn a case for sentence did not give rise to a legitimate
expectation on the part of the defendant that the court had accepted the
basis of plea (which had not been challenged by the prosecution), and that
a judge dealing with the case subsequently was entitled to insist on a
Newton hearing before passing sentence.
In R. v. Underwood [2005] 1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 13, the Court of Appeal re-
emphasised the following points: (i) the responsibility for taking the
initiative and alerting the prosecution to the fact that their case is disputed
rests with the defence; (ii) areas of dispute should be identified so as to
focus the court’s attention on the matters in issue; (iii) the court was not
bound by any agreement as to plea, and was at liberty to ignore any
document that had not been signed by both parties;(iv) where the
prosecution have no evidence to dispute the defendant’s account then,
particularly if the facts relied on arose from his own personal knowledge
and depended on his own personal account, they should not normally
agree that account unless supported by other material.
The undesirability of pleas being accepted on an artificial basis was
reiterated in R v. George [2006] 1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 119, CA, where a
complaint that the appellant had been deprived of his right to trial by an
independent and impartial tribunal was rejected. It was in the public
interest than an offender was properly sentenced for what he had done,
and accordingly, if a judge, on reading the papers, came to the view that a
basis of plea appeared artificial, he was bound to say so; this could not
give rise to a perception of bias in the fair-minded and informed observer;
the judge was saying no more than that the written evidence suggested that
what had happened was different from what the defendant was asserting;
and, by requiring a Newton hearing, he was saying no more than that a
hearing was required to resolve those differences. As to the use by the
judge of robust language in rejecting the basis of plea, and reserving the
hearing to himself, the complaint of bias was bound to fail where,
thereafter, the judge had conducted the hearing with scrupulous fairness.
As a matter of good practice, the prosecution, when responding to a basis
of plea in a case where confiscation proceedings might follow, ought to
bear in mind the question of whether it will be asking for a confiscation
inquiry to be made and, if so, what if any admission is being made (in
relation to the basis of plea) which would apply to that inquiry; it is
generally undesirable that a defendant should not know from the outset
how far the prosecution are prepared to go; in some cases, the prosecution
may be in a position to make the kind of express acknowledgement that
was made in R. v. Lunnon (Keith) [2005] 1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 24, CA, that the
indicted offence is the defendant’s first involvement in relevant crime, and
to do so knowing that the acknowledgment will be carried forward into
confiscation proceedings; in other cases, likely to be the majority, they
may be able to say no more than that for the purpose of sentence they do
not and cannot dispute a particular assertion made by a defendant, but they
cannot say what information may arise in any subsequent confiscation
proceedings; where, therefore, the prosecution accepted as a basis of plea
that the defendant had been involved in the supply of Class A drugs for a
period of about six months prior to his arrest (the indictment apparently
being amended to reflect this), such acceptance left wholly open the
question of whether there had been any benefit from drug trafficking
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before that period; and it was not right to say that the acceptance of that
admission carried with it the further assertion “and we agree he had never
done it before”; and this was particularly so where there was no express
concession by the prosecution that the defendant had never previously
been involved in drugs, and detailed financial reports put forward by the
prosecution shortly after the acceptance of plea made it clear that they
were seeking to rely on unexplained credits to the defendant’s bank
statements over a six year period for the purposes of the statutory
assumptions arising under section 4 of the DTA 1994: R.v. Lazarus [2005]
1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 98, CA (following in R.v . Green [2007] 3 All E.R. 751,
CA).
Where a plea of guilty is accepted on a particular basis, but a subsequent
pre-sentence report discloses information suggesting that the true view of
the facts is more serious, the contents of the report should be canvassed, so
that the basis on which the sentencer is to proceed is clear: R v Cunnah
[1996] 1 Cr. App. R.(S) 393, C.A.
5-74 Resolution of disputed issues
The procedure to be followed where conflicting versions of the facts of the
offence are put forward was considered in R v Newton, 77 Cr. App.R. 13,
C.A. Lord Lane C.J. said that in some cases it was possible to obtain an
answer from a jury, where the different versions could be reflected in
different charges in the indictment. The second method was for the judge
himself to hear the evidence on one side and another, and come to his own
conclusion, acting so to speak as his own jury. The third possibility was
for the judge to hear no evidence, but to listen to the submissions of
counsel; but if this course is adopted, “if there is a substantial conflict
between the two sides… the version of the defendant must so far as
possible be accepted.”
In Underwood, ante, the court said that where it was necessary, relevant
evidence should be called by the prosecution and the defence (see also R v
McGrath and Casey, 5 Cr App.R(S). 460, CA), particularly where the
issue arose from facts which were within the exclusive knowledge of the
defendant. If the defendant did not give evidence, then, subject to any
explanation offered, the judge might draw such inference as he saw fit.
The judge could reject the evidence of the defence and his witnesses, even
if the prosecution had called no contradictory evidence, but reasons for
doing so should be explained in a judgment. The court said that the judge
could not make findings of fact and pass sentence on a basis that was
inconsistent with pleas to counts already approved by the court; and
particular care was needed in relation to a multi-count indictment
involving one defendant, or an indictment involving a number of
defendants; where there was a joint enterprise the judge, while reflecting
on the individual basis of pleas, should bear in mind the seriousness of the
joint enterprise on which all were involved. As to matters of mitigation,
the court said that these are not normally dealt with by way of a Newton
hearing but it was always open to the court to allow a defendant to give
evidence in mitigation of sentence. If the factual issues were resolved
entirely in a defendant’s favour, credit for the guilty plea should be not
reduced; if, however, the defendant was disbelieved, or required a
prosecution witness to be called, or if the defendant showed no insight into
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the consequences of his offence and no genuine remorse, the court held
that the discount might be reduced; and that there may be exceptional
circumstances in which the entitlement to credit would be wholly
dissipated by the Newton hearing. In such cases, the judge should explain
his reasons. As to withholding the discount, or part thereof, see also R. v.
Stevens, 8 Cr.App.R.(S.) 297, CA; R. v. Jauncey, ibid., 401, CA, R. v.
Williams, 12 Cr. App. R.(S) 415, CA; and R. v. Hassell [2001] 1
Cr.App.R.(S.) 67, CA. As to full credit being given where a Newton
hearing had been scheduled (necessitating case preparation), following
early guilty pleas, but before the differences between the parties were
resolved by agreement, see Att.-Gen.’s References (Nos 117 and 118 of
2006) (R. v. Jesus and De Oliviera), post, 5-82.
At a Newton hearing, the judge should not put questions until counsel have
completed their examination (see R. v. Myers, ante). He should direct
himself in accordance with the normal criminal standard of proof (see R.v.
McGraith and Casey, ante, and R. v. Nabil Ahmed, 6 Cr.App.R.(S.) 391,
CA) and in announcing his decision, should indicate that he has done so
(R. v. Kerrigan, 14 Cr.App.R(S.) 179, CA). If the case involves an issue of
identification, the sentencer should approach the matter as if he were a
jury and direct himself in accordance with the guidelines in R. v. Turnbull
(post 14-2) (see R. v. Gandy, 11 Cr.App.R.(S.) 564, CA). The prosecution
must not put forward a version of the facts in the course of a “Newton
hearing” which would be consistent with a more serious offence than the
offence to which the offender has pleaded guilty (see R. v. Druce, 14
Cr.App.R.(S.) 691, CA). It is submitted that in so far as R. v. Nottingham
Crown Court, ex p. DPP [1966] 1 Cr. App.R.(S.) 283, DC, implies that the
prosecution may allege facts in a Newton hearing which show that the
defendant is guilty of a more serious offence that the offence of which he
has been convicted, it is inconsistent with authority and principle.
If the Crown Court rejects the version put forward by the accused after
hearing evidence, an appeal to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the
factual question was wrongly determined will “only succeed in clear
cases” which will be “rare indeed” when the accused has given evidence
himself: see R.v . Nabil Ahmed, ante; and R. v. Parker, ibid, at 444.
As to the inappropriateness of a judge embarking upon a Newton hearing
to decide whether or not the defendant had committed a discrete, but
similar, offence to that (those) already before the court, when making an
assessment of dangerousness under section 229 of the CJA 2003 (post 5-
297), see R v Considine; R v Davis [2007] 3 All E.R. 621, CA (post 5-
306).
Matters of dispute not requiring resolution
5-75 The cases establish three situations where although there is a
dispute as to the facts of the case, the court is not obliged to hear evidence
under the principles laid down in Newton. The first is where the difference
in the two versions of the facts is immaterial to the sentence (See R. v.
Hall, 6 Cr. App. R.(S.) 321, CA; R. v. Bent, 8 Cr.App.R.(S.) 19, CA). If
the sentencer does not hear evidence, he should specifically proceed on the
defendant’s version: R. v. Hall, ante; see also R. v. Sweeting, 9
Cr.App.R.(S) 372, CA.
The second exception is where the defence version can be described as
“manifestly false” or “wholly implausible” (see R. v. Hawkins, 7
Cr.App.R.(S.) 351, CA; R. v. Bilinski, 9 Cr.App.R.(S). 360, CA; R. v.
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Walton, ibid. at 107, CA; and R.v . Mudd, 10 Cr. App. R(S). 22, CA). See
also R. v. Palmer, 15 Cr.App.R.(S.) 123, CA and R. v. Broderick, ibid. at
476, CA (couriers claiming to believe that they were carrying cannabis as
opposed to a Class A drug). A judge may form such a view of the defence
basis of plea where, for example, he had presided over a trial of co-
defendants; but he should only do so after hearing full submissions and
giving a reasoned decision so that the basis on which subsequent
mitigation would take place was entirely clear to all concerned: R. v.
Taylor [2007] 2 Cr.App.R.(S). 24, CA.
The third exception is the case where the matters put forward by the
defendant do not amount to a contradiction of the prosecution case, but
rather to extraneous mitigation explaining the background of the offence
or other circumstances which may lessen the sentence. These matters are
likely to be outside the knowledge of the prosecution: see R. v. Broderick,
ante. Where the facts put forward by the defence do not contradict the
prosecution evidence, the cases justify the following propositions.
(a) The defendant may seek to establish his mitigation through counsel or
by calling evidence. The decision whether to call evidence is his
responsibility, and there is no entitlement to an indication from the
court that the mitigation is not accepted (Gross v. O’Toole, 4 Cr. App.
R.(S.) 283, DC); but such an indication is desirable (R v. Tolera [1999]
1 Cr.App.R. 29,CA).
(b) The prosecution are not bound to challenge the matter put forward by
the defendant, by cross-examination or otherwise (R.v. Kerr, 2
Cr.App.R.(S.) 54,CA), but may do so (R. v. Ghandi, 8 Cr.App.R.(S.)
391, CA; R v Tolera, ante).
(c) The court is not bound to accept the truth of the matters put forward by
the defendant, whether or not they are challenged by the prosecution
(Kerr, ante): see R. v. Broderick, ante.
(d) In relation to extraneous matters of mitigation raised by the defendant,
a civil burden of proof rests on the defendant, although in the general
run of cases the court would accept the accuracy of counsel’s
statement: R.v . Guppy, 16 Cr.App.R.(S.) 25, CA.”
138. In the Cunnah case [1996] 1 Cr App R(S) 393 it was indicated that
where a plea of guilty is tendered and accepted on an agreed basis of
the facts of the offence, but a subsequent pre-sentence report discloses
that the offender has admitted to a more serious version of the facts,
the court should canvass the question of which version of the facts is
to be adopted, or sentence on the agreed basis. Everyone must be clear
about the basis on which the sentencer proposes to proceed.
139. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Brummitt (judgment 13th January 2009) made reference
at paragraph 14 to the uncontroversial legal principles that if a jury
can have reached a verdict only on a particular basis of fact a
sentencing judge must adopt such basis of fact when sentencing and
that if it is not possible to ascertain which of two differing versions of
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fact had been accepted by the jury, a sentencing judge is entitled to
form his own view of the facts.
140. In R v Brown (judgment 29th January 2007) the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Acting Deemster King) stated at
paragraph 49:
“… As already indicated, it was for the Learned Deemster when he came to
sentence, to make his own judgment upon that same evidence as to the basis of
any conviction if (as was the case here) the words in question did not expressly
indicate the nature of the harm being threatened. And this of course he did so, as
Mr. O’Neil concedes and as to which he makes no complaint.”
Prosecution offering no evidence
141. Section 8(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that if a
person pleads not guilty and the prosecutor proposes to offer no
evidence against him, the court may order that a verdict of not guilty
be recorded without the defendant being given in charge to a jury, and
the verdict shall have the same effect as if he had been tried and
acquitted on the verdict of a jury. See Archbold paragraph 4-189 in
respect of offering no evidence. See also Archbold paragraph 4-190
onwards and Blackstone ’ s at paragraph D 11.27 in respect of leaving
a count on the file not to be proceeded with without leave of the court
or the Appeal Division.
142. See RC(FB) v DPP [2009] EWHC 106 in respect of cases where the
prosecution do not proceed in view of unreliable evidence.
Change of plea
143. It is only in very rare cases that it would be appropriate for the court
to exercise its discretion in favour of an accused person wishing to
change an unequivocal plea of guilty to one of not guilty. This is
particularly so where the accused has been represented by
experienced counsel. For authorities in this area of the law see S v
Recorder of Manchester [1971] AC 481, Drew [1985] 81 Crim App R
190, Sayed [2005] EWCA Crim 2386, Sheikh [2004] EWCA 492 and
Surhaindo [2006] EWCA Crim 1429. See also the useful judgment of
Deputy High Bailiff Montgomerie in Chief Constable v Atkinson
(judgment delivered on the 24th October 2008) and an article entitled
Changing an Unequivocal Plea of Guilty in the Crown Court by
Roderick Denyer [2007] Crim LR 156.
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144. The fundamental question appears to be whether the Deemster
hearing the application is satisfied that the plea represented a genuine
acknowledgment of guilt. The court has a discretion to allow the
withdrawal of a guilty plea when not to do so might work an injustice.
Mantell L J in Skeikh refers to the following examples: when a
defendant has been misinformed about the nature of the charge or the
availability of a defence or where he has been put under pressure to
plead guilty in circumstances where he is not truly admitting guilt.
145. In Hall (Appeal Division judgment 16th March 2007) the Appeal
Division (Deemster Kerruish and Deemster Doyle) dealt with a
proposed change of plea after sentence. At paragraph [16] the Appeal
Division stated:
“[16] The authorities make it clear that if a plea of “guilty” tendered in a court
of summary jurisdiction was an unequivocal plea that is a plea which could not be
described as a “guilty but …” plea, then once sentence has been passed by that
court and the conviction is accordingly complete, it is too late for an appellate
court to entertain an application for a change of plea, see S (an Infant) –v-
Manchester City Recorder (1971) AC 481 HL. Also, a plea is not equivocal
because it is based upon incorrect or corrupted evidence, see R –v- Bolton J ex
parte Scally (1991) 1 QB 537DC, where relief was available on judicial review.
We refer to Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (2007) paragraphs
2-195 to 197. This Court is entitled to enquire into the question whether the plea
entered before the summary court was equivocal. However, unless there is
something which prima facie raises the issue of an equivocal plea having been
tendered before the court of summary jurisdiction, this Court ought not to make
inquiry. The issue of equivocality is confined to what went on before the court of
summary jurisdiction. If the evidence reveals that nothing occurred there to render
the plea equivocal that is the end of the matter and this Court will proceed to hear
the appeal against sentence, if pursued. In a case of an appellant producing some
prima facie and credible evidence tending to show that the plea before the court of
summary jurisdiction was equivocal, this Court may seek assistance from a
transcript of the proceedings in the court below, or, if it is considered more
conducive to justice, from such court as to what happened before that court and
only after considering such assistance should this Court decide the issue. In P.
Foster (Haulage) Limited –v- Roberts, 67 Cr.App.R. 305, DC it was said that the
Crown Court should ask itself three questions, (a) was the plea itself equivocal?,
(b) if not, did anything occur during the proceedings which should have led the
justices to consider whether they should exercise their discretion to invite or
permit a change of plea?, (c) if so, had it been shown that by not inviting a change
of plea the justices had exercised their discretion wrongly? As to the second issue,
such court stated that if the defendant is legally represented, it will be rare that it
can be said that it ought to have been apparent to the justices that they should
consider exercising their discretion to invite a change of plea. If, however, the
mitigation, other than general assertion in mitigation, is inconsistent with the legal
ingredients of the offence, or with the plea, then the court of summary jurisdiction
should not shy from doing so.”
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146. See Archbold paragraphs 4-186 to 4-187 in respect of change of plea
generally.
147. See Archbold paragraph 2-200 re: change of plea of “guilty” following
committal by Summary Court to the Crown Court for sentence. See
also R v Mutford and Lothingland Justices Ex parte Harber [1971] 2
QB 291.
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Sentencing
General
148. Counsel should consider all relevant sentencing options and be in a
position to address the court on the same. Counsel should check the
maximum sentence for the offence. Counsel should consider all the
necessary and appropriate orders and the relevant sentencing
guidelines. There needs to be a full consideration of the facts and
circumstances of offence and the offender, victim issues and issues
relevant to the punishment of the offender, the protection of the
public, deterrence and the rehabilitation of the offender. Consider also
the aggravating and mitigating factors. Consider all the circumstances
of the case.
149. See Newbery (judgment delivered on the 13th January 2009) at
paragraphs 182, 183 and 184 in respect of the key elements in the
sentencing process namely protection of the public, punishment,
deterrence and rehabilitation of offenders. See Baines (Appeal
Division judgment 29th September 2010) in respect of deterrent
sentences.
150. See R(Edwards-Sayer) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC
467 (Admin) in respect of the phrase “convicted prisoner”. There is a
useful summary of the authorities on the word “conviction”. See also
Deemster Kerruish’s judgment in Beaumont 1999-01 MLR 149 where
it was held that a defendant is convicted at the time of sentencing and
not when he pleads guilty.
151. Counsel should ensure that the court is given all relevant and up to
date information relevant to the sentencing process. In the Attorney
General’s Reference (Kneale) 1993-95 MLR 239 Hytner J A at pages
243-244 stated: “We do find that we should take into account that Deemster
Cain was actively misled, however innocently, into believing that he was dealing
with a youth of good character.”
And at pages 244-245:
“For guidance, we should state that offences should be dealt with chronologically;
we do not know why in this case summonses were not served in relation to the
earlier offences until January 1994. But we are relieved and encouraged to hear
from Mr. Montgomerie that an enquiry is now taking place into the reasons for
that error. Applications should not be made to adjourn earlier cases in order to
avoid the accused having previous convictions when appearing for a later offence.
The court is not suggesting, however, that in this case the application was made
for an improper reason.
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Had Deemster Cain known of the pending cases, he should and would have
adjourned the case of death by reckless driving until the earlier cases had been
disposed of. Furthermore, counsel should take particular care in dealing with the
situation which faced Mr. Wannenburgh. We would emphasize that it is not the
duty of counsel for a defendant to volunteer facts aggravating the offence; but
counsel must avoid half truths which deceive and in relation to pending cases
where a guilty plea is intended counsel should be inhibited from suggesting that
the defendant is a person of good character.
We have considered what sentence to pass in this case. We would normally have
passed a longer sentence than the one which we have decided to impose, which is
one of six months’ youth custody. We have imposed what we would regard as an
unusually short sentence for an offence such as this, where there has been a
previous course of bad driving, for four reasons.
The first is that the respondent has already served part of his sentence of
community service; we would at this stage wish to emphasize that, contrary to the
belief of many members of the public, community service is not a soft option; it is
very often an onerous punishment and some hardened offenders prefer to serve a
short period of custody rather than a community service order. Secondly, we take
into account the unusual features of a reference, namely that the respondent will
have had his hopes raised by the actual sentence and then suffered a bitter shock
on hearing that there would be a review of the sentence. Thirdly, his extreme
youth, and fourthly, the almost certain loss of his job. We do not disturb the
consequential sentences that the respondent’s licence be endorsed, that he be
disqualified from driving for five years and required to pass a driving test before
being able to drive again. We wish to emphasize that in future, for such an
offence, offenders should anticipate a much longer period in custody.
Finally, it is clear that the heavy financial penalties passed by the magistrates’
court were imposed in the belief that the respondent would be at liberty and
earning money. We would in the circumstances encourage him to appeal against
those sentences.”
152. In Christian (Appeal Division 28th September 2004) the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) at
paragraph [9] in effect stated that where proceedings are pending in
the Summary Court and the Court of General Gaol Delivery it would
be far more preferable for matters to be dealt with by one judge who
could take a global view of the consequences and the totality of the
defendant’s criminal activity.
Custody
153. Custody is the last resort. Section 9(1) of the Custody Act 1995
provides that no court shall impose custody on a person unless it is of
the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate.
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154. Section 9(2) of the Custody Act 1995 provides that without prejudice
to subsection (1), no court shall impose custody on a child or young
person unless the court is of the opinion that the circumstances are so
exceptional that it would be inappropriate to deal with him by any
other method.
155. Youth is a powerful mitigating factor especially in relation to an
offender of previous good character. The courts are always reluctant
to impose immediate custodial sentences on young people. See B v
Oake 1996-98 MLR N18 in respect of custodial sentences and
juveniles. There are two possible sets of circumstances “so exceptional”
that a court could be justified in imposing custody on a juvenile under
section 9(2) of the Custody Act 1995 because any other method of
dealing with him is “inappropriate”. One is that the offence follows a
stream of repeated offences in respect of which community sentences
have been tried and failed. The other is that the offence itself is so
grave that it warrants immediate custody (e.g serious violence to the
person). A first offence of burglary and vandalism is unlikely to be
such a case. See also F v Oake 1996-98 MLR 50, O v Oake 1993-95
MLR N3, N v Chief Constable (2DS 2002/19 judgment Appeal
Division 9th April 2002) and T v Chief Constable (2DS/2002/008
judgment Appeal Division 28th February 2002). In O v Oake 1993-95
MLR N 3 it was held by the Appeal Division that the importation or
attempted importation of drugs into the Island was an offence of such
seriousness that it demanded a custodial sentence, even for juveniles.
156. For the purposes of forming an opinion under section 9(1) or (2) of
the Custody Act 1995 the court shall (a) obtain and consider
information about the circumstances including, unless the court thinks
it unnecessary or impracticable, a social inquiry report, and (b) take
into account any information before the court which is relevant to his
character and mental condition.
157. In Ollerenshaw 1999 1 Cr App R(S) 65 the English Court of Appeal
stated that when a court was considering imposing a comparatively
short period of custody, of about 12 months or less, it should ask itself
whether an even shorter period might be equally effective in
protecting the interests of the public and punishing and deterring the
criminal. There might be cases where six months might be just as
effective as nine, or two months as effective as four.
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Reports
158. The Court may order production of reports such as social enquiry
report from the Isle of Man Probation Service and psychiatric report
from the Drug and Alcohol Team to assist in the sentencing process.
Counsel will need to satisfy the court as to a relevant psychiatric issue
which would impact on sentence before a psychiatric report can be
ordered.
159. If a defendant is on bail pending sentence the court will consider
adding a condition that the defendant shall cooperate with the
preparation of any reports and attend any necessary meetings as
required.
160. Section 24 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides as follows:
“24 Power to adjourn for reports
(1) After a person has been convicted on information and before he has been sentenced or
otherwise dealt with, the court may adjourn the case for the purpose of enabling inquiries
to be made or of determining the most suitable method of dealing with his case, and may
remand him in custody or on bail.
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), where-
(a) a person is charged on information with an offence punishable with custody, and
(b) the court is satisfied that he did the act or made the omission charged, but is of
pinion that an inquiry ought to be made into his physical or mental condition before
the method of dealing with him is determined,
the court shall adjourn the case and remand him in custody or on bail for such period
or periods, no single period exceeding 6 weeks, as the court thinks necessary to
enable a medical examination and report to be made.
(3) Where a person is remanded on bail under subsection (2)-
(a ) it shall be a condition of the recognizance that he shall-
(i) undergo medical examination by a qualified medical
practitioner or, where the inquiry is into his mental condition and the
recognizance so specifies, 2 such practitioners; and
(ii) for that purpose, attend at an institution or place, or on any
such practitioner, specified in the recognizance and, where the inquiry is into
his mental condition, comply with any directions which may be given to him
for the said purpose by any person of any class so specified; and
(b) if arrangements have been made for his reception, it may be a condition of the
recognizance that he shall, for the purpose of the examination, reside until the
expiration of such period as may be specified in the recognizance or he is
discharged therefrom, whichever occurs first, in an institution or place so
specified, not being an institution or place to which he could have been
committed.
(4) On exercising the powers conferred by subsection (2) the court shall send to the
institution to which the defendant is committed, or to the institution or place at
which or the person by whom he is to be examined, as the case may be, a
statement of-
(a) the reasons why the court is of opinion that an inquiry ought to be made into his
physical or mental condition, and
(b) any information before the court about his physical or mental condition.”
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161. The court should not impose custody without first considering a social
inquiry report unless the court thinks it unnecessary or impracticable.
Section 9 of the Custody Act 1996 provides as follows:
“9. General restrictions on custody
(1) No court shall impose custody on a person unless it is of the opinion that no other
method of dealing with him is appropriate.
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), no court shall impose custody on a child or
young person unless the court is of the opinion that the circumstances are so
exceptional that it would be inappropriate to deal with him by any other method.
(3) For the purpose of forming an opinion under subsection (1) or (2) the court shall-
(a) obtain and consider information about the circumstances including, unless the
court thinks it unnecessary or impracticable, a social inquiry report, and
(b) take into account any information before the court which is relevant to his
character and mental condition.
(4) Where a court of summary jurisdiction imposes custody on a person, it shall state
in open court the reasons-
(a) for its opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate; and
(b) if no social inquiry report has been obtained, for its opinion that such a report
is unnecessary or impracticable;
and those reasons shall be entered in the order book.”
162. The Appeal Division in Watterson (judgment 24th March 1993,
unreported) at page 3 stated:
“…it must be made clear that courts are not restricted to following blindly
recommendations made in a social enquiry report; there may be many occasions
when a social enquiry report does not recommend a non-custodial sentence, but
the court may find that a non-custodial sentence is justified. Similarly, simply
because a social enquiry report does recommend a non-custodial sentence, it does
not mean that the court must blindly follow the recommendation; what is required
of the court, and required strictly, is that it pays careful attention to anything in a
social enquiry report. It is clear from the remarks of the Deemster that he has
every respect for Mrs Hulme, as does this court, but that on this occasion he found
he could not follow the recommendation.”
Mitigation
163. Defence counsel should file with the court and serve on the
prosecution a written outline of mitigation, sentencing authorities,
recommendations as to sentence and any other documents the defence
propose to rely on in mitigation well in advance of effective
sentencing hearing. Defence advocates have the opportunity to
present written outline of mitigation in advance. They should not
underestimate the importance of that. Defence advocates should focus
their pleas in mitigation on the tribunal that will be imposing the
sentence and not on the defendant or his family and friends in the
public gallery. It is inappropriate to try to appeal to the emotions.
Counsel should be concise, realistic, objective and focused in
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mitigation. Counsel should not stray from the agreed facts. Counsel
should agree the facts and basis of plea well in advance of the
sentencing hearing. If the parties cannot reach agreement then counsel
must consider the option of a Newton hearing if a matter material to
the sentence is in dispute. If a Newton hearing is required and the
court determines the facts against the defence then the sentencing
discount for a guilty plea may be significantly reduced. Indeed in
some cases it may be reduced to nil (Elicin and Moore [2008] EWCA
Crim 2249).
164. See Current Sentencing Practice which gives examples of some
potential mitigating factors. The following is an extract from pages
523-525:
“Mitigating Factors
General principles
Allowance for mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the court, and
may be withheld if there is a proper reason for doing so
Personal characteristics of the offender
A sentence may be discounted to reflect the youth of the appellant
A sentence may be discounted where the offender is in his sixties or older
A sentence may be discounted to reflect the fact that the offender is of previous
good character
A sentence may be discounted to some extent where an offender, although not of
previous good character, has not yet exhausted all possible credit for previous
good behaviour
A sentence may be discounted to reflect the fact that an offender has made a
serious attempt to lead a law-abiding life, despite a substantial criminal record
Where an offender has previous convictions for offences of a different character
from those of which he has now been convicted, the sentencer may disregard
them in determining the sentence for the latest offence
Where an offender is to be sentenced for offences of the same general character as
those for which he has been sentenced to imprisonment in the past, it may be
appropriate to discount the sentence to some extent if the alternative is to impose
a sentence very much more severe than those he has previously received for
similar offences
A sentencer may give credit to an offender for meritorious conduct wholly
unrelated to the offence for which he is to be sentenced
Circumstances preceding the commission of the offence
A sentence may be discounted where the offender has acted under provocation
The sentencer may take into account the fact that the offence was the result of
emotional stress
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The sentencer may take into account the fact that the offence was committed as a
result of serious financial difficulty for which the offender was not wholly
responsible
The fact that the offence was committed while the offender was affected by drink
is not normally a mitigating factor
Where it is alleged that the commission of the offence was the result of the
initiative of an agent provocateur, the sentence will not be mitigated unless the
officer concerned has acted improperly
The fact that the offence was committed to provide money to support an addiction
is not a mitigating factor
The effect of the sentence on persons other than the offender
The fact that the imprisonment of the offender will adversely affect his wife and
children is not normally a matter which can be taken into account
The sentencer may take into account the effect of the sentence on the offender’s
dependants, where the circumstances are such that they will be subjected to an
unusual measure of hardship as a result of his imprisonment
The sentencer may take account of the effect of a sentence on the offender’s
dependants where the effect of a custodial sentence would be to deprive his
children of all parental care
The sentencer may take account of the effect of a sentence on the offender’s
family when sentencing a woman who is the mother of young children
Additional hardships resulting from conviction
The sentencer may take account of the consequences of conviction for the
offender, over and above the sentence to be imposed for the offence
The sentencer may take account of any physical disability or illness which will
subject the offender to an unusual degree of hardship if he is imprisoned
The sentencer may not take account of the fact that the offender, if sentenced to
imprisonment, will be detained in solitary confinement for his own protection in
accordance with the Prison Rules 1964, r. 43
The offender’s individual reaction to prison life is not a matter which should
affect the sentence. When sentencing a man the court is concerned with the
character of his crime and his individual circumstances as revealed in his criminal
background, if any
The sentencer may take account of the fact that the offender will be discharged
from military service
The fact that an offender is HIV positive is not in itself necessarily a reason for
mitigating a custodial sentence
Conduct of the offender after the commission of the offence
The sentencer may take account of the fact that the offender has demonstrated his
remorse, by means over and above a plea of guilty
The fact that the offender has paid, or offered to pay compensation, does not
necessarily justify a discount in his sentence
Where an offender who has committed grave offences discloses to the police
information of substantial value in the investigation of similarly grave offences
committed by others, or the involvement of others in the same offences, the
sentencer may give credit to the offender by discounting the sentence to a
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substantial degree; but the extent of the discount is a matter to be decided by the
sentencer in relation to the circumstances of the particular case
Where an offender avoids apprehension for a substantial period of time, the
sentencer may make such allowance in mitigation as may be appropriate in the
circumstances
Where an offender commits offences as a young person but is convicted of them
as an adult, the fact that he committed the offences as a young person is a
powerful factor in sentencing him
Factors arising out of the conduct of the proceedings against the offender
Where an incident in the course of proceedings gives rise to the appearance of
injustice, or creates a justified sense of injustice on the part of the offender, his
sentence may be discounted to compensate for it Where a person convicted of an
offence and sentenced to imprisonment has served part of that sentence before the
conviction is quashed on appeal, he is not entitled to credit for that sentence
against a further sentence of imprisonment imposed on a later occasion for
offences committed subsequently to the quashing of the conviction”
165. Martin Wasik in Emmins on Sentencing (at pages 60-71) gives
examples of mitigating factors as follows:
(1) offender has acted under provocation
(2) offender has acted under duress
(3) offender has been tricked by the authorities into committing the
offence
(4) offender acted under a mistake or ignorance of the law
(5) offender is relatively young
(6) offender is relatively old (see R v Heron [2009] EWCA
Crim 94)
(7) offender has a good character, a clean record or relatively few
previous convictions
(8) offender has rendered substantial assistance to the police (See R
v P [2008] 2 Cr App R(S) 5 in respect of effect on sentence of
cooperation, assistance and valuable information given to the
prosecuting authorities).
(9) offender has performed some meritorious act unrelated to the
offence which shows him in a good light
(10) offender has shown remorse
(11) offender has pleaded guilty
(12) adverse effects of sentence on offender will be especially severe
(13) offender’s serious illness
(14) severe adverse effect of sentence on offender’s family
(15) lapse of time since the commission of the offence
(16) relevance of previous convictions
166. See also Archbold at paragraph 5-90 onwards in respect of mitigation.
81
167. Defence counsel presenting a plea in mitigation should not give
personal character references for the defendant. Counsel presents
submissions on behalf of a client rather than bringing to the attention
of the court the personal beliefs or opinions of counsel. Moreover
counsel should not attempt to give evidence during a plea in
mitigation. Counsel should not express personal beliefs when
presenting a plea in mitigation. For example it would be inappropriate
for counsel to say the following on behalf of a client for whom
counsel is advancing a plea in mitigation:
“I have been acting for the defendant for years and I’m convinced he’s finally
turned the corner and he will not commit any offences in the future” or “I’ve
been impressed with the defendant in my dealings with him. I believe he is a man
of good character and am personally convinced that his remorse is genuine.”
168. Stockdale and Devlin in Sentencing give some wise advice to defence
counsel at paragraph 5.15: “… he should not allow himself to be carried
away … He should remember the general rule that counsel personally should not
figure in the case. Assertions such as the following should be avoided: “I have
seen him in the cells and it is plain to me that he has learned his lesson”, or “I feel
sure that he bitterly regrets what he has done, and that he is most unlikely to
repeat this kind of offence”. On the other hand, there is no harm in making
submissions to the like effect in proper form: “In the circumstances in my
submission he is most unlikely to offend again”. The circumstances referred to
will not include evidence given by counsel about what he has observed, or any
personal opinion of his.”
169. See the remarks of Lord Phillips on Mitigation to the Law Society in
London on the 11th October 2007:
- consider personal mitigation
- remorse and willingness to address the problems underlying the
criminal behaviour
- discount for guilty plea to be calculated after any relevant
mitigating factors have been taken into account
- where offence on the cusp of the custody threshold chances of
rehabilitation will be better if the defendant is given a
community sentence rather than a custodial sentence
- aspects of mitigation that suggest that the defendant may avoid
re-offending have the most significant effect on sentence
- most significant single feature is the good character of the
offender. Reluctance to send a defendant to prison for a first
offence when the offence is not so serious as to make custody
inevitable.
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170. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Caldwell-Camp 2003-05 MLR 505 at paragraph 66
stated:
“The sentencer will wish to have due regard to a guilty plea and to apply an
appropriate discount. It is in the public interest that the expenditure of time and
money on a full trial is avoided. Although discount will be given, we suggest that
where there is no sensible alternative to a guilty plea the discount will be more
limited.”
171. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Watterson (judgment delivered 25th September 2007) at
paragraph [39] stated:
“.. She probably had no real alternative but to plead guilty to counts 1 to 6 but for
her frank admissions it is unlikely that the court would have appreciated the full
extent of her drug dealing. As to count 7 we consider that it is inherently unlikely
that any count of production would have been pursued against the Appellant in
the absence of her admission. It seems to this court that such matters offer very
considerable mitigation to the Appellant, even though we recognise that by
making such admissions the Appellant was avoiding the risk for later prosecution
for such matters…
[40] Taking all such matters into account it seems to this court that the appropriate
reduction of sentence to reflect the Appellant’s pleas of guilty and mitigation was
one third.”
172. In Milligan v R 1993-95 MLR N 14 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) held that the discount for a
guilty plea is not automatic and there will be no discount if the nature
of the offence or the circumstances of the offender call for a
maximum sentence. See now Hamblett (Appeal Division judgment 5th
February 2010).
173. In Elicin and Moore [2008] EWCA Crim 2249 the English Court of
Appeal Criminal Division held that where offenders plead guilty in
the face of an overwhelming prosecution case the normal discount for
their plea is reduced to 20 per cent in accordance with the Sentencing
Guidelines Council guideline on the reduction in sentence for a guilty
plea but where offenders put forward a basis of plea which is not
accepted with the result that the court conducts a Newton hearing in
which the offender’s account is not accepted, the sentencing judge is
entitled to refuse any reduction in sentence. Hooper J at paragraph 11
stated:
“11 In our view a judge is entitled to refuse any reduction where there is an
overwhelming case, as there is in this case, and where thereafter there has been a
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Newton hearing during which the defendant has clearly lied as to his involvement
in the offence. Even if any reduction were allowed in this case it would have been
a very small reduction indeed and not such as would lead this court to describe the
sentences as manifestly excessive. For these reasons the appeals are dismissed.”
174. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Jeffrey Cameron Watterson (judgment delivered 25th
April 2008) stated:
“51. We readily agree that the Respondent was entitled to mitigation for the fact
that he had produced the drug into the Island for his own personal use. If we had
been quantifying such mitigation in isolation we would have adjudged that at
most an eighteen month reduction from the starting point was justified.
52. We have considered the other mitigation available to the Respondent and
agree with Miss Norman that it is relatively limited. Whilst the Respondent
admitted his guilt from a very early stage and pleaded guilty at the earliest
opportunity and must therefore be given some credit for such behaviour, we are
bound to observe firstly that he had little realistic opportunity but to do so once he
had excreted the packages containing the heroin and secondly that he initially
denied the possession of any drugs, was not cooperative with the police and
refused to voluntarily produce the drugs, undergo an x-ray or be examined by a
doctor who might have been able to remove such packages. Moreover it is clear
that the Respondent only later consented to an x-ray and a CT scan after he had
been admitted to hospital because of concerns for his welfare.
53. By contrast there were clearly aggravating factors in that the Respondent
concealed the drugs in his rectum so that they were not immediately detectable
and had a previous conviction for production and possession with intent to supply.
Further the Respondent did not identify the supplier of his heroin, thereby
depriving himself of significant mitigation.”
[In that case, which involved a defendant producing 41.2 grams of heroin into the
Island for his own use, the Appeal Division indicated that the starting point was 8
years and that the appropriate sentence taking into account the mitigation was 5
years but imposed 4 years to take account of double jeopardy].
175. In Khan and others v R [2008] EWCA Crim 531 LCJ Phillips at
paragraph 67 stated: “[The defendant in a drugs case] did not need to see the
prosecution evidence in order to decide whether he was guilty. By waiting almost
to the door of the court [a week before trial] to indicate his plea he forfeited much
of the credit for a guilty plea. None the less guidance given by the Sentencing
Guidelines Council indicates that he should have been given a discount for his
late guilty plea of about 10% of the sentence”.
At paragraph 69 it was stated:
“The reason for the discount for a guilty plea is essentially pragmatic. It is a
reward for the saving of the time and the resources that is consequent on the plea.
For a defendant the plea usually carries with it the possibility of advancing by
way of additional mitigation the defendant’s regret for his offending. If as in the
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case of [Y] the defendant advances what the judge regards as a ludicrous story, he
robs himself of the possibility of the additional mitigation. He should not,
however, be deprived of all credit for the benefit that the guilty plea nonetheless
affords to the prosecution. [Y] did not abandon his basis of plea but left it to the
judge to form his own view of Y’s participation. The position would have been
very different if as a result of his stance it had been necessary to have a Newton
hearing.”
176. Duress or threats are of limited mitigation. In Teare (judgment 1 June
2007) the Appeal Division referred to a claim that the appellant had
been acting under duress (threats to his family) a matter not raised by
him in interview with the police and which did not form part of the
basis of plea. At paragraph 42 the Appeal Division said:
“For our part we are bound to say that we believe that such threats can offer no
more than fairly minimal mitigation, if any. We say this for two reasons. Firstly, a
person faced with such threats, which will derive from a situation into which he
has put himself has a choice of whether he reports matters to the police. Secondly,
save in very exceptional cases and we do not believe that this is such a case we do
not regard it as in the public interest that a court should treat unsubstantiated
threats as significant mitigation : were the position otherwise every defendant
before the court would contend that there was duress.”
177. This approach was also adopted by the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) in Goodman (judgment 1
June 2007) where the explanation that the defendant had been heavily
in debt at the time to loan sharks who forced him to bring the drugs
over to the island was contained in the agreed summary of facts and
accepted by the prosecution. There was reference to various threats.
Even in those circumstances the Appeal Division stated (at paragraph
38 of their judgment) that: “a plea in mitigation based on an unsubstantiated
or unchallenged account of duress, or pressure can offer no more than fairly
minimal mitigation, if any.”
178. In Conroy v R 1996-98 MLR N 18 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Cain) indicated that where an
offender has pleaded guilty but there is evidence which might lead to
mitigation if the court were to make a finding on it – for example, on
a charge of possession of drugs with intent to supply, evidence of
threats and possibly injury from the offender’s supplier – it is the duty
of the offender’s advocate to request a Newton hearing so that the
court has the opportunity to make a finding on that evidence. If the
court does not make a finding in favour of the defendant and time and
costs have been wasted on a Newton hearing the mitigation otherwise
available to the defendant may however be diminished (Elicin and
Moore [2008] EWCA Crim 2249).
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179. In an endeavour to increase the likelihood of the main offenders being
caught and brought to justice the courts have made it plain that they
will give significant sentencing discounts to those defendants (guilty
of offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1976) who are willing to
name the main dealers and suppliers and provide other useful
information to the police. It needs to be crystal clear that the court is
willing to give a substantial sentencing discount to those who provide
useful information to the police and the prosecution authorities. The
position is not limited to those convicted of offences under the Misuse
of Drugs Act 1976. It applies to all defendants convicted of any
criminal offences. If they cooperate and provide useful information
they will be dealt with more leniently than if they did not cooperate
and did not provide information. The Appeal Division in the
Caldwell-Camp case 2003-05 MLR 505 emphasised that:
“Early, and useful assistance in helping the police and the prosecution authorities
to prosecute others will almost invariably result in a substantial reduction of the
sentence which would otherwise be imposed.”
180. In Todd v R 1993-95 MLR 330 Judge of Appeal Hytner stated that in
drugs cases “the courts must apply a stick and a carrot – on the one hand
realistic sentences for offenders who maintain silence, on the other, a substantial
discount for those who are prepared to give information.”
181. See R v P and Blackburn [2007] EWCA Crim 229; [2008] 2 Cr. App
R(S) 5 in respect of guidance on sentencing an offender who has
provided assistance to a prosecutor or investigator. The English Court
of Appeal referred to the convention of giving lower sentences to
those who had informed on or given evidence against those who
participated in the same or linked crimes or in respect of crimes in
which they had no personal involvement. It was stated that this was a
price worth paying to achieve the public interest that major criminals
in particular should be prosecuted to conviction.
182. In Hill v Oake 1993-95 MLR N2 it was held by the Appeal Division
(Deemster Corrin and Deemster Cain) that confinement of a convicted
police officer with prisoners previously arrested by the officer may be
mitigation.
183. In Crossley v R 1993-95 MLR N 14 it was held by the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) that an
unusually severe effect of imprisonment on vulnerable personality
may be mitigation. Bullying in prison is a matter for the prison
authorities and is not mitigation.
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184. In Bull v R 1993-95 MLR N 13 it was held by the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) that a delay of almost
two years before trial is not mitigation if it was caused by the
appellant’s own actions.
185. In Faragher v R 1990-92 MLR 428 it was held by the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) that it was no
mitigation that the female offender would be the only female in
prison.
186. In York [2005] HCA 60 the High Court of Australia had to consider
whether to interfere with a sentence because of the risk to the
appellant’s safety whilst in prison. Hayne J at paragraph 37 stated
that: “Execution of sentences of imprisonment passed by the courts, and caring
for prisoners under sentence, are tasks committed to the executive arm of
government and regulated, for the most part, by legislation.”
187. In King 2005-06 MLR N 3 it was held by the Appeal Division (Judge
of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) that if an assault was
committed as part of a joint enterprise sentence on an individual
offender should reflect the totality of injuries whichever offender
caused them. There was no mitigation in a joint enterprise case in
saying “I didn’t cause all the injuries.”
188. In Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Tattersall and Deemster Doyle) indicated that sentences on
counsellors and procurers should reflect their different roles.
189. In Craine v R 1978-80 MLR 233 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Glidewell and Deemster Eason) held that it may be mitigation
where an offender makes no further attempts at molestation and
leaves when told to do so by the victim.
190. In R v Mako (2000) 17 CRNZ 272 (CA) the New Zealand Court of
Appeal held (1) in general, an early guilty plea will warrant a
generous discount, because the plea reflects acknowledgement of
wrongdoing, saves resources, and relieves victims from the anxieties
of trial. However, in this case the respondent entered an early guilty
plea on the aggravated robbery charge but failed to acknowledge the
totality of offending until the start of trial. A modest discount was
appropriate (2) Youth and rehabilitation prospects may be mitigating
factors, but offenders who have accumulated long lists of prior
convictions while still in their teens cannot expect leniency.
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191. The Appeal Division (Deemster Cain and Deemster Kerruish) in
Hepburn (judgment 1st November 1999, unreported) took into account
that the offender was a serving soldier and upheld an appeal against a
custodial sentence imposed for an offence of assault causing actual
bodily harm. The Appeal Division imposed a fine in the knowledge
that the offender would be the subject of further punishment under
military law. The offender had also served one third of the custodial
sentence originally imposed upon him. The Appeal Division added:
“We would comment that the fact that a defendant is a serving soldier is but one
factor to be considered by a sentencer and its importance must not be over-
emphasised. As we have indicated it is not the primary consideration before the
court.”
192. See guideline cases for specific mitigation in respect of specific
offences.
Aggravating factors
193. In addition to the plea in mitigation delivered on behalf of the
defendant the court will also be considering the aggravating factors
and the position of the victim and the protection of the public.
194. Prior to the sentencing hearing prosecution counsel should file with
the court and serve on the defence a note of the aggravating factors in
the case, the relevant sentencing options and guideline cases and their
recommendations as to sentence.
195. Martin Wasik in Emmins on Sentencing (at pages 57-60) gives the
following as examples of some of the more common aggravating
factors:
(1) victim especially vulnerable
(2) breach of trust
(3) premeditation, ‘professional’ offender
(4) group offending
(5) offending whilst on bail
(6) offence prevalence
(7) racially motivated offending
196. The Appeal Division in Westhead (judgment 22nd November 2005,
unreported) at paragraph [22] stated:
“The fact that the Appellant committed the offences whilst he was under the
influence of drink, is no excuse”.
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197. Under section 41 Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 when
considering the seriousness of an offence if the defendant was under
the influence of alcohol at the time the offence was committed the
court (a) may treat that fact as an aggravating factor; and (b) if it does
so, must state in open court that the offence was so aggravated.
198. In Gallagher v R 1981-83 MLR 314 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Hytner and Deemster Luft) held that intoxication could be an
aggravating circumstance in sexual offence cases if the accused
foresees that intoxication is likely to reduce self control and lead to
sexual violence.
199. Andrew Ashworth in Sentencing and Criminal Justice (3rd Ed)
comments on aggravating factors at pages 132-9, 155-159 and refers
to offences by groups or gangs, offences against young, elderly or
otherwise vulnerable victims, offences involving the abuse of trust or
authority, racially motivated offences and offences involving planning
or organisation.
200. See also Archbold at paragraph 5-55 onwards in respect of
determining the seriousness of the offences and the references to
previous convictions.
201. The defendant’s previous convictions may be relevant to the
sentencing process in a number of ways. They may go to the
seriousness of the offence and may be indicative of the dangerousness
of the offender and the need to protect the public from him. They may
assist in deciding the effectiveness or otherwise of a particular type of
sentence. They may provide an insight into the defendant’s criminal
career and in particular whether he has made a real effort over a
period of years to put a previous pattern of offending behaviour
behind him.
202. In Chief Constable of Humberside Police v The Information
Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 1079 the English Court of Appeal
at paragraph 109 stressed that it was the duty of the Crown to place
before the sentencing court a complete record of previous convictions
of the defendant. A previous conviction is to be treated as aggravating
the offence if it reasonably can be. Hughes L J stated that a court may
of course disregard an old conviction and often will, but it may be
wrong to do so. Certainly there ought often to be a real difference
between sentencing a person who has never before offended and
sentencing one who has, perhaps similarly, albeit many years
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previously. The Court must be in a position to make an informed
decision.
203. In S v Oake 1990-92 MLR 215 the Appeal Division (Deemster Corrin
and Deemster Callow) held that to enter a private dwelling at night
with the intention of stealing and walk into a bedroom where a child
was sleeping was so grave an offence that a custodial sentence was
essential, whatever the age of the offender. In B v Oake 1996-98 MLR
N 18 the Appeal Division (Deemster Corrin and Deemster Cain) held
that a first offence of burglary and vandalism is unlikely to justify
sending a juvenile to custody. See now Smith 2003-05 MLR N 20
where the Appeal Division (Deemster Kerruish and Acting Deemster
Sullivan) laid down new guidelines for determining the appropriate
sentence for domestic burglary.
204. See guideline cases for specific aggravating factors in respect of
specific offences.
Suspended sentence
205. See section 10 and Schedule 1 of the Custody Act 1995. A court
which passes a sentence of custody for a term of not more than 2
years may order that the sentence shall not take effect unless during a
period specified in the order, being not less than one year or more
than 2 years from the date of the order, the offender commits in the
Island another offence punishable with custody and thereafter a
competent court orders that the original sentence shall take effect.
206. In Jameson (judgment 29th April 2005) the Appeal Division
(Deemster Kerruish and Deemster Doyle) at paragraph [19] stated that
the decision whether to suspend a custodial sentence is a matter for
the sentencer having taken into account all the relevant circumstances
of the offence, the offender and the background circumstances. In
Manx law there is a wide discretion when considering whether or not
to suspend the operation of a custodial sentence. There is no statutory
requirement in the Isle of Man that the circumstances which may
justify the exercise of judicial discretion to suspend a custodial
sentence must be exceptional or limited to the circumstances of the
offence.
207. In Fair (Appeal Division judgment 26th August 1997) the Appeal
Division confirmed that there should be a good reason for suspending
a sentence of custody if an offence is serious enough to justify a
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custodial sentence in the first place. Deemster Cain in Fair at page 3
stated:
“There should be a good reason for suspending a sentence of custody, if an
offence is serious enough to justify a custodial sentence in the first place, although
there are no statutory guidelines in the Isle of Man as to when a sentence of
custody should be suspended. I am not satisfied that there is any good reason to
suspend the sentence of custody in this case.”
208. In Attorney General’s Reference No 8 of 2007 [2007] EWCA Crim
922 the English Court of Appeal did not interfere where a suspended
sentence was imposed on a young offender who had been convicted
of one count of possessing cannabis with intent to supply and one
count of possessing cocaine with intent to supply. The Court of
Appeal stated:
“21. The judge had every reason for the unusual approach that he adopted to
this case. He had every reason for taking a particularly lenient view of this
offender and imposing a sentence which, being custodial, emphasised the gravity
of the offending, but which, being suspended, reflected the fact that she was
unlikely to offend again and that it was not necessary in the circumstances that
she should go straight into detention.”
209. The court should explain to the defendant his liability if during the
operational period he commits an offence punishable with custody.
Defendants need to be aware of the consequences of a breach of
suspended sentence. The imposition of a suspended sentence is not an
easy option. If there is a breach (i.e. another offence punishable with
imprisonment committed during the operational period of the
suspended sentence) the usual result will be the activation of the
suspended sentence.
210. The court has a number of options when dealing with a breach of a
suspended sentence. It can (a) order the suspended sentence to take
effect with the original term unaltered (b) order the sentence to take
effect with the substitution of a lesser term (c) vary the order by
substituting the operational period to a period expiring not later than 3
years from the date of the variation (d) make no order. The court must
activate the original term unless it would be unjust to do so in view of
all the circumstances which have arisen since the suspended sentence
was passed, including the facts of the subsequent offence and where it
is of that opinion the court shall state the reasons.
211. If further offences punishable by custody are committed during the
operational period of a suspended sentence then in the normal course
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of events the breach of the suspended sentence will be dealt with by
activating the suspended sentence in its entirety.
212. The authorities make it crystal clear that the activation of the
suspended sentence is the normal consequence of the commission of
an offence during the operational period of a suspended sentence.
That is qualified to a certain extent as follows: where the subsequent
offence is both of a relatively trivial nature and of a different character
from the offence for which the suspended sentence was imposed, the
sentencer may consider that it would be unjust to activate the sentence
but that would be an exceptional matter.
213. The authorities make it plain that the fact that an offence committed
during an operational period of a suspended sentence is of a different
character from the offence from which the suspended sentence was
imposed is not in itself a ground for not activating the suspended
sentence.
Suspended sentence supervision order
214. See Schedule 1 of the Custody Act 1995 paragraph 6 onwards in
respect of a suspended sentence supervision order. See also the
amendments inserted by section 43 of the Criminal Justice, Police and
Courts Act 2007. See paragraph 10 in respect of a breach of the
requirements of a supervision order.
Community service order
215. Section 14 and Schedule 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1981 make
provision for community service orders. The number of hours should
not be less than forty nor more than two hundred and forty.
216. The relevant provisions of the Schedule are as follows:
“1. (1) Where a person of or over fourteen years of age is convicted of an offence
(not being an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law), the court by or
before which he is convicted may, instead of dealing with him in any other way
(but subject to paragraph 2) make an order (in this Act referred to as a 'community
service order') requiring him to perform unpaid work in accordance with the
subsequent provisions of this Schedule for such number of hours (being in the
aggregate not less than forty nor more than two hundred and forty) as may be
specified in the order…
2. A court shall not make a community service order in respect of any offender
unless the offender consents and the court is satisfied-
(a) that arrangements exist for persons to perform work under such orders;
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(b) after considering a report by a probation officer about the offender and his
circumstances and, if the court thinks it necessary, hearing a probation officer,
that the offender is a suitable person to perform work under such an order;
(c) that provision can be made under the arrangements for him to do so; and
(d) that, in the event of the offender being less than seventeen years, his parent
or guardian also consents to the order being made unless the court is satisfied
that the consent is unreasonably withheld against the wishes of the offender.
3. Where a court makes community service orders in respect of two or more
offences of which the offender has been convicted by or before the court, the
court may direct that the hours of work specified in any of those orders shall be
concurrent with or additional to those specified in any other of those orders, but
so that the total number of hours which are not concurrent shall not exceed the
maximum in paragraph 1.
4. The functions conferred by the subsequent provisions of this Schedule on the
relevant officer shall be discharged by a person nominated by the Department of
Home Affairs for the purpose of those provisions.
5. Before making a community service order the court shall explain to the
offender in ordinary language-
(a) the purpose and effect of the order (and, in particular, the requirements of
the order as specified in Part II);
(b) the consequences which may follow under Part III if he fails to comply
with any of those requirements; and
(c) the circumstances in which the court has power under Part IV to review the
order.
6. The court by which a community service order is made shall forthwith give
copies of the order to the relevant officer and he shall give a copy to the offender.
7.(1) The Council of Ministers may by order direct that paragraph 1 shall be
amended by substituting, for the maximum number of hours specified in that
paragraph as originally enacted or as previously amended under this paragraph,
such number of hours as may be specified in the order.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) shall not have effect until it has been
approved by Tynwald.
8. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be construed as preventing a court which makes a
community service order in respect of any offence from making an order for costs
against, or imposing any disqualification on, the offender or from making in
respect of the offence an order under section 16 or 17 or under Part I of Schedule
6, or under section 30 of the Theft Act 1981.
PART II
OBLIGATIONS OF PERSON SUBJECT TO COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDER
9. An offender in respect of whom a community service order is in force shall-
(a) report to the relevant officer and subsequently from time to time notify him
of any change of address; and
(b) perform for the number of hours specified in the order such work at such
times as he may be instructed by the relevant officer.
10. Subject to paragraph 20, the work required to be performed under a
community service order shall be performed during the period of twelve months
beginning with the date of the order but, unless revoked, the order shall remain in
force until the offender has worked under it for the number of hours specified in
it.
11. The instructions given by the relevant officer under this Part shall, so far as
practicable, be such as to avoid any conflict with the offender's religious beliefs
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and any interference with the times, if any, at which he normally works or attends
a school or other educational establishment.
PART III
BREACH OF REQUIREMENTS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDER
12. If at any time while a community service order is in force in respect of an
offender it appears on complaint to a justice of the peace that the offender has
failed to comply with any of the requirements of Part II (including any failure
satisfactorily to perform the work which he has been instructed to do), the justice
may issue a summons requiring the offender to appear at the place and time
specified therein, or may, if the complaint is in writing and on oath, issue a
warrant for his arrest.
13. Any summons or warrant issued under this Part shall direct the offender to
appear or be brought before a court of summary jurisdiction.
14. If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court of summary jurisdiction before
which an offender appears or is brought under this Part that he has failed without
reasonable excuse to comply with any of the requirements of Part II, the court
may, without prejudice to the continuance of the order, impose on him a fine not
exceeding £1,000 or may-
(a) if the community service order was made by a court of summary
jurisdiction, revoke the order and deal with the offender, for the offence in
respect of which the order was made, in any manner in which he could have
been dealt with for that offence by the court which made the order if the order
had not been made;
(b) if the order was made by a Court of General Gaol Delivery, commit him to
custody or release him on bail until he can be brought or appear before such a
court.
15. A court of summary jurisdiction which deals with an offender's case under
paragraph 14(b) shall send to the Chief Registrar a certificate signed by a justice
of the peace certifying that the offender has failed to comply with the
requirements of Part II in the respect specified in the certificate, together with
such other particulars of the case as may be desirable; and a certificate purporting
to be so signed shall be admissible as evidence of the failure before a Court of
General Gaol Delivery.
16. Where, by virtue of paragraph 14(b) the offender is brought or appears before
a Court of General Gaol Delivery and it is proved to the satisfaction of the court
that he has failed to comply with any of the requirements of Part II, that court may
either-
(a) without prejudice to the continuance of the order, impose on him a fine not
exceeding £1,000; or
(b) revoke the order and deal with him, for the offence in respect of which the
order was made, in any manner in which he could have been dealt with for that
offence by the court which made the order if the order had not been made.
17. A person sentenced under paragraph 14(a) for an offence may appeal to the
Staff of Government Division against the sentence.
18. In proceedings before a Court of General Gaol Delivery under this Part, any
question whether the offender has failed to comply with the requirements of Part
II shall be determined by the court and not by the verdict of a jury.
19. A fine imposed under this Part shall be deemed for the purposes of any
enactment to be a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction.
94
PART IV
AMENDMENT AND REVOCATION OF COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS,
AND SUBSTITUTION OF OTHER SENTENCES
20. Where a community service order is in force in respect of any offender and,
on the application of the offender or the relevant officer, it appears to a court of
summary jurisdiction that it would be in the interests of justice to do so having
regard to circumstances which have arisen since the order was made, the court
may extend, in relation to the order, the period of twelve months specified in
paragraph 10.
21. Where such an order is in force and-
(a) on any such application; or
(b) on the offender being convicted of an offence before a court of summary
jurisdiction, it appears to the court that, having regard to such circumstances, it
would be in the interests of justice that the order should be revoked or that the
offender should be dealt with in some other manner for the offence in respect of
which the order was made, the court may-
(a) if the order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction, revoke the order
or revoke it and deal with the offender for that offence in any manner in which
he could have been dealt with for that offence by the court which made the
order if the order had not been made;
(b) if the order was made by a Court of General Gaol Delivery, commit him to
custody or release him on bail until he can be brought or appear before such a
court;
and, where the court deals with his case under sub-paragraph (b) it shall send
to the Chief Registrar such particulars of the case as may be desirable.
22. Where an offender in respect of whom such an order is in force-
(a) is convicted of an offence before a Court of General Gaol Delivery; or
(b) is committed by a court of summary jurisdiction to a Court of General Gaol
Delivery for sentence and is brought or appears before the Court of General
Gaol Delivery; or
(c) by virtue of paragraph 21(b), is brought or appears before a Court of General
Gaol Delivery, and it appears to the Court of General Gaol Delivery to be in the
interests of justice to do so, having regard to circumstances which have arisen
since the order was made, the Court may revoke the order or revoke the order
and deal with the offender, for the offence in respect of which the order was
made, in any manner in which he could have been dealt with for that offence by
the court which made the order if the order had not been made.
23. A person sentenced under paragraph 21(a) for an offence may appeal to the
Staff of Government Division against the sentence…
26. Where a court of summary jurisdiction proposes to exercise its powers under
paragraph 20 or 21 otherwise than on the application of the offender, it shall
summon him to appear before the court and, if he does not appear in answer to the
summons, may issue a warrant for his arrest.”
217. The Appeal Division (Deemster Cain and Deemster Kerruish) in
Hepburn (judgment 1st November 1999, unreported) stated:
“The purpose of a Community Service Order is to punish the offender in a
constructive manner and enable him to make some reparation to the community
for the offence.”
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218. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin)
in Attorney General’s Reference (Kneale) 1993-95 MLR 239 at 245
stated: “ … we would at this stage wish to emphasise that, contrary to the belief
of many members of the public, community service is not a soft option; it is very
often an onerous punishment and some hardened offenders prefer to serve a short
period of custody rather than a community service order.”
Compensation order
219. Section 21 and Schedule 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1981 make
provision for compensation orders. The relevant provisions of
Schedule 6 are as follows:
“1. Subject to the provisions of this Schedule, a court by or before which a person
is convicted of an offence, in addition to dealing with him in any other way, may,
on application or otherwise, make an order (in this Act referred to as a
'compensation order') requiring him to pay compensation for any personal injury,
loss or damage resulting from that offence or any other offence which is taken
into consideration by the court in determining sentence.
2. In the case of an offence under the Theft Act 1981, where the property in
question is recovered, any damage to the property occurring while it was out of
the owner's possession shall be treated for the purposes of paragraph 1 as having
resulted from the offence, however and by whomsoever the damage was caused…
4. In determining whether to make a compensation order against any person, and
in determining the amount to be paid by any person under such an order, it shall
be the duty of the court-
(a) to have regard to his means so far as they appear or are known to the court;
and
(b) in a case where it proposes to make against him both a compensation order
and a confiscation order under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1990, shall also
have regard to its duty under section 2(7) of that Act (duty where the court
considers that the offender's means are insufficient to satisfy both orders in full
to order the payment out of sums recovered under the confiscation order of
sums due under the compensation order).
5. The compensation to be paid under a compensation order made by a court of
summary jurisdiction in respect of any offence of which the court has convicted
the offender shall not exceed £5,000, and the compensation or total compensation
to be paid under a compensation order or compensation orders made by a court of
summary jurisdiction in respect of any offence or offences taken into
consideration in determining sentence shall not exceed the difference (if any)
between the amount or total amount which under the preceding provisions of this
paragraph is the maximum for the offence or offences, of which the offender has
been convicted and the amount or total amounts (if any) which are in fact ordered
to be paid in respect of that offence or those offences.
PART II
APPEALS IN THE CASE OF COMPENSATION ORDERS
7. A compensation order made by a court of summary jurisdiction shall be
suspended-
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(a) in any case until the expiration of the period for the time being prescribed by
law for the giving of notice of appeal against a decision of a court of summary
jurisdiction;
(b) where notice of appeal is given within the period so prescribed, until the
determination of the appeal.
8. Where a compensation order has been made against any person in respect of an
offence taken into consideration in determining his sentence-
(a) the order shall cease to have effect if he successfully appeals against his
conviction of the offence or, if more than one, all the offences, of which he was
convicted in the proceedings in which the order was made;
(b) he may appeal against the order as if it were part of the sentence imposed in
respect of the offence or, if more than one, any of the offences, of which he was
so convicted.
PART III
REVIEW OF COMPENSATION ORDERS
9. At any time before a compensation order has been complied with or fully
complied with, the court which made the order may, on the application of the
person against whom it was made, discharge the order, or reduce the amount
which remains to be paid, if it appears to the court-
(a) that the injury, loss or damage in respect of which the order was made has
been held in civil proceedings to be less than it was taken to be for the purposes
of the order; or
(b) in the case of an order in respect of the loss of any property, that the
property has been recovered by the person in whose favour the order was made.
PART IV
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPENSATION ORDERS
10. The amount of any compensation awarded under a compensation order shall
be recoverable or otherwise enforceable-
(a) except in the case of a private prosecution (that is to say, a prosecution
instituted by a private citizen acting in a private capacity), in the same manner
as a fine;
(b) in the case of a private prosecution in the same manner as a judgment for a
civil debt.
PART V
EFFECT OF COMPENSATION ORDER ON SUBSEQUENT AWARD OF
DAMAGES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
11. This Part shall have effect where a compensation order has been made in
favour of any person in respect of any injury, loss or damage and a claim by him
in civil proceedings for damages in respect thereof subsequently falls to be
determined.
12. The damages in the civil proceedings shall be assessed without regard to the
order; but where the whole or part of the amount awarded by the order has been
paid, the damages awarded in the civil proceedings shall not exceed the amount
(if any) by which, as so assessed, they exceed the amount paid under the order.
13. Where the whole or part of the amount awarded by the order remains unpaid
and the court awards damages in the civil proceedings, then, unless the person
against whom the order was made has ceased to be liable to pay the amount
unpaid (whether in consequence of an appeal, of his imprisonment for default or
otherwise), the court shall direct that the judgment-
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(a) if it is for an amount not exceeding the amount unpaid under the order, shall
not be enforced; or
(b) if it is for an amount exceeding the amount unpaid under the order, shall not
be enforced as to a corresponding amount, without the leave of the court.”
220. In Halsall v Cain 1978-80 MLR 66 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Clothier, Deemster Eason and Deemster Luft) indicated that a
compensation order is generally inappropriate if the court is sending
the defendant to custody and the defendant does not have immediately
available assets to discharge it. The Appeal Division indicated that
compensation orders should not be used against an offender without
capital resources who may have difficulty in earning money to meet
the liability on his release from prison.
Probation order
221. The Criminal Justice Act 1963 was an Act to abolish transportation,
penal servitude and hard labour. It also provided improved and new
methods of dealing with offenders and persons liable to imprisonment
and empowered the courts to order compensation for the victims of
crime. The following are extracts from the Criminal Justice Act 1963
in respect of probation orders:
“2 Probation
[1948/3] (1) Where a court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence
(not being an offence the sentence of which is fixed by law) is of opinion
that having regard to the circumstances, including the nature of the offence
and the character of the offender, it is expedient to do so, the court may,
instead of sentencing him, make a probation order, that is to say, an order
requiring him to be under the supervision of a probation officer or some
other person, such other person being named in the order for a period to be
specified in the order of not less than six months nor more than three years.
Provided that a probation order shall not, without the consent of the
Department of Health and Social Security, place a child or young person
under the supervision of a person other than an officer of that Department
designated for the purpose by that Department.
(2) ......
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next following section, a probation order
may in addition require the offender to comply during the whole or any part of the
probation period with such requirements as the court, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, considers necessary for securing the good conduct of
the offender or for preventing a repetition by him of the same offence or the
commission of other offences:
Provided that (without prejudice to the power of the court to make an order
under subsection (2) of section eight of this Act) the payment of sums by way of
damages for injury or compensation for loss shall not be included among the
requirements of a probation order.
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(4) Without prejudice to the generality of the last foregoing subsection, a
probation order may include requirements relating to the residence of the
offender:
Provided that-
(a) before making an order containing any such requirements, the court shall
consider the home surroundings of the offender; and
(b) where the order requires the offender to reside in an approved probation
hostel, or any other institution, the period for which he is so required to reside
shall be specified in the order.
(4A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsections (3) and (4), a
probation order may in addition-
(a) require the person to remain for periods specified in the order at a place
so specified, and paragraphs 1(3) to (8) and 2 of Schedule 5 to the Criminal
Justice Act 2001 and rules made under paragraph 5 of that Schedule shall apply to
such requirements as they apply to a curfew order;
(b) include the requirements which are authorised by Schedule 1A.
(5) Before making a probation order, the court shall explain to the offender
in ordinary language the effect of the order (including any additional requirements
proposed to be inserted therein under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of this
section or under the next following section) and that if he fails to comply
therewith or commits another offence he will be liable to be sentenced for the
original offence; and if the offender is not less than fourteen years of age the court
shall not make the order unless he expresses his willingness to comply with the
requirements thereof.
(6) The court by which a probation order is made shall forthwith give copies
of the order to the probation officer or other person responsible for the
supervision of the offender, and he shall give a copy to the offender, to the parent
or guardian (if present in court) of an offender who is under the age of seventeen
years, and to the person in charge of any premises in which the probationer is
required by the order to reside.
3 Probation orders requiring treatment for mental condition
(1) Where the court is satisfied, on the evidence of a registered medical
practitioner approved for the purposes of section 12 of the Mental Health Act
1998, that the mental condition of an offender is such as requires and may be
susceptible to treatment, but is not such as to warrant his detention in pursuance
of a hospital order, the court may make a probation order and include in it a
requirement that the offender shall submit, during the whole of the probation
period or during such part of that period as may be specified in the order, to
treatment by or under the direction of a registered medical practitioner with a
view to the improvement of the offender's medical condition.
(2) The treatment required by any such order shall be such one of the
following kinds of treatment as may be specified in the order-
(a) treatment as a resident patient in a hospital or mental nursing home;
(b) treatment as a non-resident patient at such institution or place as may
be specified in the order; or
(c) treatment by or under the direction of such registered medical
practitioner as may be so specified;
but except as aforesaid the nature of the treatment shall not be specified in the
order.
(3) A court shall not make a probation order containing such a requirement
as is mentioned in subsection (1) unless it is satisfied that arrangements have been
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made for the treatment intended to be specified in the order and, if the offender is
to be treated as mentioned in subsection (2)(a), for his reception.
(4) While the probationer is under treatment as a resident patient in
pursuance of a requirement of the probation order, the probation officer
responsible for his supervision shall carry out the supervision to such an extent
only as may be necessary for the purpose of the discharge or amendment of the
order.
(5) Where the medical practitioner by whom or under whose direction a
probationer is being treated for his mental condition in pursuance of a probation
order is of opinion that part of the treatment can be better or more conveniently
given in an institution or place not specified in the order, being an institution or
place in or at which the treatment of the probationer will be given by or under the
direction of a registered medical practitioner, he may, with the consent of the
probationer, make arrangements for him to be treated accordingly, and the
arrangement may provide for the probationer to receive part of his treatment as a
resident patient in an institution or place although it is not one which could have
been specified in that behalf in the probation order.
(6) Where any such arrangements as are mentioned in subsection (5) are
made for the treatment of a probationer-
(a) the medical practitioner by whom the arrangements are made shall give
notice in writing to the probation officer responsible for the supervision of the
probationer, specifying the institution or place in or at which the treatment is to be
carried out; and
(b) the treatment provided for by the arrangements shall be deemed to be
treatment to which he is required to submit in pursuance of the probation order.
(7) Section 61(2) and (3) (medical reports) of the Mental Health Act 1998
applies for the purpose of this section as it applies for the purpose of any
provision of Part 3 of that Act.
(8) In this section-
'hospital' and 'hospital order' have the same meanings as in the Mental
Health Act 1998;
'mental nursing home' has the same meaning as in the Nursing and
Residential Homes Act 1988.
4 Discharge, amendment and review of probation orders
(1) The provisions of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect in
relation to the discharge and amendment of probation orders.
(2) Where, under the following provisions of this Act, a probationer is
sentenced for the offence for which he was placed on probation, the probation
order shall cease to have effect.
5 Breach of requirement of probation order
(1) If at any time during the probation period it appears on complaint to a
justice that the probationer has failed to comply with any of the requirements of
the order, the justice may issue a summons requiring the probationer to appear at
the place and time specified therein, or may, if the complaint is in writing and on
oath, issue a warrant for his arrest.
(2) If without reasonable excuse a person fails to comply with any of the
requirements of a probation order made in respect of that person, that person shall
be liable on summary conviction, to custody for a term not exceeding 6 months or
to a fine not exceeding £5,000, or to both.
(2A) A conviction for an offence under subsection (2) is in addition to and
does not affect the conviction in respect of which the person was placed on
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probation nor the continuance of the probation order nor the powers that may be
exercised by a court in respect of the person, conviction or order.
(3) If, on the application of a probation officer, it is proved to the
satisfaction of the court before which a probationer appears or is brought under
this section that the probationer has failed to comply with any of the requirements
of the probation order, that court may-
(a) if the probation order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction,
deal with the probationer, for the offence in respect of which the probation order
was made, in any manner in which the court could deal with him if it had just
convicted him of that offence;
(b) if the probation order was made by a Court of General Gaol Delivery,
commit him to custody or release him on bail (with or without sureties) until he
can be brought or appear before the court of General Gaol Delivery.
(4) Where the court of summary jurisdiction deals with the case as
provided in paragraph (b) of the last foregoing subsection, then-
(a) the court shall send to the Court of General Gaol Delivery a certificate
signed by a justice, certifying that the probationer has failed to comply with such
of the requirements of the probation order as may be specified in the certificate,
together with any such other particulars of the case as may be desirable; and a
certificate purporting to be so signed shall be admissible as evidence of the failure
before the Court of General Gaol Delivery; and
(b) where the probationer is brought or appears before the Court of
General Gaol Delivery, and it is proved to the satisfaction of that Court that he has
failed to comply with any of the requirements of the probation order, that court
may deal with him, for the offence in respect of which the probation order was
made, in any manner in which the court could deal with him if he had just been
convicted before that court of that offence.
(5) ......
(6) A probationer who is required by the probation order to submit to
treatment for his mental condition shall not be treated for the purposes of this
section as having failed to comply with that requirement on the ground only that
he has refused to undergo any surgical, electrical or other treatment if, in the
opinion of the court, his refusal was reasonable having regard to all the
circumstances; and without prejudice to the provisions of section seven of this Act
a probationer who is convicted of an offence committed during the probation
period shall not on that account be liable to be dealt with under this section for
failing to comply with any requirement of the probation order…
7 Commission of further offence or breach of condition
(1) If it appears to a judge or a justice on whom jurisdiction is hereinafter
conferred that a person in whose case a probation order or an order for conditional
discharge has been made has been convicted by a court in any part of the British
Islands of an offence committed during the probation period or during the period
of conditional discharge, and has been dealt with in respect of that offence, or has,
during the period of conditional discharge, failed to comply with any condition
specified in the order, the judge or justice may issue a summons requiring that
person to appear at the place and time specified therein, or may issue a warrant for
his arrest:
Provided that a justice shall not issue such a summons except on
complaint and shall not issue such a warrant except on complaint in writing and
on oath.
(2) The following persons shall have jurisdiction for the purposes of the
foregoing subsection, that is to say-
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(a) if the probation order or the order for conditional discharge was made
by the Court of General Gaol Delivery, a judge of that court;
(b) if the order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction, a justice;
(c) in the case of a probation order, by whatever court it was made, a
justice.
(3) A summons or warrant issued under this section shall direct the person
named therein to appear or to be brought before the court by which the probation
order or the order for conditional discharge was made:
Provided that-
(a) if that court is a court of summary jurisdiction and the summons or
warrant is issued by the High Bailiff or a justice, the summons or warrant may
direct him to appear or to be brought before the supervising court; and
(b) if a warrant is issued requiring him to be brought before a Court of
General Gaol Delivery, and he cannot forthwith be brought before that court
because that court is not being held, the warrant shall have effect as if it directed
him to be brought before a court of summary jurisdiction; and the court of
summary jurisdiction shall commit him to custody or release him on bail (with or
without sureties) until he can be brought or appear before the Court of General
Gaol Delivery.
(4) If a person in whose case a probation order or an order for conditional
discharge has been made by a Court of General Gaol Delivery is convicted and
dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction in respect of an offence committed
during the probation period or during the period of conditional discharge, the
court of summary jurisdiction may commit him to custody or release him on bail
(with or without sureties) until he can be brought or appear before the court by
which the order was made, and if it does so the court of summary jurisdiction
shall send to the Court of General Gaol Delivery a copy of the minute or
memorandum of the conviction entered in the Order Book certified by the clerk of
the court.
(5) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court by which a probation
order or an order for conditional discharge was made, or, if the order (being a
probation order) was made by a court of summary jurisdiction, to the satisfaction
of that court or the supervising court, that the person in whose case that order was
made has been convicted and dealt with in respect of an offence committed during
the probation period, or during the period of conditional discharge, as the case
may be, or has, during the period of conditional discharge, failed to comply with
any condition specified in the order, the court may deal with him, for the offence
for which the order was made, in any manner in which the court could deal with
him if he had just been convicted by or before that court of that offence.
(6) If a person in whose case a probation order or an order for conditional
discharge has been made by a court of summary jurisdiction is convicted before a
Court of General Gaol Delivery of an offence committed during the probation
period or during the period of conditional discharge, or is dealt with by a Court of
General Gaol Delivery for an offence so committed in respect of which he was
committed for sentence to that court, the Court of General Gaol Delivery may
deal with him, for the offence for which the order was made, in any manner in
which the court of summary jurisdiction could deal with him if it had just
convicted him of that offence.
(7) If a person in whose case a probation order or an order for conditional
discharge has been made by a court of summary jurisdiction is convicted by
another court of summary jurisdiction of any offence committed during the
probation period or during the period of conditional discharge, that court may, if it
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is satisfied that it has the consent of the court which made the order or, in the case
of a probation order, if it is satisfied that it has the consent of that court or of the
supervising court, deal with him, for the offence for which the order was made, in
any manner in which the court could deal with him if it had just convicted him of
that offence.
8 Supplementary provisions as to probation and discharge
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 82(3) of the Children
and Young Persons Act 2001 (which enables a court to order the parent or
guardian of a child or young person found guilty of an offence to give security for
his good behaviour), any court may , on making a probation order or an order for
conditional discharge under this Act, if it thinks it expedient for the purpose of the
reformation of the offender, allow any person who consents to do so to give
security for the good behaviour of the offender and, in the case of an order of
conditional discharge wherein conditions are specified, for compliance with such
conditions, and section ten of this Act shall apply to any security so given before a
court of summary jurisdiction.
(2) and (3) ......
(4) In proceedings before a Court of General Gaol Delivery under the
foregoing provisions of this Act, any question whether a probationer has failed to
comply with the requirements of the probation order or has been convicted of an
offence committed during the probation period, and any question whether any
person in whose case an order for conditional discharge has been made has failed
to comply with any condition specified therein or has been convicted of an
offence committed during the period of conditional discharge, shall be determined
by the court and not by the verdict of a jury.
9 Effects of probation and discharge
(1) Subject as hereinafter provided, a conviction of an offence for which
an order is made under this Act placing the offender on probation or discharging
him absolutely or conditionally shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any
purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings in which the order is made and
of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under the
foregoing provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an offender, being not less than seventeen years of
age, at the time of his conviction of an offence for which he is placed on
probation or conditionally discharged as aforesaid, is subsequently sentenced
under this Act for that offence, the provisions of this subsection shall cease to
apply to the conviction.
(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this section, the
conviction of an offender who is placed on probation or discharged absolutely or
conditionally as aforesaid shall in any event be disregarded for the purposes of
any enactment which imposes any disqualification or disability upon convicted
persons or authorises or requires the imposition of any such disqualification or
disability.
(3) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not affect-
(a) any right of any such offender as aforesaid to appeal against his
conviction, or to rely thereon in bar of any subsequent proceedings for the same
offence;
(b) the revesting or restoration of any property in consequence of the
conviction of any such offender, or
(c) the operation, in relation to any such offender, of any enactment in
force at the commencement of this Act which is expressed to extend to persons
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dealt with under subsection (1) of section three of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1913, as well as to convicted persons.”
222. The First Schedule contains provisions in respect of the discharge and
amendment of probation orders. The following are extracts from the
First Schedule :
“ Discharge
1. The court by which a probation order was made may, upon application
made by the probation officer or other person responsible for the supervision of
the offender or by the probationer, discharge the order…
3. Without prejudice to the provisions of the last foregoing paragraph, the
supervising court may, upon application made by the probation officer or other
person responsible for the supervision of the offender or by the probationer, by
order amend a probation order by cancelling any of the requirements thereof or by
inserting therein (either in addition to or in substitution for any such requirement)
any requirement which could be included in the order as if it were then being
made by that court in accordance with the provisions of sections two and three of
this Act:
Provided that-
(a) the court shall not amend a probation order by reducing the
probation period, or by extending that period beyond the end of three years from
the date of the original order;
(b) the court shall not so amend a probation order that the probationer
is thereby required-
(i) to reside in an approved probation hostel, or in any other
institution, or
(ii) to submit to treatment for his mental condition,
for such period as is specified in the order;
(c) the court shall not amend a probation order by inserting therein a
requirement that the probationer shall submit to treatment for his mental condition
unless the amending order is made within three months after the date of the
original order.
4. Where the medical practitioner by whom or under whose direction a
probationer is being treated for his mental condition in pursuance of any
requirement of the probation order is of opinion-
(a) that the treatment of the probationer should be continued beyond
the period specified in that behalf in the order; or
(b) that the probationer needs different treatment, being treatment of a
kind to which he could be required to submit in pursuance of a probation order; or
(c) that the probationer is not susceptible to treatment; or
(d) that the probationer does not require further treatment;
or where the practitioner is for any reason unwilling to continue to treat or direct
the treatment of the probationer, he shall make a report in writing to that effect to
the probation officer and the probation officer shall apply to the supervising court
for the variation or cancellation of the requirement.
General
5. Where the supervising court proposes to amend a probation order under
this Schedule, otherwise than on the application of the probationer, it shall
summon him to appear before the court; and if the probationer is not less than
fourteen years of age, the court shall not amend a probation order unless the
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probationer expresses his willingness to comply with the requirements of the
order as amended:
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to an order cancelling a requirement
of the probation order or reducing the period of any requirement.
6. On the making of an order discharging or amending a probation order, the
High Bailiff or the clerk to the court, as the case may be, shall forthwith give
copies of the discharging or amending order to the probation officer or other
person responsible for the supervision of the offender, and the probation officer
shall give a copy to the probationer and to the person in charge of any place in
which the probationer is or was required by the order to reside.”
223. Schedule 1A contains provisions in respect of additional requirements
of probation orders as follows:
“Requirements as to testing for drugs
1. This Schedule applies where a court proposing to make a probation order
is satisfied that the offender is dependent on or has a propensity to misuse drugs.
2. A probation order may include a requirement ('the testing requirement')
that the offender submits, during the whole or a specified part of the probation
period, to periodic testing for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of drugs in
the offender's body.
3. The offender shall, in accordance with the terms of the testing
requirement, provide at such times and in such circumstances as may be
determined by the probation officer responsible for the supervision of the
offender, samples of such description as may be so determined.
4. The probation officer responsible for the supervision of the offender shall
make arrangements with a person having the necessary qualifications to take such
samples as are appropriate to comply with the testing requirement.
5. The testing requirement shall specify the frequency of testing and the
drugs for which the tests are to be undertaken.
6. (1) If at any time during the probation period a sample taken from the
offender shows-
(a) the presence in his body of relevant drugs when none were present
when the offender was last tested; or
(b) the level of relevant drugs in his body is no less than when last
tested,
that shall be treated as constituting a failure to comply with the requirements of
the probation order and section 5 shall have effect accordingly.
(2) In this paragraph 'relevant drugs' means the drugs for which testing is required
under the testing requirement.”
224. Cullen v Rogers [1982] 2 All ER 571 is a useful reminder to those
imposing probation orders to take care in relation to the imposition of
conditions. There are limitations.
Combination order
225. Section 7 of the Criminal Justice (Penalties Etc.) Act 1993 provides
that where a person over 14 years of age is convicted of an offence
(not being an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law) the court
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may, instead of dealing with him in any other way, make a
combination order. A combination order is an order requiring the
convicted person both (a) to be under the supervision of a probation
officer for a period specified in the order not being less than 12
months nor more than 3 years and (b) to perform unpaid work for a
number of hours so specified being in the aggregate not less than 40
hours and not more than 120 hours. The court shall not make a
combination order unless it is of the opinion that (a) the offence or the
combination of the offence and another offence associated with it, is
serious enough to warrant such a sentence and (b) the order is the
most suitable for the offender. See also sections 2 to 9 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1963 and section 14 and schedule 3 Criminal Law Act
1981.
Electronic monitoring
226. See section 47 of the Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 in
respect of electronic monitoring and community orders.
Exclusion order
227. Under the Criminal Justice (Exclusion of Non-Resident Offenders)
Act 1998 the court is given the power to make an exclusion order. The
following are extracts from the 1998 Act:
“1 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a court convicts a person of an
offence for which he is punishable with custody, the court may make an order
prohibiting that person from being in, or entering the Island.
(2) An exclusion order-
(a) shall expire at the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the day on
which it comes into operation; and
(b) shall not come into operation until (disregarding any power of a court to
grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on
which the order could be varied or set aside.
(3) An exclusion order may be made-
(a) on application by the prosecutor; or
(b) by the court of its own motion.
(4) A person who is subject to an exclusion order is guilty of an offence if he fails
to comply with the order at a time after he has been, or has become liable to be,
removed from the Island under this Act and shall be liable on summary conviction
to custody for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding £5,000 or
both.
(5) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (4) it shall be
a defence for him to show that he took all reasonable steps and exercised all due
diligence to avoid committing the offence.
(6) In this Act, an order under subsection (1) is referred to as an 'exclusion order'.
2 Cases in which exclusion orders shall not be made
(1) A court shall make an exclusion order if it is satisfied that-
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(a) it is conducive to the public good; and
(b) the circumstances are such that the order is not in breach of any
international obligation of the United Kingdom which has effect in relation to the
Island; and
(c) the circumstances otherwise justify the making of the order.
(2) An exclusion order shall not be made in respect of a person who, on
the date on which the order is made,-
(a) is ordinarily resident in the Island; or
(b) is an Isle of Man Worker within the meaning of the Control of
Employment Act 1975; or
(c) has not attained the age of 17 at the time of his conviction or, on
consideration of any available evidence, it appears to the court that he has not
done so; or
(d) has a child, parent or spouse who is ordinarily resident in the
Island.
(3) When any question arises under this Act whether or not a person is
entitled to rely on subsection (2), it shall lie on the person asserting it to prove that
he is.
(4) Before making an exclusion order, a court shall explain to the person
concerned, so far as material, the effect of subsection (2).
3 Exclusion orders: supplementary provisions
(1) An exclusion order may be made in addition to any other sentence or
order which may be made on conviction.
(2) Subject to section 1(2), an exclusion order may be suspended so as to
come into operation immediately after a convicted person has served a term in
custody.
(3) The question whether an offence is one for which a person is
punishable with a term of custody shall be determined without regard to any
enactment restricting the custody of young offenders or persons who have not
previously been sentenced to imprisonment.
(4) A person who has at any time become ordinarily resident in the Island
shall not be treated for the purposes of this Act as having ceased to be so resident
by reason only of his having remained in the Island in breach of any statutory
provision other than this Act.
(5) A person shall not be treated as becoming ordinarily resident in the
Island by reason only of his serving a term of custody in the Island.
(6) The fact that an exclusion order against a person has expired shall not
prevent the making of a further exclusion order against him.
4 Appeals against exclusion orders
(1) When a court makes an exclusion order, the validity of the order shall
not be called into question by any other court except on an appeal to the Staff of
Government Division against the order or against the conviction on which it is
made.
(2) An exclusion order shall be treated as a sentence for the purpose of any
enactment providing an appeal against sentence.
5 Postponed determinations
(1) Where a court considers that it requires further information before
making an exclusion order it may, for the purpose of enabling that information to
be obtained, postpone making the order for such period as it may specify.
(2) More than one postponement may be made under subsection (1) in
relation to the same case.
(3) The court shall not specify a period under subsection (1) which-
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(a) by itself, or
(b) where there have been one or more previous postponements under
subsection (1), when taken together with the earlier specified period or periods,
exceed 14 days beginning with the date of conviction.
(4) A postponement or extension under subsection (1) may be made-
(a) on application by the defendant or the prosecutor; or
(b) by the court of its own motion.
(5) Where the court exercises its power under subsection (1), it may
nevertheless proceed to sentence, or otherwise deal with, the defendant in respect
of the offence in question.
(6) In this section 'the date of conviction' means-
(a) the date on which the defendant was convicted; or
(b) where he appeared to be sentenced in respect of more than one
conviction, and those convictions were not all on the same date, the date of the
latest of those convictions.
6 Removal directions
(1) When making an exclusion order, the court may, in accordance with
the following provisions of this section, give directions for-
(a) the removal from the Island of a person who is subject to an
exclusion order; and
(b) where the court thinks fit, the detention of the person pending his
removal.
(2) Directions under this section may be directions for the removal from
the Island of the person in question in accordance with arrangements to be made
by the Chief Constable in compliance with the directions.
(3) Directions under this section shall specify the country or territory to
which the person in question is to be removed.
(4) No directions under this section shall be for the removal of a person to
any country or territory other than one-
(a) of which the person in question is a national or citizen;
(b) in which he obtained a passport or other document of identity; or
(c) to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted.
(5) No directions under this section shall be given for the removal of a
British citizen, a British Dependent Territories citizen, a British Overseas citizen
or a British National (Overseas) to a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom unless he is also a national or citizen of, or has indicated that he is
willing to be removed to, that country or territory.
(6) A person in respect of whom directions are given under this section
may be placed under the authority of a police constable or a prison officer on
board any ship or aircraft in which he is to be removed in accordance with the
directions.
(7) The costs of complying with any directions under this paragraph shall
be defrayed by the Department of Home Affairs out of money provided by
Tynwald.
7 Detention pending removal
(1) A person in respect of whom directions for detention pending removal
have been given under section 6, may be detained in accordance with the
directions.
(2) A person liable to be detained under this section may be arrested
without warrant by a police constable.
(3) The captain of a ship or aircraft, if so requested by a police constable
or a prison officer, may prevent any person placed on board the ship or aircraft
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under section 6 from disembarking in the Island or, before the directions for his
removal have been fulfilled, elsewhere.
(4) Where under subsection (3) the captain of a ship or aircraft is
requested to prevent a person from disembarking he may for that purpose detain
him in custody on board the ship or aircraft.
8 Detention: supplementary provisions
(1) If a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that a person liable to be arrested under section 7 is to be found on
any premises he may grant a search warrant authorising any constable to enter
those premises for the purpose of searching for and arresting that person.
(2) A person detained under this Act shall be deemed to be in legal
custody at any time when he is so detained and, if detained otherwise than on
board a ship or aircraft, may be detained in such a place as the Department of
Home Affairs may from time to time direct.
(3) Where a person is detained under this Act, any police constable or
prison officer may take all such steps as may be reasonably necessary for
photographing, measuring or otherwise identifying him.
(4) Any person detained under this Act may be taken in the custody of a
constable or a prison officer to and from any place where his attendance is
required for the purpose of establishing his nationality or citizenship or for
making arrangements for his admission to a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom or where he is required to be for any other purpose connected with the
operation of this Act.”
228. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Cain)
in Campbell (judgment delivered 3rd July 2002) considered an
exclusion order that had been imposed against a defendant who had
pleaded guilty to the offence of harassment. The Appeal Division felt
that the terminology of section 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice
(Exclusion of Non-Resident Offenders) Act 1998 was readily
understandable and that there was a clear test to apply. The Appeal
Division did not consider that the English authorities on deportation
were of any assistance in this context. At paragraph [19] of the
judgment the Appeal Division stated:
“In our judgment the test which is to be applied in determining whether to make
an exclusion order is clearly set out in section 2(1) and does not include the risk
re-offending. The test includes whether it is conducive to the public good to make
such an order and whether the circumstances otherwise justify the making of an
order”.
229. The Appeal Division in the Campbell case concluded as follows:
“[20] On the facts of this case we are satisfied that the requirements of section
2(1) were met. The Appellant had no connection whatsoever with the Island, save
that he had hoped to settle here with Miss Clark. That did not happen. His
behaviour towards Miss Clark was disgraceful. He is a man with many previous
convictions. We have no doubt whatsoever that his exclusion from the Island is
conducive to the public good and that all the circumstances justify the making of
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an exclusion order. Accordingly we can see no merit in this appeal and it is
dismissed.”
230. The Appeal Division (Deemster Kerruish and Deemster Doyle) in
Department of Tourism and Leisure v Maule (judgment delivered on
the 12th March 2007) dealt with the definition of “ordinarily resident” in
the context of the Control of Employment legislation. Ordinarily
resident involves some degree of permanence and an element of
continuity, order or settled purpose. It may mean according to the way
in which a person’s life is usually ordered. It may refer to a person’s
abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted
voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his
life for the time being, whether of short or long duration. There must
however be a degree of settled purpose and a sufficient degree of
continuity.
231. The Appeal Division in Armieneos (judgment delivered on the 28th
October 2003) held that it had jurisdiction to deal with an application
for a stay of an exclusion order pending appeal. See also Jones 1999-
01 MLR 369.
232. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in O’Keeffe (judgment delivered 1st June 2009) dismissed
an appeal against an exclusion order and stressed at paragraph 36 that:
“judicial considerations of sections 2(1) and 2(2) are completely separate and that
there is no interplay between the two sub-sections.”
233. The Appeal Division (Deemster Kerruish and Deemster Doyle) in
O’Reilly (judgment delivered on the 22nd June 2009) stated:
“33. As to the words 'ordinarily resident', we refer to R v Barnet London
Borough Council Ex parte Nilish Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, and part of Lord
Scarman's judgment at 341e-g, in which he cited with approval the judgment of
Lord Warrington in Levene –v- IRC, thus:-
In Levene's case [[1928] AC 217] Lord Warrington of Clyffe said, at p.232:
‘I do not attempt to give any definition of the word "resident". In my opinion it
has no technical or special meaning for the purposes of the Income Tax Act.
"Ordinarily resident" also seems to me to have no such technical or special
meaning. In particular it is in my opinion impossible to restrict its connotation to
its duration. A member of this House may well be said to be ordinarily resident in
London during the Parliamentary session and in the country during the recess. If it
has any definite meaning I should say it means according to the way in which a
man's life is usually ordered.’"
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Lord Scarman continued at 343g-344b and 344c:-
"Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the statutory framework or the legal
context in which the words are used requires a different meaning, I unhesitatingly
subscribe to the view that 'ordinarily resident' refers to a man's abode in a
particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled
purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of short
or long duration.
There is, of course, one important exception. If a man’s presence in a particular
place or country is unlawful, e.g. in breach of the immigration laws, he cannot
rely on his unlawful residence as constituting ordinary residence (even though in a
tax case the Crown may be able to do so) … There is indeed express provision to
this effect in the [Immigration] Act of 1971, section 33(2). But even without this
guidance I would conclude that a man could not rely on his own unlawful act to
secure an advantage which could have been obtained if he had acted lawfully.
…
And there must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be one or there
may be several. It may be specific or general. All the law requires is that there is a
settled purpose. This is not to say that the propositus [the applicant] intends to
stay where he is indefinitely; indeed his purpose, while settled, may be for a
limited period. Education, business or profession, employment, health, family or
merely love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular
abode. And there may well be many others. All that is necessary is that the
purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be
properly described as settled."
34. The proper interpretation of the words “ordinarily resident” must, of
course, depend on the statutory framework and the legal context in which it arises.
We agree that it is a question of degree and involves a consideration of the
purpose of the relevant statute and all the circumstances of the case.
35. The purpose of the Act is to enable a court to exclude a non-resident
offender from the Island if the court is satisfied that such exclusion is conducive
to the public good, not in breach of any international obligation of the United
Kingdom which has effect in relation to the Island and the circumstances
otherwise justify the making of the exclusion order. However, section 2(2) of the
Act provides, inter alia, that an exclusion order shall not be made in respect of a
person who, on the date on which the order is made, is ordinarily resident on the
Island. Section 2(3) places the onus on the person to prove that one, or more of
the provisions of section 2(2) apply to him as at the date of sentence.
36 If a person’s presence on the Isle of Man is unlawful that person cannot
rely on his unlawful residence as constituting ordinary residence for the purposes
of section 2(2)(a). If a person moves to, and takes up residence on the Island in an
endeavour to avoid the criminal legal process in another jurisdiction then he
cannot be said to be lawfully ordinarily resident on the Island. In this case, whilst
there was no restriction to prevent the Appellant moving to the Island on, or about
3rd January 2007, his failure to attend the Irish court on 18th January 2007, and our
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finding that he was aware of such court appearance leads us to the conclusion that
the Appellant moved to the Island to avoid such court appearance. His residence
on the Island was unlawful. Thus, he cannot be said to have been lawfully
ordinarily resident when the First Exclusion Order was made.
37. We dismiss the appeal.”
Register of sex offenders
234. Section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 and Schedule 1 provides
for a register of sex offenders. The following are extracts from the
Schedule:
“Schedule 1
Registration of Sex Offenders
Section 1
Notification Requirements for Sex Offenders
Sex offenders subject to notification requirements
1. (1) A person becomes subject to the notification requirements of this
Schedule (in this Schedule referred to as 'the notification requirements') if, after
the commencement of this Schedule-
(a) he is-
(i) convicted of an offence specified in paragraph 2 (in this
Schedule referred to as a 'scheduled offence'); or
(ii) found not guilty of a scheduled offence by reason of
insanity, or to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him
in respect of such an offence; and
(b) the court by which he is convicted has by order directed that he is
subject to the notification requirements.
(2) A person becomes subject to the notification requirements if, after the
commencement of this Schedule-
(a) in the Island, he is cautioned by a constable in respect of a
scheduled offence which, at the time when the caution is given, he has admitted;
and
(aa) before giving the caution-
(i) the constable has served on the person a notice, in such
form as is prescribed by order made by the Department of Home Affairs, setting
out the consequences of accepting a caution under this Schedule; and
(ii) the person must consent to the caution being given; and
[Head (aa) inserted by Sex Offenders Act 2006 s 15.]
(b) at the time when the caution is given, he is served with a notice, in
such form as is prescribed by an order made by the Department of Home Affairs,
which directs that he is subject to the notification requirements.
(3) A person falling within sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) shall continue to be
subject to the notification requirements for such period as is directed by-
(a) the court under sub-paragraph (1)(b); or
(b) by the notice under sub-paragraph (2)(b), but that period shall
not exceed the maximum period set out opposite a person of his description in the
following:
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A person who, in respect of the offence, is or has been
sentenced to custody for life or for a term of 30 months
or more:
An indefinite period
A person who, in respect of the offence or finding, is or
has been admitted to a hospital subject to a restriction
order :
An indefinite period
A person who, in respect of the offence, is or has been
sentenced to custody for a term of more than 6 months
but less than 30 months:
A period of 10 years
beginning with the relevant
date
A person who, in respect of the offence, is or has been
sentenced to custody for a term of 6 months or less:
A period of 7 years
beginning with the relevant
date
A person who, in respect of the offence or finding, is or
has been admitted to a hospital without being subject to a
restriction order:
A period of 7 years
beginnings with the relevant
date
A person of any other description: A period of 5 years
beginning with the relevant
date
(4) Sub-paragraph (5) applies where a person falling within sub-
paragraph (1)(a) is or has been sentenced, in respect of two or more scheduled
offences-
(a) to consecutive terms of custody; or
(b) to terms of custody which are partly concurrent.
(5) In cases to which this sub-paragraph applies, sub-paragraph (3) shall
have effect as if the person were or had been sentenced, in respect of each of the
offences, to a term of custody which-
(a) in the case of consecutive terms, is equal to the aggregate of
those terms;
(b) in the case of concurrent terms, is equal to the aggregate of those
terms after making such deduction as may be necessary to secure that no period
of time is counted more than once.
(6) Where a person found to be under a disability, and to have done the
act charged against him in respect of a scheduled offence, is subsequently tried
for the offence, the finding, and any order made in respect of the finding, shall
be disregarded for the purposes of this paragraph.
(7) In this Schedule 'the relevant date' means-
(a) in a case of a person falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a)(i), the date of
the conviction;
(b) in a case of a person falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a)(ii), the
date of the finding;
(c) in a case of a person falling within sub-paragraph (2)(b) , the date
of the caution.
(8) A direction by the court under sub-paragraph (1)(b) shall be treated for
the purposes of any enactment relating to appeals to be a sentence passed on
conviction.
(9) A person who is the subject of a notice under sub-paragraph (2)(b)
may by complaint appeal against the direction to the High Bailiff.
(10) On the determination of a complaint under sub-paragraph (9), the
High Bailiff may cancel, vary or uphold the declaration.
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(11) A determination of the High Bailiff under sub-paragraph (10) may be
appealed against in the same manner as an appeal against sentence passed on
conviction and any enactment relating to appeals shall apply accordingly.
(12) An order under sub-paragraph (2)(b) shall be laid before Tynwald.
Serious offences which are 'scheduled offences'
2. (1) The following offences are scheduled offences-
(a) offences under the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act
1992-
(i) section 1 (rape);
(ii) section 2 (procurement by threats or lies);
(iii) section 3 (administering drugs to obtain or facilitate
sexual act);
(iv) section 4 (intercourse with young people);
(v) section 5 (sexual act with subnormal person);
(vi) section 6 (sexual act with a mental patient);
(vii) section 7 (incest);
(viii) an offence under section 8 (incitement to commit
incest);
(ix) section 9 (unnatural offences);
(x) section 11 (assault with intent to commit
buggery);
(xi) section 12 (bestiality);
(xii) section 13 (indecent assault);
(xiii) an offence under section 14 (indecent
conduct towards young people);
(xiv) section 18 (procurement of a young person);
(xv) section 19 (procurement of subnormal person);
(xvi) section 23 (causing or encouraging
prostitution of, intercourse with, or indecent
assault on, young people);
(xvii) section 24 (causing or encouraging
prostitution of subnormal person);
(xviii) section 25 (living on or controlling prostitution);
(xix) section 28 (keeping a brothel);
(xx) an offence equivalent to any of those in heads (i) to
(xix) if that offence was an offence under an enactment
repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 1992;
[Subhead (xx) added by Sex Offenders Act 2006 s 15.]
(b) an offence under Schedule 3 to this Act (indecent photographs of
children);
(c) subject to sub-paragraph (2)(b), an offence under section 178 of the
Customs and Excise Management Act 1986 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty
etc.) in relation to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the Customs
Consolidation Act 1876 (prohibitions and restrictions) (an Act of Parliament) as it
has effect in the Island;
(d) offences under section 2 of the Obscene Publications and Indecent
Advertisements Act 1907 (printing, selling, etc. indecent or obscene publications);
(e) an offence under section 9 of the Theft Act 1981 of burglary with
intent to commit rape;
(f) an offence of conspiracy to commit any of those offences;
(g) an offence of attempting to commit any of those offences;
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(ga) an offence under section 9A of the Sexual Offences Act 1992
(abuse of position of trust);
[Head (ga) inserted by Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2006 s 3.]
(gb) an offence under section 18A of the Sexual Offences Act 1992
(meeting a person under 16 following sexual grooming); and
[Head (gb) inserted by Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2006 s 3.]
(h) an offence of inciting another to commit any of those offences.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1)-
(a) heads (a)(iv) and (viii), (ga) and (gb) do not apply in respect of a
first offence committed by an offender who, at the time of the offence, was under
18; and
[Head (a) amended by Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2006 s 3.]
(b) head (c) does not apply where the prohibited goods did not include
indecent photographs or pseudo photographs of a person which give the impression
or predominant impression that the person shown is a child.
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b), paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 to
this Act (interpretation) shall apply as it applies for the purposes of that Schedule.
Effect of notification requirements
3. (1) A person who is subject to the notification requirements shall, before the
end of the period of 2 days beginning with the relevant date or, if later, the
commencement of this Schedule, notify to the police the following information,
namely-
(a) his name and, where he also uses one or more other names, each of
those names;
(b) his home address;
(c) the nature and place of his employment; and
(d) the name and business address of his employer.
(2) A person who is subject to the notification requirements shall also,
before the end of the period of 2 days beginning with-
(a) his using a name which has not been notified to the police under this
paragraph;
(b) any change of his home address;
(c) his having resided or stayed, for a qualifying period, at any premises
in the Island, the address of which has not been notified to the police under this
paragraph; or
(d) any change of the nature and place of his employment.
notify that name, the effect of that change or, as the case may be, the address of
those premises to the police.
(3) A notification given to the police by any person shall not be regarded as
complying with sub-paragraph (1) or (2) unless it also states-
(a) his date of birth;
(b) his name on the relevant date and, where he used one or more other
names on that date, each of those names; and
(c) his home address on that date.
(4) For the purpose of determining any period for the purposes of sub-
paragraph (1) or (2) , there shall be disregarded any time when the person in
question-
(a) is remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
(b) is serving a sentence of custody or a term of service detention;
(c) is detained in a hospital; or
(d) is outside the Island.
(5) A person may give a notification under this section-
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(a) by attending at any police station in the Island and giving an oral
notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the
officer in charge of the station; or
(b) by sending a written notification to any such police station.
(6) Any notification under this section shall be acknowledged; and an
acknowledgement under this sub-paragraph shall be in writing and in such form as
the Chief Constable may direct.
(7) In this paragraph-
'home address', in relation to any person, means the address of his home,
that is to say, his sole or main residence in the Island or, where he has no such
residence, premises in the Island which he regularly visits;
'qualifying period' means-
(a) a period of 14 days; or
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which (taken
together) amount to 14 days.
Travel notification
3A. (1) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring relevant
offenders who leave the Island, or any description of such offenders-
(a) to give in accordance with the regulations, before they leave, a
notification under subparagraph (2);
(b) if they subsequently return to the Island, to give in accordance with
the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
(2) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose-
(a) the date on which the offender will leave the Island;
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, all the countries) to which
the offender will travel and the offender’s point of arrival (determined in
accordance with the regulations) in each country;
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the
offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the Island and the
offender’s movements and place or places of accommodation while outside the
Island.
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information
prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the Island.
(4) Regulations under sub-paragraph (1) may make different provision for
different categories of person.
(5) Regulations under sub-paragraph (1) shall be laid before Tynwald.
[Para 3A inserted by Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 s 1.]
Offences
4. (1) If a person-
(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with paragraph 3(1) or
(2) ; or
(b) notifies to the police, in purported compliance with paragraph 3(1)
or (2), any information which he knows to be false,
that person shall be liable-
(i) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000, or to custody
for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to both; or
(ii) on conviction on information to a fine, or to custody for a term not
exceeding 5 years, or to both.
[Subpara (1) amended by Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 s 1.]
(2) A person commits an offence under sub-paragraph (1)(a) on the day on
which he first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with paragraph 3(1) or
(2) and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure
116
continues; but a person shall not be prosecuted under that provision more than once
in respect of the same failure.
(3) If a person-
(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with sub-paragraph (3A)
or regulations under that sub-paragraph; or
(b) notifies to the police, in purported compliance with sub-paragraph
(3A) or regulations under that sub-paragraph, any information which the person
knows to be false'
that person shall be liable-
(i) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000, or to custody
for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to both; or
(ii) on conviction on information to a fine, or to custody for a term not
exceeding 5 years, or to both.
[Subpara (3) added by Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 s 1.]
Young offenders
5. (1) In the case of a person who is under 18 on the relevant date, paragraph
1(3) shall have effect as if for any reference to a period of 10 years, 7 years or 5
years there were substituted a reference to one-half of that period.
(2) In the case of a person who is under 18 on the relevant date, the court
may direct that, until he attains that age, paragraphs 3, 3A and 4 and regulations
under paragraph 3A shall have effect as if an individual having parental
responsibility for him-
(a) were authorised to comply on his behalf with the provisions of
paragraph 3 and 3A and regulations under that paragraph ; and
[Item (a) amended by Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 s 1.]
(b) were liable in his stead for any failure to comply with those
provisions.
[Subpara (2) amended by Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 s 1.]
(3) In the case of a person who is under 18, paragraph 4(1) and (3) shall
have effect as if the words 'or to custody for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to
both' were omitted.
[Subpara (3) amended by Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 s 1.]
Certificates for purposes of Schedule 1
6. (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where, on any date after the commencement
of this Schedule, a person-
(a) is convicted of a scheduled offence;
(b) is found not guilty of a scheduled offence by reason of insanity; or
(c) is found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged
against him in respect of a scheduled offence.
(2) If the court by or before which the person is so convicted or so found-
(a) states in open court-
(i) that on that date he has been convicted, found not guilty by
reason of insanity or found to be under a disability and to have done the act
charged against him; and
(ii) that the offence in question is a scheduled offence; and
(b) certifies those facts (whether at the time or subsequently),
the certificate shall, for the purposes of this Schedule, be evidence of those facts.
(3) Sub-paragraph (4) applies where, on any date after the commencement
of this Schedule, a person is in the Island cautioned by a constable in respect of a
scheduled offence and which, at the time when the caution is given, he has
admitted.
(4) In a case to which this sub-paragraph applies, if the constable-
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(a) informs the person that he has been cautioned on that date and that
the offence in question is a scheduled offence; and
(b) certifies those facts (whether at the time or subsequently) in such
form as the Department of Home Affairs may by order prescribe,
the certificate shall, for the purposes of this Schedule, be evidence of those facts.
(5) An order under this paragraph shall be laid before Tynwald.”
235. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Bridson (judgment 31st July 2009) provided guidance in
respect of the period of registration on Register of Sex Offenders. In
Bridson the Appeal Division varied the order of the sentencing
Deemster so that the registration continued for an indefinite period.
236. See R v F [2009] EWCA Crim 319 on the issue as to whether the
imposition of notification requirements for an indefinite period is
compatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. See also R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2010] UKSC 17.
Sex offenders travel notification order
237. See Criminal Justice Act 2001, Sex Offenders Act 2006 and the Sex
Offenders Act 2006 (Sexual Offences Prevention) Order 2007. See
also section 1 of the Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007
which inserts paragraph 3A in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act
2001 in respect of regulations regarding travel notifications. See the
Sex Offenders (Travel Notification Requirements) Regulations 2007
(SD No 753/07). Depending on the circumstances of the case a
defendant may be made subject to the travel notification requirements
pursuant to the Sex Offenders (Travel Notification Requirements)
Regulations 2007.
Sex offences prevention order
238. If the court is satisfied that it is necessary to make a sexual offences
prevention order pursuant to section 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 2006
it may do so. Such an order should be fair and proportionate.
239. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in R v Volante (judgment 5th September 2008) provided
guidance in respect of sexual offences prevention orders. The
following are extracts from the Appeal Division’s judgment in
Volante :
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“90. The power of a court to make a Sexual Offences Prevention Order is
contained in section 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 2006, the relevant part of which
provides :
`(1) A court may make an order (`sexual offences prevention order`) under this
section in respect of a person (`the defendant`) if -
(a) subsection (2) or (3) applies to the defendant ; and
(b) the court is satisfied that it is necessary to make such an order, for the purpose
of protecting the public or any particular members of the public from serious
sexual harm from the defendant.
(2) This subsection applies to the defendant where the court deals with him or her
in respect of a listed offence.`
91. A `listed offence` is defined as an offence listed in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1
to the Criminal Justice Act 2001 and is prescribed for the purposes of this Part 1
of the Act by an order made by the Department of Home Affairs. The offences
committed by the Appellant fall within such definition.
92. `Serious sexual harm` has been defined as `death or serious personal injury,
whether physical or psychological, occasioned by further offences` : see R v
Halloren [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 57.
93. In such circumstances the Acting Deemster was entitled to make an order if
satisfied that it was necessary to make the same for the purpose of protecting the
public or any particular members of the public from serious sexual harm, as so
defined, from the Appellant.
94. The Acting Deemster was so satisfied. Mr Quinn invites us to adopt the
contrary view. We decline to do so. It is settled law that this court should only
interfere with the exercise of a trial judge`s discretion if the sentence imposed is
manifestly wrong or so excessive or inadequate as to appear wrong in principle or
if the court erred in principle : see Perry v Clague [1961-71] MLR 162, at 166.
We are satisfied that that having regard to all the evidence, including the victim
impact statements, the Acting Deemster was entitled to impose such an order.
95. Mr Quinn`s secondary submission was that the order was wider than was
necessary and that this court should impose an order with a narrower remit.
96. The material parts of section 3 of the Sex Offenders Act 2006 provides :
`(1) A sexual offences prevention order -
(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order, and
(b) has effect for a fixed period (not less than 5 years) specified in the order or
until further order.
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(2) The only prohibitions that may be included in the order are those necessary for
the purpose of protecting the public or any particular members of the public from
serious sexual harm from the defendant.`
97. Many cases have emphasised that a Sexual Offences Prevention Order must
be justified on the basis that it is necessary, as distinct from being desirable, and
necessary for the reasons set out in the statute and that the terms of such Order
must be tailored to meet the danger that the offender presents and should not be
wider than is necessary : see R v RH [2006] EWCA Crim 1470 and R v Collard
[2005] 1 Cr App R (S) 34.
98. Before this court there was much discussion as to the width of the Order made
by the Acting Deemster and the proper interpretation thereof. As such discussion
progressed it became clear that not only was the Order unnecessarily complex but
it was far wider than could be justified as necessary. For example, the Order
would have restricted the Appellant from visiting any recreational, sporting or
leisure area used by children under the age of 16 years unless accompanied by an
adult which we believe was unnecessary wide.
99. However although Mr Quinn submitted that it was unnecessary that the Order
should expressly prohibit the Appellant from entering or attending any
gymnasium frequented by children under the age of 16 years because he will not
be permitted by the British Gymnastics Association to coach again, we reject this
submission. We consider that it is necessary to prohibit the Appellant from acting
as a coach, official or volunteer in any organisation which would involve him
having contact with children.
100. In such circumstances we substitute for the Order made by the Acting
Deemster, an Order in the following terms :
`AND IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's name be added to the Sex Offender's
Register for a period of 10 years and for that period the Defendant be subject to
the notification requirements of Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 and
subject to the travel notification requirements pursuant to the Sex Offenders
(Travel Notification Requirements) Regulations 2007
And the Court being satisfied that it is necessary to make a Sexual Offences
Prevention Order pursuant to section 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 2006
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be PROHIBITED from doing
any of the following for a period of 10 years:-
[a] Entering and/or attending at any gymnasium which is frequented at any time
by a child or children
[b] Acting as a coach, official, or volunteer in respect of any organisation which
would involve the Defendant having any form of contact with a child or children.
For the avoidance of doubt 'contact' includes non-physical contact
[c] Approaching, speaking or communicating with, in any way, either directly or
indirectly, the victims or any family members of the victims or of the Prosecution
witnesses at the trial who were children at the time of giving evidence
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[d] To have any involvement in any capacity with a club, organisation, or
association frequented by children
[e] To allow any child within his home or any part of his home, including any
garden, or outbuilding belonging thereto unless [i] such child is accompanied by
an adult member of the child's family, or of the Defendant's family, or [ii] such
child is a member of the Defendant's family
[f] To be the supervising adult of any child in any mode of transport unless such
child is a member of the Defendant's family
In this Order 'child' or 'children' means a person or persons who has, or have not
attained the age of 16 years.”
240. See also R v Smith [2009] EWCA Crim 785 and [2009] Crim LR 600.
241. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Bridson (judgment delivered 16th June 2009) stated:
“The length of the Sexual Offences Prevention Order
43. In support of his submission that the Sexual Offences Prevention Order should
have been `until further order`, and not for a fixed period of 8 years as ordered by
the Acting Deemster, Mr Neale reminded the court that it is a necessary
precondition to the making of such an order that the court is satisfied that it is
necessary to make such an order for the purpose of protecting the public, or any
particular members of the public from serious sexual harm from the Respondent.
44. In the light of Mrs Stott`s observations as to the risk of the Respondent re-
offending and the risk of significant harm to others, it is unsurprising that the
Acting Deemster adjudged that it was appropriate to make such an order.
45. Mr Neale submitted that where there was no material upon which the Acting
Deemster could properly conclude that the protection of the public would cease to
be required or the risk of harm would cease after a determinate period, he should
have made an order `until further order`. He reminded the court that in Attorney-
General v Gosling [20th November 2006] this court, as presently constituted,
substituted an indeterminate life sentence for a determinate sentence where the
offender constituted a danger to the public for an unpredictable period of time.
46. We note that section 7(1) of the Sex Offenders Act 2006 gives power upon
application by a defendant, or the Attorney General to vary, renew or discharge a
Sexual Offences Prevention Order.
47. Mr O`Neill`s response to this submission was that if the court was persuaded
that a longer period than 8 years might be required for the protection of the public,
the authorities could apply to extend such period.
48. Whilst we accept that there would be power to vary an order for a fixed
period, in this case we are persuaded that the public need to be protected for an
unpredictable period of time, the length of which is likely to depend upon the
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Respondent`s willingness to undergo appropriate treatment and his response
thereto. It was inappropriate to impose an order for a fixed period. In such
circumstances we adjudge that the Sexual Offences Prevention Order should be
`until further order` and we so order.
The period of Registration on the Sex Offences Register
49. Acting Deemster Turner ordered that the Respondent`s name be added to the
Sex Offenders Register for a period of 10 years and that he be subject to the
notification requirements thereto, pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2001.
50. Paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 provides that
the maximum period for the notification requirement for a sex offender, who has
been sentenced to a period of 30 months or more is an indefinite period.
51. Given that we have increased the custodial sentence to be served by the
Respondent to 42 months, there can be no doubt that this court has jurisdiction to
lengthen the period of registration on the Sex Offences Register and the
notification requirements thereto and can order that such should be for an
indefinite period.
52. Although we note that the notification requirements in the Island are less
onerous than in England and Wales, such requirements are still onerous and
accordingly at the conclusion of the hearing we invited both Mr Neale and Mr
O`Neill to consider whether there was any statutory power to vary any period
imposed by the court for the notification requirement. Because this issue had not
previously been considered by them in either their skeleton arguments or oral
submissions, we ordered that supplemental written submissions should be filed by
them on this discrete issue.
53. In such submissions, both Mr Neale and Mr O`Neill agreed that there is no
power to amend or vary such period. Given that the point has not been fully
argued, we are prepared to accept that such is the case for the purpose of this
Reference alone. Should the point be raised for future consideration by this court,
it must be fully argued.
54. In his skeleton arguments, Mr Neale encouraged this court to increase the
period of registration to life. Mr O'Neill did not address the period of registration.
Having accepted for the purpose of this Reference alone that once imposed there
is no power to amend or vary a period of registration, and not having had benefit
of argument, we have decided to require argument as to whether we should
interfere with the period of registration, and if so, whether we such should impose
an indefinite or lesser period.
Conclusion
55. We thus vary the sentence imposed by Acting Deemster Turner so that the
custodial term is increased from 28 months to 42 months, and the Sexual
Prevention Order is varied so that it is until further order. As to the extended
licence period, and the period of registration on the Sex Offenders Register we
reserve our decisions relevant to the same until we have had benefit of further
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argument from Mr Neale, and Mr O'Neill, which further argument will be
scheduled for the July sitting of this court.”
242. See Warren (Appeal Division judgment 1st February 2010) in respect
of sexual offences prevention orders.
Extended sentence
243. See Section 38 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 extended licence
periods in respect of sexual or violent offences. Sexual offences
means an offence under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 1. Violent offence
means an offence which leads, or is intended or likely to lead, to a
person’s death or to physical injury to a person, and includes an
offence which is required to be charged as arson (whether or not it
would otherwise fall within this definition).
244. Section 38 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 provides as follows:
“38 Sentences extended for licence purposes
(1) This section applies where a court which proposes to impose a
custodial sentence for a sexual or violent offence considers that the
period (if any) for which the offender would, apart from this section, be
subject to a licence would not be adequate for the purpose of
preventing the commission by him of further offences and securing his
rehabilitation.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) to (5), the court may pass on the offender
an extended sentence, that is to say, a custodial sentence the term of
which is equal to the aggregate of-
(a) the term of the custodial sentence that the court would have
imposed if it had passed a custodial sentence otherwise than under this section
('the custodial term'); and
(b) a further period ('the extension period') for which the offender is to
be subject to a licence and which is of such length as the court considers
necessary for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1).
(3) The extension period shall not exceed-
(a) 10 years in the case of a sexual offence; and
(b) 5 years in the case of a violent offence.
(4) The term of an extended sentence passed in respect of an offence shall
not exceed the maximum term permitted for that offence.”
245. See Bridson (Appeal Division judgment 31st July 2009) in respect of
extended sentences for licence purposes.
Offences to be taken into consideration
246. In respect of offences to be taken into consideration reference may be
made to a list of offences prepared by the prosecution, signed by the
defendant and filed with the court. The defendant’s position in
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relation to such list should be ascertained after he has entered his
pleas in respect of the counts contained in the information. The
defendant (not his counsel) should be asked in open court –
(1) Have you considered the list of offences to be taken into
consideration? Have you had a full opportunity of considering
the list? Do you understand the document and its effect?
(2) Do you admit each of the offences?
(3) Do you wish each of them to be taken into consideration?
It is the responsibility of the judge to ensure that the offender
understands the document which he has received and that he has had
time to consider it.
Fines
247. Consider the statutory maximum fine if any. In respect of time to pay
see section 28 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. In respect of
committal in default of payment in respect of summary courts
consider section 95 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989. See
section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 in respect of the procedure
for enforcing fines. Consider periods of custody in default of
payments of fine. See section 27 and schedule 1 of the Criminal
Jurisdiction Act 1993 in respect of periods of custody for non-
payment of fines.
Attendance centre
248. Under section 37 and paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 of the Criminal
Justice Act 2001 where a person is convicted of an offence punishable
with custody (not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by
law) the court may order him to attend such centre as may be
specified in the order for such number of hours as may be so
specified. The aggregate number of hours shall not exceed 12.
Provision is also made in Schedule 7 in respect of the discharge and
variation of attendance centre orders and for dealing with any
breaches of attendance centre orders or attendance centre rules. See
also SD No 156/05 the Attendance Centre Rules 2005. Rule 3(1)
provides that the occupation and instruction given at a centre shall
include a programme of group activities designed to assist offenders
to acquire or develop personal responsibility, self-discipline, skills
and interests.
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Anti-social behaviour sentence
249. Section 28A of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 provides as follows:
“28A Anti-social behaviour sentence
(1) The court by or before which a person ('the defendant') is convicted of
an offence (not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law) may, in
addition to any penalty or sentence prescribed for the offence by the enactment
creating the offence, make an order ('an anti-social behaviour sentence') under this
section if subsection (2) applies.
(2) The court may make an anti-social behaviour sentence if it is satisfied-
(a) that the offence was committed in circumstances in which
harassment, alarm or distress was caused by the defendant to one or more persons
not of the same household as the defendant; and
(b) that an anti-social behaviour sentence is necessary to protect any
person in the Island or in a particular area or locality within the Island from such
further anti-social acts by the defendant; and
(c) that the offence was committed after the date on which this section
comes into operation.
(3) An anti-social behaviour sentence may prohibit the defendant from
doing anything described in the sentence.
(4) The prohibitions that may be imposed by an anti-social behaviour
sentence are those necessary for the purpose of protecting persons in the Island or
in a particular area or locality within the Island from further anti-social acts by the
defendant.
(5) An anti-social behaviour sentence shall have effect for a period (not
exceeding 3 years) specified in the sentence.
(6) The defendant may apply by complaint to the court which made an
anti-social behaviour sentence for it to be varied or discharged by order of the
court.
(7) If without reasonable excuse a person does anything which that person
is prohibited from doing by an anti-social behaviour sentence, that person shall be
liable-
(a) on summary conviction, to custody for a term not exceeding 6
months or to a fine not exceeding £5,000, or to both; or
(b) on conviction on information, to custody for a term not exceeding
5 years or to a fine, or to both.
(8) Where a person is convicted of an offence under subsection (7), it shall
not be open to the court by or before which the person is so convicted to make an
order under section 6(1)(b) (conditional discharge) of the Criminal Justice Act
1963 in respect of the offence.
(9) A conviction of an offence under subsection (7) is in addition to and
does not affect the conviction in respect of which the anti-social behaviour
sentence was imposed.
(10) For the purposes of any enactment conferring rights of appeal in
criminal cases, an anti-social behaviour sentence is a sentence passed on the
offender by the court for the offence for which the anti-social behaviour sentence
was passed.”
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Curfew order
250. Section 29 and Schedule 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 gives the
court power to impose a curfew order. Schedule 5 provides as
follows:
“Schedule 5
Curfew Orders
Section 29
Power for court to impose curfew order
1. (1) Where a person is convicted of an offence (not being an offence for
which the sentence is fixed by law) the court by or before which he is convicted
may make a curfew order, that is to say, an order requiring him to remain, for
periods specified in the order, at a place so specified.
(2) A curfew order may specify different places or different periods for
different days, but shall not specify-
(a) periods which fall outside the period of 6 months beginning with
the day on which it is made; or
(b) periods which amount to less than 2 hours or more than 12 hours
in any one day.
(3) The requirements in a curfew order shall, as far as practicable, be such
as to avoid-
(a) any conflict with the offender's religious beliefs or with the
requirements of any community service order, probation order, combination
order, attendance centre order or supervision order to which he may be subject;
and
(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which he normally
works or attends school or other educational establishment.
(4) A curfew order shall include provision for making a person responsible
for monitoring the offender's whereabouts during the curfew periods specified in
the order; and a person who is made so responsible shall be of a description
specified in an order made by the Department of Home Affairs.
(5) A court shall not make a curfew order unless the court has been
notified by the Department of Home Affairs that arrangements for monitoring the
offender's whereabouts are available in the area in which the place proposed to be
specified in the order is situated and the notice has not been withdrawn.
(6) Before making a curfew order, the court shall explain to the offender
in ordinary language-
(a) the effect of the order;
(b) the consequences which may follow if he fails to comply with any
of the requirements of the order; and
(c) that the court has power to review the order on the application
either of the offender or of the responsible person.
(7) Before making a curfew order, the court shall obtain and
consider information about the place proposed to be specified in the order
(including information as to the attitude of persons likely to be affected by the
enforced presence there of the offender).
(8) The court by which a curfew order is made shall give a copy of
the order to the offender and to the person responsible for monitoring the
offender's whereabouts during the curfew periods specified in the order.
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(9) The Department of Home Affairs may by order direct that sub-
paragraph (2) shall have effect with the substitution, for any period there
specified, of such period as may be specified in the order.
(10) An order under sub-paragraph (9) shall not come into operation
unless it is approved by Tynwald.
Procedural requirements for curfew orders
2. (1) Where a court makes a curfew order, the particular order or orders
comprising or forming part of the sentence shall be such as in the opinion of the
court is, or taken together are, the most suitable for the offender and in forming
that opinion, a court may take into account any information about the offender
which is before it.
(2) Where a court makes a curfew order, the restrictions on liberty
imposed by the order or orders shall be such as in the opinion of the court are
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, or the combination of the
offence and one or more offences associated with it and in forming that opinion, a
court shall take into account all such information about the circumstances of the
offence and any offences associated with it (including any aggravating or
mitigating factors) as is available to it.
Enforcement etc of curfew orders
3. (1) If at any time while a curfew order is in force in respect of an offender
it appears on complaint to a justice of the peace that the offender has failed to
comply with any of the requirements in a curfew order, the justice may issue a
summons requiring the offender to appear at the place and time specified therein,
or may, if the complaint is in writing and substantiated on oath, issue a warrant
for his arrest.
(2) Any summons or warrant issued under this paragraph shall direct the
offender to appear or be brought before a court of summary jurisdiction.
(3) If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court of summary jurisdiction
before which an offender appears or is brought under this paragraph that he has
failed without reasonable excuse to comply with any of the requirements in a
curfew order, the court may-
(a) impose on him a fine not exceeding £5,000;
(b) if the curfew order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction,
revoke the order and deal with the offender, for the offence in respect of which
the order was made;
(c) if the order was made by a Court of General Gaol Delivery,
commit him to custody or release him on bail until he can be brought or appear
before that court.
(4) A court of summary jurisdiction which deals with an offender's case
under sub-paragraph (3)(c) shall send to the Chief Registrar a certificate signed by
a justice of the peace certifying that the offender has failed to comply with the
requirements in a curfew order in the respect specified in the certificate, together
with such other particulars of the case as may be desirable; and a certificate
purporting to be so signed shall be admissible as evidence of the failure before a
Court of General Gaol Delivery.
(5) Where, by virtue of sub-paragraph (3)(c) the offender is brought or
appears before a Court of General Gaol Delivery and it is proved to the
satisfaction of the court that he has failed to comply with any of the requirements
in a curfew order, that court may-
(a) impose on him a fine not exceeding £5,000;
(b) revoke the order; and
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(c) deal with him, for the offence in respect of which the order was
made.
(6) A person sentenced under sub-paragraph (3) or (5) may appeal to the
Staff of Government Division against the sentence.
(7) In proceedings before the Court of General Gaol Delivery under sub-
paragraph (5), any question whether the offender has failed to comply with the
requirements of the relevant order shall be determined by the Court without a
jury.
Amendment of curfew orders
4. (1) Where a curfew order is in force and-
(a) on the application of the offender or the responsible person; or
(b) on the offender being convicted of an offence before a court of
summary jurisdiction,
it appears to a court of summary jurisdiction that, having regard to such
circumstances, it would be in the interests of justice that the order should be
revoked or that the offender should be dealt with in some other manner for the
offence in respect of which the order was made, the court may-
(i) if the order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction, revoke
the order or revoke it and deal with the offender for that offence in any manner in
which he could have been dealt with for that offence by the court which made the
order if the order had not been made;
(ii) if the order was made by a Court of General Gaol Delivery,
commit him to custody or release him on bail until he can be brought or appear
before such a court,
and, where the court deals with his case under head (ii) it shall send to the Chief
Registrar such particulars of the case as may be desirable.
(2) Where an offender in respect of whom such an order is in force-
(a) is convicted of an offence before a Court of General Gaol
Delivery; or
(b) is committed by a court of summary jurisdiction to a Court of
General Gaol Delivery for sentence and is brought or appears before the Court of
General Gaol Delivery; or
(c) by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(ii), is brought or appears before a
Court of General Gaol Delivery,
and it appears to the Court of General Gaol Delivery to be in the interests of
justice to do so, having regard to circumstances which have arisen since the order
was made, the Court may revoke the order or revoke the order and deal with the
offender, for the offence in respect of which the order was made, in any manner in
which he could have been dealt with for that offence by the court which made the
order if the order had not been made.
(3) A person sentenced under sub-paragraph (1) or (2) for an offence may
appeal to the Staff of Government Division against the sentence.
(4) Where a court of summary jurisdiction proposes to exercise its powers
under sub-paragraph (1) otherwise than on the application of the offender, it shall
summon him to appear before the court and, if he does not appear in answer to the
summons, may issue a warrant for his arrest.
Regulation of curfew orders
5. The Department of Home Affairs may make rules for regulating-
(a) the monitoring of the whereabouts of persons who are subject to
curfew orders; and
(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), the functions
of the responsible person of such persons as are mentioned in that paragraph.
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Interpretation
6. (1) In this Schedule-
'responsible person' means-
(a) in relation to an offender who is subject to a probation order, the
probation officer responsible for his supervision;
(b) in relation to an offender who is subject to a curfew order, the
person responsible for monitoring his whereabouts during the curfew periods
specified in the order.
(2) References in this Schedule to the offender's being under the age of 17
years are references to his being under that age on conviction.
(3) For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4, the jurisdiction conferred on a
court of summary jurisdiction shall be exercised by a juvenile court in the case of
a juvenile.
Offenders under the age of 17 years
7. Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not have effect in relation to offenders who are
under the age of 17 years unless paragraph 8 has been brought into operation by
an order under section 64.
8. (1) A court shall not make a curfew order in respect of offenders who are
under the age of 17 years unless the court has been notified by the Department of
Health and Social Security that arrangements for monitoring the offender's
whereabouts are available in the area in which the place proposed to be specified
in the order is situated and the notice has not been withdrawn.
(2) Before making a curfew order in respect of an offender who is under
the age of 17 years, the court shall obtain and consider information about his
family circumstances and the likely effect of such an order on those
circumstances.
(3) In relation to an offender who is under the age of 17 years, paragraph
1(2)(a) shall have effect as if the reference to 6 months were a reference to 3
months.
(4) The Department of Home Affairs may by order direct that sub-
paragraph (3) shall have effect with such additional restrictions as may be so
specified.
(5) An order under this sub-paragraph (4) shall not come into operation
unless it is approved by Tynwald.”
Reparation orders and restorative justice
251. Section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 gives the court power to
impose a reparation order. The relevant provisions are as follows:
“35 Reparation orders
(1) This section applies where a person is convicted of an offence
other than one for which the sentence is fixed by law.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this section and section 36, the court
by or before which the offender is convicted may make an order
(a 'reparation order') which requires the offender to make
reparation as specified in the order-
(a) to a person or persons so specified; or
(b) to the community at large;
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and any person so specified must be a person identified by the
court as a victim of the offence or a person otherwise affected by
it.
(3) The court shall not make a reparation order unless it has been
notified by the Department of Home Affairs that arrangements
for implementing such orders are available and the notice has not
been withdrawn.
(4) The court shall not make a reparation order in respect of the
offender if it proposes-
(a) to pass on him a custodial sentence or a sentence under section 8
of the Custody Act 1995; or
(b) to make in respect of him a community service order under
Schedule 3 to the Criminal Law Act 1981, a combination order
under section 7 of the Criminal Justice (Penalties, Etc.) Act
1993, or a compensation order under Schedule 6 to the Criminal
Law Act 1981.
(5) The court shall not make a reparation order in respect of the
offender without the offender's consent.
(6) A reparation order shall not require the offender-
(a) to work for more than 24 hours in aggregate; or
(b) to make reparation to any person without the consent of
that person.
(7) Subject to subsection (8), requirements specified in a reparation
order shall be such as in the opinion of the court are
commensurate with seriousness of the offence, or the
combination of the offence and one or more offences associated
with it.
(8) Requirements so specified shall, as far as practicable, be such as
to avoid-
(a) any conflict with the offender's religious beliefs; and
(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the offender
normally works or attends school or any other educational
establishment.
(9) Any reparation required by a reparation order-
(a) shall be made under the supervision of a relevant officer; and
(b) shall be made within a period of 3 months from the date of the
making of the order.
(10) In this section 'the relevant officer' means-
(a) in the case of a person of or over 17 years of age, by a person
nominated by the Department of Home Affairs; and
(b) in the case of a person under 17 years of age, by a person
nominated by the Department of Health and Social Security.
36 Reparation orders: supplemental
(1) Before making a reparation order, a court shall obtain and consider
a written report by a relevant officer (within the meaning given in
subsection (10) of section 35) indicating-
(a) the type of work that is suitable for the offender; and
(b) the attitude of the victim or victims to the requirements
proposed to be included in the order.
(2) Before making a reparation order, a court shall explain to the
offender in ordinary language-
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(a) the effect of the order and of the requirements proposed to be
included in it; and
(b) the consequences which may follow under subsection (3) if he fails
to comply with any of those requirements.
(3) Any person who is the subject of a reparation order and who fails
to comply with its requirements shall be guilty of an offence and
shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£5,000 or to custody for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to
both.”
252. In R v Clotworthy [1998] 15 CRNZ 651 the New Zealand Court of
Appeal reduced a custodial sentence in an assault case because of the
offender’s participation in the restorative conference. See also the
speech of Lord Falconer to the Justice Research Consortium
Conference, June 2004 Restorative Justice and sentencing – facing
the issues.
253. In April 2009 the Island successfully hosted a major international
criminal justice conference which, amongst other matters, considered
restorative justice approaches. It is likely that the Island, subject to the
will of Tynwald, will travel further along the progressive path of
restorative justice in the future.
Ban from licensed premises
254. See section 33 Licensing Act 1995 and Davidson (Appeal Division
judgment delivered 9th December 2004) is worthy of consideration.
255. In Davidson the Appeal Division (Deemster Kerruish and Acting
Deemster Sullivan) stated:
“[11] Unfortunately, the learned High Bailiff gave no reasons for the imposition
of the ban: it is therefore impossible to ascertain his reasoning in this regard. We
therefore approach the consideration of the ban from first principles.
[12] Miss. Hannon submits that no ban should be imposed for any first offence
committed on licensed premises. We reject such submission, each case must
depend upon its individual facts. In this case, we accept, however, that this
offence is at the less serious end of the spectrum, no physical violence was used
or threatened, and immediately after the offensive remarks were made the
Appellant left the public house. His behaviour outside the public house was
inexcusable, but this was the subject of a separate charge. Of greater significance
to us is that the commission of this offence was entirely coincidental. In our view,
the Appellant was clearly following the South African men, and had those men
entered a fast food store instead of a public house, the abusive words would no
doubt have been used there instead.
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[13] If the learned High Bailiff had been concerned about the Appellant’s
drinking habits it would have been open to him to apply a ban under subsection
(4)(a) rather than (b) which is as follows:
(a) an order that he shall not purchase liquor from the holder of any licence for
such period (not exceeding 5 years) from the date of the order as may be specified
in the order”
We note that the Appellant was at liberty between the commission of these
offences on 7th March 2004 until he was finally arrested after the latest offences,
for which he was sentenced, on 22 May 2004. No other offences were committed
on licensed premises in spite of the fact that the Appellant had committed
offences of theft of alcohol. As previously remarked the Appellant has an
appalling record for his age, but he has no other convictions in relation to licensed
premises. We note he was just 18 at the time of the commission of this offence.
[14) For the reasons expressed in paragraph [11], in particular, absent any finding
to the contrary, our view is that the commission of this offence was entirely
coincidental to the South Africans choosing to visit a public house. In the absence
of assistance of reasons for the ban, and/or its length, and bearing in mind the
concomitant sentences of imprisonment totalling 14 months, we do not consider
that a ban was called for in this case. We have considered what other, if any,
sentence should be imposed instead of the ban. In the light of the other sentences
passed on the same occasion, we intend to impose no separate penalty for this
offence. To that extent this appeal is allowed.”
Conditional discharge
256. Under Section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1963 where the court is
of opinion, having regard to the circumstances including the nature of
the offence and the character of the offender, that it may be
inexpedient to inflict punishment and that a probation order is not
appropriate the court may discharge him subject to the condition that
he commits no offence during such period, not exceeding three years
or discharge him conditionally on his entering into a recognizance to
be of good behaviour and to comply with such conditions during such
period, not exceeding three years as may be specified in the order.
257. Section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1963 is set out below for ease of
reference:
“6 Absolute and conditional discharge
(1) Where the court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence
(not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law) is of opinion, having
regard to the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character
of the offender, that it is inexpedient to inflict punishment and that a probation
order is not appropriate, the court may make an order-
(a) discharging him absolutely, or,
(b) if the court thinks fit,
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(i) discharging him subject to the condition that he commits no
offence during such period, not exceeding three years from the date of the order
as may be specified therein, or
(ii) discharging him conditionally on his entering into a
recognizance to be of good behaviour and to comply with such conditions during
such period, not exceeding three years, as may be specified in the order.
(2) An order discharging a person under the provisions of
paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section is in this Act referred to as 'an order
for conditional discharge', and the period specified in any such order as 'the period
of conditional discharge'.
(3) Before making an order for conditional discharge the court shall
explain to the offender in ordinary language the effect of any conditions which may
be contained in the order and that if he commits another offence during the period
of conditional discharge or fails to comply with any conditions which may be
specified in the order he will be liable to be sentenced for the original offence.
(4) Where, under the following provisions of this Act, a person
conditionally discharged under this section is sentenced for the offence in respect of
which the order for conditional discharge was made, that order shall cease to have
effect.”
258. In Macaulay v Cain 1978-80 MLR 75 the Appeal Division (Deemster
Eason and Deemster Luft) held that under section 9 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1963 a conditional discharge was deemed to be no
conviction if the conditions of the conditional discharge were
observed and therefore there was no right of appeal.
Absolute discharge
259. Section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1963 empowers a court to
discharge an offender absolutely.
Pardons
260. See Halsburys Laws 4th Ed Vol 8(2) paragraph 823 and Christian v
Nowell (PC) 1522-1920 MLR 5 in respect of pardons generally. See R
(Shields) v Secretary of State for Justice (QBD judgment delivered
17th December 2008) in respect of the power to pardon prisoner
sentenced abroad. See Prisoners, Pardons and Politics: R(Shields) v
Secretary of State for Justice [2009] Crim LR 648 article by Hannah
Quirk.
261. See Mallard v The Queen [2005] HCA 68 in respect of the
prerogative of mercy.
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Confiscation order
262. See Drug Trafficking Act 1996 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008
together with various Manx authorities including R v Miller
(judgment delivered 15th June 2001 by Deemster Kerruish). See R v
May [2008] UKHL 28, CPS v Jennings [2008] UKHL 29 (piercing
the corporate veil and benefit) and R v Green [2008] UKHL 30 (issue
of payment or rewards in respect of drug trafficking being received
jointly by two or more persons acting as principals to a drug
trafficking offence). See also Telli v Revenue and Customs
Prosecution Office [2008] 2 Cr App. R(S) 48 where it was indicated
that agreements between the Crown and the defence must not be
inconsistent with the framework of the statutory scheme.
263. Section 2 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 makes provision for
confiscation orders.
264. Where the court proceeds under section 2 of the Drug Trafficking Act
1996 it shall first determine whether the defendant has benefited from
drug trafficking.
265. For the purposes of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 a person has
benefited from drug trafficking if he has at any time received any
payment or other reward in connection with drug trafficking carried
on by him or another person.
266. If the court determines that the defendant has so benefited the court
shall before sentence determine in accordance with section 5 the
amount to be recovered.
267. The court shall then (a) order the defendant to pay that amount (b)
take account of the order before imposing any fine on him or other
financial orders.
268. Under section 2(7) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 the standard of
proof required to determine any question arising under the Act as to:
(a) whether a person has benefited from drug trafficking or
(b) the amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of section 2,
shall be that applicable in civil proceedings .
269. Section 3 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 deals with postponed
determinations. Unless satisfied that there are exceptional
circumstances the total period of the adjournment should not exceed 6
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months beginning with the date of conviction. Where the defendant
appeals his conviction unless there are exceptional circumstances the
court should not adjourn for a period exceeding 3 months ending
after the date on which the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed
of. “Date of conviction” is defined in section 3(11) of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1996.
270. Section 4 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 concerns assessing the
proceeds of drug trafficking. Subject to certain provisions of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1996 the Court of General Gaol is required, for the
purposes (a) of determining whether the defendant has benefited from
drug trafficking and (b) if he has of assessing the value of his
proceeds of drug trafficking, to make certain assumptions.
271. The required assumptions are -
(a) that any property appearing to the court -
(i) to have been held by the defendant at any time since his
conviction, or
(ii) to have been transferred to him at any time since the
beginning of the period of 6 years ending when the
proceedings were instituted against him,
was received by him, at the earliest time at which he appears to the
court to have held it as a payment or reward in connection with drug
trafficking carried on by him;
(b) that any expenditure of his since the beginning of that period
was met out of payments received by him in connection with drug
trafficking carried on by him; and
(c) that, for the purpose of valuing any property received or
assumed to have been received by him at any time as such a reward,
he received the property free of any other interests in it.
272. The court shall not make any required assumption in relation to any
particular property or expenditure if -
(a) that assumption is shown to be incorrect in the defendant’s
case; or
(b) the court is satisfied that there would be a serious risk of
injustice in the defendant’s case if the assumption were to be
made;
and where, under the subsection, the court does not make one or more
of the required assumptions, it shall state its reasons
[subsection (2) does not apply if the only drug trafficking offence is an offence in
respect of proceeds of drug trafficking]
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273. Section 5 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 oncerns the amount to be
recovered under a confiscation order. Section 5(1) of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1996 provides that subject to subsection (3) the
amount to be recovered in the defendant’s case under the confiscation
order shall be the amount the Court of General Gaol Delivery assesses
to be the value of the defendant’s proceeds of drug trafficking.
274. Section 5(3) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 provides that if the
court is satisfied that the amount that might be realised at the time the
confiscation order is made is less than the amount the court assesses
to be the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking, the amount to be
recovered in the defendant’s case under the confiscation order shall
be:
(a) the amount appearing to the court to be the amount that might
be so realised; or
(b) a nominal amount, where it appears to the court (on the
information available to it at the time) that the amount that
might be so realised is nil.
275. Under section 6 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 the amount that
might be realised at the time a confiscation order is made against the
defendant is:
(a) the total of the values at that time of all the realisable property
held by the defendant, less
(b) where there are obligations having priority at that time, the total
amount payable in pursuance of such obligations;
together with the total values at that time of all gifts caught by the
Act.
276. Realisable property means (a) any property held by the defendant and
(b) any property held by a person to whom the defendant has directly
or indirectly made a gift caught by the Act.
277. Section 7 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1996 concerns value of
property and other matters. Section 8 of the Drug Trafficking Act
1996 concerns gifts caught by the Act.
278. See R v John Miller judgment of Deemster Kerruish 15th June 2001
generally and in respect of gifts. See also Gibson v Revenue and
Customs Prosecutions Office [2008] EWCA Civ 645.
279. In R v May [2008] UKHL 28 the following appeared as an endnote:
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“Endnote
48. The committee would conclude by drawing attention to the current
importance of the power to make confiscation orders. In the period April 2007 -
February 2008 the courts in England and Wales made 4504 such orders in sums
totalling £225.87 million. In recent years the number of orders and the sums
confiscated have steadily risen. Recognition of the importance and difficulty of
this jurisdiction prompts the committee to emphasise the broad principles to be
followed by those called upon to exercise it:
(1) The legislation is intended to deprive defendants of the benefit they have
gained from relevant criminal conduct, whether or not they have retained such
benefit, within the limits of their available means. It does not provide for
confiscation in the sense understood by schoolchildren and others, but nor does it
operate by way of fine. The benefit gained is the total value of the property or
advantage obtained, not the defendant’s net profit after deduction of expenses or
any amounts payable to co-conspirators.
(2) The court should proceed by asking the three questions posed above: (i) Has
the defendant (D) benefited from relevant criminal conduct? (ii) If so, what is the
value of the benefit D has so obtained? (iii) What sum is recoverable from D?
Where issues of criminal life style arise the questions must be modified. These are
separate questions calling for separate answers, and the questions and answers
must not be elided.
(3) In addressing these questions the court must first establish the facts as best it
can on the material available, relying as appropriate on the statutory assumptions.
In very many cases the factual findings made will be decisive.
(4) In addressing the questions the court should focus very closely on the
language of the statutory provision in question in the context of the statute and in
the light of any statutory definition. The language used is not arcane or obscure
and any judicial gloss or exegesis should be viewed with caution. Guidance
should ordinarily be sought in the statutory language rather than in the
proliferating case law.
(5) In determining, under the 2002 Act, whether D has obtained property or a
pecuniary advantage and, if so, the value of any property or advantage so
obtained, the court should (subject to any relevant statutory definition) apply
ordinary common law principles to the facts as found. The exercise of this
jurisdiction involves no departure from familiar rules governing entitlement and
ownership. While the answering of the third question calls for inquiry into the
financial resources of D at the date of the determination, the answering of the first
two questions plainly calls for a historical inquiry into past transactions.
(6) D ordinarily obtains property if in law he owns it, whether alone or jointly,
which will ordinarily connote a power of disposition or control, as where a person
directs a payment or conveyance of property to someone else. He ordinarily
obtains a pecuniary advantage if (among other things) he evades a liability to
which he is personally subject. Mere couriers or custodians or other very minor
contributors to an offence, rewarded by a specific fee and having no interest in the
property or the proceeds of sale, are unlikely to be found to have obtained that
property. It may be otherwise with money launderers.”
280. See also CPS v Jennings [2008] UKHL 29 and R v Green [2008]
UKHL 30. In the Jennings case the issues of piercing the corporate
137
veil and the meaning of ‘benefit’ were considered. Green involved the
issue of payments or rewards in respect of drug trafficking being
received jointly by two or more persons acting as principals to a drug
trafficking offence. See R v Allpress [2009] EWCA Crim 8. See R v
Winters The Times 12.1.09 in respect of proving the benefit of drug
trafficking. See Islam [2008] EWCA Crim 1736 & 1740 in respect of
appeals against confiscation orders.
281. In Grayson v UK (Application nos 1995/05 and 15085/06 Chamber
judgment 23 September 2008) it was held that it was not incompatible
with the notion of a fair hearing in criminal proceedings to place the
onus on each applicant to give a credible account of his current
financial situation. It was not unreasonable to expect the applicants to
explain what had happened to the money from their drug dealing over
a period of years. Such matters fell within their knowledge.
282. In R v Nelson [2009] EWCA Crim 1573 the English Court of Appeal
held that confiscation proceedings which had been properly brought
in accordance with statutory provisions to deprive a convicted
defendant of the benefit of his crime should not be stayed as an abuse
of process because the judge considered that they might produce an
oppressive result.
283. In R v Knaggs [2009] EWCA 1363 the English Court of Appeal held
that a defendant who pleaded guilty to an offence without any
challenge to the facts presented by the prosecution was not, as a
matter of law, thereby debarred from challenging the prosecution
evidence for the purpose of a confiscation hearing.
284. See also R v Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19.
285. See also the provision of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 in respect of
confiscation orders and International Finance Trust Company Limited
v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49 in respect of
without notice proceedings.
Forfeiture and disposal
286. In respect of the power of the court to deprive an offender of property
used, or intended for use, for the purposes of crime see section 16 of
the Criminal Law Act 1981 which provides as follows:
“16 Power to deprive offender of property used, or intended for use, for
purposes of crime
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(1) Where a person is convicted of an offence and-
(a) the court by or before which he is convicted is satisfied that any property
which has been lawfully seized from him or which was in his possession
or under his control at the time when he was apprehended for the offence
or when a summons in respect of it was issued-
(1) has been used for the purpose of committing, or facilitating the
commission of, any offence; or
(2) was intended by him to be used for that purpose; or
(b) the offence, or an offence which the court has taken into account in
determining his sentence, consists of unlawful possession of property
which has been lawfully seized from him or which was in his possession
or under his control at the time when he was apprehended for the offence
or when a summons in respect of it was issued.
the court may make an order under this section in respect of that property and
may do so whether or not it also deals with the offender in respect of the offence
in any other way and without regard to any restrictions on forfeiture in any Act
passed before the Criminal Justice Act 1990.
[Subs (1) substituted by Criminal Justice Act 1990 s30.]
(1A) In considering whether to make an order under subsection (1) in respect of
any property a court shall have regard-
(a) to the value of the property; and
(b) to the likely effects on the offender of the making of the order (taken
together with any other order that the court contemplates making).
[Subs (1A) inserted by Criminal Justice Act 1990 s30.]
(2) Facilitating the commission of an offence shall be taken for the purposes
of this section and section 17 to include the taking of any steps after it has
been committed for the purpose of disposing of any property to which it
relates or of avoiding apprehension or detection, and references in this or
that section or an offence punishable with imprisonment shall be construed
without regard to any prohibition or restriction imposed by or under any
enactment on the imprisonment of young offenders.
(3) An order under this section shall operate to deprive the offender of his
rights (if any) in the property to which it relates, and the property shall (if
not already in their possession) be taken into the possession of the police.
(4) Section 34 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 shall apply, with the
following modifications, to property which is in the possession of the
police by virtue of this section –
(a) no application shall be made under subsection (1) of that section
by any claimant of the property after the expiration of six months
from the date on which the order in respect of the property was
made under this section; and
(b) no such application shall succeed unless the claimant satisfies the
court either that he had not consented to the offender having
possession of the property or, where an order is made under
subsection (1)(a), that he did not know, and had no reason to
suspect, that the property was likely to be used for the purpose
mentioned in that paragraph.
[Subs (4) amended by Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 Sch 5. Para (b)
amended by Criminal Justice Act 1990 s30.]
(5) In relation to property which is in the possession of the police by virtue of
this section and in respect of which no application has been made within
the period specified in subsection (4)(a) or no such application has
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succeeded, section 34(1) of the said Act of 1989 shall apply as if the
owner of the property cannot be ascertained.
[Subs (5) amended by Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 Sch 5.] ”
287. In respect of the power of the court to order forfeiture of drugs or
anything which relates to an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act
1976 or a drug trafficking offence see section 27 of the Misuse of
Drugs Act 1976 which provides as follows:
“27 Forfeiture
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, the court by or before which a
person is convicted of an offence to which this section applies may order
anything shown to the satisfaction of the court to relate to the offence, to
be forfeited and either destroyed or dealt with in such other manner as the
court may order.
[Subs (1) amended by Criminal Justice Act 1990 s 31.]
(1A) This section applies to any offence which is either (or both) of the
following –
(a) an offence under this Act;
(b) a drug trafficking offence, as defined in section 1(3) of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1996.
[Subs (1A) inserted by Criminal justice Act 1990 s 31. Para (b) amended
by Drug Trafficking Act 1996 Sch 1.]
(2) The court shall not order anything to be forfeited under this section, where
a person claiming to be the owner of or otherwise interested in it applies to
be heard by the court, unless an opportunity has been given to him to show
cause why the order should not be made.”
Starting points
288. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Goodman (judgment delivered 1st June 2007) provided
guidance in respect of the indication of starting points that is the
starting point of sentence on the basis of a contested trial and without
reflecting any mitigation. Goodman concerned sentences for offences
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1976. At paragraphs 27 and 28 it was
indicated that the sentencing judge in sentencing for these types of
offences should make it clear what is his starting point for sentence
assuming a conviction after a trial and without reflecting any
mitigation so that there can be no misunderstanding when he imposes
sentence as to what degree such sentence has been reduced to reflect
the available mitigation. Counsel for the prosecution and defence
should indicate their views on the appropriate starting point in
advance of the effective sentencing hearing.
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289. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Clinton (judgment 29th October 2009) stated:
“71. We do not consider that the application of the sentencing guidelines in this
case was disproportionate. Such sentencing guidelines provide guidance as to a
usual starting point for sentence, it is for the sentencing judge to determine the
actual starting point in the circumstances of the partiulcar case, and what sentence
should be imposed in the light of all the aggravating and mitigating factors. We
reject Mr O’Neill’s submission that the sentencing guidelines do not allow the
sentencing judge to fully consider and give approproiate credit for the
circumstances of the offender. In so far as it is believed that such guidelines
compel a sentencing judge to impose a particular sentence, such a belief is
erroneous.”
290. In Taylor (judgment 4th April 2008) the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) indicated that matters such
as the fact that drugs were required for personal use were more
appropriately considered in the context of the degree of mitigation
given to a defendant in reducing the sentence to be imposed rather
than in the assessment of the starting point for sentence. In Taylor the
Appeal Division stated:
“20. Accordingly in Caldwell-Camp this court set out bands of starting points for
sentence by reference to the weight of drugs in powder form and by reference to
the number of tablets, capsules or other units of drugs supplied. Such starting
points assumed a conviction after a trial and did not reflect any mitigation. But it
is important to note two matters emphasised by the court.
21. Firstly, the court stressed that the quantity of drugs was not the only factor
relevant to the exercise of the sentencing discretion and that `there may be some
cases where the appropriate starting point may be above or below the band
otherwise appropriate, but it will seldom be the case that the starting point for any
quantity of drugs will be below five years`. In our judgment an appropriate
starting point will reflect not only the quantity of drugs involved but also the
totality of the offences committed [see for example Goodman in which this court
adjudged that the production and supply of two different Class A drugs justified
an increased starting point than each of the drugs individually would justify], the
manner in which they were committed and in some cases the level of criminality
of the offender.
22. Secondly, the court stressed that in determining the appropriate sentence to be
imposed on a defendant, the sentencing judge will have regard to all relevant
matters which may include matters of aggravation such as the sophistication of
the methods used to avoid detection, and matters of mitigation such as co-
operation with the police, pleas of guilty and when they were first intimated, and
other matters of personal mitigation. Such considerations may result in the
sentencing judge imposing a sentence which is greater or lower than the starting
point for sentence.
141
23. It thus necessarily follows that in every case of this type a sentencing judge
has to consider firstly, what was the starting point for sentence and secondly, to
what extent such starting point should be increased, or reduced to become the
sentence imposed.
24. We turn to the facts of this case.
The appropriate starting point for sentence
25. Firstly, we consider the appropriate starting point for sentence in this case.
26. The guidelines in Caldwell-Camp indicate that the appropriate band for the
starting point for sentence for the supply of 1-500 tablets is 5 to 8 years custody.
Having considered the submissions of Mrs Watts, who then appeared on behalf of
the Attorney General, who contended for a starting point of 6 years custody and
Mr Stephen Wood, who then appeared on behalf of the Respondent, who
contended for a starting point of 3½ to 4 years custody, Deemster Doyle
concluded that there should be a starting point for sentence of 4 years custody.
27. Before this court Miss Norman submitted that Deemster Doyle erred in so
concluding and we must therefore consider whether Deemster Doyle was entitled
to adopt the starting point for sentence which he did.
28. Miss Norman correctly observed that, whilst Deemster Doyle had stated that
he had considered all the authorities and all the circumstances of the case, he gave
no explanation as to why the starting point was not within the guidelines and did
not suggest that the circumstances of the Respondent`s case were in any way
exceptional. She submitted that there was no reason for Deemster Doyle to depart
from the guidelines and that the appropriate starting point should have been 6
years.
29. Miss Hannan adopted a realistic and sensible approach. She conceded that the
starting point of 4 years adopted by Deemster Doyle could not be justified by
reference to the guidelines set out in Caldwell-Camp. She contended for a starting
point of 5 years and, in doing so, relied on the Respondent`s explanation, not
challenged by the Attorney General, that he intended to supply ecstasy only to his
friends, that he was not commercially motivated and that Deemster Doyle had
expressly accepted that the Respondent`s motivation was not to make money.
Whilst we recognise that the absence of a financial motive is a matter of some
relevance, we are not persuaded that it is a matter of a substantial importance,
particularly because the mischief of the offence of possession with intent to
supply is that illegal drugs were intended to be supplied to others.
30. Although we thus concede that the court was required to have some regard to
the Respondent`s non-commercial approach and that ordinarily such might be
taken into account in determining the starting point for sentence, we note that in
this case Miss Hannan also relied upon the fact that the persons to whom the
Respondent supplied drugs were not in a public place or young vulnerable
persons, but simply his friends, and acquaintances. In these circumstances on the
facts of this case we think that it is appropriate that all these matters should be
considered in the context of the degree of mitigation given to the Respondent in
reducing the starting point for sentence to the sentence to be imposed rather than
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in assessing the starting point for sentence. In some sense it matters not at what
stage relevant mitigation is taken into account : it is only important that it is taken
into account before the determination of the sentences to be imposed.
31. We recognise that in adopting the starting point for sentence Deemster Doyle
was exercising a discretion and that this court should be slow to interfere with the
exercise of such discretion. That said we agree with Miss Norman that there was
nothing remarkable about this case which should have led to the adoption of a
starting point outside the guidelines. On the precise facts of this case we think it is
appropriate to determine the starting point for sentence on the basis of the
quantity of drugs which the Respondent intended to supply to others [here 84
ecstasy tablets], leaving to mitigation all questions of non-commercial motive and
to whom the drugs were intended to be supplied. Adopting such an approach we
are satisfied that the correct starting point for sentence was 6 years and that
Deemster Doyle erred in adopting a starting point of 4 years. On the facts of this
case we can see no reasons which would justify departing from the guidelines set
out in Caldwell-Camp.”
291. In Taylor the Appeal Division increased the sentence of 18 months to
a sentence of 33 months.
292. In Crosbie (judgment 23rd September 2009) the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) declined to give
the Attorney General leave to refer the case for review of the
sentence. The Appeal Division stated:
“18. Ms Hughes, on behalf of the Attorney General, explained to the court that the
thrust of the Attorney General`s application was that the starting point of 5 years
custody adopted by Deemster Doyle was too low and that, adopting the guidelines
set out by this court in Caldwell-Camp v R [2003-05] MLR 505, it ought to have
been between 8 and 11 years. In fact she contended for a starting point of 8 years
custody but conceded that had Deemster Doyle adopted a starting point of 7 years,
such could not have been criticised.
19. Such argument was founded upon the fact that the Respondent had been
concerned in the production of 56.1 grams of cocaine. Ms Hughes submitted that
in so far as Deemster Doyle had, in determining the starting point for sentence,
taken into account the fact that the Respondent had pleaded guilty to count 4 on
the basis that most of the cocaine was for her own use but that she would have
shared it with her friends and sold the remainder to a few friends for profit,
Deemster Doyle had erred. In support of such submission Ms Hughes relied upon
dicta of this court in Attorney General v Taylor [4th April 2008] where this court
indicated that matters such as the fact that drugs were required for personal use
were more appropriately considered in the context of the degree of mitigation
given to a defendant in reducing the sentence to be imposed rather than in the
assessment of the starting point for sentence.
20. Although we did not hear any submissions from Mrs Jones, on behalf of the
Respondent, we are satisfied that there is much merit in such submission. In all
the circumstances we are satisfied that the period of 5 years custody adopted as a
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starting point by Deemster Doyle was too low and the appropriate starting point
was 8 years, although we agree that [since Deemster Doyle was exercising a
discretion as to the starting point, the exercise of which this court should be slow
to interfere with] this court could not have adjudged that a starting point of 7
years custody was wrong.
21. Given that at one stage during her oral submissions Ms Hughes submitted that
the effect of Caldwell-Camp was that the guidelines must be followed save in
exceptional circumstances, we think it important that we should emphasise that in
Caldwell-Camp this court emphasised that the guidelines therein enunciated were
`indicative only and for the purpose of giving guidance to judges at first instance
charged with the exercise of a sentencing discretion so as to reduce the incidence
of unnecessary and inappropriate inconsistency` [see paragraph 46], that `there
may be some cases where the appropriate starting point may be above or below
the band otherwise appropriate` [see paragraph 52] and `there is a delicate balance
to be struck between the issuing of guidelines to assist judges at first instance and
the proper exercise by such judges of their sentencing discretion` [see paragraph
57].
22. It is common ground that the appropriate sentence to be served by the
Respondent required to reflect a number of matters, which overall offered the
Respondent very considerable mitigation. Firstly, whilst the Respondent had not
pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, she did plead guilty at an early stage and
her admission that she had intended to supply some of the cocaine to others merits
much credit given that it is conceded that there was no other evidence to confirm
that and she could easily, and perhaps persuasively, have contended that all such
cocaine was for her own personal use. Secondly, there was other strong mitigation
deriving from her own personal circumstances : at the time of the offences she
was of good character and in employment. Thirdly, the Respondent had pleaded
guilty to count 4 on the basis that most of the cocaine was for her own use but that
she would have shared it with her friends and sold the remainder to a few friends
for profit. Fourthly, Deemster Doyle readily recognised that `this was not a
sophisticated and prolonged commercial operation`. Indeed Ms Hughes accepted
that this was a `one-off` event.
23. Taking all such matters into account each member of this court would have
imposed a total sentence of 3½ years custody on this Respondent. In such
circumstances we have to consider whether a total sentence of 3 years custody ,
which Deemster Doyle expressly recognised was lenient, was unduly lenient.
Moreover if we were minded to increase the sentence on the Respondent we
would have to have regard to the principle of double jeopardy.
24. For all these reasons, having considered Ms Hughes` written submissions and
heard her oral submissions in support of this Reference, we are convinced that
there is no realistic prospect that the reference to review the sentence would
succeed.”
293. In R v Saw [2009] EWCA Crim 1 the English Court of Appeal at
paragraph 4 referred to the expression ‘starting point’ and stated:
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“It is nowadays used to identify a notional point within a broad range, from which
the sentence should be increased or decreased, to allow for aggravating or
mitigating features, rather than the lowest point in the range.”
294. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Johnson (judgment 12th June 2008) at paragraph 15
stated that there was no room for an “arithmetical approach” to starting
points. The Appeal Division stated:
“…The essence of Caldwell-Camp is that, while this court has given broad
guidelines for judges, it is for the sentencing judge to decide where within the
band the starting point should be on the particular facts of the case. In such
circumstances there is no room for an arithmetical approach which in any event is
inconsistent with the fact that the bands of starting points overlap.”
295. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) stated at paragraph 29 of a judgment delivered on the 29th
October 2009 in Myers : “… In the case of an offence involving the
trafficking of Class A drugs a judge is required firstly to ascertain a starting point
for sentence, following the guidance of this court in Caldwell-Camp, and
secondly, after weighing the matters which he identifies as aggravating the
offence or offering the defendant mitigation, to exercise his sentencing discretion
so as to impose what he believes to be the appropriate sentence for such offence.”
296. See also Harrison v Attorney General 2004 JLR 111 (Jersey Court of
Appeal):
“ Conclusions on starting points
93 As we have already observed, one of the advantages of the sentencing
process in this jurisdiction is the assistance given to the Jurats by the
Crown. The delay between verdict and sentence affords an opportunity to
the Crown Advocate to research any relevant authorities and to assist the
Royal Court in moving for a specific sentence in their conclusions.
94 To a limited extent, the conclusions may be guesswork because the
Crown will not necessarily be aware of all the mitigating features relating
to the offender which the defence advocate may be able to put before the
court, although it will have received the social enquiry report and any
other reports as well as any testimonials, references, letters or other
material to be relied on by the defence, in accordance with Practice
Direction (Royal Ct.) (Testimonials, References, Letters from Defendants,
etc. for Sentencing Purposes) (2004/01). But insofar as the conclusions
consist of an assessment of the mischief of the offence itself, of the proper
weight in sentencing terms for its commission, the Crown seems to us to
be in a particularly good position to assist and to research the appropriate
authorities so as to ensure that the aggravating features, pleas and
mitigation in such cases arc clearly identified to enable the Royal Court to
make appropriate comparisons.
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95 In cases where the Crown is moving for a custodial sentence, we see no
reason why the Crown should not undertake this research and include, as
part of its conclusions, an assessment of the starting point for the offence
in question and we would expect them to do so. Indeed, the Crown
conducted such an exercise in the Royal Court in this case. We are
confident that such assessments will prove valuable to the Jurats in the
task they have to undertake in the Royal Court.
96 We accept that the key to the effective operation of sentencing as
between this court and the Royal Court is not for this court to impose a
sentencing straitjacket which forces the Royal Court to determine
sentences according to a fixed and immutable set of rules, but rather to
ensure that, whatever route is chosen by the Royal Court, the journey is
well mapped and signposted. Provided the reasoning of the Royal Court is
clear, the necessary discretion which the lower court possesses in
sentencing matters will not easily be questioned or overturned.
97 It is obvious that where the sentencing court gives adequate reasons,
though using a method of sentencing which does not apply a starting
point, the appellate court will be able to perform its functions
satisfactorily. If the case of Hanby (4) had come before this court on
appeal, the court would have been able fully to assess the reasons for the
sentence and the allowances which the Royal Court had made for the
various matters which aggravated and mitigated the offence as well as the
conduct of the offender, despite the fact that the Royal Court failed to
identify a starting point.
98 It is when the reasoning of the Royal Court is unclear that the Court of
Appeal feels bound to reason its own way to an assessment of sentence,
which, if it differs from the sentence of the Royal Court, may result in the
appeal being allowed. In setting out its own reasons this court not
infrequently feels bound to ascertain an appropriate starting point sentence
for the gravity of the offence. This may result in the Court of Appeal
deciding that the sentence of the Royal Court is too high, and therefore
allowing the appeal. But it may result in this court deciding that the
sentence of the Royal Court is too low: that was the position in Harris
(20), in which ascertainment by this court of the appropriate starting point
showed that the sentence imposed by the Royal Court for manslaughter by
the injection of Class A drugs was inappropriately lenient.
99 However, in our judgment, the advantages of fixing a starting point are
considerable for the reasons we have identified above. We hope that we
will have allayed the concerns in the use of starting points which have
been ventilated by the Royal Court in the cases to which we have referred,
and which have contributed to a reluctance by the Royal Court to use
starting points in non-drugs cases.
100 We emphasize, therefore, that we regard it as desirable for the Royal
Court to identify starting points; but what we have said does not constitute
a direction that the Royal Court must perform this function. We do not
conclude that the absence of the application of a starting point of itself
prevents this court from carrying out its functions as defined in the Court
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of Appeal (Jersey) Law 1961 provided that the Royal Court’s reasoning is
clear; nor do we conclude that the absence of a starting point constitutes a
breach of art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. To that
extent, we take the view that any inferences to the contrary which may
have arisen from what was said by this court on this point in Harris (20),
Channing (15) and Le Pavoux (24) should be disregarded.
101 Finally, in the context of starting points, may we express the hope, as
a result of this judgment, that the difficulties and problems to which this
vexed question has given rise can now firmly be put to one side and that
the administration of criminal justice in this jurisdiction can proceed, so
far as the sentencing process is concerned, with a better understanding of
what is expected from its participants. We now turn to the submissions
which Advocate Tremoceiro addressed to us specific to this appellant.”
297. An extract from the headnote to the case reads as follows:
“Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) It was not inappropriate for the Court of Appeal to exercise general
though light control over the sentencing procedures of the Royal Court.
Whenever the interests of justice required it, its powers extended to
considering the process by which that court had decided what sentence to
pass and to reviewing its procedure so as to allow the Court of Appeal to
determine its fairness and adequacy and ensure its compliance with the
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. In more
conventional terms, it would then interfere with a sentence passed by the
Royal Court where (a) it was not justified by law; (b) it was passed on the
wrong factual basis; (c) some matter had been improperly taken into
account or some fresh matter needed consideration; or (d) the sentence
was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive (paras. 22-24; paras. 2-3l;
paras. 97-98).
(2) It was desirable for the Royal Court to identify starting points for
sentences in all cases, though the court would not direct that it do so since
it did not wish to impose a sentencing straitjacket on the Royal Court. It
was clear in any event that the absence of a starting point neither offended
art. 6 of the European Convention nor usually prevented the appellate
court from carrying out its functions, provided that the Royal Court’s
reasoning was clear. The advantages of using starting points were
nevertheless considerable, as (a) they made the sentencing process more
transparent and helped to promote open justice; (b) the building up of a
body of precedent of cases with decided starting points would help to
achieve consistency in sentencing, and advocates would be able to advise
their clients more accurately; and (c) it would help the court to ensure that
the appropriate sentencing reductions had been made, particularly for
guilty pleas. Some estimation would certainly be required when selecting
starting points because most current Jersey authority did not specify them
for particular offences (although there were some examples where this had
been done satisfactorily) - but the task was well within the capacity of the
Royal Court with the assistance of the Crown in moving its conclusions
(paras. 56-57; paras. 75-81; paras. 89-92; paras. 94-100; para. 108; para.
117; paras. 127-130).
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(3) The selection of a starting point was the first stage in a two- stage
process:
(a) it should be selected by weighing up the aggravating features of the
offence (including the accused’s bad character specifically relating to the
offence though not general bad character) and any factors which reduced
its gravity;
(b) excluded from the starting point would be the weight given to any plea
of guilty (which should be the first deduction made from the starting
point), matters of personal mitigation, time spent awaiting trial, good
character or other personal circumstances (all of which should be deducted
next and might be expressed as a single comprehensive discount covering
all relevant factors);
(c) it followed that the factors listed in (b) above would be considered at
the second stage of the two-stage process (paras. 45-46; paras. 69-72;
paras. 91-92).
(4) The identification of a starting point in every case would not,
moreover, lead to proliferation of appeals based on cases with similar facts
because (a) as the variables in non-drugs cases were much greater than in
drugs cases, it would be unproductive to compare one case directly with
another—and it was an established practice to require counsel to rely only
on comparator cases which laid down principles or guidelines; and (b) the
Court of Appeal did not test figures given by the Royal Court, either-for
starting or finishing points, by reference to other cases. The use of starting
points in sentencing in drugs cases had not caused significant problems
(paras. 58-65).
(5) The Royal Court would be greatly assisted if, when moving its
conclusions (especially those involving a custodial sentence) the Crown
were to research the appropriate authorities on aggravation, pleas and
mitigation, present the results of that research to the court and in all cases
to include in its conclusions its own assessment of the starting point
(paras. 94-95).
(6) Proof of intent was not a requirement of the offence of grave and
criminal assault in Jersey and it was therefore not appropriate to consider
whether the offence in the present case in England would have fallen
under s18, s20 or s.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
Introducing such a requirement would make the sentencing process
unnecessarily and artificially restricted and to attempt to introduce
elements of the English offences into the sentencing process for the Jersey
offence would significantly increase the likelihood of introducing more
Newton hearings into the process (paras. 114-119).
(7) The Crown, when drafting the statement of facts in the case of a grave
and criminal assault, and the Jurats, when considering the appropriate
sentence to pass, should make an assessment of the seriousness of the
offence and should consider, inter alia -
(a) the nature of the deliberation with which the assault was carried out;
(b) whether the blow was aimed;
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(c) whether the incident was committed in cold blood;
(d) the degree of force with which the blow was struck;
(e) the nature, extent, gravity, and permanence of the injury caused;
(f) if a weapon was used, the nature of such a weapon;
(g) whether the weapon was carried or seized on the instant;
(h) how many were concerned in the assault and the circumstances
which gave rise to their involvement;
(i) the nature and extent of any provocation offered by the victim;
(j) whether the offender had a record of committing the same or similar
offences or constituted a danger to himself or the public (para. 120).
(8) Although there was no maximum sentence for contempt of court, the
appeal against the sentence of 12 months concurrent with the main offence
would be allowed as it was excessive, no example having been found of a
sentence of 12 months passed for absconding in breach of bail. Moreover,
any sentence for contempt should normally be consecutive to the
substantive sentence. In this case, a sentence of three months would be
substituted but the court would not alter the sentence to run consecutively,
since the total sentence of 3½ years was, on the fact of the case, entirety
appropriate (paras. 133-134; paras. 142-143).
(9) It was clear that r.1(1) of the Criminal Proceedings (Computation of
Sentences) (Jersey) Rules 1968, which provided that the length of a prison
sentence should be reduced by any period which the accused had already
spent in prison in connection with the same offence, did not apply to
orders of overseas courts and the accused’s sentence would therefore not
be reduced by the time he had spent in the Spanish prison awaiting
extradition. The court would not interpret the rule contrary to the normal
rule of construction that words in a statute were assumed to be used
consistently by draftsmen - the first use of the word “court” in the rule
admittedly referring to a court in Jersey, the second use of the same word
had to be given the same restricted meaning. Nevertheless, the Royal
Court did have a discretion to take account of the period spent in custody
overseas pending extradition and had made some allowance for it, though
this was affected by the extent to which the accused had brought the
custody on himself, e.g. by opposing extradition. The court did not have to
exercise its discretion to grant full day-for-day discount from the point at
which the accused ceased opposing extradition as he had brought the
imprisonment on himself by initially absconding from Jersey, and the
authorities had acted promptly at all times (paras. 135 - 136; paras. 139-
142)”
298. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in R v Jeffery Cameron Watterson (judgment delivered 25th
April 2008) at paragraph 14 stated:
“Although Goodman was dealing with different drug offences, there can be no
doubt that such dicta are appropriate in all cases. Such an approach where a judge
initially sets out what his sentence would have been, assuming a conviction after a
trial and without reflecting any mitigation, makes it transparent what effect a plea
of guilty and mitigation have had on the sentence in fact imposed.”
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Leniency and mercy
299. In the Attorney General’s Reference No 73 of 2006 (judgment
October 10th 2006) it was stressed that judges may temper justice with
mercy.
300. In Angela Schumann (Times 15th February 2007) Phillips L C J stated:
“There is one word that you will not read in the sentencing guidelines and that is
‘mercy’. There are occasions where the court can put the guidelines and
authorities on one side and apply mercy instead.”
301. In Weston [1980] Crim App R(S) 391 it was indicated that a short
sentence of up to 3 months (“clang of the prison gates”) may be
punishment and deterrent enough in some circumstances especially
where the defendant is of good character, the offence is out of
character and there is genuine remorse.
302. In Westhead (judgment 22nd November 2005, unreported) the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish)
exercised leniency and substituted for a custodial sentence of 90 days
a community service order of 200 hours.
303. In Ahier [2005] JRC 134 the Royal Court of Jersey exercised leniency
and gave a drug addict a chance to stay out of prison by placing her
on probation for 12 months. The Royal Court of Jersey also exercised
leniency in De Gouveia [2005] JRC 139.
304. Lord Phillips in the Attorney General’s Reference No 8 of 2007
[2007] EWCA Crim 922 at paragraph 16 stated:
-
“16. We wish to make one thing clear. The oath taken by a judge to administer
justice “without fear or favour, affection of ill-will” extends to imposing what the
judge concludes to be the appropriate sentence, without being deterred by the fear
of an Attorney’s reference. That is not to say that a judge should not pay careful
regard to sentencing guidelines, whether laid down by this court or by the
Sentencing Guidelines Council. But these are only guidelines. There will be cases
where there is good reason to depart significantly from the guidelines. In
particular, this may be appropriate where the facts of the offence diminish its
seriousness in comparison to the norm, or where there is particularly powerful
personal mitigation. In such circumstances it is quite wrong for the judge to
refrain from imposing the sentence that he considers appropriate because of
apprehension that this may cause the Attorney General to intervene. We have no
doubt that the Attorney General recognises that a departure from the guidelines,
even if it is substantial, is not of itself to justify his intervention. The test for
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intervention is not leniency, but undue leniency. Leniency where the facts justify
it is to be commended, not condemned.”
305. Lord Lane in Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 1989 (1989) 11
Crim App R(S) 517 stated:
“That mercy should season justice is a proposition as soundly based in law as it is
in literature.”
306. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Luft) in
R v Jewell 1981-83 MLR 366 at 371 stated:
“Quite apart from our obvious feeings of deep sympathy with the victim in this
case and the victim in the first case, we naturally feel the greatest compassion for
this appellant, and it would be only somebody wholly lacking in normal human
feelings who could not view his history and his circumstances without a feeling of
pity for him; but in this case we have been motivated above all by the safety of
the public on this Island. In any event, we feel that it is highly likely that in
passing a sentence of life imprisonment we may actually be passing a sentence
which in the end is more beneficial to the appellant than would have been a
determinate sentence of between 12 and 15 years’ imprisonment.”
307. The Appeal Division (Deemster Cain and Deemster Kerruish) in
Hepburn (judgment 1st November 1999, unreported) allowed an
appeal against the imposition of a custodial sentence for an offence of
assault causing actual bodily harm and imposed a community service
order. The Appeal Division decided that in the unusual circumstances
of the case a lengthy community service order could properly be
imposed on one of the appellants in place of the custodial sentence.
308. In Crossley v R 1993-95 MLR N14 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) dealt with an appeal involving a
17 year old male who was serving a two year sentence. He was
immature and unassertive and had allegedly been bullied and
assaulted by other prisoners. Further, the effect on him of being in
custody had in itself been unusually harsh and his mental condition
was such that he was being held in hospital. The Appeal Division held
that alleged attacks in prison, however bad the circumstances, were
not matters for the courts but should be passed on to the executive for
investigation and action. On the other hand, the fact that normal
imprisonment in itself had had a far greater effect on a prisoner with
an unusually vulnerable personality than could have been anticipated
when the sentence was passed was a matter that could be taken into
account on appeal. Since the appellant had suffered and would in the
future suffer unusual consequences if he remained in prison, the
balance of the sentence would be suspended and a supervision order
imposed.
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309. In the Attorney General’s Reference (Nos 132 and 133 of 2004)
Times 21st March 2005 it was stated that it was important when
sentencing offenders to bear in mind their children’s interests.
310. In Furness v R 1984-86 MLR 245 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Hytner and Deemster Luft) reduced the sentence first as an act
of compassion to the appellant’s dying wife and secondly because the
appellant would suffer more severely while serving the sentence,
because of his wife’s illness, than would an ordinary offender.
311. In Perry v Clague 1961-71 MLR 162 the Appeal Division (Deemster
Kneale and Deemster Moore) exercised leniency in an endeavour to
induce an offender to turn from a criminal to an honest way of life.
Severe sentences
312. Sometimes severe sentences are necessary. The Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) in Morrison
(judgment 15th September 2003) stated :
“Those who commit serious offences and flout the law must realise the
inevitability of a custodial sentence.”
313. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Caldwell-Camp (judgment delivered 24th March 2005) at
paragraph 56 stated :
“Large-scale drug misuse poses an exceptional threat to our society and offences
involving Class A drugs merit significant punishment at a level capable of
deterring others.”
314. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Clinton (judgment 29th October 2009) stated at paragraph
55 that counsel’s submission on a particular point: “fails to recognise that
there is a problem in the Island in the trafficking of Class A drugs, a need to
protect young people from exposure to such drugs and the profound adverse
consequences to both individuals and society generally from drugs becoming
endemic in society. That is what motivated this court in Caldwell-Camp to
promulgate sentencing guidelines which we believed would have a substantial
deterrent effect on both offenders and those who might be tempted to commit
such offences.”
315. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Doyle) in Freeman (judgment delivered 15th July 2003) at paragraph
23 stated:
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“Those who commit wanton and pre-meditated acts of violence must understand
that when convicted they will be punished severely. Further those who are
tempted to commit acts of violence must be deterred from so doing by the
sentences which the courts impose.”
316. The English Court of Appeal in Bulande v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 806 stressed that a society had
a fundamental interest in protecting its members from violent crime.
317. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Doyle) in Christian (judgment delivered 4th June 2008) dismissed an
appeal against an appellant, who had on the 21st January 2008, been
convicted of 12 counts of indecent assault on his daughter over a four
year period. The Appeal Division concluded that the overall sentence
imposed in that case was neither manifestly excessive or wrong in
principle. The Appeal Division stated their reasons as follows:
“36. Firstly these offences constituted a breach of trust by a father towards his
daughter over a very substantial period of time. It is unsurprising that they were
not reported to the police for many years and that the effect of them on the
Complainant was very substantial.
37. In this context we echo the dicta of Newman J in R v JW [2000] 1 Cr App R
(S) 234, at 235:
‘It has to be remembered, in our judgment, that in cases such as this a mere recital
of the indecency recounts but the crimes, but the circumstances of such persistent
abuse as this mean that a young girl is forced to live, day in night out, for years to
suffer the stress, anxiety, shame and confusion being the consequences to which
these offences give rise. Day after day this victim must have returned to school
carrying the burden of hurt, shame and humiliation and suffered in silence.
Inevitably childhood years are ruined. From crimes such as these there is no
escape, no means to prevent them being committed at the time, and generally no
support or counselling between times to alleviate the shame and fear they
generate.’
38. Secondly, although we accept that the Appellant had no relevant previous
convictions, we do not believe that there was any mitigation which could properly
be advanced on behalf of the Appellant. He was convicted after a trial in which
the Complainant was required to give evidence.
39. Thirdly, it is crucial that those who are tempted to commit offences of this
kind should know that the courts will impose severe sentences, if necessary the
maximum sentence provided. The sentences imposed on this Appellant are not
only to punish him but to deter others.”
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Sentencing not a mathematical process
318. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Myers (judgment delivered 29th October 2009) at
paragraph 29 stated:
“We add this. Sentencing is never merely a mathematical exercise : it is a matter
for the exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge.”
319. In R v Martin the English Court of Appeal (judgment April 5th 2006)
stressed that sentencing decisions do not represent a mathematical
exercise resulting from an arithmetical calculation. The sentencing
judge has a heavy responsibility of making a balanced analysis of the
requirements of both justice and mercy in each individual case,
reflecting the sometimes conflicting aggravating and mitigating
features of it.
320. Kirby J in Postiglione v R (1997) 189 CLR 295 at 339 stated: “It is a
mistake to endeavour to reduce judicial sentencing to mathematical accuracy or
analytical certainty.”
321. In Harrison [2008] EWCA Crim 3170 the English Court of Appeal
stressed that sentencing is not an arithmetically precise exercise and
guidelines are simply guidelines. A mechanistic approach cannot be
supported.
Consecutive/concurrent sentences
322. Consider in cases involving more than one offence whether the
sentences should be concurrent (i.e. run together) or consecutive (i.e.
one to start after the completion of the other). When consecutive
sentences are imposed the duty of the sentencer is to make sure that
the totality of the consecutive sentences is not excessive.
323. In Westhead (judgment 23rd May 2006) the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) accepted that a “sentencing
judgment must always ensure that the totality of consecutive sentences imposed is
not excessive.”
324. The court must look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and ask
itself what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences. The Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) in
Watterson (judgment delivered 4th December 2009) stated: “53. Subject
to the question of totality we can see no reason in principle why the sentence for
the offence of doing an act against public justice should not run consecutively to
the sentence for the offence of manslaughter.”
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325. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Thomas (judgment delivered 24th October 2006) stated:
“17. We recognise that consecutive sentences can be justified for offences
arising from the same incident if different in principle - see Purcell v Oake
[1990-92] MLR 185 in which case this court held that the offences of
simple possession and possession with intent to supply were different in
principle and could justify consecutive sentences.
18. Miss Hannan referred the court to dicta of Clothier JA in Skillen v R
[1972-77] MLR 331 where, at 333, he stated :
‘It is contrary to the public interest for any offender to serve a total sum of
imprisonment which is too long in relation to the need to protect the public
and to deter other offenders and to punish him. For he is liable to become
enured to having his life controlled and ordered for him and to become
incapable of fending for himself. And in the meantime his family becomes
a burden upon the public purse. Wherever it can reasonably be said that a
group of offences constitutes a new or fresh outbreak of lawbreaking
having the same character and motivation common to each, it is open to
the court to impose concurrent sentences if it thinks fit so as to arrive at a
total sentence which is appropriate in all the circumstances.’
19. Whilst we do not dissent from Clothier JA’s reasoning as to sentencing
policy, we do not consider that such dicta offer any principled basis for
determining whether a judge, when sentencing for a number of offences,
should impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence. In our judgment, as
was the case in Purcell v Oake, a consecutive sentence can be justified
where offences are different in principle although the sentencing judge
will have to ensure that the total sentence imposed is not too long. On the
facts of this case we are satisfied that the drug offences and the firearm
offence were different in principle and that, notwithstanding that they
were committed at the same time, a consecutive sentence was justified.
20. Thirdly, Miss Hannan invited this court to consider the question of
totality, it being contended that on the facts of this case an overall sentence
of three years custody was too long.
21. Whilst we readily recognise, as did Deemster Doyle, that a court must
always ensure that the totality of consecutive sentences imposed is not
excessive [see Skillen v R and Hartley v Cain [1978-80] MLR 196] we do
not accept this submission. These were serious offences committed by a
mature man who has an appalling antecedent history and who continues to
pose a substantial risk of re-offending. If he continues to offend he must
realise that the sentences imposed upon him will become longer in an
endeavour to protect the public from his criminal behaviour. Having
carefully considered the facts and circumstances relevant to the offences
and the Appellant, we decline to conclude that the total sentence imposed
was too long.
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22. It follows that we consider that this appeal is devoid of any merit and it is
dismissed.”
326. In R v Moore (judgment delivered 22nd November 2006) the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) dealt
with an appeal in respect of sentences imposed in an arson case and at
paragraph 27 stated:
“27. We recognise that, having decided to impose consecutive sentences for
offences committed on bail, which practice this court has consistently approved
of, Deemster Doyle was constrained to reduce the sentences for each individual
offence so as not to offend the principle that the total sentence imposed was too
long. However, we have reached the conclusion that the sentences imposed were
unduly lenient, and that a longer overall sentence was appropriate in this case.
Moreover, we believe that it is appropriate to impose substantial terms of custody
on each count and to make such sentences concurrent.”
327. McCombe J in R v Donovan and Matthews (sentencing remarks 23rd
January 2009) at paragraph 22 stated:
“Finally, it has to be remembered that when sentences are passed for a number of
offences, committed as part of a course of criminal conduct, the sentences can be
expressed to be served consecutively to one another or concurrently to one
another. It remains important to pass a sentence that, in total, is not excessive for
the offending as a whole. The law requires this; it is called the principle of
“totality”. This may mean that the total sentence for all the offences is rather less
than would be the case if one simply passed sentences for the individual offences
and added them together. In the interests of a proper total sentence, the final term
of imprisonment will be rather less than that.”
328. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Cain)
in Lamb (judgment delivered 17th April 1999, unreported) stated that
in the case of a courier whose sole purpose is to transfer drugs to his
contact on the Island it would be inappropriate to impose any
consecutive sentence and that the primary sentence imposed by the
court should be for the offence of production with a shorter
concurrent sentence for the offence of possession with intent to
supply. In the case of an offender who elects to both produce drugs
into the Island and then possess them with the intent of him personally
supplying to others - whether as a retailer or a wholesaler, because the
offences are different types of offences, the primary sentence imposed
by the court should be for the possession with intent to supply with an
appropriate consecutive sentence for the offence of production. The
nature and the degree of concealment of the drugs will be an
important factor. The court will also need to have careful regard to the
totality of the sentence imposed so as to ensure that it is not unduly
excessive. But see now Batty (Appeal Division judgment 30th July
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2010) where at paragraph 23 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Tattersall and Deemster Corlett) stated:
“23. Having reflected on the dicta in Lamb which preceded the
enunciation by this court of sentencing guidelines in drug trafficking
cases in Caldwell-Camp, we are bound to say that we find it difficult
to discern logic in the distinction between the person `whose sole
purpose is to transfer drugs to his contact in the Island` where it is said
to be inappropriate to impose a consecutive sentence and the person
`who elects to both produce drugs into the Island and then possess
them with the intent of him personally supplying to others, whether as
a retailer or as a wholesaler` where a consecutive sentence is
appropriate. We are satisfied that this is an unhelpful analysis which
would be best avoided in the future and that it is more important for
the sentencing judge to concentrate on the totality of the criminality
within the offences of production and possession with intent to supply
and to ensure that, whether or not consecutive sentences are imposed,
the overall sentence is not manifestly excessive.
24. To that extent we agree with Mr Benson that there is no general
principle of law that there needs to be exceptional circumstances for
the imposition of consecutive custodial sentences for offences which
arise out of the same transaction : he gave the example of driving
whilst disqualified and with excess alcohol.”
329. In Langton v Teare 1984-86 MLR 354 the Appeal Division (Deemster
Luft and Deemster Corrin) held that concurrent sentences may be
appropriate for several offences arising from a single transaction
happening within a short period of time but the court must also ensure
that the total sentence is not inadequate because of the concurrency.
330. See Current Sentencing Practice A5-2:
(1) consecutive terms of imprisonment should not generally be
imposed in respect of offences which arise out of a single incident
(2) consecutive terms of imprisonment may be inappropriate where
the offences concerned form a series of similar offences against the
same victim and are committed over a short period of time
(3) where an offender commits burglary with intent to steal and
then uses violence against the occupant of the premises who interrupts
him, the offences do not form part of the same transaction and
consecutive sentences may be appropriate
(4) where violence is used against a police officer who is
endeavouring to arrest the offender for an offence he has committed
157
consecutive sentences may be passed in respect of the offence of
violence against the police officer and the offence for which he was
attempting to arrest the offender
(5) where an offender who commits a robbery or other violent
offence carries a firearm in order to facilitate that offence a
consecutive sentence should be imposed for the offence of carrying
the firearm
(6) where further offences are committed whilst on bail the
sentences should normally be consecutive
(7) where an offender is sentenced for an offence in respect of
which he has previously been subjected to a community order or
granted a conditional discharge, the sentence in respect of the original
offence should normally be consecutive to any sentence imposed for
the later offence, which caused him to be liable to be sentenced for the
original offence
(8) where a court activates a suspended sentence following
conviction of the offender for an offence committed during the
operational period of the suspended sentence, the suspended sentence
should normally be ordered to run consecutively to any sentence of
imprisonment imposed for the later offence
(9) a court may impose consecutive sentences for offences
committed on the same occasion when there are exceptional
circumstances which justify a departure from the usual practice
(10) where an offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an
offence a sentence for attempting to pervert the course of justice in
relation to that offence should normally be consecutive to that offence
(11) where a custodial sentence is passed on an offender who is
serving a custodial sentence for another offence, the new sentence
should be ordered to run consecutively to the existing sentence, with
appropriate allowance for the totality of the two sentences
(12) a court should not pass a sentence to run consecutively to
another sentence which the offender is already serving, if the offender
has previously been released from that sentence and has been recalled
to serve the sentence following the revocation of his licence
(13) a sentence of imprisonment imposed for an offence may be
ordered to be served consecutively to a term for which the offender
has been committed for contempt of court
(14) where the court imposes a serious of consecutive terms of
imprisonment the court should view the aggregate and make such
reductions as may be necessary if the aggregate of the consecutive
terms does not appear to be just and appropriate
(15) where a series of consecutive sentences are imposed in respect
of a number of offences of moderate gravity, the aggregate will be
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excessive if it reaches the level of sentence which would be
considered appropriate for really serious crime
(16) a sentencer imposing a series of consecutive sentences should
pay particular attention to the aggregate in the case of a relatively
young offender receiving his first sentence of immediate
imprisonment
(17) where an offender is sentenced to a long term of imprisonment
for a crime in the first order of gravity it may be appropriate to order
any sentences of imprisonment which are imposed at the same time
for lesser unrelated offences to run concurrently
(18) the totality principle applies to a persistent offender as much as
to any other category of offender
(19) where a sentencer is dealing with an offender for a series of
offences, and is required to adjust the sentences in order to avoid an
excessive aggregate, it is better to impose concurrent sentences which
are appropriate to the offences for which they are passed, than a series
of consecutive sentences, each shorter than would normally be
appropriate
(20) where a sentencer is dealing with an offender who has recently
been sentenced to imprisonment by another judge for different
offences, and decides to impose a further term of imprisonment
consecutive to the existing term, he should have regard to the totality
of all the sentences to which the offender will become subject, and
adjust the sentence to be imposed in light of the aggregate.
331. In Parry and Faragher v R 1961-71 MLR 298 the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Bingham and Deemster Moore) stated that it was
desirable that sentences on charges arising from a series of offences,
similar in nature and closely connected in time, should run
concurrently, but the overriding principle was that the court should
look at the overall position and decide on the appropriate sentence for
the offences as a whole.
332. In Skillen v R 1972-77 MLR 331 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Clothier and Deemster Eason) stated that when consecutive
sentences are imposed the duty of the sentencer is to ensure that the
totality of the consecutive sentences is not excessive for it is not
sufficient merely to add the sentences together without more. Such an
approach might result in the imposition of a sentence which would be
wholly out of proportion to the circumstances of the offender and his
offence, exceed what was necessary for protecting the public and
deterring the commission of other offences, and distort the pattern of
justice for the future. Wherever it can reasonably be said that a group
of offences having a common character and motivation constitute a
159
new or fresh outbreak of crime, it is open to the court to impose
concurrent sentences so as to arrive at a total sentence which is
appropriate in all the circumstances.
333. In Purcell v Oake 1990-92 MLR 185 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) held that the possession of drugs
for supply was different in principle from possession for one’s own
use. The Appeal Division dismissed the appeal and held that the Court
of General Gaol Delivery was right to pass consecutive sentences for
possession of heroin and possession of cannabis with intent to supply.
334. In Hartley v Cain 1978-80 MLR 196 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Glidewell and Deemster Eason) held that the court was under
a duty when deciding whether to make sentences consecutive or
concurrent to ensure that the overall sentence was not excessive. It
was further held that the sentence would ordinarily run from the date
the appeal was dismissed less the time in custody before the notice of
appeal was filed but the court had a discretion to vary, for example the
court may order that it run from the date it was passed and give credit
for the total time in custody.
335. See also Corris v R 1961-71 MLR 198 in respect of concurrent and
consecutive sentences.
336. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Roberts (1st June 2007) at paragraph 60 stated:
“ … In our judgment when, as here, long custodial sentences are imposed, no
useful purpose is served by increasing those sentences to a small degree.”
[in that case 7 years 3 months custody, 7 years for Class A drugs and 3 months
consecutive in respect of possession of cannabis – consecutive sentence in theory
justified but not useful]
337. See, on a different point, section 26 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act
1993 which provides as follows:
“26 Consecutive sentences
(1) Where a person -
(a) is convicted of an offence punishable with custody, and
(b) is already liable to be detained in custody for another offence,
the court may impose a sentence of custody to commence at the expiration of the
term of custody for which he was previously sentenced.
(2) Subsection (1) applies even though the aggregate term of custody exceeds
the term which may be imposed for either offence.”
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Maximum sentences
338. The statute specifying the criminal offence will usually also refer to
the maximum sentence the court can impose in sentencing an offender
who has committed such offence. In arriving at a starting point for
sentence the court will have regard to the maximum sentence the
court is permitted to impose and any relevant sentencing guidelines.
339. In Bridson (judgment delivered 16th June 2009) the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) dealt with a
submission that in the particular circumstances of that case the
starting point for sentence should be close to the maximum penalty.
The Appeal Division stated:
“29. The maximum sentence for the offence of indecent assault is 7 years custody.
It may be observed that the maximum penalty for the like offence in England and
Wales is 14 years.
30. Mr Neale`s submission was that, given the circumstances of the offence and
the offender, the starting point for sentence before taking into account the
Respondent`s plea of guilty and any other mitigation was a period of 6 years
custody.
31. Given that such a starting point is close to the maximum penalty, Mr Neale
referred the court to Her Majesty The Queen v L.M. [2008] SCC 31 in which the
Supreme Court of Canada restored the maximum penalty imposed by a trial judge
and considered in what circumstances the imposition of a maximum penalty was
warranted. LeBel J, giving the judgment of a majority, stated :
`18. This individualized sentencing process is part of a system in which
Parliament has established a very broad range of sentences that can in some cases
extend from a suspended sentence to life imprisonment. The Criminal Code
provides for a maximum sentence for each offence. However it seems that the
maximum sentence is not always imposed where it could or should be, as judges
are influenced by an idea or viewpoint to the effect that maximum sentences
should be reserved for the worst cases involving the worst circumstances and the
worst criminals. … As a result, maximum sentences become almost theoretical :
In the end the difficulty with maximums is that they may be seen as almost
theoretical rather than as an indication of how seriously an offence is to be treated
in the "ordinary" case.
(T W Ferris, Sentencing : Practical Approaches (2005), at p. 292).
19. As Morin JA noted in his dissenting reasons, human nature is such that it will
always be possible for a court to imagine a worse case than the one before it.
Morin JA rightly pointed out that it is important for a judge, when deciding
whether the maximum sentence can or should be imposed for a given offence, to
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avoid contemplating fictitious situations in this way. This approach is consistent
with this Court`s recent case law.
20. In R v Cheddesingh [2004] SCC 16, the Court acknowledged the exceptional
nature of the maximum sentence, but firmly rejected the argument that it must be
reserved for the worst crimes committed in the worst circumstances. Instead, all
the relevant factors provided for in the Criminal Code must be considered on a
case-by-case basis, and if the circumstances warrant imposing the maximum
sentence, the judge must impose it and must, in so doing, avoid drawing
comparisons with hypothetical cases.`
32. We unreservedly accept and adopt such dicta. When sentencing any defendant
for a serious offence it is always a temptation for a tribunal to contemplate what
more serious offences could hypothetically have been committed in an attempt to
justify a failure to impose a sentence which is or approaches the statutory
maximum. Whilst we reaffirm the exceptional nature of the maximum sentence
we too reject any notion that a maximum sentence should be reserved for worst
crime committed in the worst circumstances. It is a matter of judgment for the
tribunal as to whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, the
maximum sentence is warranted and thus ought to be imposed.”
340. In Milligan v R 1993-95 MLR N 14 the Appeal Division held that the
discount for a guilty plea is not automatic and there will be no
discount if the nature of the offence or the circumstances of the
offender call for a maximum sentence.
341. In Myers (judgment delivered 26th November 2008) the Appeal
Division stated:
“18. We agree that the sentence of 6 years custody was manifestly excessive. On a
guilty plea it equated to the appropriate sentence for an offence of possession of a
relatively small amount of a Class A drug with intent to supply - whereas this was
an offence of attempted possession only. Moreover, given that there must be
much more serious cases of attempted possession, particularly where a much
larger quantity of drugs was involved with the consequent risk that such drugs
might be a temptation to, or might be stolen by, others we do not think that this
was a case which could justify the imposition of a sentence almost at the
maximum level, particularly when there was a guilty plea, albeit a late guilty
plea.”
Sentencing of co-defendants
342. See Archbold paragraphs 4-192 to 4-196 and 5-105 in respect of
sentencing co-defendants.
343. Whenever practicable all offenders involved in a particular offence
should be sentenced at the same time by the same judge but this is not
always possible. Subject to issues of undue delay a sentence in respect
of a defendant who has pleaded guilty may be postponed until the
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other or others have been tried. By that time the court will be in
possession of the facts relating to all of them and will be able to assess
properly the degree of guilt among them (R v Payne 34 Cr App R 43).
Archbold at paragraph 4-192 adds that where however the judge is of
the opinion at any stage during the proceedings that he is in
possession of the material facts and is able to assess properly the
degree of guilt as between the particular defendant and the other
accused it is within his discretion to deal with the defendant at that
stage if it is desirable that he should do so. It is normally undesirable
that defendants who have pleaded guilty should have to wait many
months for sentence while others are being dealt with at contested
trials. There is also the danger that at trial the defendants who pleaded
not guilty will endeavour to minimise their role and exaggerate the
role of the defendants who pleaded guilty. Those defendants who
pleaded guilty will not be able to cross examine those defendants who
pleaded not guilty and it may be that the court is not presented with a
completely accurate picture at trial. Also consider the position of
those defendants remanded in custody awaiting sentence and the
length of time to the sentencing hearing.
344. Archbold at paragraph 5-76 deals with the position in respect of
evidence given in trial of co-defendants and states that:
“A judge in sentencing a defendant who has pleaded guilty, may take into account
evidence given during the trial of a co-defendant who pleaded not guilty; he must
however, bear in mind that self-serving statements are likely to be untrue, and that
the evidence given during the trial was not tested by cross-examination on behalf
of the defendant who pleaded guilty; such a defendant should be given the
opportunity to give evidence of his version of the facts: R. v. Smith (Patrick), 10
Cr.App.R.(S.) 271, CA (preferring R. v. Taggart, 1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 144, CA, and R.
v. Depledge, ibid., at 183, CA to R. v. Michaels and Skoblo 3 Cr. App. R.(S.) 188
C.A. and R. v, Winter, Colk and Wilson [1997] 1 Cr. App. R.(S.)331, CA.”
345. Goddard LCJ in Payne 34 Cr App R 43 delivered the judgment of the
English Court of Criminal Appeal on the 12th December 1949 and
stated:
“It may be a very convenient course to sentence prisoners who plead Guilty on the
first day, but that ought not to apply where several persons are indicted together
and one pleads Guilty and the other or others Not Guilty. In such a case the proper
course is to postpone sentence on the prisoner who has pleaded Guilty until the
other or others have been tried and then to bring the prisoner who has pleaded
Guilty up in the Court where the other or others have been tried and let all who
have been convicted be dealt with together, because by that time the Court will be
in possession of the facts relating to all of them and will be able to assess properly
the degree of guilt among them. The reason why the appellant received a heavier
sentence than his other two co-prisoners is because he was tried in a different
Court on a different day. It is a most inconvenient practice and it is a practice
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which is wrong and which ought to cease. Quarter sessions should be informed
that where more than one prisoner is joined in an indictment and one pleads
Guilty and the other or others plead Not Guilty, the sentencing of the first one
should be postponed until the others have been tried and all whose guilt has been
established should be sentenced together. I hope that quarter sessions will take
notice of the opinion of this Court and discontinue a practice which can only lead
to disproportionate sentences being passed and will naturally leave a sense of
grievance in the minds of prisoners. [The LCJ continued as follows:]
What I have said will not apply in the exceptional case where a prisoner who
pleads Guilty is going to be called as a witness. In such circumstances, the general
practice is that he should be sentenced there and then, so that there should be no
suspicion of his evidence being coloured by the fact that he hopes to get a lighter
sentence because of the evidence which he gives. If it is a case in which one
prisoner is going to be called to give evidence against another, that may be a good
reason for dealing with him separately. I do not throw doubt on that very proper
practice; I am speaking only of cases in which those circumstances do not arise.”
[but see below for summary of modern practice]
346. At paragraph 4-195 of Archbold under the heading Sentencing
defendant who is to give evidence for the Crown it is stated that where
a man pleads guilty and it is the prosecutor’s intention to call him
against a co-defendant, the decision as to whether the trial judge
sentences him before or after he has given evidence for the
prosecution is a matter within the discretion of the judge (R v Palmer
99 Cr App R 83). Archbold states that the modern practice is
generally not to sentence an accomplice until the conclusion of all the
proceedings in the case; this would enable the judge to get the flavour
of the case and to view it in the round at the conclusion of all the
evidence (R v Palmer and R v Weekes 74 Cr App R 161, 166). This
practice is based on the risk of disparity in sentence; different
considerations apply in respect of sentence on an offender who is to
give evidence for the prosecution in a case that is unrelated to his
own, so as to mitigate his own sentence (Chan Wai-Keung v R [1995]
2 Cr App R 194, PC).
347. Archbold at paragraph 4-196 under the heading Sentencing defendant
who is to give evidence for a co-defendant states that ordinarily a
person falling within this category should be sentenced at the end of
the case (R v Coffey 74 Cr App R 168).
348. Broadbridge 1983 Cr App R (S) 269 concerned the position where a
judge sentenced an offender whose accomplice had already been
sentenced by another judge. Sir John Thompson at page 271 stated:
“This Court has said many times that it is desirable that co-accused should, if
possible, be sentenced at the same time, and in any event by a judge common to
all of them. But sometimes it is not possible, since some defendants plead guilty
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and others not guilty, and those who have pleaded guilty are dealt with if there is
to be delay before the others are sentenced. Here the judge had to sentence an
accused who had pleaded guilty and had been convicted, and whose co-accused
some time earlier had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced by a different judge.
It is a situation which unfortunately often arises. Usually the judge who still has to
pass sentence will be told what sentence the co-accused received, and no doubt
that will be one of the factors which he considers when determining the sentence
that he should pass. But it appears to be submitted here that he ought to pass the
same sentence as was passed on the co-accused unless he can distinguish between
them. It is argued that to equip himself to perceive whether there are any
differentiating features between the two cases the judge should, if asked, and
perhaps even if not asked, adjourn the case before him in order to be informed of
the detailed circumstances of the case that he has not tried, and no doubt obtain a
transcript of the proceedings in that other case. That was the suggestion that was
made to the learned judge below in this case, and, in our view, he rightly rejected
it. The duty of the sentencing judge is to deal with the person who is before him
for the offence that he committed, allowing in so doing for such favourable
circumstances as there are, such as, for example, that the accused pleaded guilty.
This appellant pleaded not guilty. Here the judge passed a sentence which is not
seriously complained of, and one part of which can certainly be said to be lenient.
The fact that the appellant’s co-accused White, who pleaded guilty on an earlier
occasion before another court, received a longer, but suspended, sentence is not a
circumstance that leads us to impugn the sentence that the learned judge passed in
this case.
We affirm that sentence, and dismiss the appeal.”
349. Archbold deals with Broadbridge at paragraph 5-105 under the
heading Accomplice already dealt with by a different judge.
350. In Langton v Teare 1984-86 MLR 354 the Appeal Division (Deemster
Luft and Deemster Corrin) indicated that the court has a duty to
ensure that any disparity between sentences imposed upon co-
defendants is not such as to give rise to a sense of grievance. It was
held that disparities may be justified by differences between the
offenders and the offences.
Media and victim issues in the sentencing process
351. In respect of media and victim issues in the sentencing process the
Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish)
in Lindon (judgment 28th October 2005) stated:
“13. In R v Sargeant (1975) 60 Cr App R 74 Lawton LJ, at 77, observed that:
‘The courts do not have to reflect public opinion. On the other hand courts must
not disregard it.’
14. In R v Nunn [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 136 the Court of Appeal was
confronted, in an appeal against sentence for causing death by dangerous driving,
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with letters from relatives of the deceased urging leniency because the sentence
imposed was adversely affecting them. At page 140, Judge, J, (as he then was),
stated:
‘We mean no disrespect to the mother and the sister of the deceased, but the
opinions of the victim, or the surviving members of his family, about the
appropriate level of sentence do not provide any sound basis for reassessing a
sentence. If the victim feels utterly merciful towards the criminal and some do,
the crime has still been committed and must be punished as it deserves. If the
victim is obsessed with vengeance, which can in reality only be assuaged by a
very long sentence, as also happens, the punishment cannot be made longer by the
court than would otherwise be appropriate. Otherwise cases with identical
features would be dealt with in widely different ways leading to improper and
unfair disparity.
If carried to its logical conclusion the process would end up by imposing unfair
pressures on the victims of crime or the survivors of a crime resulting in death, to
play a part in the sentencing process which many of them would find painful and
distasteful. This is very far removed from the court being kept properly informed
of the anguish and suffering inflicted on the victims by the crime.’
However it may be observed that the court held that whilst it was not concerned
with the relatives’ judgment as to the appropriate level of the sentence, it could
not disregard the clear evidence that the length of the sentence was adding to the
grief and anxiety which they were suffering consequent upon the death of the
deceased.
15. Such dicta were approved by the Court of Appeal in R v Roche [1999] 2 Cr
App R (S) 105. and R v Matthews [2003] 1 Cr App R (S) 26. In Roche Lord
Bingham CJ, (as he then was), stated, at 109:
‘it is, of course, a cardinal principle of sentencing that it is for the court to pass
what it judges to be the appropriate sentence, having regard to all the
circumstances relating to the offence and the offender. The system is not one
which allows the injured party to dictate the sentence to be imposed, which must
always have regard to wider considerations than the wishes of those who suffer as
the result of the commission of criminal offences. Just as it is not for the injured
party to call for such and such a sentence to be imposed by way of vengeance, so
it is not for the injured party to prevail by calling for a sentence well below the
level of sentence ordinarily passed. If the court were as a matter of course to
accede to a plea for vengeance by the relatives of a deceased person, then it would
be appropriate to pay regard to pleas for compassion also. But the court is not
swayed by demands for vengeance and has to be very cautious in paying attention
to pleas for mercy.’
16. We believe that such cases emphasise that a court cannot allow a desire for
vengeance or compassion to influence the sentence to be imposed, save for those
few cases where on appeal it is shown that the excessive length of a sentence
imposed is adding to the burdens of surviving relatives. Even assuming that a
court is satisfied that public opinion has been accurately recorded, the court
should resist allowing public opinion to achieve disproportionate status in the
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overall sentencing process. We have no doubt that it is for a court to pass what it
adjudges is the appropriate sentence, having regard to all the circumstances
relating to both the offence and the offender. It is important that a court
approaches that task objectively and dispassionately. Whilst the court should not
disregard public opinion, the court should, never be overborne or intimidated into
imposing a sentence which it regards as unjust.”
352. Judge of Appeal Hytner in Attorney General’s Reference (Kneale)
1993-95 MLR 239 at page 242 stated:
“… there must always be a judicial concern of the public in general and the
feelings of the victim or, in the case of death, the feelings of the family. Courts
can never and certainly ought never to pass such sentence as may be demanded by
or on behalf of the victim. In many cases, indeed most cases, where death has
resulted from an offence, no sentence can satisfy the relatives and certainly no
sentence can reverse the tragedy. Further, the courts must be astute to gauge
public concern without reference to immediate campaigns in the media arising out
of a particular offence.”
353. In R v Venables [1998] AC 407 the House of Lords held that while a
sentencing judge might take into account general considerations of
public confidence in the administration of justice, natural justice
would require him to ignore as irrelevant public petitions or public
opinion as expressed in the media. Lord Goff at page 491 drew a
distinction between public concern of a general nature with regard to,
for example, the prevalence of certain types of offence, and the need
that those who commit such offences should be duly punished and
public clamour that a particular offender whose case is under
consideration should be singled out for severe punishment. Lord Goff
stated:
“It is legitimate for a sentencing authority to take the former concern into account,
but not the latter.”
354. Lord Steyn at page 526 referred to “informed public opinion” and added:
“Plainly a sentencing judge must ignore a newspaper campaign designed to
encourage him to increase a particular sentence. It would be an abdication of the
rule of law for a judge to take into account such matters … He ought to ignore the
high-voltage atmosphere of a newspaper campaign. The power given to him
requires, above all, a detached approach.”
355. A separate section of this book (at paragraphs 828 and 829) deals with
applications for stays where there has been inappropriate media
coverage. See Teare 1993-95 MLR 212 and Flanagan (Appeal
Division judgment 29th July 2004). See also Watterson (Appeal
Division judgment 4th December 2009) in respect of taking into
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account the views of the victim’s family in the sentencing process
following a conviction for manslaughter.
Licence and sentence expiry dates and early release of detainees
356. See section 23(1) and Schedule 2 of the Custody Act 1995 in respect
of licence and sentence expiry dates and early release of detainees.
357. Consider the options of breach: the defendant could be returned to
prison to serve the entire or part of the remaining period, such period
to be served before the commencement of any sentence for the fresh
offence or concurrently or no action could be taken.
358. In Johnson (judgment delivered 12th June 2008) the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) at paragraph 21
stated:
“Those who are sentenced to terms of custody and released on licence well
understand that the commission of an offence whilst on licence entitles a court to
order them to be returned to custody, perhaps to serve that portion of their
custodial sentence which they have not served. In determining the period to be so
served, a court is not required to have regard to principles of totality.”
Sentencing guidelines
359. The Appeal Division has on numerous occasions (see for example
Caldwell-Camp 2003-05 MLR 505) stressed that sentencing
guidelines are guidelines and not binding in any formal sense. They
are intended to be flexible guidelines not rigid tramtracks. The
Deemster at first instance still retains a sentencing discretion. The
Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Corrin) in
Bull v R 1993-95 MLR N 13 (judgment delivered 24th April 1995)
stressed that by definition sentencing guidelines are to be used
flexibly. In Bowley [2008] EWCA 2036 the English Court of Appeal
stressed that guidelines were guidelines and judges should not be
unduly constrained by particular sentencing brackets which are set out
in the guidelines. Counsel should refer to any relevant sentencing
guidelines and where counsel seek to persuade the court not to follow
the guidelines counsel should state clear reasons why it is not
appropriate to facts and circumstances of the case before the court to
follow the guidelines.
360. In R v Bao [2008] 2 Cr App R(S) 10 it was indicated that sentencing
judges were obliged to follow guidelines even if they disagreed with
them.
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361. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Clinton (judgment delivered 29th October 2009) stated:
“71 … Such sentencing guidelines provide guidance as to a usual starting point
for sentence, it is for the sentencing judge to determine the actual starting point in
the circumstances of the particular case, and what sentence should be imposed in
light of all the aggravating and mitigating factors. We reject Mr O’Neill’s
submission that the sentencing guidelines do not allow the sentencing judge to
fully consider and give appropriate credit for the circumstances of the offender.
Insofar as it is believed that such guidelines compel a sentencing judge to impose
a particular sentence, such a belief is erroneous.”
362. Bowering [2005] EWCA Crim 3215 Nov 9th 2005 stresses that if the
court is not following the guidelines the court must state its reasons.
See also R v Best [2006] All ER (D) 134 (Jan) CA and Wong [2001] 1
HCA 64 (15th November 2001). In November 2009 it was announced
that Lord Justice Leveson had accepted the position of chairman to
the Sentencing Council in England and Wales. The remit of the
Council includes an obligation to produce guidelines for the courts to
follow when sentencing offenders but it will also consider the
effectiveness and impact of sentencing in England and Wales which
may in turn inform policy makers and legislators.
363. The Privy Council in Tyack (judgment delivered 29th March 2006)
considered the effect of the United Kingdom’s sentencing guidelines
in overseas jurisdictions.
364. If there are no relevant sentencing guidelines issued by the Appeal
Division consider authorities in other jurisdictions including the
authorities in Current Sentencing Practice in relation to sentencing
issues in England and Wales. If reference is made to English or other
cases decided outside the jurisdiction consider these cases in the light
of any differing maximum sentences under the relevant statutory
provisions and in light of local conditions.
365. The following guideline authorities on sentencing matters in particular
areas may be of some assistance:
Sex offenders: AG’s References 37, 38 etc of 2003 [2004] 1
Cr App R(S) 84 AG’s References 120, 91,
and 119 of 2002 [2003] EWCA Crim 5,
Christian (Appeal Division judgment 4th
June 2008 in respect of historic sex offences
and sentencing), R v Volante (Appeal
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Division judgment 5th September 2008),
Bridson (Appeal Division judgments 16th
June 2009 and 31st July 2009), Attorney
General’s References No 67 of 2008
(Sharon Edwards) [2009] EWCA Crim 132,
R v S [2008] EWCA Crim 600 (sexual
grooming of children), Warren (Appeal
Division judgment 1st February 2010)
Indecent images: Oliver [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 15
Rape: R v Milberry [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 31,
Finn (Appeal Division judgment 26th
September 2002), Gallagher 1981-83 MLR
314, Qualtrough 1987-89 MLR 244
Unlawful sexual
Intercourse: Parker (Appeal Division judgment 18th July
2003)
Incest: AG’s Ref (No 1 of 1989) (1989) 11 Cr App
R (S) 409 1, R v MH [2001] 2 Cr App R (S)
10
Firearm offences: Thomas (Appeal Division judgment 24th
October 2006), R v Crispin [2008] EWCA
Crim (gun crime)
Benefit fraud: R v Graham and Whatley [2005] 1 Cr App R
(S) 115
Drugs: Caldwell-Camp 2003-05 MLR 505 (Appeal
Division), Fleming (Appeal Division
judgment 29th July 2005), Goodman (Appeal
Division judgment 1st June 2007), Watterson
(Appeal Division judgment 25th September
2007), Taylor (Appeal Division judgment 4th
April 2008), Todd 1993-95 MLR 300,
Aramah (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 407 and
subsequent authorities Gillies (Appeal
Division judgment 16th April 2004
paragraph [21] re: minders), Teare (Appeal
Division judgment 1st June 2007 re: duress),
Jeffrey Cameron Watterson (Appeal
Division judgment 25th April 2008), R v
Greaves [2008] 3 Cr App R(S) 7 (supplying
drugs to prisoners), Myers (Appeal Division
judgment 26th November 2008 attempted
possession of drugs in prison), Lamb v Oake
1999-01 MLR N11 (possession of drugs in
prison), Stevenson v Oake 1999-01 MLR N
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11 (simple possession), Davies v Oake
1996-98 MLR N 7, F v Oake 1996-98 MLR
50 (simple possession), Lamb v R 1999-01
MLR N 12, Devereau v R (Appeal Division
judgment 4th August 2009), Crosbie (Appeal
Division judgment 23 September 2009),
Myers (Appeal Division judgment 29th
October 2009), Clinton (Appeal Division
judgment 29th October 2009), Pemberton
and Sinclair (Appeal Division judgment 25th
June 2010) and Batty (Appeal Division
judgment 30th July 2010)
Counterfeit currency: R v Howard (1985) Cr App R (S) 320,
Shah (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 167,
Wake (1991) 13 Cr App R (S) 422
Burglary: Smith (Appeal Division judgment 25th May
2004), Quirk v Turnbull 1961-71 MLR 227
at 229, R v Saw [2009] EWCA Crim 1
Theft/breach of trust: Roberts 2001-03 MLR N 28, Carney
(Appeal Division judgment 27th September
2004)
Falsification of
accounts: Roberts 2001-03 MLR N 28, Bull 1993-95
N 14
Dealing in counterfeit
medicinal products: R v Haywood [2009] EWCA Crim 69
Perverting the
course of justice: Constantinou v R 1987-89 MLR 312
Acts of violence: Watterson (Appeal Division judgment 4th
December 2009, manslaughter), Lindon
(Appeal Division judgment 28th October
2005 manslaughter), Gosling (Appeal
Division 20th November 2006 manslaughter
by reason of diminished responsibility,
discretionary sentence of life imprisonment),
King 2005-06 MLR N3 (Appeal Division
judgment 27th July 2005 in respect of an
offence contrary to section 35 of the
Criminal Code 1872 as amended),
Thompson (Appeal Division judgment 27th
July 2005 another section 35 case), Harrison
v AG 2004 JLR 111, Watterson (Appeal
Division judgment 24th March 1993,
unreported), Kewley (Appeal Division
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judgment 1st July 2002 re assault on very
young child), Losty 1996-98 MLR 7 (Appeal
Division judgment 23rd September 1996 re
use of shod feet), Freeman (Appeal Division
judgment 15th July 2003 section 33 of the
Criminal Code 1872 as amended offence),
McVey (Appeal Division judgment 2nd July
2002), McGivern (Appeal Division
judgment 6th January 2004), R v Julian
Clare (2002) 2 Crim App R (S) 97 one blow
cases, R v Goodwin (1999) 2 Crim App R
(S) 128 re sentencing young violent
offenders, Patterson (Appeal Division
judgment 2nd July 2002 in respect of one
punch manslaughter cases), Attorney
General’s Reference No 64 of 2008 (Wyatt)
[2009] EWCA Crim 88 (one punch
manslaughter), R v Povey [2008] EWCA
Crim 1261 (knife crime) and see Brummit
(Appeal Division judgment 13th January
2009) for a useful review of sentences
imposed in respect of acts of violence
Causing death by
Dangerous driving: Webb 2005-06 MLR N 34 (Appeal Division)
Greaney (Appeal Division judgment 31st
July 2001) Cooksley [2004] 1 Cr App R (S)
1, Martin [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 99, Noble
[2003] Cr App R (S) 65
Arson: R v Moore (Appeal Division judgment 22nd
November 2006)
Unlawful detention: R v Cockeram [1988] EWCA Crim 3446 R v
Holman [2006] EWCA 1638
Money-laundering: Baines (Appeal Division judgment 29th
September 2010).
General comments on sentencing
366. Judge of Appeal Hytner in Attorney General’s Reference (Kneale)
1993-95 MLR 239 stated at pages 242-243:
“Sentencing frequently appears an easy task to those who are not burdened with
the task of carrying it out. The essential principle is the protection of the public.
This can be achieved either by reform and rehabilitation or by deterrence, which
can be general or individual. By and large, custodial sentences are not effective as
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deterrents. The certainty of detection is the best deterrent and if there is little risk
of being apprehended heavy sentences rarely deter. However, in the background
there must always be a judicial regard for the concern of the public in general and
the feelings of the victim or, in the case of death, the feelings of the family.
Courts can never and certainly ought never to pass such sentence as may be
demanded by or on behalf of the victim. In many cases, indeed most cases, where
death has resulted from an offence, no sentence can satisfy the relatives and
certainly no sentence can reverse the tragedy. Further, the courts must be astute to
gauge public concern without reference to immediate campaigns in the media
arising out of a particular offence.
In this case, the probation officer quite properly recommended a non-custodial
sentence. I say quite properly because the task of the probation officer is not to
tell the court what sentence to impose but to recommend such sentence as may be
best suited to the defendant’s needs. We have no doubt that, in the absence of the
concerns of the public and the feelings of the relatives of the deceased in this case,
a non-custodial sentence was the correct one and the probation officer’s
recommendations were sensible. Further, it must be emphasized that Deemster
Cain was misled into believing that the respondent was a boy of good character;
and furthermore, he followed Manx sentencing practice in imposing a non-
custodial sentence.”
367. The headnote to Perry v Clague 1961-71 MLR 162 (Appeal Division
judgments of Deemster Kneale and Deemster Moore delivered on the
15th October 1965) stated:
“The courts served the public interest not just by punishing crime but also by
attempting to prevent it, by deterring others, by deterring the offender from
committing a crime again, and by inducing the offender to turn from a criminal to
an honest way of life, and the court in this instance acted in the hope that the
appellant might be induced by the alteration [of a prison sentence or a fine] to turn
back from a criminal to an honest life.”
368. Judge of Appeal Hytner in Faragher v R 1990-92 MLR 428 at 432
stated:
“In our view the protection of the individual is far more important than the
protection of property and physical violence of this nature [glassing] really must
be discouraged.”
369. Faragher is also authority for the proposition that any issues which
arise in respect of the running of prisons are for the prison
management. See also Newbery (Chancery Division judgment
delivered on the 13th January 2009) on this point. In Faragher it was
also indicated that the fact that the defendant was the sole female
prisoner was not significant mitigation. Stress and delay suffered in
getting the matter to court may be mitigating factors.
173
370. Counsel should be conscious of the position of the sentencing judge
and the task he has to undertake. Counsel should assist the sentencing
judge in that task.
371. Lord Woolf in A New Approach to Sentencing (9th April 2003) stated
that there needed to be a greater emphasis on the prevention of crime
and greater priority given to the police and the probation services. He
wanted to see greater emphasis on community punishment, restorative
justice and rehabilitation. Concentrate on what works. Reduce crime
and protect the public. Lord Woolf felt that there was a need to
eradicate politics from legislation in respect of sentencing. Lord
Woolf wanted to avoid short term law reform to catch the law and
order votes. Lord Woolf wanted to concentrate on bold law reform for
the long term protection of the public.
372. Lord Carswell in R v G [2008] UKHL 37 at paragraph 57 stated:
“57. Determining the appropriate sentence in cases involving sexual activity
between young people is one of the more difficult tasks facing judges in criminal
courts. They have to attempt to uphold the intention of Parliament in attaching
penalties to acts of various kinds, while recognising the changes in sexual
morality and behaviour which have taken place, involving greater sexual activity
at younger ages than would have been accepted in previous generations. The
appeal before your Lordships demonstrates some of these difficulties.”
373. Sir Igor Judge in Public Protection 20th November 2006 stressed that
the most salutary form of deterrence is the certainty of being caught.
The most effective form of prevention starts in childhood in proper
upbringing and education, in loving discipline. Punishment and
deterrence, but not inhumanity to the criminal and his possible
reformation. Education and rehabilitation may themselves serve to
produce greater long term public protection from the offender.
Consider the public protection in the long term.
374. In R v Seed (judgment delivered 13th February 2007) the English
Court of Appeal commented that a prison environment is more
punitive when the prison is overcrowded.
375. Lord Woolf in Making Sense of Sentencing (12th May 2005) argued
that judges should be prepared to impose the unconventional sentence
if this is what the case requires. Judging must never be mechanistic.
The court should determine what is the correct sentence irrespective
of the criticism to which it may give rise. If the offender is returned to
society at the end of his sentence with increased skills a job to go to
and accommodation the risk of that offender reoffending is
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significantly reduced. Consider community punishments. Lord Woolf
stated that keeping a prisoner within a prison averages roughly
£37,500 per year. Consider restorative justice. Lord Woolf indicated
that the use of imprisonment should be focused primarily on four
situations:
(1) where imprisonment is necessary because the offender is
sufficiently dangerous to make imprisonment essential for the
protection of the public;
(2) where the crime is so serious that it can only be marked by a
significant prison sentence;
(3) where the clang of the prison door sentence is required (very
short period of imprisonment in conjunction with other
punishments);
(4) where the crime itself does not make imprisonment necessary
but it becomes necessary because an offender will not comply
with other sentences.
376. Nelson Mandela once stated: “No one truly knows a nation until one has
been inside its jails.”
377. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Orator/Lawyer 106-43 BC has been quoted as
having said:
“The true mark of any society that would declare itself to be civilized, lies in its
treatment of those whom it would hold in its custody.”
378. Extract from Prisongate by David Ramsbotham (2003) at pages 66-
67:
“There are four aspects to a Healthy Prison:
• Everyone is, and feels, safe - staff, prisoners, and those who work in or visit the
prison.
• Everyone is treated with respect as a fellow human being.
• Everyone is encouraged to improve themselves and given the opportunity to do
so through access to purposeful activity.
• Everyone is enabled to maintain contact with their family and is prepared for
release.
We felt that this concept was entirely in line not only with Michael Howard but
also with famous words spoken by another previous Home Secretary. Had I been
in the Strangers’ Gallery of the House of Commons shortly before 10 p.m. on the
evening of 20 July 1910, I would have heard the 36-year-old Winston Churchill
wind up a debate on Prison Estimates as follows:
‘We must not forget that when every material improvement has been effected in
prisons, when the temperature has been rightly adjusted, when the proper food to
maintain health and strength has been given, when the doctors, chaplains and
prison visitors have come and gone, the convict stands deprived of everything that
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a free man calls life. We must not forget that all these improvements, which are
sometimes salves to our consciences, do not change that position.
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisation of any country. A
calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused against the State
and even of convicted criminals against the State, a constant heart-searching by
all charged with the duty of punishment, a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in
the world of industry all those who have paid their dues in the hard coinage of
punishment, tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerating
processes, and an unfaltering faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it,
in the heart of every man - these are the symbols which, in the treatment of crime
and criminals, mark and measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and are sign
and proof of the living virtue in it.’
Marvellous words that stayed on my desk from the moment that I first read them!
What better guidance for a Chief Inspector required to assure the quality of the
treatment and conditions of prisoners? What better description of a humane and
purposeful Criminal Justice System? Churchill’s sentiments are the clearest
possible condemnation of punitive, as opposed to rehabilitative, imprisonment.
They challenged the national conscience in 1910 by referring to the civilisation of
the country. How strong was a nation that sanctioned what I saw in Holloway 85
years later? They provided the clearest possible answer to questions about what
the Prison Service should be attempting to do with and for prisoners. After
sentencing, while the convicted discharge their dues to society, prison should
rehabilitate them with the aim of turning them into useful and law-abiding
citizens. In order to determine what curative and regenerating processes to apply,
it should discover the talents and abilities of even the most hardened criminals.
How much attention would the stakeholders pay to demands for the end of
unacceptable treatment and conditions? If ministers chose to ignore anything
condemnatory, and instigated no change as a result of Inspectorate disclosures, it
suggested that they had another agenda. Some said that they simply wanted the
Prison Service to keep prisons under control so that there was nothing for the
media to highlight. Winning the next election was far more important than risking
public outcry by trying to reform prisons.”
379. At a sentencing seminar in 2003 conducted by David Thomas on the
Isle of Man shortly after my appointent as Second Deemster I stated
the following by way of brief introductory comments:-
“There is no doubt in my mind that for serious criminal offences, in particular
serious acts of violence, custodial sentences will continue to be imposed for the
foreseeable future. It is the protection of the public that must be paramount. We
must never forget however that sentencing serves the purpose of crime reduction
and reparation as well as punishment. The three objectives of any criminal justice
sentencing system are to punish, to deter and to re-habilitate. All this is with a
view to protecting the public. But how are the public best protected? The
available evidence suggests that greater support for reform and rehabilitation
reduces the risk of re-offending and offers the best prospects for improved
outcomes for victims, for offenders and for society as a whole.
We need to concentrate on the protection of the public, the impact of crime on
victims and the prevention of further criminal activity by the offender.
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I would like to place on record my thanks to all those who are working so hard in
this respect including the prison authorities, Victim Support, the Drug and
Alcohol team, the Probation Services, the law enforcement agencies and the
dedicated prosecutors and defence advocates to name just a few.
We should not underestimate the impact that the rehabilitation of offenders –
especially young offenders – will have on the protection of the public. People
need to understand that rehabilitation of offenders will, in the long run, reduce the
number of victims. There needs to be a greater emphasis on community
punishment and rehabilitation not as soft options but as options that really work in
the long run to the great benefit of the public. The reduction of crime and the
protection of the public must be the main priorities of the criminal justice
sentencing system.
A separate topic would be what re-habilitation takes place within a prison
environment. It was a young Winston Churchill who stressed in 1910 that one
judges the civilization and strength of a society by how that society deals with
criminals and how that society treats its prisoners. It would be inappropriate of me
to make any comment this evening on the existing state of the prison which I
visited only a few weeks ago but suffice to say – hopefully it will not be too long
before we have a new prison with modern conditions conducive to the re-
habilitation of offenders and the protection of the public.” [The new prison in
Jurby opened in 2008]
380. Consider the then President of the Queen’s Bench Division in
England and Wales Sir Igor Judge’s talk at Lincoln’s Inn London on
29th October 2007 on Current Sentencing Issues. Extracts as follows:
“… sentencing a fellow human being is indeed an art, a human skill, a skill in
humanity, not a science, and it is this skill, and its application, that is embodied in
the possibly pompous sounding phrase, “judicial discretion”.
What I am encouraging this audience to do is to think, and to encourage others to
think, about issues which have been obscured by political rhetoric, and indeed a
general approach to sentencing issues which implies that some goodies, or
baddies, depending on your point of view, are “tough” on crime, and others,
again, goodies or baddies depending on your point of view, are “soft” on crime.
To those who like it, “tough” implies strong-minded, robust sentencing, or, to
those who do not, it is said to be wild excessive sentencing imposed ignorant of
the social deprivation and emotional damage to which many offenders were
subjected in their early years. “Soft” implies soggy, woolly, liberal-minded
sentencers, ignorant of the deprivation and emotional damage suffered by the
victims of crime.
The same sentencers, and their “soft” sentences, are thought by others to be
balanced, and careful, seeking to ensure the rehabilitation of the offender, to the
advantage of the community. Some sentences of course we have to accept are just
plain wrong, either too ‘tough’ or too ‘soft, but proportionate to the number of
sentences imposed overall, they are a very small proportion.
177
There is so much more to it than that, and like so much that is written and spoken
about the sentencing process, these epithets are misleading. First and foremost,
the sentencer is administering justice. But tempering justice with mercy is a
concept which we know about in literature, in the very Bible itself, along with the
“eye for an eye, and tooth for a tooth”. Every Christian of whatever denomination,
saying his or her prayers, asks for forgiveness for his own trespasses, “as we
forgive those who trespass against us”. Is that merely an incantation? Or is it a
prayer that means something? Incidentally, and in passing, as a salutary
admonition to those with power and influence, and that includes judges,
politicians, and newspaper editors, I cannot resist my current favourite quotation
from Shakespeare (Measure for Measure, Act two, Scene two):
Isabella says:
“How would you be, if
He, which is the top of judgment, should
But judge you as you are? O, think on that;
And mercy then will breathe within your lips”.
The admonition in that passage, although it is not the whole of Isabella’s theme in
Measure for Measure, is not that mercy should out-trump justice, but that each
and every one of us is a fallible human being. In the end, we all need forgiveness
for our mistakes.
We must have prisons: we must have rehabilitation services. Appropriate
punishment must be imposed. For judges, public protection against serious crime
comes first. Sometimes where it can be achieved, rehabilitation itself provides the
significant forum of long-term protection.
And is it just beyond our wildest imagination that we might, as a society, and
adapt the phrase made famous by Willie John McBride’s Lions in South Africa,
get our rehabilitation in first? By that I mean, that as a society we should
recognise the reality that the vast majority of offenders, and the vast majority of
crimes are committed by those who have had a dreadful start in life. No real
family life. No loving discipline. No understanding that actions have
consequences. No example. No guidance by good example. That is the reality of
the lives of most offenders who appear in the Crown Court. And the logical
conclusion: for every offender rehabilitated before he starts committing crime,
there are the victims of those uncommitted crimes who will not have to endure the
consequent pain and distress. In the context of resources, you cannot calculate the
value to the victim of a crime which has not been committed. It would not show
on the accountant’s figures. The truth is that it would be too valuable for that. The
essence of the point I am making, and the theme which I have been seeking to
address, is in the end perfectly simple.
On sentencing issues we, as a community, must focus on the long as well as the
short term view. We need strategy and we need foresight. In fact what we need is
wisdom.”
381. Consider also Sir Igor Judge’s talk in Sydney Australia in August
2007 The Criminal Justice System in England and Wales Greater
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Efficiency in the Criminal Justice System Time for Change? and the
address by Phillips LCJ to the Howard League for Penal Reform 15th
November 2007 How Important is Punishment ? Sir William Young,
President of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, in The Effects of
Imprisonment on Offending: A Judge’s Perspective [2010] Crim LR 3
concluded that retribution was the predominant rationale for the use of
imprisonment in both England and New Zealand.
382. Mario A Paparozzi and Roger Guy in The Giant That Never Woke:
Parole Authorities as the Lynchpin to Evidence – Based Practices and
Prisoner Re-entry (Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 2009,
25) dealt with recidivism reduction and the promotion of offender
rehabilitation, reintegration and long term public safety.
Assistance to court in respect of sentencing issues
383. Both prosecution and defence counsel have duties to assist the court
in respect of sentencing issues (see Parton Court of General Gaol
Delivery judgment delivered 30th July 2009).
384. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Myers (judgment delivered 26th November 2008) at
paragraph 10 of their judgment stressed the necessity of advocates
making focused submissions as to the appropriate length of sentence
and added:
“We have no doubt that, particularly when judges are dealing with a busy list,
they are entitled to expect assistance from advocates as to their powers and what
sentence it is submitted would be appropriate and the reasons for such
submission.”
385. The prosecution should make plain in advance of the sentencing
hearing any further orders requested for example, exclusion,
registration of sex offender, travel notification requirements, sex
offenders prevention order and forfeiture and destruction orders. The
prosecution should highlight in advance of the sentencing hearing any
outstanding breaches of suspended sentences or probation orders. The
prosecution should refer to the relevant statutory provisions giving the
court jurisdiction to make any orders the prosecution are requesting.
The prosecution should refer to the sentencing options and highlight
any aggravating matters. The prosecution should file updated previous
convictions and draw to the attention of the court any victim impact
issues and ensure the relevant evidence is before court and included in
the agreed summary of facts. Prosecution and defence counsel should
make their views on starting points clear in advance of the sentencing
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hearing (see Goodman Appeal Division judgment 1st June 2007).
Prosecution and defence counsel should refer to any relevant guideline
cases and make specific recommendations as to sentence.
386. R v Cain was a decision of the English Court of Appeal on the 5th
December 2006 and reported in the Times on the 26th December 2006
under the heading Prosecution duty to assist in sentencing process.
The following are extracts:
“It was unacceptable for defence and prosecution counsel not to ascertain and be
prepared to assist a judge with the statutory provisions governing sentencing, in
order to ensure that the judge did not impose a sentence which was unlawful …
THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, giving the judgment of the court, said that the four
appeals had one thing in common: in each case the judge had imposed a sentence
that was unlawful.
In some of the cases that fact formed no part of the grounds of appeal drafted by
counsel. It was identified by the diligence of the court staff who were preparing
the papers to be placed before the single judge.
Such a situation reflected adversely on the advocates whose duty it was to
represent the interests of their clients when the appropriate sentences were being
considered by the judge.
It was, of course, the duty of a judge to impose a lawful sentence, but sentencing
had become a complex matter and a judge would often not see the papers very
long before the hearing and did not have the time for preparation that the
advocates should enjoy. In those circumstances, a judge relied on the advocates to
assist him with sentencing.
It was unacceptable for advocates not to ascertain and be prepared to assist the
judge with the legal restrictions on the sentence that he could impose on their
clients. That duty was not restricted to defence advocates.
The advocates for the prosecution also owed a duty to assist the judge at the stage
of sentencing. It was not satisfactory for a prosecuting advocate, having secured a
conviction, to sit back and leave sentencing to the defence.
Nor could a prosecuting advocate, when appearing for the purpose of sentence on
a guilty plea, limit the assistance that he provided to the court to providing an
outline of the facts and details of the defendant’s previous convictions.
The prosecuting advocate should always be ready to assist the court by drawing
attention to any statutory provisions that governed the court’s sentencing powers.
It was prosecuting counsel’s duty to ensure that the judge did not, through
inadvertence, impose a sentence that was outside his powers.
The prosecuting advocate should also be in a position to offer to draw the judge’s
attention to any relevant sentencing guidelines or guideline decisions of the Court
of Appeal, Criminal Division.
Those propositions were clearly stated by Lord Woolf, Lord Chief Justice, in
Attorney General’s Reference (No 52 of 2003); R v Webb (The Times December
12, 2003) and by Lord Justice Rose, Vice President, in R v Pepper (The Times
May 10, 2005).
What caused particular concern was that, as the present appeals demonstrated,
there appeared to be widespread disregard of those judicial admonitions.
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It might be that the only way of achieving an acceptable standard of practice was
to require the prosecuting advocate to prepare a schedule or memorandum that
identified the matters relevant to sentence identified above. Such a requirement
had been imposed in New Zealand in 2003.
Their Lordships invited the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to consider
whether it would be desirable to impose some such requirement in this
jurisdiction.
All that had been said was equally applicable to those appearing in magistrates
courts.”
387. See also Archbold at paragraph 5-46. Judges should not be slow to
invite assistance from prosecuting counsel in sentencing matters and
counsel should be ready to offer assistance if asked. It is the
obligation of counsel for the prosecution to bring to the attention of
the court any matters relevant to sentence (R v Beglin [2003] 1 Cr.
App. R (S) 21 CA). The English authorities stress that it is the duty of
counsel for the prosecution, in a case where there are guideline
sentencing cases, to indicate, before sentencing, to the judge that there
were such authorities, and that copies were available should the judge
wish to see them: this practice should be meticulously followed and
counsel who failed to do so could expect a frosty reception in the
English Court of Appeal (R v Webb [2004] Crim LR 306, CA).
388. The following extract has been taken from the Code for Crown
Prosecutors which can be found at www.cps.gov.uk:
“11 PROSECUTORS’ ROLE IN SENTENCING .
11.1 Crown Prosecutors should draw the court’s attention to:
• any aggravating or mitigating factors disclosed by the prosecution case;
• any victim personal statement;
• where appropriate, evidence of the impact of the offending on a
community;
• any statutory provisions or sentencing guidelines which may assist;
• any relevant statutory provisions relating to ancillary orders (such as anti
social behaviour orders).
11.2 The Crown Prosecutor should challenge any assertion made by the
defence in mitigation that is inaccurate, misleading or derogatory. If the
defence persist in the assertion, and it appears relevant to the sentence, the
court should be invited to hear evidence to determine the facts and
sentence accordingly.”
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Goodyear indications
389. Where appropriate defence counsel should consider an application to
the court with a copy to the prosecution for a Goodyear indication
namely an advance indication by the court of the maximum sentence
which would be imposed if the defendant pleaded guilty at that stage
of the proceedings. See Goodyear [2005] 2 Cr App R 20. This
procedure has been followed on a number of occasions at first
instance in the Court of General Gaol Delivery but has yet to receive
the blessing of the Appeal Division.
390. The procedure may briefly be outlined as follows. There is a facility
whereby a defendant may request an advance indication of the
maximum sentence that would be imposed if the defendant pleads
guilty (see Archbold at paragraphs 4-78 and 5-79b and 5-79c).
391. The principle is that a defendant’s plea must always be made
voluntarily and free from any improper pressure. A defendant may
however personally instruct his advocate to seek an indication from
the Deemster of his current view of the maximum sentence which
would be imposed on the defendant in the event of a guilty plea at that
stage. A five judge English Court of Appeal in R v Goodyear [2005] 2
Cr App R 20 laid down guidelines for indications from the judge as to
sentence.
392. The hearing should normally take place in open court in the
defendant’s presence. The indication should only be given if sought
by the defendant but a judge is entitled to remind the defence
advocate of the defendant’s entitlement to seek such an indication.
393. The judge has an unfettered discretion to refuse to give an indication
or to reserve his position until such time as he felt able to give such an
indication.
394. The indication should not be sought on the basis of hypothetical facts;
there should be an agreed summary of facts and where appropriate a
written basis of plea without which the judge should decline to give
an indication.
395. Once the indication was given the court was bound by it, but the
indication would cease to have effect if, after a reasonable opportunity
had been given to consider it, the defendant declined to plead guilty.
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396. No indication should be sought without the defence obtaining written
and signed authority from the defendant. The defence advocate
remained responsible for advising the defendant that he should not
plead guilty unless he was guilty, that he understood (in an
appropriate case) that the sentence might be the subject of an unduly
lenient reference to the Appeal Division and that if a plea of guilty did
not follow on the indication the indication would cease to have effect.
The judge should not be asked to give an indication where there was
any uncertainty as to the facts or the basis of plea and the judge
should not be asked to indicate levels of sentence on the basis of
possible alternative pleas. Prosecution and defence counsel should
refer the Deemster to the relevant sentencing guidelines. Prosecution
counsel should not say anything which might tend to create the
impression that the sentence indication had the support or approval of
the Crown.
397. At least 7 days notice should be given of an intention to seek an
indication and failure to give such notice where it resulted in an
adjournment could lead to a reduced discount for any guilty plea that
followed. Any reference to a sentence request would be inadmissible
in a subsequent trial; reporting restrictions should normally be
imposed but they could be lifted once a guilty plea had been entered
or the defendant had been found guilty.
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Trials
Trial bundles and general preparation
398. Counsel should ensure that case management directions are promptly
and fully complied with. The prosecution should file well in advance
of the trial duly paginated court and jury bundles.
399. The court file should contain copies of all relevant documents
necessary for the information of the court in the conduct of the trial
including the information which will be going before the jury
containing the relevant counts, the prosecution’s opening note,
statements of witnesses who will be attending to give evidence, any
statements and admissions that are agreed and are to be read, any
expert reports and schedules of disagreements, any previous orders in
the proceedings, bail bonds, defendant’s previous convictions (if any),
relevant correspondence, judgments on any preliminary issues, list of
agreed issues and list of issues in dispute (if available), list of any
issues to be raised by the defence at trial (if available), list of exhibits,
list of witnesses and schedule of dates upon which witnesses will be
giving their evidence and time estimates of such evidence and any
other documents which it is desirable for the court to have available.
The file should be duly indexed, divided and paginated.
400. In the jury bundle should be a copy of the duly checked and agreed
transcripts of the defendant’s interviews with the police, any
statements made by the defendant to the police and any photographs,
plans, charts or other documents that are to be produced to the jury.
401. The contents of the court and jury file must be filed in accordance
with the court’s case management order and not left until the day
before the start of the trial or produced piecemeal during the course of
the trial.
402. In advance of the trial prosecution and defence counsel should agree
the contents of the court and jury bundles. In the event of
disagreement counsel should seek a ruling from the Deemster well in
advance of the trial. The defence should, well before the trial, raise
with the prosecution any objections to the admissibility of evidence
and any issues in respect of the prosecution’s opening note. Counsel
should ensure that only admissible evidence is presented at trial. If the
prosecution agree that references should be excluded then they should
be and the witness warned that the excluded reference should not be
mentioned in court. If the prosecution do not agree then the matter
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should be raised with the Deemster at the first available opportunity
and thereafter fully argued at the appropriate time. If issues as to
admissibility of evidence arise for the first time during the evidence of
the witness at trial then counsel should raise the issue and it should be
dealt with in the absence of the jury.
403. In respect of the need to focus preparation on the main issues and the
desirability of agreeing aspects of the evidence see Dobbie (Court of
General Gaol Delivery judgment 23rd March 2009) and McVey (Court
of General Gaol Delivery judgment 30th October 2009). Defence
advocates should sensibly consider what witnesses will be required to
be called and notify prosecution in early course. The defence should
not require witnesses to be called unnecessarily. Where possible
sensible admissions in respect of matters not in dispute should be
made and the trial should concentrate on the main issues in dispute.
Prosecution and defence counsel and the defendant should sign
written admissions where appropriate. The reason it is suggested that
the defendant also sign the admission is to minimise disputes between
defendant and his advocate as to authority to sign and the content of
admissions. See also section 16 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993
and Schedule 4 Part II of the Criminal Law Act 1981. Admissions, as
with timely guilty pleas, will attract sentencing discounts where
appropriate if convictions are subsequently recorded. Moreover
unreasonable conduct may have adverse costs consequences.
404. Counsel should ensure that any preliminary points that can be dealt
with prior to trial are dealt with prior to trial. If a point is likely to
arise during the trial counsel should put markers down and ensure that
no one is taken by surprise. Surprises increase the risk of injustice and
do not assist in the best use of time. Counsel should not leave matters
to the first day of the trial which would necessitate in some cases
members of the public waiting for a considerable period of time
before the jury is empanelled.
405. Advocates representing the prosecution and the defence should ensure
that only admissible evidence is presented. It is not for counsel
representing the prosecution or the defence in a specific case to give
evidence. Counsel must ensure that evidence is properly admitted.
406. Counsel should liaise with court administration to ensure that any
necessary facilities for the trial are made available. Any proposals for
site views should be made at an early stage of the proceedings.
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407. If there is to be a defence bundle this should generally be agreed in
advance and duly paginated. Copies should generally be provided to
the court in advance of the commencement of the hearing.
408. Counsel should ensure that trial bundles are prepared and filed well in
advance of the commencement of the trial where possible. His
Worship High Bailiff Moyle made the following comments in Corkill
(judgment 30th October 2006):
“[84] There is one other matter I would wish to mention. In this case there were
obvious difficulties caused by the illness of Mr Kelly. However delays were
caused by the “peculiar” practice of the Prosecution, virtually every day
seemingly, of producing a considerable number of additional exhibits. It is not as
if the Prosecution were not given more than ample notice of these proceedings.
Furthermore, the exhibit bundles as produced did not appear to follow any logical
sequence, or if there were any logic behind the order in which the exhibits were
put, I was unable to discern it. In any event, it must have been apparent that there
were some 25-30 ‘key’ documents. They should have been reduced to a “core
bundle” which should have been paginated, and an index provided. A lot of
confusion and delay may have been spared had such elementary procedures been
adopted. I trust such a situation will not arise again and that the Prosecution in
future similar cases will be fully prepared, well before the actual hearing, to
conduct their case without the need for unnecessary and frustrating delays.”
409. See in a different context the issues raised by Munby J in In re X and
Y (Bundles) [2008] EWHC 2058 (Fam) and warnings in relation to the
consequences which may flow if proper bundles are not filed on a
timely basis.
410. The prosecution should ensure that the relevant witnesses attend and
are reminded of the need to attend. In Adams [2007] EWCA Crim
3025 the English Court of Appeal dealt with an issue under section
116 of the English Criminal Justice Act 2003 and made general
comments in respect of the prosecution making arrangements for the
attendance of witnesses. The need to keep in contact with witnesses
and the need to remind them of the need to attend was stressed. All
the experience of the criminal courts demonstrated that witnesses
were not invariably organised people with settled addresses who
responded promptly to letters and telephone calls and who managed
their calendars with precision. They often did not much want to come
to court. If they were willing they might not accord the appointment
the high priority that it needed. Even if they did, it was only too
foreseeable that something might intervene either to push the matter
out of their minds or to cause a clash of commitments. Holidays,
work, move of house, illness of self or relative and commitments
within the family were just simple examples of the kind of
considerations which day in, day out, led to witnesses not appearing.
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Leaving contact with the witness until the last working day before the
trial was not good enough and it certainly did not satisfy the statutory
criterion. In addition, once the message was not known to have been
received, reasonably practicable steps which ought to have been taken
included a visit to his address and/or to his place of work or agency,
or at least contact with those places, perhaps by telephone. These
were not expensive steps (noting that police resources were relevant
to the reasonableness of the steps to be taken: R v Coughlan [1999]
EWCA Crim 553). Prosecution and defence counsel should stay in
touch with their witnesses and ensure that they attend as required.
Compliance with case management directions
411. The importance of compliance with case management directions
cannot be overstated. Such compliance is absolutely vital for the fair
and efficient administration of justice.
412. Sir Robin Auld in Review of the Criminal Courts of England and
Wales 2001 (at paragraph 231) stated that he had anxiously searched
in England and abroad for just and efficient sanctions and incentives
to encourage better preparation for trial. He said that England and
Wales were not “alone in this search and that as to sanctions at any rate, it is
largely in vain.”
413. A failure to comply with case management and other court orders
may involve serious consequences such as judicial criticism, a
negligence claim by the client, disciplinary proceedings, contempt
proceedings and adverse costs orders. Counsel should ensure that all
case management directions and other court orders are complied with.
“I was busy and had other urgent matters to attend to”, “we were considering a
plea to a lesser charge”, “the experts were too busy to provide their reports on
time”, “we were having difficulties with legal aid”, “it is not my file, I am dealing
with it for another colleague”, “I have only just come back off holiday and other
urgent matters arose” “I didn’t finalise the jury bundle in advance because further
admissions were due to be filed” and the like are not adequate excuses.
Counsel should ensure that preparation and compliance with court
orders is conducted on a timely basis. Counsel should diarise
deadlines and ensure compliance well in advance of the deadline. If
the deadline cannot be met counsel should make a prompt application
for an extension of time giving full reasons as to the difficulties in
complying with the deadline.
414. In R v Phillips [2007] EWCA Crim 1042 Clarke J stated:
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“36. In a number of recent decisions of this court it has been made clear to Crown
Court judges that they should be robust in case management decisions and that
this court will strive to uphold them. Active hands-on case management, both pre-
trial and during the trial, is an essential part of the judge’s task. The decisions of
this court should be well- known, but we refer to Chaaban [2003] EWCA Crim
1012, Jisl [2004] EWCA Crim 696 and most recently Lee [2007] EWCA Crim
764. No doubt it was with these judgments in mind that the recorder was robustly
determined to proceed with the trial that afternoon, but against the history which
we have summarised, it would, in our judgment, have been better if he had been
prepared to grant some more time for counsel to read and absorb the material
which had been so belatedly disclosed. The decision that it should proceed then,
yet still interposing further enquiries at the end of the day, in our judgment placed
defence counsel, notwithstanding his experience, in considerable difficulties and
distracted him from the primary task of conducting the defence.
37. We are not inclined to be unduly critical of the judge, however. The
responsibility, as he and Judge Campbell had both remarked, lay with the Crown.
Not only must judges be robust in their case management decisions, as Judge
Campbell and the other judges who handled this case had been, but the parties
who are ordered to take steps must take them. Case progression staff, both on the
prosecution and defence side, must ensure compliance with case management
orders. The responsibilities of prosecution and defence, particularly in accordance
now with the Criminal Procedure Rules, are well- known. We are not, we must
say with some regret, impressed by the grudging tone of one remark in the
Crown’s skeleton argument on this point, where counsel says “Appellant’s
counsel seemed to have the support of the trial judge and had been able to
persuade previous judges that there was merit in these complaints”. What is
singularly lacking is any explanation, even now, of why the proper orders had not
been complied with.”
415. In R v Glover, Glover & Priestnal (judgment 25th August 2006) I
stated:
“121. Advocates should not treat court orders including case management
directions as simply pieces of papers which can be ignored or compliance with
them delayed to suit their convenience. Orders and directions in respect of
contested trials or sentencing hearings should be strictly complied with. Serious
consequences can follow if they are not. The efficient and fair administration of
justice depends on advocates and the parties complying strictly with court orders.
Everyone concerned with the trial process, the prosecution, the defence and all
advocates involved in a case should ensure that court orders including case
management directions are strictly complied with on a timely basis and that the
case is ready for hearing and proceeds accordingly. Late preparation and late
applications are to be discouraged. They involve delay. They waste time and costs
and they cause inconvenience. There are few reasonable excuses for late
preparation. It is not reasonable to say I did not comply with the court order
because I was too busy or I was only a few days late or other matters took
priority. Compliance with court orders should take priority. If advocates are too
busy and cannot devote sufficient time to existing matters then they should
arrange for additional resources and support or refuse to take on new instructions.
Preparation for a hearing should commence at an early date rather than at a late
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date. Proper time and attention should be given to every case. Leaving preparation
until a couple of days or a couple of weeks before trial invites disaster together
with judicial criticism and adverse costs orders or other penalties.”
416. In R v Winsland and others (transcript of judgment delivered on 2nd
April 2008) I stated:
“10. I find myself, yet again, referring to the comments I made in R v Glover,
Glover and Priestnal (judgment 25th August 2006) at paragraph 121:
“… Orders and directions in respect of contested trials or sentencing hearings
should be strictly complied with. Serious consequences can follow if they are not.
The efficient and fair administration of justice depends on advocates and the
parties complying strictly with court orders. Everyone concerned with the trial
process, the prosecution, the defence and all advocates involved in a case should
ensure that court orders including case management directions are strictly
complied with on a timely basis and that the case is ready for hearing and
proceeds accordingly. Late preparation and late applications are to be
discouraged. They involve delay. They waste time and costs and they cause
inconvenience. There are few reasonable excuses for late preparation.”
10. Miss Braidwood who appeared for the Crown fairly and courageously
accepted that the delay in the filing of the Defence Application was consequent
upon the delays in the Prosecution providing information. Mrs Watts was unable
to attend court to deal with the Application as she was engaged in another trial.
Miss Braidwood was therefore fielded to deal with the Application at short notice.
I make no criticism of Miss Braidwood. Indeed I congratulate her for her
assistance to the court in difficult circumstances and at such short notice. The fact
remains however that this case, in particular the failure of the Prosecution to
respond promptly to important correspondence from the Defence, does not show
the Prosecution in a good light. The Prosecution’s failings in this case do not lie
at the door of Miss Braidwood. They appear on the face of the correspondence to
lie at the door of Mrs Watts.
11. The bad habits of failing to respond to correspondence promptly and of
failing to comply with case management directions on a timely basis must be
stopped and replaced with a settled practice of early responses to correspondence
and strict compliance with court orders on a timely basis. Prosecution counsel
have on occasions complained of lack of resources within the Attorney General’s
Chambers. If there is a lack of resources within the Attorney General’s Chambers
then urgent action needs to be taken by the appropriate authorities to remedy that
situation otherwise the administration of justice on this Island will suffer
…
37. Before I leave this judgment I am duty bound to comment on the lateness
of the Application and the failure to comply with the order of the 24th August
2007. It is not pleasant to have to say this but it has to be said if matters are to
improve in the future.
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38. In previous cases when Prosecution counsel have been challenged as to
their failure to comply with court orders they have complained of lack of
resources within the Attorney General’s Chambers. If additional resources are
required then they should be provided forthwith. Lack of resources is not a
satisfactory excuse for continual failures to comply with court orders. See also
judicial comments in respect of prosecution resources in Gray 1990-92 MLR 74
at 92-93.
39. I will not refrain from criticism simply because it may cause counsel some
discomfort. The efficient and fair administration of justice on this Island is more
important than the comfort of counsel and the comfort of Deemsters. I again stress
the need for court orders to be complied with strictly. I do criticise counsel in this
case. I am frankly unimpressed with the considerable delays of the Prosecution in
responding to correspondence from the Defence and the failure to file the court
and jury bundles in compliance with the order of the 24th August 2007. I am also
unimpressed with the late timing of the Defence Application which Miss
Braidwood accepts is consequent upon the delays in the Prosecution providing
information. In my judgment the Application could and should have been filed
much earlier. There must come a time if the Defence are not receiving responses
from the Prosecution when the matter needs to be referred to the Court by way of
formal application. That time should be well before the last week prior to the
commencement date of the trial.
40. I make those critical comments in the hope that counsel will accept in the
future the importance of responding to correspondence, of ensuring compliance
with court orders and case management directions on a timely basis and making
applications to the court on a timely basis. The bad habits of delayed responses to
letters, failures to comply strictly with timetables set by the court and the filing of
late applications will not be tolerated. It may be that in future if court orders are
not strictly complied with sanctions will have to be considered in an endeavour to
focus the minds of counsel on the importance of strictly complying with court
orders.”
417. In R v Collister 2003-05 MLR 150 the defendant was committed for
trial on the 21st May 2003. It was not however until 3rd November
2003 that the information against Mr Collister was signed by the
Attorney General. On the 16th December 2003 I invited the
prosecution to provide its opening note before 4pm on 30th December
2003. On the 29th December 2003 Mrs Linda Watts, the chief
prosecutor in the Attorney General’s Chambers, wrote to the court
stating that owing to other commitments it had not been possible to
provide a prosecution opening note. At paragraph 111 of my
judgment I stated:
“The prosecution should have had sufficient resources to prosecute this case
properly, efficiently, fairly and within a reasonable time.”
At paragraph 112 I added:
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“There have already been significant and inexcusable delays by the prosecution in
this case. The prosecution has had ample time to amend the first count and to
prepare and finalise their opening note. They should get on with it. They should
amend the first count and provide the opening note as soon as possible.”
418. In that case the prosecution were in breach of an order made on the
16th December 2003 in that they had not provided the required
additional particulars in respect of the first count. At paragraph 105 of
the judgment I stated:
“Deliberate disregard of court orders could in the future lead to contempt
proceedings – with all the consequences that follow. It is not for the prosecution
to decide whether they will comply with a court order or not. Court orders, until
they are varied or set aside, need to be complied with. Moreover, if the
prosecution continues to fail to comply with orders of this court one cannot rule
out the possibility of the proceedings being stopped on the grounds of abuse of
process. We have not yet reached that stage. As there are no contempt
proceedings before me, I say no more at this stage on that point but I am sure the
prosecution appreciate the importance of complying with court orders.”
419. See Archbold News Issue 5, June 8, 2007 and the case of Phillips
[2007] EWCA Crim 1042, April 26 2007 which stressed the
importance of obedience to court orders. Crown Court judges should
be robust in case management decisions (Chaaban [2003] EWCA
Crim 1012, Jisl [2004] EWCA Crim 696 and L [2007] EWCA Crim
764). Not only must judges be robust in case management decisions,
but the parties who were ordered to take steps must take them.
420. In L [2007] EWCA Crim 764 Thomas L J stated :
“(d) The duty of a trial judge
27. Rule 3 of the Criminal Procedure Rules which had come into force shortly
before this trial began make it clear that it is the duty of court to manage the case
and trial actively. This court has also emphasised the essential importance of the
duty of the trial judge actively to manage the trial. The three most important
judgments were all given by Sir Igor Judge, President, and in view of their
importance to the conduct of trials and to this appeal, we set the passages out in
full.
i) In R v. Chaaban [2003] EWCA Crim 1012 ([2003] Crim.L.R. 658) the trial
judge had made it clear that he intended the case to proceed expeditiously; it was
contended on behalf of the appellant that the impression was left that convenience
and speed were treated as having higher importance that the fairness of the trial,
but could point to no material which had not been made available or where proper
examination was obstructed. Judge LJ (as he then was) said in the course of
giving the judgment of the court:
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“35. …The trial judge has always been responsible for managing the trial. That is
one of his most important functions. To perform it he has to be alert to the needs
of everyone involved in the case. That obviously includes, but it is not limited to,
the interests of the defendant. It extends to the prosecution, the complainant, to
every witness (whichever side is to call the witness), to the jury, or if the jury has
not been sworn, to jurors in waiting. Finally, the judge should not overlook the
community's interest that justice should be done without unnecessary delay. A fair
balance has to be struck between all these interests…
37. We must also consider whether the case was somehow rushed, a submission
which gives this court the opportunity to highlight a significant recent change,
perhaps less heralded than it might have been, that nowadays, as part of his
responsibility for managing the trial, the judge is expected to control the timetable
and to manage the available time. Time is not unlimited. No one should assume
that trials can continue to take as long or use up as much time as either or both
sides may wish, or think, or assert, they need. The entitlement to a fair trial is not
inconsistent with proper judicial control over the use of time. At the risk of stating
the obvious, every trial which takes longer than it reasonably should is wasteful of
limited resources. It also results in delays to justice in cases still waiting to be
tried, adding to the tension and distress of victims, defendants, particularly those
in custody awaiting trial, and witnesses. Most important of all it does nothing to
assist the jury to reach a true verdict on the evidence.
38. In principle, the trial judge should exercise firm control over the timetable,
where necessary, making clear in advance and throughout the trial that the
timetable will be subject to appropriate constraints. With such necessary even-
handedness and flexibility as the interests of the justice require as the case
unfolds, the judge is entitled to direct that the trial is expected to conclude by a
specific date and to exercise his powers to see that it does. We find that nothing in
the criticisms of the way in which the judge dealt with the timetable, and nothing
in the remaining complaints about his management of the case which would
justify us interfering with the decisions made while exercising his discretion as
the trial judge.”
ii) In R. v. Jisl, Tekin, Konakli [2004] EWCA Crim 696 (set out very helpfully in
Blackstone 2007 edition at paragraph D3.6), Judge LJ, giving the judgment of the
court again drew attention to the duty of the trial judge to manage a trial:
“114. The starting point is simple. Justice must be done. The defendant is entitled
to a fair trial: and, which is sometimes overlooked, the prosecution is equally
entitled to a reasonable opportunity to present the evidence against the defendant.
It is not however a concomitant of the entitlement to a fair trial that either or both
sides are further entitled to take as much time as they like, or for that matter, as
long as counsel and solicitors or the defendants themselves think appropriate.
Resources are limited. The funding for courts and judges, for prosecuting and the
vast majority of defence lawyers is dependent on public money, for which there
are many competing demands. Time itself is a resource. Every day unnecessarily
used, while the trial meanders sluggishly to its eventual conclusion, represents
another day's stressful waiting for the remaining witnesses and the jurors in that
particular trial, and no less important, continuing and increasing tension and
worry for another defendant or defendants, some of whom are remanded in
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custody, and the witnesses in trials which are waiting their turn to be listed. It
follows that the sensible use of time requires judicial management and control.
115. Almost exactly a year ago in R v Chaaban [2003] EWCA Crim. 1012 this
Court endeavoured to explain the principle:
116. The principle therefore, is not in doubt. This appeal enables us to re-
emphasise that its practical application depends on the determination of trial
judges and the co-operation of the legal profession. Active, hands on, case
management, both pre-trial and throughout the trial itself, is now regarded as an
essential part of the judge's duty. The profession must understand that this has
become and will remain part of the normal trial process, and that cases must be
prepared and conducted accordingly.
117. The issues in this particular trial were identified at a very early stage, indeed
during the course of the previous trial itself. In relation to each of the defendants,
in a single word, the issue was knowledge. And indeed, the issue in most trials is
equally readily identified.
118. Once the issue has been identified, in a case of any substance at all, (and this
particular case was undoubtedly a case of substance and difficulty) the judge
should consider whether to direct a timetable to cover pre-trial steps, and
eventually the conduct of the trial itself, not rigid, nor immutable, and fully
recognising that during the trial at any rate the unexpected must be treated as
normal, and making due allowance for it in the interests of justice. To enable the
trial judge to manage the case in a way which is fair to every participant, pre-trial,
the potential problems as well as the possible areas for time saving, should be
canvassed. In short, a sensible informed discussion about the future management
of the case and the most convenient way to present the evidence, whether disputed
or not, and where appropriate, with admissions by one or other or both sides,
should enable the judge to make a fully informed analysis of the future timetable,
and the proper conduct of the trial. The objective is not haste and rush, but greater
efficiency and better use of limited resources by closer identification of and focus
on critical rather than peripheral issues. When trial judges act in accordance with
these principles, the directions they give, and where appropriate, the timetables
they prescribe in the exercise of their case management responsibilities, will be
supported in this Court. Criticism is more likely to be addressed to those who
ignore them.
119 …..We are not seeking to analyse each and every aspect of the present trial
where modern case management would have avoided delay. We are simply
illustrating some of the more obvious areas where the modern approach would
probably have saved time.
120. Experience shows that once the forward impetus has been lost, it becomes
extremely difficult to recover it. Imperceptibly at first, drift infiltrates the
proceedings and develops into unacceptable delay…… The trial judge is
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responsible for providing the necessary example and leadership to prevent
accumulating drift. In the longer cases in particular, the organisation of his
administrative and other judicial burdens should, so far as practical, be reduced or
organised to start at times which enable him to sit every day for full court days.
121. As already explained, these observations are directed to future arrangements
for case management of criminal trials. They do not impinge on the safety of
these convictions, or the appropriate levels of sentence.”
iii) These principles were reiterated in R v K & others [2006] EWCA Crim 724:
“Case management decisions are case specific. We are simply emphasising that
the new Criminal Procedure Rules impose duties and burdens on all the
participants in a criminal trial, including the judge, and the preparation and
conduct of criminal trials is dependent on and subject to these rules.
These principles are clearly set out in the Protocol on Disclosure dated 20
February 2006. This protocol should be applied by trial judges, and those who act
both for the prosecution and the defence should ensure that they familiarise
themselves with it.” ”
421. In R v Bury Magistrates Court judgment delivered 13th December
2007 (172 JP 19) the prosecution were ordered to serve video tapes of
police interviews with children. The prosecution failed to serve the
evidence. Both parties filed certificates of readiness for trial. The
prosecution made an application for an adjournment. The judge made
an order for costs against the prosecution. The Divisional Court
(Maurice Kay L J and Burnton J) held that the judge had been entitled
to make a costs order against the prosecution where it had failed to
comply with a court order that it should have served its witness
evidence on the defence by a specified date as it had given no
reasonable explanation for that failure.
422. Consider Newbery (judgment delivered 13th January 2009), R v Gray
1990-92 MLR 74 at 93 and R v Winsland and others (judgment
delivered 2nd April 2008) at paragraphs 12 and 38 in respect of lack of
resources. In Winsland at paragraph 38 it was stated that: “Lack of
resources is not a satisfactory excuse for continual failures to comply with court
orders.”
423. In Owens [2006] EWCA Crim 2206 the defence complained in
respect of the prosecution’s drip-feeding of notices of additional
evidence. The trial judge made an order that anything served after a
period of 21 days would not be admitted. Approximately two weeks
before the trial and after the deadline imposed by the trial judge the
prosecution served further voluminous witness statements and
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exhibits. The defence wanted the evidence excluded but the judge
refused. Rix L J at paragraph 52 stated:
“The Judge was entitled, having satisfied himself that there was ultimately no
unfairness and no undue prejudice in the service of this material, to conclude that,
his own order notwithstanding, it would be in the interests of justice to permit the
material encompassed by the NAE to go forward for consideration as to its
admissibility or exclusion on its own merits.”
424. In R (Robinson) v Sutton Coldfield Magistrates [2006] EWHC 307;
[2006] 2 Cr App R 13 the Divisional Court stressed at paragraphs 14-
16:
“The first point to make is that time limits must be observed … Secondly,
Parliament has given the court a discretionary power to shorten a time limit or
extend it even after it has expired. In the exercise of that discretion, the court will
take into account of all the relevant considerations, including the furtherance of
the overriding objective … In this case there were two principal material
considerations: first the reason for the failure to comply with the Rules. As to that,
a party seeking an extension must plainly explain the reason for its failure.
Secondly, there was the question of whether the Claimant’s position was
prejudiced by the failure …any application for an extension will be closely
scrutinised by the court. A party seeking an extension cannot expect the
indulgence of the court unless he clearly sets out the reasons why it is seeking the
indulgence.”
425. See Lawson [2006] EWCA Crim 2572; [2007] 1 Cr App R 11 at
paragraphs 17, 18 and 41 in respect of the duties of defence counsel in
the context of a multi-defendant trial and the need to give advance
notice where it is proposed that steps be taken in respect of bad
character evidence. See also Musone [2007] EWCA Crim 1237
described by Judge Denyer QC in his useful book on Case
Management in the Crown Court at page 11 as a “rare and (with great
respect) in some ways a slightly doubtful illustration of the use of the Rules (and
their breach) being used to prevent one defendant pursuing a line of enquiry
against a co-defendant.”
426. Sir Robin Auld in Review of the Criminal Courts of England and
Wales 2001 at paragraphs 229 and 230 stated:
“I have mentioned the lack of effective sanctions and the need for better
incentives to encourage all concerned in the preparation of criminal cases for trial
to cooperate when they reasonably can and to get on with it. Orders of costs,
wasted costs orders, the drawing of adverse inferences or depriving one or other
side of the opportunity of advancing all or part of its case at trial, are not, in the
main, apt means of encouraging and enforcing compliance with criminal pre-trial
procedures. In these respects criminal courts have much less control than civil
courts . . .
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In criminal cases an order for costs against a defendant personally is rarely an
option because of his lack of means and because it may be hard to apportion fault
as between him and his legal representative. And there are problems about the
fairness of a trial if a defendant is under threat of a sanction of that sort ... an order
for costs against the prosecution for procedural default is possible and sometimes
imposed. But, though it serves as a mark of the court’s disfavour and dents a
departmental budget, judges are disinclined in publicly funded defence cases to
order what amounts to a transfer of funds from one public body to another. The
third possible financial sanction is to make a wasted costs order against the legal
representative on one side or the other. But again there are often practical
limitations on the court in identifying who is at fault—on the prosecution side
Counsel, those instructing him or the police—and on the defence side, Counsel,
his solicitors or the defendant.”
427. In R v S and L [2009] EWCA Crim 85 (a case concerning the defence
of necessity) the English Court of Appeal held that in principle a
preparatory hearing could be conducted for the purposes of ensuring a
properly controlled trial during which fanciful and speculative
defences were not raised (thus confining the trial to a reasonable time
and ensuring that the jury focused upon the real issues). A trial judge
is entitled to seek particulars of what material it was suggested the
defence might adduce and to restrict or refuse cross-examination
absent some indication of material to be called in support of the
propositions advanced. Further the trial judge is entitled to know how
long the case would take, how long the jury would be detained and
what the programmed timetable was. In order to be satisfied of those
matters the trial judge would need to be able to assess how long the
defence should be allowed to cross examine any particular witness, to
what issues cross examination would go, and what day or days would
be occupied with the defence case. Furthermore, once the trial judge
had heard the cross examination it would be perfectly open to him to
conclude that there was no material upon which the defence could be
left to the jury. The following are extracts from the court’s judgment
delivered by Moses L J:
-
“10 …The purpose of the preparatory hearing was to ensure that there was a
properly controlled hearing during which fanciful and speculative defences were
not raised, for the purposes of confining the trial to a reasonable time, and of more
importance, ensuring that the jury focused upon the real issues. No complaint has
been made, nor could be made, as to the propriety of conducting such a
preparatory hearing, but there are dangers. The main danger is as to the evidential
or factual basis upon which any ruling could be given.
…
28. Our conclusion, therefore, is that, at this stage, the defence ought not be shut
out from advancing the defence of necessity. But the control and management of
these proceedings does not stop there. We have already pointed out that the
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material set out in the latest note dated 25 January 2009 was laid before the judge.
Indeed, some of the defence statements went so far as to refer, as we have already
indicated, to general fears of robbery, theft and other violence which seem miles
away from the case the defendants now seek to adopt.
29. The remedy lies in the judge’s control of the proceedings by seeking
particulars of what material it is suggested the defence may adduce in relation to
those matters specifically set out at paragraph 5. During the course of this
judgment we have already indicated the absence of particularity. The judge would
be perfectiy entitled to restrict or indeed refuse cross-examination in relation to
the first point absent some indication of a basis for saying there will be material
called in support of the propositions set out in paragraph 5. It is not for us to
exercise case management over the case when so experienced and respected a
judge has control of it, but there is nothing to stop the judge requiring those
particulars and written material in support of them before he allows the defence to
be deployed; otherwise he may reach the conclusion that the matter is purely
speculative. If there is such material, at least the categories of that material can be
shown to the prosecution and to the judge, if he wishes to see it.
30. The next way of controlling this case is in relation to the cross-examination.
The judge is entitled to know how long the case will in fact take, how long the
jury will be detained and what the programme is. In order to be satisfied of those
matters, he will need to be able to assess how long the defence should be allowed
to cross-examine any particular witness, to what issues it will go, and what day or
days will be occupied with the defence case, That too will require identification of
particular documents or witnesses that the defendants seek to advance. In that
way, the question as to whether this is merely a fanciful defence or otherwise may
emerge.”
Unnecessary adjournments and vacation of trial dates
428. With proper preparation on all sides there should be no unnecessary
applications for adjournments or vacation of trial dates. If
circumstances arise whereby such applications have to be made
consider the relevant law and the likely consequences and ensure that
such applications are made at the earliest possible time. Where
appropriate ensure that all necessary evidence (for example medical
evidence) is filed in support of the application.
429. In Watterson (judgment 19th October 2005) I dealt with the relevant
law in respect of adjournments and cases proceeding in the absence of
defendants. I stated:
“10. In relation to the relevant law I will deal firstly with the general law in respect of
adjournments and secondly with the special position where a defendant is absent
from the court.
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Adjournments generally
11. If there is an application for an adjournment or for trial dates to be vacated then
the court has a discretion to exercise.
12. The following general principles appear from the authorities :
(1) The court should fully examine the circumstances leading to the
application, the reasons for the application and the consequences to the
prosecution and defence and indeed all others involved in the process.
Ultimately the court must decide what is fair in light of all the
circumstances.
(2) Both sides should be given an opportunity to prepare and present their
cases at trial properly but proceedings have to be progressed in the public
interest. Court resources must not be unnecessarily wasted. Moreover if
the reason for the delay is the failure of counsel to properly prepare the
case despite having had an opportunity to do so or if the application for an
adjournment arose due to the fact that counsel had failed to obtain an
expert report in time or had failed to arrange for witnesses to be
summoned in good time, the applicant should not expect much sympathy
from the court. All these matters lie within the control of the applicant and
his advisers. Counsel should ensure that they are duly prepared for trial.
Last minute preparation and last minute applications are to be
discouraged. Moreover a defendant who dispenses with the services of his
advocate shortly before a trial is due to commence or indeed part way
through the trial should ensure that he is ready to proceed with alternative
legal representation or if need be as an unrepresented defendant. A
defendant should not simply assume that a court will automatically
adjourn a trial if a defendant feels unable to proceed in such
circumstances. It will not.
(3) When asked for an adjournment the court should scrutinise the application
closely and unless satisfied that it was indeed necessary and fully justified
the court should refuse it. The court considering the application needs to
be alert to the needs of everyone involved in the process including but not
limited to the prosecution and the defendant. It extended also to the
complainant, to every witness, to the jury or those jurors in waiting.
Moreover the court should not overlook the community’s interest that
justice should be done without unnecessary delay. A fair balance needs to
be struck between all those interests. Adjournments have to be fully
justified and if at all possible should be avoided. (See also the interesting
research into the causes of adjournments in Scottish summary criminal
cases by Fiona Leverick and Peter Duff Court Culture and Adjournments
in Criminal Cases : A Tale of Four Courts [2002] Crim LR 39).
(4) The court needs to consider whether a trial can proceed without injustice.
The court needs to consider whether there can be a fair trial. The aim to be
achieved by an adjournment must be in proportion to the effect of
adjourning the case. It is in the public interest that unnecessary
applications for adjournments be discouraged.
13. When considering an application for an adjournment or the vacation of hearing
dates the legal authorities indicate that there are various factors that the court
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needs to take into account when considering how to exercise its discretion
including the following:
(1) the nature of the application and the background to the proceedings
(2) the reasons for the application and the timing of it
(3) the importance of the proceedings and what is at stake
(4) the likely adverse consequences and the risk of prejudice to the person
seeking an adjournment if an adjournment is not granted
(5) the likely adverse consequences and the risk of prejudice to others if
the application is granted
(6) the commitments of the court, and where appropriate of witnesses, of
jurors and indeed all others involved in the proceedings
(7) the interests of justice in ensuring that cases are dealt with efficiently
and fairly to all concerned in the process
(8) the undesirability of delays
(9) the extent to which the applicant or his legal representative has been
responsible for the circumstances which have led to the application for
an adjournment
The absence of the Defendant
14. Special considerations apply where a defendant has absented himself from the
trial process and these were usefully reviewed by the House of Lords in R v Jones
[2003] 1 AC 1 (the Jones case) where it was held that a judge had a discretion to
commence a trial in the defendant’s absence though it was to be exercised with
great caution; that it was generally desirable that a defendant should be
represented, even if he had voluntarily absconded; and that the commencement of
a trial in the voluntary absence of the accused did not contravene Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
15. I noted the facts of the Jones case and the helpful comments of their Lordships on
the relevant legal factors to consider when deciding whether to continue with a
criminal trial in the absence of a defendant.
16. Lord Bingham in the Jones case at page 10 recognised that, in a case where a
defendant was absent, the court had:
“a discretion, to be exercised in all the particular circumstances of the case,
whether to continue the trial or to order that the jury be discharged with a view to
a further trial being held at a later date. The existence of such a discretion is well
established, and is not challenged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal. But it
is of course a discretion to be exercised with great caution and with close regard
to the overall fairness of the proceedings; a defendant afflicted by involuntary
illness or incapacity will have much stronger grounds for resisting the
continuance of the trial than one who has voluntarily chosen to abscond”.
17. There can be no doubt that in the normal course of events a fair hearing requires a
defendant to be notified of the proceedings against him. A person should as a
general principle be entitled to be present at his trial. A defendant in a criminal
trial should have the opportunity to present his argument adequately and
participate effectively. A defendant should as a general principle be entitled to be
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represented by counsel at trial and on appeal whether or not he is present or has
previously absconded.
18. Lord Bingham in the Jones case referred to the Strasbourg jurisprudence and at
page 12 concluded that:
“There is nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to suggest that a trial of a
criminal defendant held in his absence is inconsistent with the Convention”.
Lord Bingham added:
“If a criminal defendant of full age and sound mind with full knowledge of a
forthcoming trial, voluntarily absents himself, there is no reason in principle why
his decision to violate his obligation to appear and not to exercise his right to
appear should have the automatic effect of suspending the criminal proceedings
against him until such time, if ever, as he chooses to surrender himself or is
apprehended”.
19. Lord Bingham stated at page 12 that “one who voluntarily chooses not to exercise
a right cannot be heard to complain that he has lost the benefits which he might
have expected to enjoy had he exercised it”.
20. Lord Bingham stressed that the discretion to commence a trial in the absence of a
defendant should be exercised with the utmost care and caution and that it was
generally desirable that a defendant be represented even if he has voluntarily
absconded. At page 13 he continued:
“…the presence throughout the trial of legal representatives, in receipt of
instructions from the client at some earlier stage, and with no object other than to
protect the interests of that client, does provide a valuable safeguard against the
possibility of errors and oversight. For this reason trial judges routinely ask
counsel to continue to represent a defendant who has absconded during the trial,
and counsel in practice accede to such an invitation, and defend their absent client
as best they properly can in the circumstances”.
21. Lord Nolan at page 14 in the Jones case also recognised the existence of a
discretion of a trial judge to proceed with a trial in the absence of the defendant as
did Lords Hoffmann and Hutton at page 15. Lord Hutton at page 19 in the Jones
case stated:
“The discretion of a judge to proceed with a trial in the absence of the defendant
is one to be exercised with great care, but in my opinion there can be
circumstances where in the interests of justice a judge is entitled to decide to
proceed, particularly where the defendant has deliberately absconded to avoid
trial”.
22. Lord Rodger at page 26 in the Jones case agreed with the need for caution and
also associated himself with the comments of Lord Bingham as to the desirability
of a defendant being represented even if he has voluntarily absconded.
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23. See also the interesting article by P. W. Ferguson Trial in Absence and Waiver of
Human Rights [2002] Crim L.R. 554. In his conclusions at page 564 the learned
author states that :
“…there must be safeguards of a fair trial where the decision is exercised in
favour of trial in absence : the presence of legal representatives previously
instructed is a valuable protection of the defendant’s interests in the course of the
trial. If that safeguard is missing, any conviction will more likely be overturned”.
24. The legal authorities confirm that the court has a discretion to permit a trial to
proceed in the absence of a defendant but that discretion needs to be exercised
with great care taking into account all the circumstances of the case.”
430. See the useful judgment of Acting Deemster Montgomerie in
Tonneson (judgment delivered on the 30th June 2009) and the
desirability of warning defendants that if they fail to attend the trial it
may proceed in their absence and without defence legal
representation.
431. See R v Ulcay [2007] EWCA Crim 2379 to the effect that the court
should not oblige a lawyer to continue to act when he had made a
proper professional judgment that he was obliged, for compelling
reasons, to withdraw from the case. Counsel instructed late were
professionally required to do the best they could in the circumstances.
Lawyers acting for parties were officers of the court and had
obligations to the court to comply with its orders and to do the best for
the client in the light of those orders. Basically counsel was
professionally required to “soldier on and do their best.”
432. See also O’Hare [2006] EWCA Crim 471, Boodhoo [2007] EWCA
Crim 14 and R v Pomfrett [2010] 2 Cr App R 28.
433. In R v North and East Hertfordshire Justices (judgment 17th January
2008) 172 JP 74 [2008] EWHC 103 (Admin) a prosecution witness
could not attend due to extreme weather conditions and lack of
provision of child care. The justices refused an adjournment and the
case against the defendant was dismissed. The Divisional Court
allowed the appeal. The following is an extract from the report:
“Every sympathy could be had with the desire to get cases on quickly, but the
issue on an application for an adjournment was the question of doing justice to all
those involved in the case. A prosecution should not be shut out as punishment for
fault on the part of the Crown Prosecution Service, let alone on the part of a
witness. If, through no fault of a defendant, witnesses do not attend who should
have attended, magistrates ought generally to grant adjournments. No fault could
be ascribed to the witness, unless it could be said that she had failed to arrange for
childcare on a contingency basis. Similarly, there was no basis for criticizing the
prosecution, unless it could be said that they had failed to suggest to her to make
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childcare arrangements in case, unexpectedly, the school remained closed. There
was nothing to place in the balance against an adjournment other than further
delay. In all the circumstances, the decision to refuse the adjournment had been
irrational and perverse.”
434. In R v Bradford Justices (1990) 1 Crim App R 390 crucial material
defence witnesses who had not been summoned failed to turn up on
two occasions and the justices refused to issue warrants. Mann L J at
392 stated:
“The Justices have a duty to hear a case which a defendant wishes to advance …
the power to grant a witness warrant is one which ought to be exercised when the
evidence is critical.”
435. In Jorgic v Germany (App no 74613/01) 25 BHRC 287 the European
Court of Human Rights considered whether the defence had a right
for witnesses resident abroad to be summoned to attend to give
evidence.
436. Judge Denyer QC in Case Management in the Crown Court at pages
80-81 states that when an adjournment is sought on the basis that an
important witness is absent, the court is entitled to enquire about the
nature of the evidence that the witness may be able to give. In R v
Bracknell Justices (1990) Crim LR 266 the Divisional Court said if
the legal representative does not himself volunteer sufficient
information about the nature of the proposed evidence, then the court
itself should ascertain what sort of support to the defence case that
absent witness could give.
437. In R (Taylor) v Southampton Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 3006
(Admin) the Queen’s Bench Division did not interfere with the
exercise of discretion of magistrates who adjourned a case to permit
the prosecution to adduce further evidence in respect of the service of
a notice of intended prosecution. See Gleeson [2003] EWCA Crim
3357, DPP v Chorley Justices [2006] EWHC 1795 and Writtle v DPP
[2009] EWHC 236 to the effect that the days when the defence can
assume that they will be able to successfully ambush the prosecution
are over. See Judge Denyer The End of the Ambush Criminal Law &
Justice Weekly Vol 173 5th December 2009.
438. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Doyle) in Williams (judgment delivered on the 19th August 2003)
stated:
“13. It is agreed that the question of whether to grant an adjournment was one for
the exercise of the Acting Deemster`s discretion. The considerations affecting the
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exercise of the court`s discretion in such a situation will vary greatly from case to
case. However there can be no doubt that the Acting Deemster applied the correct
test, namely whether, in the absence of Mr Griffin, it was possible for the
Appellant to have a fair trial, which is simply another way of asking whether any
injustice would result from the trial proceeding. She concluded that a fair trial was
possible even in the absence of Mr Griffin.
14. We entirely agree. The matters which Miss Hannan wished to canvass with
Mr Griffin were substantially uncontroversial. We were told that the Appellant
gave evidence that Mr Griffin had agreed that she could stay at his flat that night
and of the previous good relations between them. That evidence was not disputed
by the prosecution and there was no reason for the jury not to unreservedly accept
it. It is noteworthy that although the defence were anxious to rebut any suggestion
that the Appellant participated in the assault on Mr Griffin in order to obtain
possession of the keys and thereby gain access to his flat, that suggestion was
never pursued by the prosecution. As to the remaining matters, for example what
clothing was being worn or who did what, there can be no doubt that Mr Griffin
could have given no material evidence. In our judgment, in such circumstances
the Acting Deemster was entitled to exercise her discretion in the manner in
which she did.
15. We add only that, if during the trial, matters had arisen which highlighted the
need for Mr Griffin to give evidence, Miss Hannan could have renewed her
application to the Acting Deemster or the Acting Deemster, of her own volition,
could have raised the matter. Neither Miss Hannan nor the Acting Deemster did
so.”
439. Judge Denyer QC in Case Management in the Crown Court at pages
81-82 reviewed some of the relevant authorities as follows:
“In R v Ealing Justices [1999] Crim LR 840 after defence witnesses had failed to
turn up, the Justices refused an adjournment because they felt that the defendant
should have taken steps prior to the hearing to obtain witness summonses for their
attendance. Quashing the conviction, the Divisional Court held that when
witnesses were persons who were apparently willing to attend voluntarily, the fact
that the defence had failed to apply for a witness summons was irrelevant. The
Justices should not focus on the perceived irresponsibility of a witness but on the
germane question of whether on the material before them, there was proper room
for the conclusion that the applicant was himself the author of the difficulties in
question. The fundamental question was whether, in all the circumstances of the
case, including the legitimate interests of the prosecution and the court, it was fair
to continue the hearing. The overriding consideration had to be the fairness of the
proceedings.
When the absence of evidence or of a witness is related to a failure or fault on the
part of a defendant, that may be highly relevant to the decision as to whether the
proceedings should be adjourned. In Lappin v HM Customs & Excise [2004]
EWHC (Admin) 953 there was a failure by the defendant to obtain an expert
report in flagrant breach of a previously laid-down timetable. He complained on
the basis that in spite of his breach, an adjournment should have been granted.
Goldring J [at paragraphs 23 and 24] said:
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“I, of course, accept that the appellant was entitled to a fair trial ... Whether he
received one depends upon all the circumstances of the case. In assessing those
circumstances, a court is entitled to take into account, not only the desirability of
the appellant having an expert report ... but the reasons for his failure to do so at
the time of trial. If the reality is that he did not have such a report because of his
persistent failure to obtain one over a period of time, it cannot be said that the
resulting trial was unfair and in breach of his Article 6 rights. In my view, the
reason for the absence of the report was the appellant’s persistent failure to obtain
one. It cannot be said in the light of that failure, that the action of the Crown
Court in insisting on the hearing going ahead was in any sense disproportionate or
unfair.”
A very neat summary of the proper approach is to be found in the judgment of
Simon Brown L J in R v Kingston upon Thames Justices (1994) Immigration
Appeal Reports 172. During the course of his judgment upholding the decision of
the Justices not to adjourn the trial, he said:’ [at page 177] :
“Whether or not an adjournment should be granted in any particular case, more
particularly whether or not fairness so clearly demands an adjournment that a
refusal will found a successful judicial review application, must inevitably depend
on a variety of considerations. These are likely to include: the importance of the
proceedings and their likely adverse consequences to the party seeking the
adjournment; the risk of his being prejudiced in the conduct of the proceedings if
the application is refused; the risk of prejudice or other disadvantage to the other
party if the adjournment is granted; the convenience of the court and interests of
justice generally in the efficient despatch of court business; the desirability of not
delaying future litigants by adjourning early and thus leaving the court empty; and
the extent to which the applicant himself has been responsible for creating the
difficulty which is said to require the adjournment in the first place; the extent to
which, in short, he has brought the problem on himself.”
13.4 It is worth considering separately the position that arises when a
manipulative defendant recognises that the case is going badly for him and seeks
to bring about a situation whereby the existing trial has to be aborted and a new
trial held. Such a situation can arise when the defendant, for no objectively good
reason, sacks his existing team or so changes his instructions that his existing
team feel obliged to withdraw. This was the position in Ulcay [2007] EWCA
Crim 2379. Having brought about a situation where those then representing him
felt obliged to withdraw, the Judge granted a short adjournment to enable fresh
lawyers to take over. To over-simplify a complicated situation, the second set of
lawyers requested a further two weeks’ adjournment which the trial Judge
refused, because to grant it would have the effect of completely derailing the trial.
Upholding the decision of the trial Judge not to grant that adjournment, the
President said [at paragraph 24]:
“It is however equally elementary that the processes designed to ensure the
fairness of his trial cannot be manipulated or abused by the defendant as to derail
it and a trial is not to be stigmatised as unfair when the defendant seeking to derail
it is prevented from doing so by robust judicial control. Such a defendant must
face the self-inflicted consequences of his own actions.”
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He went on to say [at paragraph 36]:
“In all these circumstances, the Judge was entitled to exercise his discretion to
refuse the lengthy adjournment sought by Counsel ... A lengthy adjournment
would have produced either an inordinate delay in the trial of all the defendants,
in which case the jury would have been discharged and a new trial started again at
huge public inconvenience and cost, and possibly prejudice to the remaining
defendants as well as the prosecution, or alternatively, that which the appellant
was seeking, for the trial of the remaining defendants to continue, with the jury
discharged from giving a verdict in his case and the subsequent trial of the
appellant on his own. That would have been contrary to the interests of justice
overall. The fact that the Judge was prepared to transfer the legal aid certificate
does not mean that he was saying that, whatever the consequences to the trial,
new representatives must be obtained and that thereafter he would conduct the
trial in accordance with whatever applications were made by new Counsel.” ”
440. In R v Symmons [2009] EWCA Crim 654 the English Court of Appeal
dismissed an appeal where the appellant had submitted that a trial
judge had erred in rejecting an application for an adjournment after
the appellant had complained of feeling ill. The following are extracts
from the judgment of the court delivered by Dyson L J:
_“43. Mr Fitzgerald submits that the appellant was not able to participate
effectively in the proceedings. He refers to V v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121 at [84]
and Makhfi v France (19 January 2005 ECtHR 59335/00) at [39] to [41] in
support of the proposition that article 6 of the ECHR requires that a defendant
should be able to defend himself effectively by participating effectively in the
proceedings …
46. We reject this ground of appeal. Other judges might have adjourned the
proceedings on 30 November until 4 December. But the judge thought that the
appellant might benefit from making a start on giving his evidence. In our
judgment, that was a reasonable judgement to make despite the strong submission
made by Mrs Radford that the trial should be adjourned until 4 December. There
undoubtedly were concerns about the appellant’s fitness to give evidence. The
judge was alive to these. He said that he intended to keep a careful watch over
how the appellant gave his evidence. If it became apparent that he was to any
significant degree impaired in his ability to give evidence, he would stop the case.
There is no reason to suppose that the judge was not true to his word. Moreover, if
the appellant’s legal advisers had thought that he was having difficulty, then,
mindful of what the judge had said, they would surely have made an application.
The appellant himself is an intelligent and articulate man. He had heard what the
judge had said. We think that, if he had felt during his evidence that he was unfit
to carry on, he would have said so. The reason why the appellant was permitted to
carry on until 16.00 hrs on 30 November was because there was no indication that
the appellant was unfit to give evidence. That view of his performance was
supported by the notes made by the prison doctor in the evening of 30 November
and the contemporaneous evidence of the views of the appellant’s legal
representatives as well as the impression created on counsel for the
prosecution …
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49. We have been shown passages from the transcripts of the appellant’s evidence
for 4 and 5 December. There were times when he was tearful and almost
inaudible. But there were also times during his cross-examination when he gave
as good as he got and he showed a remarkable grasp of the detail of the case.
There is no doubt that, viewed overall, he did not perform well under cross-
examination. Things went wrong for him when he was confronted by the tape on
4 December. But there is nothing in the transcripts of his evidence to suggest that
he was unfit to give evidence. It is clear that his cross-examination on the taped
phone conversation (see [38] above) was a defining moment in the trial. The
appellant must have appreciated this. His low mood at times during his cross-
examination is readily explicable by the fact that he must have understood that he
had not performed well under highly damaging cross- examination to which there
was no answer. For the reasons that we have given, there is no real basis for a
finding by this court that he was unfit to give evidence.”
441. The fundamental issue which any court must grapple with when an
adjournment is sought is the question of justice to all those involved.
The interests of the defendant and any complainants must always be
borne in mind, including their legitimate expectation that the case be
dealt with fairly and within a reasonable time. A proper balance has to
be struck between the interests of the parties and the general public
interest in prosecutions proceeding fairly and without undue delay and
convicting those guilty of criminal conduct and acquitting those
innocent of criminal conduct within a reasonable time.
Prompt time keeping
442. Counsel should not be late for court. It is a good discipline to be in a
position to proceed at least five minutes prior to the time the court is
due to commence. It is a discourtesy to the court and to other court
users if you are late. Taken together it wastes a great deal of valuable
time. It also reflects badly on organisational skills. Much time can be
lost if there are not prompt starts. If the court adjourns for fifteen
minutes counsel and all others attending court should ensure that they
are back in court in good time to facilitate a prompt restart of the
proceedings.
443. Judge L J in Jisl [2004] EWCA Crim 696 emphasised the need for
prompt starts:
“120. The proper progress of this case was also interrupted by additional
administrative burdens on the judge, performed and eating into the ordinary
sitting hours of the court. Experience shows that once the forward impetus has
been lost, it becomes extremely difficult to recover it. Imperceptibly at first, drift
infiltrates the proceedings and develops into unacceptable delay. Again, we shall
simply illustrate the phenomenon by example. If the jury is asked to be ready for
the trial to start at 10.00 am or 10.30 am, and the start is delayed by even a few
minutes, a pattern of late sitting eventually engulfs everyone. The ten minute
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break for the jury then lasts fifteen minutes. Counsel or the defendants, or one or
other of them, is then not quite ready for the court to sit at 2.00 pm sharp. And so
on. Witnesses whose evidence should have been completed on one particular day
have to return on the next. Then, as by definition their evidence is not completed,
the next day’s hearing inevitably involves some repetition of what has already
been explored on the previous day sometimes inadvertently, sometimes to enable
a particular forensic point to be repeated. The inconvenience to the witness, and
the problem of repetition would both have been avoided if the evidence had been
completed by the end of the previous day. The trial judge is responsible for
providing the necessary example and leadership to prevent accumulating drift. In
the longer cases in particular, the organisation of his administrative and other
judicial burdens should, so far as practical, be reduced or organised to start at
times which enable him to sit every day for full court days.”
444. In R v Scott [2007] ALL ER (D) 191 (Oct) judgment delivered
October 15, 2007 the English Court of Appeal indicated that if a
culture of lateness were tolerated, the effects would be cumulative and
bad for the administration of justice. A defendant appearing half an
hour late is in breach of bail. Surrender to custody means surrendering
at the appointed time and place and not “at or about” the appointed
time.
Interventions by Deemsters
445. Deemsters should only have to intervene on limited occasions in
criminal cases. Deemsters should keep out of the arena and take care
what they say especially in front of the jury (See R v Hulusi and
Purvis 58 Cr App R 378 and 385 Jahree v State of Mauritius [2005] 1
WLR 1952 PC). Evidence should flow but the jury must follow and
understand it. All interested parties should perceive a sense of fairness
and a sense of balance. See R v Lashley [2006] Crim LR 83 in respect
of conduct of a judge towards defence counsel during trial interfering
with due process and rendering the conviction unsafe. See also R v
Bryant [2005] EWCA 2079. Deemsters should avoid personal
comments on any apparent lack of counsel’s ability and integrity in
presence of jury or in the presence of a defendant or indeed generally
unless such comments are necessary and serve a useful purpose. See R
v Cole (17th December 2008 English Court of Appeal Criminal
Division).
446. The Privy Council in Michel v The Queen [2009] UKPC 40 had to
consider the conduct of a Commissioner of the Royal Court of Jersey.
It had been accepted that a significant part of the interventions of the
Commissioner amounted to cross examination, sometimes apparently
hostile or incredulous in tone. They were also much too frequent
especially during examination in chief of the applicant. The Privy
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Council in a judgment delivered by Lord Brown on the 4th November
2009 referred to a number of cases dealing with judicial interventions
during the course of trial starting with R v Hulusi (1973) 58 Cr. App.
R 378, 382, adopting Lord Parker C J’s statement of principle in R v
Hamilton (unreported, 9 June 1969):
“Of course it has been recognised always that it is wrong for a judge to descend
into the arena and give the impression of acting as advocate. . . Whether his
interventions in any case give ground for quashing a conviction is not only a
matter of degree, but depends to what the interventions are directed and what their
effect may be. Interventions to clear up ambiguities, interventions to enable the
judge to make certain that he is making an accurate note, are of course perfectly
justified. But the interventions which give rise to a quashing of a conviction
are really three-fold; those which invite the jury to disbelieve the evidence for the
defence which is put to the jury in such strong terms that it cannot be cured by the
common formula that the facts are for the jury… The second ground giving rise to
a quashing of a conviction is where the interventions have made it really
impossible for counsel for the defence to do his or her duty in properly presenting
the defence, and thirdly, cases where the interventions have had the effect of
preventing the prisoner himself from doing himself justice and telling the story in
his own way.”
447. The following are further extracts from Lord Brown’s judgment:
“27. There is, however, a wider principle in play in these cases merely than the
safety, in terms of the correctness, of the conviction. Put shortly, there comes a
point when, however obviously guilty an accused person may appear to be, the
Appeal Court reviewing his conviction cannot escape the conclusion that he has
simply not been fairly tried: so far from the judge having umpired the contest,
rather he has acted effectively as a second prosecutor. This wider principle is not
in doubt. Perhaps its clearest enunciation is to be found in the opinion of Lord
Bingham of Cornhill speaking for the Board in Randall v R [2002] 2 Crim App
R, 267, 284 where, after remarking that “it is not every departure from good
practice which renders a trial unfair” and that public confidence in the
administration of criminal justice would be undermined “if a standard of
perfection were imposed that was incapable of attainment in practice,” Lord
Bingham continued:
“But the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is absolute. There will come a
point when the departure from good practice is so gross, or so persistent, or so
prejudicial, or so irremediable that an appellate court will have no choice but to
condemn a trial as unfair and quash a conviction as unsafe, however strong the
grounds for believing the defendant to be guilty. The right to a fair trial is one to
be enjoyed by the guilty as well as the innocent, for a defendant is presumed to be
innocent until proved to be otherwise in a fairly conducted trial.”
28. Lord Bingham was, of course, right to recognise that by no means all
departures from good practice render a trial unfair. So much, indeed, was plainly
implicit in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in CG v United
Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 31, 789 which rejected the complaint that the trial
proceedings as a whole were unfair notwithstanding the Court’s finding that the
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judicial interventions had been “excessive and undesirable”. Ultimately the
question is one of degree. Rarely will the impropriety be so extreme as to require
a conviction, however safe in other respects, to be quashed for want of a fairly
conducted trial process …”
448. Lord Brown considered further authorities including the judgment of
Toulson L J in R v Perren [2009] EWCA Crim 348 and added:
“31. To that admirable analysis the Board would add that not merely is the
accused in such a case deprived of “the opportunity of having his evidence
considered by the jury in the way that he was entitled”. He is denied too the basic
right underlying the adversarial system of trial, whether by jury or Jurats: that of
having an impartial judge to see fair play in the conduct of the case against him.
Under the common law system one lawyer makes the case against the accused,
another his case in response, and a third holds the balance between them, ensuring
that the case against the accused is properly and fairly advanced in accordance
with the rules of evidence and procedure. All this is elementary and all of it,
unsurprisingly, has been stated repeatedly down the years. The core principle, that
under the adversarial system the judge remains aloof from the fray and neutral
during the elicitation of the evidence, applies no less to civil litigation than to
criminal trials. All will be familiar with Denning L J’s celebrated judgment in
Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55, 64, a personal injury claim ending
with each party complaining that he had been unable to put his case properly:
“A judge’s part. . . is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of
witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or
left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves seemly and keep to the
rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevances and discourage repetition; to make
sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making
and can assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where the truth
lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of a judge and assumes the role of
an advocate; and the change does not become him well. Lord Chancellor Bacon
spoke right when he said that: ‘Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part
of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.”’
32. The need for the judge to steer clear of advocacy is more acute still in criminal
cases. It is imperative that a party to litigation, above all a convicted defendant,
will leave court feeling that he has had a fair trial, or at least that a reasonable
observer having attended the proceedings would so regard it.
33. None of this, of course, is to say that judges presiding over criminal trials by
jury cannot attempt to assist the jury to arrive at the truth. On the contrary, they
should. That is part of their task. Judges exist to see that justice is done and justice
requires that the guilty be convicted as well as that the innocent go free. But for
the most part they must do so, not by questioning of the witnesses but rather by
way of a carefully crafted summing up. As to that, Simon Brown L J, giving the
judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v Nelson (Garfield Alexander) [1997] Crim.
LR 234 (transcript dated 25 July 1996) put it thus:
“Every defendant, we repeat, has the right to have his defence, whatever it may
be, faithfully and accurately placed before the jury. But that is not to say that he is
entitled to have it rehearsed blandly and uncritically in the summing up. No
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defendant has the right to demand that the judge shall conceal from the jury such
difficulties and deficiencies as are apparent in his case. Of course, the judge must
remain impartial. But if common sense and reason demonstrate that a given
defence is riddled with implausibilities, inconsistencies and illogicalities … there
is no reason for the judge to withhold from the jury the benefit of his own powers
of logic and analysis. Why should pointing out those matters be thought to smack
of partiality? To play a case straight down the middle requires only that a judge
gives full and fair weight to the evidence and arguments of each side. The judge is
not required to top up the case for one side so as to correct any substantial
imbalance. He has no duty to cloud the merits either by obscuring the strengths of
one side or the weaknesses of the other. Impartiality means no more and no less
than that the judge shall fairly state and analyse the case for both sides. Justice
moreover requires that he assists the jury to reach a logical and reasoned
conclusion on the evidence. . . . Judges who go to the trouble of analysing the
competing cases and who give the jury the benefit of that reasoned analysis . . .
are to be congratulated and commended, not criticised and condemned.”
In all of this, of course, it goes without saying that the judge in his summing up
must make it abundantly plain that the all important conclusion on the facts is for
the jury alone.”
449. The Privy Council in the Michel case advised Her Majesty that the
appeal should be allowed and the conviction quashed, the respondent
should pay the appellant’s costs and the case be remitted to the Court
of Appeal of Jersey for that court to decide whether or not to order a
fresh trial.
450. If an advocate believes that a Deemster is wrong the advocate should
politely but firmly tell him so and tell him why he is wrong and what
the advocate says the correct position is with reference to the relevant
authorities. Hytner J A in Clucas v Clucas 1981-83 MLR 5 at 15
stressed that judges should not be sensitive to criticism. The very
presence in most jurisdictions and in all civilised jurisdictions of a
court of appeal is a constant reminder to the public and to judges that
mistakes from judges are in fact expected. Advocates should always
stand up to judges and it is their duty to do so. This is the strength of
having an independent Bar and independent advocates. The liberty of
the subject depends upon a strong and independent-minded advocate
when it is his duty to do so standing up to a judge and embarrassment
should never prevent him from doing so.
451. The judge has a discretionary power to recall or allow the recall of
witnesses at any stage of the trial prior to the conclusion of the
summing up. A defendant has no right to be recalled in order to rebut
evidence given by a defence witness (R v Tuegal [2000] 2 All ER
872).
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Disclosure
452. Despite repeated judicial calls (the Appeal Division on the 15th
November 1993 in Teare v R 1993-95 MLR 154 at 159 and Deemster
Kerruish in the Newbery Report in March 2005) for a review of the
procedure in respect of disclosure and for it to be placed on a more
formal footing the position is still governed by Manx common law.
453. Judge of Appeal Hytner briefly touched upon disclosure issues in
Teare v R 1993-95 MLR 154 but since then there have not been many
cases involving the legal principles governing disclosure in criminal
proceedings on the Island which have arisen for determination by the
Appeal Division. There were some passing comments on lack of
disclosure by the prosecution in Devo (Appeal Division judgment 29th
October 2008). Moreover the legal position in respect of disclosure
generally has not been fully argued in the Court of General Gaol
Delivery but there have been a number of judgments on some specific
points which have arisen for determination from time to time. Some
of those judgments are referred to below. The legal position in respect
of disclosure has not yet therefore been fully determined and what
follows must be read in light of any future Appeal Division judgments
and in the light of any future statutory provisions. See now Dobbie
(Appeal Division judgment 13th January 2010). See also Allison v Her
Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 6 and McInnes v Her Majesty’s
Advocate [2010] UKSC 7.
454. In addition to the evidence upon which the prosecution intend to rely
on at trial the prosecution are also under a duty to disclose certain
other relevant material to the defence. The relevant materiality test
appears to be that a disclosable matter is that which can be seen on a
sensible appraisal by the prosecution:
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case;
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not
apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use;
(3) to hold out a real, as opposed to a fanciful prospect of
providing a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2).
455. It is the duty of the prosecuting authority to determine what is
material. The defence can assist in this process by raising with the
prosecution any relevant defence issues. In practice the prosecution
write to the defence identifying what the prosecution have taken to be
the issues in the case and inviting the defence to respond.
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456. The authorities stress the following points: (1) The defence are not
permited to go on fishing expeditions to trawl for information and
documentation (2) The duty of disclosure relates to material matters
relevant or possibly relevant to issues in the case (3) Fairness requires
that any material held by the prosecution that weakens its case or
strengthens the defence case if not relied upon as part of its formal
case against the defendant should be disclosed to the defence (4) It is
also essential that the trial process is not overburdened or diverted by
erroneous and inappropriate disclosure of unused prosecution
material, or by misconceived applications in relation to such material.
457. Simon Brown L J in R v Bromley Magistrates ex parte Smith [1995] 4
All ER 146 at 152 expressed the hope that those representing
defendants will not too readily seek to challenge a prosecutor’s
assertion that documents are in his considered view not material.
Simon Brown L J stated:
“Although ultimately the defence cannot be prevented from raising such an issue
and seeking the court’s ruling upon it, courts should, in my judgment, treat such
applications with some scepticism and should certainly decline even to examine
further documents unless the defendant can make out a clear prima facie case for
supposing that, despite the prosecutor’s assertion to the contrary, the documents
in question are indeed material.”
458. The authorities also stress the following points: (1) It is the duty of the
prosecuting authority to sift and evaluate the material in good time (2)
Relevant material which must be disclosed (subject to any exceptions
such as matters covered by public interest immunity) may include
material affecting the credibility of a prosecution witness, previous
inconsistent statements, the fact that a reward has been requested by a
prosecution witness and previous convictions of prosecution
witnesses (3) Disclosable matter, which satisfied the materiality test,
may include that which is not admissible. It may also include oral
statements, preparatory material and drafts of witness statements.
459. In Shetty (judgment delivered 4th January 2007) I stated:
“23. In Tully 2003-05 MLR N1 (judgment 2nd July 2003 a case involving an
application for a stay) Mrs Watts who appeared for the prosecution indicated that
we did not have in the Isle of Man the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996 (Parliament). In that case I endeavoured to explore with counsel for the
prosecution and the defence the duties and obligations of the prosecution in
connection with the evidence to be presented to the court in criminal prosecutions
in the Isle of Man. Paragraphs 77-82 of the Tully judgment read as follows:
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“77 I explored with counsel for the prosecution and the defence the duties and
obligations of the prosecution in connection with evidence to be presented to the
court in criminal prosecutions in the Isle of Man. The prosecution indicated that
we do not have in the Isle of Man the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act
1996 (of Parliament). The defence indicated that the prosecution need to present
the case in a fair and proper manner. I do not believe the prosecution took issue
with that principle. No legal authorities were brought to my attention in
connection with the specific duties of the prosecution regarding the gathering
together of relevant medical evidence, where that evidence goes to the credibility
of a prosecution witness rather than to the actual injuries or facts forming part of
the Information.
78. Paragraph 4-275 point 7 on page 430 of Archbold 2003 states that:
“A prosecutor properly exercising his discretion is not obliged to offer to proffer
a witness merely in order to give the defence material with which to attack the
credit of other witnesses on whom the prosecution rely. To hold otherwise would
in truth, be to assert that the prosecution are obliged to call a witness for no
purpose other than to assist the defence in its endeavour to destroy the Crown’s
own case. No sensible rule of justice could require such a stance to be taken”.
79. Paragraph 4-278 of Archbold 2003 indicates that where the prosecution
are anxious to call witnesses who they regard as reliable and are prevented from
doing so by circumstances beyond their control various principles are applicable.
In such a case the prosecution should take all reasonable steps to secure the
attendance of a witness required by the defence but if it is impossible to have a
witness present the court might in its discretion permit the trial to proceed
provided that no injustice be done thereby. The considerations affecting the
exercise of the court’s discretion would vary greatly from case to case. The matter
must be looked at in the round and even if the prosecution had not taken all
reasonable steps to ensure the attendance of the witness or for the production of
the evidence it is for the Judge to decide whether or not, in justice, the trial should
proceed. These are the principles usefully summarised in Archbold 2003. Similar
principles referred to in the 1999 edition of Archbold were applied by His Honour
Deemster Cain in the case cited at paragraph 60(2) above.
80. The well known case of Judith Theresa Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R 1
confirmed that the prosecution were obliged to make available to the defence any
witnesses whom they did not propose to call but whom they knew could give
material evidence, which tended either to weaken the prosecution case or
strengthen the defence case and they had a positive duty to disclosure any
scientific evidence which might arguably assist the defence. There was reference
in that case to the equally well known Attorney General’s Guidelines (1982) 74
Cr App R 302 and the prosecution’s duties of disclosure. The Ward case in the
main regarded the non disclosure of information and documentation that was in
the possession or control of the prosecution. The case sheds little light on the
position where medical records which may go to the credibility of the
complainant are not available or have gone missing. There are however some
general statements in the Ward case to the effect that the courts must bear in mind
that those who prepare and conduct prosecutions owe a duty to the courts to
ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is either led by them or
made available to the defence. It is emphasised that “all relevant evidence of help
to the accused” is not limited to evidence that would obviously advance the
accused’s case. It is of help to the accused to have the opportunity of considering
all the material evidence which the prosecution have gathered, and from which
the prosecution have made their own selection of the evidence to be led.
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Prosecutors should bear in mind at all times that they are responsible for the
presentation and general conduct of the case and it is their duty to ensure that all
relevant evidence is either presented by the prosecution or made available to the
defence. There are certain exceptions to this general principle and one would, of
course, be the doctrine of pubic interest immunity.
81. At paragraph 12-47 on page 1212 of the 1997 edition of Archbold there is
reference to the prosecution’s duty of disclosure and the case of R v Cannon
unreported (January 30th, 1995), C.A. Lord Taylor CJ stated:
“Onerous though the duty of the prosecution is to disclose material to the defence
which may be of assistance.. it is not, and cannot be, the duty of the prosecution to
disclose that of which they are unaware .. To require the prosecution in every case
.. to make exhaustive enquiries as to the possibility of some previous history
which might affect a witness’s credibility would be to put too heavy a burden
upon them”.
Those comments are of interest but I do not place any great reliance upon them
and they can be distinguished from the facts of the case I am dealing with in any
event. In the case I am dealing with there is available some evidence to suggest
that there could be in existence further evidence of some previous history which
may well assist the defence and we are not just dealing with “an ordinary witness”
we are dealing with the alleged victim who is the complainant and the main
prosecution witness.
82. In my judgment a prosecutor is personally responsible with conducting
prosecutions fairly, as a minister of justice assisting in the administration of
justice, in accordance with the common law duties of a prosecutor. The
prosecution may not be under a duty to make speculative enquiries of third parties
in the hunt for potentially relevant material but the prosecution do have a duty to
invite third parties to retain such material. If the material is obtained the
prosecution should disclose it to the defence in the normal course of events. In my
judgment the prosecution have an overriding duty to do their utmost to ensure that
a defendant receives a fair trial. When the substantive provisions of the Human
Rights Act 2001 are implemented they may well impact upon the law in relation
to the prosecution’s duty in this respect. I heard no submissions on the application
or otherwise of the Convention Rights and therefore I say no more at this stage.”
24. I note in Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619 a case decided before the 1996 Act that the
English Court of Appeal held that the prosecution’s general duty of disclosure
extended to anything that might arguably assist the defence. Materiality would
include evidence which tended either to weaken the prosecution case or
strengthen the defence case. The court stressed that in the normal course of events
the prosecutor should ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is
either led by them or made available to the defence. I note the wide ranging test of
relevance/materiality as specified at para 4-270 onwards of Archbold 1995
“4-270 The test of materiality was set out by Jowitt J. in R v Melvin (Graham),
unreported, December 20, 1993, C.C.C. and later adopted by the Court of
Appeal in R v Keane. 99 Cr. App. R. 1, and R v Brown. According to this
test, disclosable matter is:
“that which can be seen on a sensible appraisal by the prosecution:
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case;
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not
apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to
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use;
(3) to hold out a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of providing a
lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2)”.
25. The prosecution’s duty of disclosure is governed by the common law. The
historical position under the common law of England and Wales was outlined in
Archbold (1995) at paragraphs 4-265 onwards. Material matters must be
disclosed. Archbold (1995) at paragraph 4-272 states that material matters will
include matter affecting the credibility of a prosecution witness. Reference is
made to R v Brown The Times June 20th, 1994 CA and the following example of
disclosable material is given:
“previous convictions of prosecution witnesses (R v Collister and Warhurst, 39 Cr
App R 100 CCA) or any other matter which is adverse to the character of a
prosecution witness”.
26. In R v Collister and Warhurst the English Court of Appeal on the 26th May 1955
held that it was the duty of the prosecution to inform the defence of any known
convictions of prosecution witnesses but they were not under a further duty of
examining every kind of record to see whether anything existed which might
affect his character. Hilbery J at page 104 stated:
“If the conviction was disclosed, that was sufficient so far as the police were
concerned. The police are not expected to examine the records or see whether
possibly there exists anywhere in the country any matter which might affect the
character of a witness. It is their duty to disclose to the defence … actual
convictions of crime standing on the record …”
27. Ms Hannan refers to Jespers v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR CD 305 and the principle
of equality of arms and the obligation on prosecuting and investigating authorities
to disclose any material in their possession, or to which they could gain access,
which may assist the accused in exonerating himself or in obtaining a reduction in
sentence. Ms Hannan also produced extracts from Archbold 2006 at paragraph 16-
83 which states:
“This principle extends to material which might undermine the credibility of a
prosecution witness … non disclosure of evidence relevant to credibility may also
raise an issue under Article 6(3) (d)”. These statements are repeated in the 2007
edition of Archbold.
28. In Sinclair v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Privy Council DRA No 2 of 2004 judgment
delivered 11th May 2005) the Privy Council had to deal with a Scottish case where
the Crown had not provided the defence with witness statements which could
have been used to cross examine a crucial Crown witness about her credibility
and reliability. The appellant appealed on the ground that he had been denied a
fair trial by reason of the Crown’s failure to disclose the statements. It was held
that the primary rule was that all witness statements in the possession of the
Crown had to be disclosed and there was no duty on the defence to ask for them.
Although there might be cases where a statement might have to be withheld or
redacted in the public interest, such cases were rightly treated as exceptions which
the Crown would need to be in a position to explain to the court in the event that
an application for disclosure was made by the defence. It was further held that it
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was a fundamental aspect of the accused’s right to a fair trial that there should be
an adversarial procedure in which there was equality of arms between the
prosecution and the defence. Furthermore the prosecution was under a duty to
disclose to the defence all material evidence in its possession for or against the
accused. For that purpose any evidence which would tend to undermine the
prosecution’s case or to assist the case for the defence was to be taken as material.
Moreover the defence did not have an absolute right to disclosure of all relevant
evidence. While there might be competing interests which it was in the public
interest to protect, decisions as to whether the withholding of relevant information
was in the public interest could not be left exclusively to the Crown. It was held
that the appellant’s complaint that there was a breach of his article 6(1)
convention right to a fair trial was well founded.
29. In his report into the reasons for the vacation of the Newbery trial (March 2005)
His Honour Deemster Kerruish stated that:-
“It is in the interests of justice that full and appropriate disclosure is made in a
timely fashion, I commend to the Attorney General that he undertakes a review of
the practices and procedures relevant to disclosure of material in criminal
proceedings”.”
460. In Teare v R 1993-95 MLR 154 at 159 Judge of Appeal Hytner stated:
“We do wish to say one or two things about the non-disclosure of evidence. Some
of the fresh evidence which has become available to the defence has not been
available because, although in the hands of the police, it was unused material
which was not disclosed previously. We are told that at the time of this trial the
criteria followed by the prosecution were not necessarily those which were laid
down by the English Attorney General for the Director of Public Prosecutions and
the Crown Prosecuting Service to follow.
It seems to us, from what Mr Moyle has said, that the procedure was somewhat
informal and that, in our view, is not wholly satisfactory. It is more satisfactory if
formal procedure is laid down and followed.”
461. At paragraph [7] of his report into the reasons for the vacation of the
Newbery trial (March 2005) Deemster Kerruish stated:
“In this jurisdiction, the prosecution’s duty of disclosure may be considered to be
similar to the practice in England and Wales prior to the coming into force of the
Criminal Procedure and Investigating Act 1996 (of Parliament).”
462. In Oates (judgment delivered 13th March 2007) I stated:
“28 Frankly Mr Kermode has left the Application far too late and has not
allowed sufficient time to enable it to be dealt with properly prior to trial with all
interested parties being given an adequate opportunity to make informed
submissions. Mr Kermode will have to take responsibility and the consequences
for such failings. The Application raises serious and fundamental issues. Those
issues include confidentiality of Ms Teare’s medical records and potential public
interest immunity concerns of the DHSS. I have to balance those interests with
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the necessity for a fair trial. I accept, of course, that the Defendant is entitled to a
fair trial. The Defendant and Mr Kermode however had the opportunity to file an
application much earlier but failed to do so. I refer to the comments of Goldring J
in Lappin v HM Customs & Excise [2004] EWHC 953 at paragraphs 23 and 24
albeit in a different context:
“23. I of course accept that the appellant was entitled to a fair trial in the
determination of his civil rights and obligations. Whether he received one depends
upon all the circumstances of the case. In assessing those circumstances, a court is
entitled to take into account not only the desirability of the appellant having an
expert’s report on contamination, but the reason for his failure to do so at the time
of the trial. If the reality is that he did not have such a report because of his
persistent failure to obtain one over a period of time, it cannot be said that the
resulting trial was unfair and in breach of his Article 6 rights.
24. In my view, the reason for the absence of the report was the appellant’s
persistent failure to obtain one. It cannot be said, in the light of that failure, that
the action of the Crown Court in insisting in the hearing going ahead was in any
sense disproportionate or unfair. There was, although it was not expressed to be
in terms of Article 6, a balancing exercise carried out by the court. It reached a
decision. In my view, it was a decision it was entitled to reach”.
29. This court’s views on lack of timely preparation, lack of compliance with
court orders and the vacations of trial dates are or should be well known. By way
of example I would refer to the comments at paragraphs 120 and 121 of the
judgment in R v Glover, Glover and Priestnal (judgment 25th August 2006):
“120. The vacation of trial dates is a serious step to take. It wastes a great deal of
court time and resources and it is a great inconvenience to the court, to the
prosecution, to the defence, to the witnesses, to the jury and to other court users. It
wastes time, valuable resources and costs. It delays justice. It has an impact on
other cases awaiting trial. It impedes an efficient use of valuable judicial time. It
should be avoided. The risk of vacation of trial dates can be significantly reduced
if all counsel focus on the issues in the case at an early stage and ensure that early
preparation in connection with the case is undertaken and not left until the last
moment and that the availability of important witnesses is not overlooked.
121. Advocates should not treat court orders including case management
directions as simply pieces of papers which can be ignored or compliance with
them delayed to suit their convenience. Orders and directions in respect of
contested trials or sentencing hearings should be strictly complied with. Serious
consequences can follow if they are not. The efficient and fair administration of
justice depends on advocates and the parties complying strictly with court orders.
Everyone concerned with the trial process, the prosecution, the defence and all
advocates involved in a case should ensure that court orders including case
management directions are strictly complied with on a timely basis and that the
case is ready for hearing and proceeds accordingly. Late preparation and late
applications are to be discouraged. They involve delay. They waste time and costs
and they cause inconvenience. There are few reasonable excuses for late
preparation. It is not reasonable to say I did not comply with the court order
because I was too busy or I was only a few days late or other matters took
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priority. Compliance with court orders should take priority. If advocates are too
busy and cannot devote sufficient time to existing matters then they should
arrange for additional resources and support or refuse to take on new instructions.
Preparation for a hearing should commence at an early date rather than at a late
date. Proper time and attention should be given to every case. Leaving preparation
until a couple of days or a couple of weeks before trial invites disaster together
with judicial criticism and adverse costs orders or other penalties.”
30. In R v Watterson (judgment 19th October 2005) I endeavoured to cover the
factors a court should consider when dealing with applications for adjournments
or vacation of trial dates. At paragraph 12(2) I stressed that last minute
preparation and last minute applications were to be discouraged. I stated that if the
reason for the delay was the failure of counsel to properly prepare the case despite
having had an opportunity to do so or if the application for an adjournment arose
due to the fact that counsel had failed to obtain an expert report in time or had
failed to arrange for witnesses to be summoned in good time, the applicant should
not expect much sympathy from the court. All these matters lie within the control
of the applicant and his advisers.
31. In R v Shetty (judgment 4th January 2007) I dealt with an application for
the disclosure of school and employment records. At paragraph 41 I referred to R
(on the application of B) v Stafford Combined Court [2007] 1 All ER 102 as a
good example of the concerns that can be raised in respect of disclosure of
medical records.
32. In the Stafford Combined Court case the English Queen’s Bench Division
(Divisional Court) held that procedural fairness in light of Article 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms required that a child victim of alleged sexual abuse who was to be a
prosecution witness should be given notice of an application for disclosure of her
medical and psychiatric records and an opportunity to be heard and to make
submissions before any order was made.
33. May L J at paragraph [30] on page 111 felt that this approach should
extend to all medical records including those of adults. May L J referred to
medical records together with school, social services and tax records. May L J
referred to the balance between a patient’s rights of privacy and confidentiality
and a defendant’s right to have his defence informed of the content of relevant
medical records.
34. I have considered my judgments in Shetty and Tully in respect of
disclosure and the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
35. I have briefly considered the relevant law on public interest immunity
matters. I note the non-exhaustive categories of public interest immunity specified
from paragraphs 12-34 of Archbold 2007 onwards. There is reference to
information relating to children and documents and records maintained by social
services at paragraph 12-43.
36. I also note the judgment of May L J in the Stafford Combined Court case.
At paragraph [16]:
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“Medical records, in particular perhaps psychiatric records, are confidential
between the medical practitioner and the patient. The patient undoubtedly has a
right of privacy within art 8 of the convention…”
37. Baroness Hale’s comments in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 are
referred to at paragraph [17]
38. At paragraph [19] May L J states:
“The confidentiality of a patient’s medical records belongs to the patient. For the
particular importance of confidentiality in psychiatric medical notes, see
Ashworth Hospital Authority v MEN Ltd [2002] UKHL at [63]”.
39. I am not satisfied that adequate notice of the Application has been given to
Ms Teare and the DHSS. I am not satisfied that Ms Teare and the DHSS have
been given an adequate opportunity to make submissions in respect of the
Application.
40. Notice of any applications for the disclosure of medical records should in
the normal course of events be given to the person whose records are sought to be
disclosed. Moreover if there is an application for a witness (such as the Chief
Executive of the DHSS) to be issued with a witness summons requiring
production of medical records such application should in the normal course of
events be made with notice to the prosecution, the witness and the person whose
records are sought to be disclosed.
41. In previous cases such as Tully (Crim 2002/20 judgment 2nd July 2003) it
would appear that the prosecution have considered requests from the defence in
relation to disclosure of a complainant’s medical records and obtained the
informed consent of a complainant and subsequently produced copies of the
records to the defence. Clearly in cases where the prosecution are of the view that
such records are relevant and necessary that is a sensible approach to adopt. If
informed consent cannot be obtained and the defence wish to proceed then an
application needs to be made to the court in good time well before the trial dates
and with adequate notice to all interested parties.
42. I have to balance the rights of Ms Teare to the privacy of her records and
the rights of the Defendant to a fair trial. To make an order overriding Ms Teare’s
confidentiality in her records is a serious step to take. Before making such an
order I would have to be satisfied that Ms Teare has had adequate notice and an
adequate opportunity to be heard in relation to the Application. I am not so
satisfied. Moreover I would also have to be satisfied that such order was
proportionate, in accordance with the law and necessary for the protection of the
rights of others. I would have to balance Ms Teare’s rights of privacy and
confidentiality and the Defendant’s right to a fair trial. I may also have to consider
other matters in the public interest and the involvement of the DHSS and those
who come into contact with it. As no notice of the Application was given to the
DHSS I have not had the benefit of submissions on their behalf.
43. At the hearing this morning I expressed my concerns over the lateness of
the Application and the inadequate notice given to Ms Teare. I also indicated that
I was uncomfortable in considering the matter further without giving Ms Teare
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and the DHSS a reasonable opportunity of considering their positions, taking
advice and making submissions.
44. Ms Braidwood helpfully indicated that she could contact the DHSS in an
endeavour to progress matters.
45. I adjourned the hearing of the Application to enable counsel to liaise
further and to make contact with Ms Teare and the DHSS to ascertain their
positions in respect of the Application to see if the matter could be progressed.
46. Ms Braidwood on her return stated that she had considered the matter with
the DHSS who were content that an order be made permitting Ms Braidwood to
have access to the records and to take copies of any relevant and disclosable
records.
47. I am not willing to make an order for Ms Teare and/or the DHSS to
release the records to the Defendant as I am not satisfied that Ms Teare and the
DHSS have received adequate notice of the Application or an adequate
opportunity of putting their submissions before the court. In such circumstances I
am not persuaded that it would be appropriate for me to grant the order or issue
the summons as requested by the defence in the Application.
48. The best that can be done at this late stage, and endeavouring to balance
the various competing interests, is to make an order in the following terms:
The Department of Health and Social Security do permit Ms Braidwood of the
Attorney General’s Chambers or any other advocate within those chambers to
have access to and to take copies of any relevant and disclosable medical records
of Tracey Olwen Teare for the period 1st January 2005 to date.
49. Having considered the matter further with the DHSS and Ms Teare it will
be for the prosecution to come to a conclusion as to whether it would be
appropriate for them to release to Mr Kermode, the advocate acting for the
Defendant, copies of such records insofar as they relate to any mental health
issues in respect of Ms Teare. If copies of such records are released to Mr
Kermode they should only be used for the purpose of these proceedings and all
copies should be returned by Mr Kermode to Ms Braidwood at the conclusion of
these proceedings or any appeal arising therefrom.
50. I also make an order that the prosecution do forthwith disclose to the
defence the previous convictions of the prosecution witnesses whose evidence has
not been agreed and whose evidence is not to be read.
51. Mr Kermode to prepare draft orders for my approval and ensure that
copies of the orders are served on Ms Teare and the DHSS forthwith. If Ms Teare
and/or the DHSS wish to apply to have the orders I have made set aside they may
do so on short notice and I will endeavour to consider such applications as a
matter of urgency this week.”
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463. The following are extracts from the judgment of Simon Brown L J in
R v Bromley Magistrates ex parte Smith [1995] 4 All ER 146 at 152-
153:
“Generally speaking, only in relation to documents which the prosecution regard
as prima facie relevant to an issue but which they wish to withhold will the [court]
need to rule. Rare indeed should be the case where the [court] will required to rule
on materiality. It is, after all, for the prosecution to decide in accordance with
clearly established principle what is material. The responsibility rests with them.
That is made clear in R v Keane [1994] 2 All ER 478 at 484-485, [1994] 1 WLR
746 at 752:
‘The prosecution must identify the documents and information which are material
according to the criteria set out above ... Only that part which is both material in
the estimation of the prosecution and sought to be withheld should be put before
the court for its decision. If in an exceptional case the prosecution are in doubt
about the materiality of some documents or information, the court may be asked
to rule on that issue.’
Of course the defence are entitled to raise with the prosecution the suggestion that
other documents not yet disclosed are material and should be disclosed. As was
also said in Keane [1994] 2 All ER 478 at 484, [1994] 1 WLR 746 at 752:
‘… it is open to the defence to indicate to the prosecution a defence or an issue
they propose to raise as to which material in the possession of the prosecution
may be of assistance, and if that is done the prosecution may need to reconsider
what should be disclosed.’
The prosecution, indeed, should always be prepared to review the question of
materiality. Generally, no doubt, even if they are still unconvinced of the
materiality of the document, they would presumably prefer to disclose it rather
than go to the lengths of seeking a ruling on the point—always supposing no issue
of public interest immunity or legal professional privilege arises. But, on
occasion, the prosecution will for good reason contest the defendant’s request for
further material to be disdosed. That, indeed, is what happened in the present
cases and to those I shall shortly return.
First, however, I would express the hope that those representing defendants will
not too readily seek to challenge a responsible prosecutor’s assertion that
documents are in his considered view not material. Although ultimately the
defence cannot be prevented from raising such an issue and seeking the court’s
ruling upon it, courts should, in my judgment, treat such applications with some
scepticism and should certainly decline even to examine further documents unless
the defendant can make out a clear prima facie case for supposing that, despite the
prosecutor’s assertion to the contrary, the documents in question are indeed
material.
The court in R v Brown (Winston) [1994] 1 WLR 1599 at 1609 referred to ‘the
undoubted fact that defence lawyers sometimes bombard the prosecution with
requests for thousands of documents with little regard to their relevance’ and the
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need for trial judges to ‘firmly discourage unnecessary and oppressive requests
for discovery’.
That, of course, was said particularly in the context of large cases. But it would
scarcely be less aptly said of summary trials before magistrates. On the contrary:
it is dearly desirable that such proceedings should retain their essentially speedy
and summary character and not become complicated and delayed by ill-judged
applications for needless further disclosure of documents. There may be
occasions, indeed, when the court will wish to consider its powers of making
wasted costs orders.”
464. See Her Majesty’s Advocate v Murtagh (Privy Council judgment 3rd
August 2009) in respect of disclosure to the accused of all previous
convictions and outstanding charges of Crown witnesses and whether
such disclosure is limited to those as materially weaken the Crown’s
case or materially strengthen the case for the defence. The Privy
Council considered Article 6 and Article 8 issues in the context of
disclosure.
465. In Chief Constable of Humberside Police v The Information
Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 1079 the English Court of Appeal
at paragraph 109 stated that there was an obligation on the Crown to
reveal to the defence any convictions of any witness on whom it
relies. That does not mean that the conviction can automatically be
put in evidence by the defendant but it enables the court to give
proper consideration to any application under section 100 Criminal
Justice Act 2003 to do so. Similarly, it will sometimes happen that it
is relevant to challenge a witness called on behalf of the defendant on
the basis of his record, especially for example if he has professed to a
respectability which he does not enjoy.
466. If the prosecution fail to make adequate disclosure the trial may have
to be adjourned in order that adequate disclosure is made (See Swash
v DPP [2009] WLR 506 394 (DC) 4th March 2009). If adequate
disclosure is not given well before trial the defence should make a
timely application to avoid the adjournment of the trial. Such
application should not be left to a few weeks prior to the trial.
467. The following are extracts from Disclosure : a protocol for the
control and management of unused material in the Crown Court
Archbold 2009 Supplement:-
“Third party disclosure
52. The disclosure of unused material that has been gathered or generated by a
third party is an area of the law that has caused some difficulties: indeed, a Home
Office Working Party has been asked to report on it. This is because there is no
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specific procedure for the disclosure of material held by third parties in criminal
proceedings, although the procedure under section 2 of the Criminal Procedure
(Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 or section 97 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act
1980 is often used in order to effect such disclosure. It should, however, be noted
that the test applied under both Acts is not the test to be applied under the CPIA,
whether in the amended or unamended form. These two provisions require that
the material in question is material evidence, i.e., immediately admissible in
evidence in the proceedings (see in this respect R. v. Reading JJ., ex p. Berkshire
County Council [1996] 1 Cr.App.R. 239, R. v. Derby Magistrates’ Court, exp. B
[1996] AC. 487 and R. v. Alibhai [2004] EWCA Grim. 681)…
54. Where material is held by a third party such as a local authority, a social
services department, hospital or business, the investigators and the prosecution
may seek to make arrangements to inspect the material with a view to applying
the relevant test for disclosure to it and determining whether any or all of the
material should be retained, recorded and, in due course, disclosed to the accused.
In considering the latter, the investigators and the prosecution will establish
whether the holder of the material wishes to raise PII issues, as a result of which
the material may have to be placed before the court. Section 16 of the CPIA gives
such a party a right to make representations to the court.
55. Where the third party in question declines to allow inspection of the material,
or requires the prosecution to obtain an order before handing over copies of the
material, the prosecutor will need to consider whether it is appropriate to obtain a
witness summons under either section 2 of the Criminal Procedure (Attendance
of Witnesses) Act 1965 or section 97 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980.
However, as stated above, this is only appropriate where the statutory
requirements are satisfied, and where the prosecutor considers that the material
may satisfy the test for disclosure. R. v. Alibhai (supra) makes it clear that the
prosecutor has a “margin of consideration” in this regard.
56. It should be understood that the third party may have a duty to assert
confidentiality, or the right to privacy under article 8 of the ECHR, where
requests for disclosure are made by the prosecution, or anyone else. Where issues
are raised in relation to allegedly relevant third party material, the judge must
ascertain whether inquiries with the third party are likely to be appropriate, and, if
so, identify who is going to make the request, what material is to be sought, from
whom is the material to be sought and within what time scale must the matter be
resolved.
57. The judge should consider what action would be appropriate in the light of the
third party failing or refusing to comply with a request, including inviting the
defence to make the request on its own behalf and, if necessary, to make an
application for a witness summons. Any directions made (for instance, the date by
which an application for a witness summons with supporting affidavit under
section 2 of the 1965 should be served) should be put into writing at the time. Any
failure to comply with the timetable must immediately be referred back to the
court for further directions, although a hearing will not always be necessary.
58. Where the prosecution do not consider it appropriate to seek such a summons,
the defence should consider doing so, where they are of the view (notwithstanding
the prosecution assessment) that the third party may hold material which might
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undermine the prosecution case or assist that for the defendant, and the material
would be likely to be ‘material evidence’ for the purposes of the 1965 Act. The
defence must not sit back and expect the prosecution to make the running. The
judge at the PCMH should specifically enquire whether any such application is to
be made by the defence and set out a clear timetable. The objectionable practice
of defence applications being made in the few days before trial must end.
59. It should be made clear, though, that ‘fishing’ expeditions in relation to third
party material-whether by the prosecution or the defence-must be discouraged,
and that, in appropriate cases, the court will consider making an order for wasted
costs where the application is clearly unmeritorious and ill-conceived.
60. Judges should recognise that a summons can only be issued where the
document(s) sought would be admissible in evidence. While it may be that the
material in question may be admissible in evidence as a result of the hearsay
provisions of the CJA (sections 114 to 120), it is this that determines whether an
order for production of the material is appropriate, rather than the wider
considerations applicable to disclosure in criminal proceedings: see R. v. Reading
Justices (supra), upheld by the House of Lords in R. v. Derby Magistrates’ Court
(supra).
61. A number of Crown Court centres have developed local protocols, usually in
respect of sexual offences and material held by social services and health and
education authorities. Where these protocols exist they often provide an excellent
and sensible way to identify relevant material that might assist the defence or
undermine the prosecution.
62. Any application for third party disclosure must identify what documents are
sought and why they are said to be material evidence. This is particularly relevant
where attempts are made to access the medical reports of those who allege that
they are victims of crime. Victims do not waive the confidentiality of their
medical records, or their right to privacy under article 8 of the ECHR, by the mere
fact of making a complaint against the accused. Judges should be alert to balance
the rights of victims against the real and proven needs of the defence. The court,
as a public authority, must ensure that any interference with the article 8 rights of
those entitled to privacy is in accordance with the law and necessary in pursuit of
a legitimate public interest. General and unspecified requests to trawl through
such records should be refused. If material is held by any person in relation to
family proceedings (e.g., where there have been care proceedings in relation to a
child, who has also complained to the police of sexual or other abuse) then an
application has to be made by that person to the family court for leave to disclose
that material to a third party, unless the third party, and the purpose for which
disclosure is made, is approved by rule 10.20A(3) of the Family Proceedings
Rules 1991 (S.I. 1991 No. 1247). This would permit, for instance, a local
authority, in receipt of such material, to disclose it to the police for the purpose of
a criminal investigation, or to the CPS, in order for the latter to discharge any
obligations under the CPIA.
Conclusion
63. The public rightly expects that the delays and failures which have been
present in some cases in the past where there has been scant adherence to sound
disclosure principles will be eradicated by observation of this Protocol. The new
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regime under the Criminal Justice Act and the Criminal Procedure Rules gives
judges the power to change the culture in which such cases are tried. It is now the
duty of every judge actively to manage disclosure issues in every case. The judge
must seize the initiative and drive the case along towards an efficient, effective
and timely resolution, having regard to the overriding objective of the Criminal
Procedure Rules (Pt 1). In this way the interests of justice will be better served
and public confidence in the criminal justice system will be increased.”
468. For the position in Australia see Mallard v The Queen [2005] 224
CLR 125; [2005] HCA 68 and Grey v The Queen [2001] HCA 65. For
the position in Scotland see Her Majesty’s Advocate v Murtagh (Privy
Council judgment 3rd August 2009). For a detailed commentary on the
position in England and Wales see Disclosure in Criminal
Proceedings (2009) by Corker and Parkinson. See also H [2004]
UKHL 3, Wood [2006] EWHC 32 (Admin) and Flook [2009] EWCA
Crim 682.
469. See generally Disclosure : a protocol for the control and management
of unused material in the Crown Court Archbold 2009, Supplement,
Appendix N -52 to N-60 pages 725-735. Extracts as follows:
“Introduction
1. Disclosure is one of the most important-as well as one of the most abused-of
the procedures relating to criminal trials. There needs to be a sea-change in the
approach of both judges and the parties to all aspects of the handling of the
material which the prosecution do not intend to use in support of their case. For
too long, a wide range of serious misunderstandings has existed, both as to the
exact ambit of the unused material to which the defence is entitled, and the role to
be played by the judge in ensuring that the law is properly applied. All too
frequently applications by the parties and decisions by the judges in this area have
been made based either on misconceptions as to the true nature of the law or a
general laxity of approach (however well-intentioned). This failure properly to
apply the binding provisions as regards disclosure has proved extremely and
unnecessarily costly and has obstructed justice. It is, therefore, essential that
disclosure obligations are properly discharged - by both the prosecution and the
defence - in all criminal proceedings, and the court’s careful oversight of this
process is an important safeguard against the possibility of miscarriages of justice.
2. The House of Lords stated in R. v. H. and C. [2004] 2 A.C. 134 at 147: Fairness
ordinarily requires that any material held by the prosecution which weakens its
case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied on as part of its formal case
against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence. Bitter experience has
shown that miscarriages of justice may occur where such material is withheld
from disclosure. The golden rule is that full disclosure of such material should be
made.
3. However, it is also essential that the trial process is not overburdened or
diverted by erroneous and inappropriate disclosure of unused prosecution
material, or by misconceived applications in relation to such material.
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4. The overarching principle is therefore that unused prosecution material will fall
to be disclosed if, and only if, it satisfies the test for disclosure applicable to the
proceedings in question, subject to any overriding public interest considerations.
The relevant test for disclosure will depend on the date the criminal investigation
in question commenced (see the section on Sources below), as this will determine
whether the common law disclosure regime applies, or either of the two
disclosure regimes under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
(CPIA).
5. There is very clear evidence that, without active judicial oversight and
management, the handling of disclosure issues in general, and the disclosure of
unused prosecution material in particular, can cause delays and adjournments.
6. The failure to comply fully with disclosure obligations, whether by the
prosecution or the defence, may disrupt and in some cases even frustrate the
course of justice.
7. Consideration of irrelevant unused material may consume wholly unjustifiable
and disproportionate amounts of time and public resources, undermining the
overall performance and efficiency of the criminal justice system. The aim of this
Protocol is therefore to assist and encourage judges when dealing with all
disclosure issues, in the light of the overarching principle set out in paragraph 4
above. This guidance is intended to cover all Crown Court cases (including cases
where relevant case management directions are made at the magistrates’ court). It
is not, therefore, confined to a very few high profile and high cost cases.”
470. See also paragraphs 18-05 to 18-30 of May and Powles Criminal
Evidence 5th edition in respect of disclosure of unused material and
pages 53 to 68 of Judge Roderick Denyer’s Case Management in the
Crown Court in respect of disclosure.
471. The defence may, in principle, have copies of and access to
documents and other items seized from a defendant unless refusal of
such copies and access can be justified. Sections 24 and 25 of the
Police Powers and Procedures Act 1998 provide as follows:-
“24 Access and copying
(1) A constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power
conferred by any enactment, including an enactment contained in
an Act passed after this Act, shall, if so requested by a person
showing himself-
(a) to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized; or
(b) to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure,
provide that person with a record of what he seized.
(2) The officer shall provide the record within a reasonable time from
the making of the request for it.
(3) Subject to subsection (8), if a request for permission to be granted
access to anything which-
(a) has been seized by a constable; and
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(b) is retained by the police for the purpose of investigating an offence,
is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had
custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized, or
by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall allow the
person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a
constable.
(4) Subject to subsection (8), if a request for a photograph or copy of any
such thing is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who
had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized, or by
someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall-
(a) allow the person who made the request access to it under the
supervision of a constable for the purpose of photographing or copying it; or
(b) photograph or copy it, or cause it to be photographed or copied.
(5) A constable may also photograph or copy, or have photographed or
copied, anything which he has power to seize, without a request being made under
subsection (4).
(6) Where anything is photographed or copied under subsection (4)(b),
the photograph or copy shall be supplied to the person who made the request.
(7) The photograph or copy shall be so supplied within a reasonable time
from the making of the request.
(8) There is no duty under this section to grant access to, or to supply a
photograph or copy of, anything if the officer in charge of the investigation for the
purposes of which it was seized has reasonable grounds for believing that to do so
would prejudice-
(a) that investigation;
(b) the investigation of an offence other than the offence for the
purposes of investigating which the thing was seized; or
(c) any criminal proceedings which may be brought as a result of-
(i) the investigation of which he is in charge; or
(ii) any such investigation as is mentioned in paragraph (b).
25 Retention
(1) Subject to subsection (4), anything which has been seized by a
constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made under
section 22 or 23 may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)-
(a) anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be
retained, except as provided by subsection (4)-
(i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or
(ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection
with an offence; and
(b) anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner,
where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in
consequence of the commission of an offence.
(3) Nothing seized on the ground that it may be used-
(a) to cause physical injury to any person;
(b) to damage property;
(c) to interfere with evidence; or
(d) to assist in escape from police detention or lawful custody, may be
retained when the person from whom it was seized is no longer in police detention
or the custody of a court or is in the custody of a court but has been released on
bail.
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(4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in
subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.
(5) Nothing in this section affects any power of a court to make an order
under section 34 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 (disposal of property in
possession of police).”
472. See also Chapter 7 paragraphs 7-062 to 7-073 of Clayton and
Tomlinson on Civil Actions Against the Police (3rd Edition) dealing
with retention, access and copying. The English Court of Appeal dealt
with the English common law position regarding the supply of copies
of seized “documents” in Arias v Commissioner of Police (The Times
August 1, 1984).
473. In Scopelight Ltd v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2009]
EWCA Civ 1156 (English Court of Appeal judgment delivered 5th
November 2009) it was held that the police could retain property they
had seized after the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to
prosecute but a private prosecution was being contemplated or taking
place.
Expert evidence
474. Any permitted admissible expert evidence should be filed and
exchanged well in advance of the trial. Counsel should ensure that any
necessary and duly authorised experts are instructed promptly and that
they are available to produce reports on a timely basis and to attend
court where necessary. If the prosecution and defence instruct experts
the experts should liaise and endeavour to limit the areas of
disagreement. The experts are there to assist the court. If there are
areas of disagreement the experts should liaise and provide a schedule
outlining the areas of disagreement and the reasons for disagreement.
The experts should also be conscious of the reality that it is the jury
who decide the guilt or innocence of a defendant and not the experts.
Counsel should take care to ensure that the correct issues are put to
the experts and that the experts limit their evidence to issues upon
which they are able to express their opinions.
475. Section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 provides as follows:
“16 (1) An expert report shall be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings,
whether or not the person making it attends to give oral evidence in those
proceedings.
(2) If it is proposed that the person making the report shall not give oral evidence,
the report shall only be admissible with the leave of the court. (3) For the purpose
of determining whether to give leave the court shall have regard -
(a) to the contents of the report;
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(b) to the reasons why it is proposed that the person making the report shall not
give oral evidence;
(c) to any risk, having regard in particular to whether it is likely to be possible to
controvert statements in the report if the person making it does not attend to give
oral evidence in the proceedings, that its admission or exclusion will result in
unfairness to the accused or, if there is more than one, to any of them; and
(d) to any other circumstances that appear to the court to be relevant.
(4) An expert report, when admitted, shall be evidence of any fact or opinion of
which the person making it could have given in oral evidence. (5) In this section
‘expert report’ means a written report by a person dealing wholly or mainly with
matters on which he is (or would if living be) qualified to give expert advice.”
476. If further experiments or for example car handling tests are being
undertaken in a causing death by dangerous driving case all relevant
instructed experts should be given an opportunity to be present and to
participate or at least observe the tests (Bates judgment of Acting
Deemster Montgomerie delivered 7th May 2007). See also Acting
Deemster Montgomerie’s judgment delivered on the 10th January
2006 in Halligan. In Halligan Acting Deemster Montgomerie
succinctly summed up the relevant law as follows:
“10. As a general rule, parol evidence is not admissible with regard to anything
not immediately within the knowledge of the witness; he must speak of facts
which happened in his presence or within his hearing. This rule excludes both
hearsay and the expression of opinion or belief.
11. A recognised exception to this rule is expert opinion evidence. At trial, the
judge acts as gatekeeper to the admissibility of such evidence. There are three
vital pre-requisites to the admissibility of expert testimony.
12. Firstly, is it something outside the competence of the jury (or does it fall
within ordinary human experience and so not require an expert's assistance)?: R.v.
Turner (Terence).
13. Secondly, is the tendered witness an expert within his field?: R v Silverlock
(1894) 2 Q.B. 766.
14. Thirdly and finally, does the evidence relate to what is recognised by the
Courts to be a legitimate field of expertise (even if the proposed field is obviously
outside the jury's competence and the tendered witness is clearly a specialist
within it)?: see R. v. Robb (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 161 at page 164 where Bingham
L.J. pointed out that the Courts would not receive the evidence of an astrologer or
a soothsayer (even if they had spent decades mastering their discipline).”
477. R v B (T ) [2006] EWCA Crim 417; [2006] Cr App R 3 dealt with the
duties of an expert witness at a criminal trial, the need for expert
reports to be prepared with great care and guidelines as to what should
be included in an expert report. See Drawing on Expertise: Legal
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decision-making and the reception of expert evidence Andrew Roberts
[2008] Crim LR 443.
478. In Hawthorne v Jones (judgment 11th September 2007) I endeavoured
to set out some of the general law applicable to expert evidence in
civil proceedings. Some of this law is equally applicable to experts in
the criminal arena. The following are extracts from the judgment:-
“Law and Procedure
26. I turn now to consider the relevant law and procedure in connection with
the petition presently before the court. Order 28 rules 30-39 of the Rules of the
High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man deal with expert evidence.
27. Order 28 rule 31(1) provides that except with leave of the Court or where
all parties agree, no expert evidence may be adduced at the trial or hearing of any
cause or matter unless the party seeking to adduce the evidence has applied to the
court by petition to determine whether a direction should be given under rule 32,
33 or 36 (whichever is appropriate) and has complied with any direction given on
the application.
28. Order 28 rule 32(1) provides that where in an action for personal injuries
an application is made under rule 31(1) in respect of oral expert evidence relating
to medical matters then unless the court considers that there is sufficient reason
for not doing so, it shall direct that the substance of the evidence be disclosed in
the form of a written report or reports to such other parties and within such period
as the court may specify.
29. Order 28 rule 38 provides that where a party to any cause or matter calls
as a witness the maker of a report which has been disclosed in accordance with a
direction given under rule 32 the report may be put in evidence at the
commencement of its maker’s examination in chief or at such other time as the
court may direct.
30. At what stage should a point on the admissibility of evidence that is said to
be expert evidence be taken? It appears from the commentary to the Old English
Supreme Court Practice 1999 on page 722 that a judge in England who is not the
trial judge may not be entitled, at the interlocutory stage, to rule on the
admissibility of such evidence. (Sullivan v West Yorkshire Passenger Transport
Executive [1985] 2 All ER 134, CA and Rawlinson v Westbrook, The Times
January 25, 1995, CA). The White Book commentary continues:
“A judge, sitting interlocutorily, has no power to edit an expert’s report in
advance of the trial even when it appeared to him that the report contained
evidence that was not relevant to the action (The Scotch Whiskey Association v
Kella Distillers Ltd The Times December 27, 1996).”
31. I should add that in the 1980s it appears that in England judges other than
the judge who eventually presided over the action at the trial would frequently
deal with interlocutory applications in respect of such action. In Sullivan the
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English Court of Appeal was stressing that issues of admissibility of evidence
should in general be left to the trial judge. In the Isle of Man the Deemster who
presides over the action at trial is frequently the same Deemster who hears
interlocutory applications in respect of the action prior to trial. To that extent the
procedures referred to in Sullivan may be distinguished. I accept however that in
civil matters it is sometimes difficult to decide on issues of admissibility of
evidence prior to trial and prior to such evidence being put in context once all
issues in dispute have been properly identified.
32. In Sullivan it was stressed that the issue of admissibility is a matter for the
trial judge. In England the powers of the judge in chambers in respect of expert
evidence appear at the time when Sullivan was decided to have been limited to
ruling on the number of experts to be utilised and whether the evidence is
genuinely expert evidence and whether pre-trial disclosure of it should be
directed. Stephenson L J at page 135:
“Broadly speaking it is for the parties to decide what witnesses they wish to call
and for the judge, before whom the evidence is put, to rule whether it is
admissible, and if it is whether he can accept it or reject it as incredible or
unhelpful”.
33. Stephenson L J then referred to the old English Order 38 which restricts,
as Order 28 of our rules does, the giving of medical evidence in actions for
personal injuries. Stephenson L J at page 138 stated in effect that it was possible
for the judge at the interlocutory stage to “rule on any submission or question as
to it being genuine expert evidence”. It was not suggested in Sullivan that the
evidence was not genuinely expert evidence. Stephenson L J bore in mind the
general law embodied in section 3 of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 to the effect
that where a person is called as a witness in civil proceedings his opinion on any
relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence, shall be
admissible in evidence. The Manx equivalent is contained in section 3 of the
Evidence Act 1983.
34. Ackner L J felt that Order 38 was designed to extend the ambit of
disclosure:
“it was not directed to the question of the admissibility of the evidence”
(page 139).
35. Sir David Cairns (at page 139) could find nothing “which would enable
any limitation to be placed on the right of a party to call an expert witness: at
least, no right for the court to make any order on an interlocutory application
barring the party calling an expert witness”. The learned judge at page 140 added:
“In my view there is nothing in that rule [Order 38 rule 38] which would
enable the court to say that the expert evidence should not be called. It would be
for the judge at the trial, if the evidence is tendered, to rule on admissibility and
on the relevance of the evidence tendered, but that is not, in my view, a function
which can be exercised on an interlocutory application”.
36. Who is qualified to give expert evidence? It is for the court at the
appropriate time, to decide whether a witness is qualified to give expert evidence
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or not. Such competence may have been derived either from a course of study or
from experience. A witness may be an expert but not in the relevant subject. In
that case his opinion will not be admissible. It is for the judge to decide whether a
witness has sufficient knowledge and experience to qualify as an expert. There is
no need for it to have been acquired professionally (R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB
766). Silverlock concerned a handwriting expert in a criminal case. Lord Chief
Justice Russell at page 771 felt that reliable opinions based on past experience
were sufficient but stated that once it is determined that the evidence is admissible
the question of its value or weight is another matter to consider. In each case the
decision is one of fact and degree (R v Somers [1963] 3 All ER 808).
37. In Mackenney (1983) 76 Cr App R 271 a witness with training in
psychology was not allowed to give medical evidence. In Mackenney it was held
that a psychologist with no medical qualifications could not be called to give
expert evidence as to whether a defendant was suffering from any specific disease
or defect or abnormality of mind. However if a witness was suffering from a
mental disability it may, in a proper case, be permissible to call psychiatric
evidence to show that the witness is incapable of giving reliable evidence. DPP v
ABC Chewing Gum [1967] 2 All ER 504 also dealt with the admissibility of
evidence of psychiatrists.
38. An expert’s evidence is necessarily founded on his training and
experience. It has been held that a doctor can give evidence of what he was told
by a patient about his condition for the purpose of evaluating his diagnosis though
his testimony is inadmissible to show what symptoms were actually being
experienced by the patient (R v Bradshaw (1986) 82 Cr App R 79, CA). An expert
can give evidence on specific matters within his personal knowledge or of which
admissible evidence will be given by another witness. Where the opinion of
experts is based on reports of facts, those facts unless within the experts’ own
knowledge or unless the subject of admissions must be proved independently.
39. In National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd
(the Ikarian Reefer) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 68 Cresswell J at page 81 referred to
some of the duties and responsibilities of experts in civil cases as follows:
“ 1. Expert evidence presented to the Court should be, and should be seen
to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by
the exigencies of litigation (Whitehouse v. Jordan, [1981]1 W.L.R. 246 at p. 256,
per Lord Wilberforce).
2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way
of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise (see
Polivitte Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. Plc., [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
379 at p. 386 per Mr. Justice Garland and Re J, [1990] F.C.R. 193 per Mr. Justice
Cazalet). An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an
advocate.
3. An expert witness should state the facts or assumption upon which his opinion
is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from
his concluded opinion (Re J sup.).
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4. An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls
outside his expertise.
5. If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that
insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the
opinion is no more than a provisional one (Re J sup.). In cases where an expert
witness who has prepared a report could not assert that the report contained the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, that
qualification should be stated in the report (Derby & Co. Ltd. and Others v.
Weldon and Others, The Times, Nov. 9, 1990 per Lord Justice Staughton).
6. If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a material
matter having read the other side’s expert’s report or for any other reason, such
change of view should be communicated (through legal representatives) to the
other side without delay and when appropriate to the Court.
7. Where expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, calculations, analyses,
measurements, survey reports or other similar documents, these must be provided
to the opposite party at the same time as the exchange of reports (see 15.5 of the
Guide to Commercial Court Practice)”.
40. In the Ikarian Reefer Cresswell J was dealing with expert evidence in
respect of a claim that a vessel was lost by being deliberately run aground and
deliberately set on fire by or with the connivance of those beneficially interested
in the plaintiffs.
…
46. I cannot leave this judgment without referring to the undisclosed report of
Mr David Miller. Miss Oates indicated that she had written instructions not to
disclose the report of Mr David Miller (a consultant orthopaedic surgeon) referred
to in paragraph 1 (iii) of Dr McAndry’s report under the heading “Documents
Available”. The English Court of Appeal in Vasiliou v Hajigeorgiou [2005]
EWCA Civ 236; [2005] 3 All ER 17 disapproved of expert shopping. There is no
application presently before the court for the disclosure of Mr David Miller’s
report and therefore I make no order in that respect. I leave Mr Cordwell to pursue
his request to the Plaintiff pursuant to Order 23 rule 10. All I would say at this
stage is that as the Plaintiff is relying on the report of Dr McAndry and in that
report Dr McAndry makes express reference to the report of Mr David Miller then
on the face of it I would have thought, without the benefit of hearing detailed
submissions, that such report should be disclosed forthwith.
47. For the sake of completeness, on the issue of physical injuries (in
particular injuries to bones and joints) and the prognosis of recovery of a plaintiff
from such injuries, I should make the obvious point that if a court is asked to
prefer the opinion of a specialist consultant orthopaedic surgeon over that of a
general practitioner with some accident and emergency experience at a cottage
hospital it may well be, depending of course on all the other relevant evidence
before the court, that the court may be minded to prefer the specialist consultant’s
opinion. I say no more on that obvious point.”
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479. In B [2006] EWCA Crim 417 the English Court of Appeal gave
further guidance. Gage L J said:
“In addition to the specific factors referred to by Cresswell J in The Ikarian Reefer
[1993] 2 Lloyd’s Report 68 … we add the following as necessary inclusions in an
expert report—
(1) Details of the expert’s academic and professional qualifications, experience
and accreditation relevant to the opinion expressed in the report and the range and
extent of the expertise and any limitation upon the expertise.
(2) A statement setting out the substance of all the instructions received ...
questions upon which an opinion is sought, the materials provided and
considered, and the documents, statements, evidence, information or assumptions
which are material to the opinion expressed or upon which those opinions are
based.
(3) Information relating to who has carried out measurements, examinations, tests
etc and the methodology used and whether or not such measurements etc were
carried out under the expert supervision.
(4) Where there is a range of opinion in the matters dealt with in the report, a
summary of the range of opinions and the reason for the opinion given. In this
connection any material facts or matters which detract from the expert’s opinions
and any points which should fairly be made against any opinion expressed should
be set out.
(5) Relevant extracts of literature or any other material which might assist the
court.
(6) A statement to the effect that the expert has complied with his or her duty to
the court to provide independent assistance by way of objective unbiased opinion
in relation to matters within his or her expertise and an acknowledgement that the
expert will inform all parties and where appropriate the court, in the event that his
or her opinion changes on any material issues.
(7) Where on an exchange of experts’ reports matters arise which require a further
or supplemental report, the above guidelines should of course be complied with.”
480. Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092 dealt with the position where
experts disagree. R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 dealt with
expert evidence in respect of facial mapping. Thomas (General Gaol
Delivery judgment delivered 9th July 2010) dealt with expert evidence
issues in proceedings under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1976.
481. In R v Holdsworth [2008] EWCA Crim 971 and R v Harris [2005]
EWCA Crim 1980 the position as to the power of the court to make
provision for experts to consult together and produce a summary of
points of disagreement was dealt with.
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482. See the standard textbooks on evidence including Criminal Evidence
5th Edition Richard May and Steven Powles Chapter 6 and Mental
Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony Parry and Drogin (American
Bar Association).
483. See also Clark (Sally) (No 2) [2008] EWCA 1020 and Cannings
[2004] EWCA Crim 1 and the English Law Commission Consultation
Paper Number 190 The Admissibilty of Expert Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings in England and Wales.
484. The Judicial Studies Board Specimen Direction 33 dealt with expert
evidence as follows:
“33. Expert Evidence
In this case you have heard the evidence of X, who has been called as an expert
on behalf of the prosecution/defendant. Expert evidence is permitted in a criminal
trial to provide you with scientific [or e.g. accountancy] information and opinion,
which is within the witness' expertise, but which is likely to be outside your
experience and knowledge. It is by no means unusual for evidence of this nature
to be called; and it is important that you should see it in its proper perspective,
which is that it is before you as part of the evidence as a whole to assist you with
regard to one particular aspect of the evidence, namely [...].
[In a case where e.g. handwriting (see Note 1, below) is in issue or there might
otherwise be a danger of the jury coming to its own 'scientific' conclusions, add:
With regard to this particular aspect of the evidence you are not experts; and it
would be quite wrong for you as jurors to attempt to [compare specimens of
handwriting/perform any tests/experiments of your own] and to come to any
conclusions on the basis of your own observations. However you are entitled to
come to a conclusion based on the whole of the evidence which you have heard,
and that of course includes the expert evidence.]
A witness called as an expert is entitled to express an opinion in respect of [his
findings or the matters which are put to him]; and you are entitled and would no
doubt wish to have regard to this evidence and to the opinion/s expressed by the
expert/s when coming to your own conclusions about this aspect of the case.
You should bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration,
you do not accept the evidence of the expert/s, you do not have to act upon it.
[Indeed, you do not have to accept even the unchallenged evidence of an expert.]
(In a case where two or more experts have given conflicting evidence:) It is for
you to decide whose evidence, and whose opinions you accept, if any. You should
remember that this evidence relates only to part of the case, and that whilst it may
be of assistance to you in reaching a verdict, you must reach your verdict having
considered all the evidence.
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Notes
1. In relation to a matter such as handwriting, it is desirable to give the jury
(in addition to any directions in the summing up) an early direction when the
matter arises in evidence that they should not embark upon a comparison exercise
on their own. They may, e.g. be told, if the issue is likely to be of importance, that
they must decide it on the evidence only (which may legitimately take the form of
agreed facts, the evidence of the maker or alleged maker of the document, the
evidence of a person proved to be familiar with the maker's handwriting, expert
evidence and circumstantial evidence); but they must not decide it on the basis of
any comparison carried out privately by them.
See R v Stockwell 97 Cr App R 266; R v Fitzpatrick [1999] Crim LR 832;
Archbold (2003) 10-61 page 1232 et seq.
Blackstone (2003) F10.3 page 2126 et seq”
Evidence of speed
485. As to evidence of impressions of speed from non-expert witnesses in
causing death by dangerous driving cases see Bates (judgment of
Acting Deemster Montgomerie delivered on the 7th May 2007). In that
case evidence as to the rate of speed and estimates as to speed were
considered relevant and admissible. It was doubted that remarks of
witnesses such as “blast over the Mountain” were admissible and the
court expected “the Prosecution to exercise its customary common
sense/expertise when adducing its evidence” (paragraph 40 of judgment).
Site views
486. If a site view is desirable counsel should make an application.
Counsel and court administration should ensure that all necessary
arrangements are made including transport to the site for the Deemster
and clerk and transport for the jury separately from the Deemster but
together in their own vehicle. Prosecution and defence advocates to be
present at the site view together with the defendant. The court should
determine the purpose of the site view. What is to be seen and why?
What if anything is to be said and by whom? Has anything changed at
the site since the relevant date? Consider any health and safety and
security issues. If the site view is of a road prosecution counsel should
consider any necessary road closure orders. The site view should be
regarded as a part of the proceedings in court. There should be no
discussion. The jury should not discuss matters with third parties and
should not permit third parties to discuss matters with them.
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487. See Archbold paragraphs 4-83, 4-84, 4-418, 4-264. At paragraph 4-83
it is indicated that the judge may permit the jury to view the locus in
quo at any time during the trial but he should take precautions not to
allow any improper communications being made to them at the view.
The judge must be present at any view to control the proceedings and
ensure that the correct procedure is followed. A view is part of a
criminal trial and, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the
presence of the accused at a view is as necessary as at any other part
of the trial. No view should take place after the retirement of the jury.
See for further detail the authorities referred to in Archbold.
488. See also Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2003 at paragraph F8.35. A
view should be attended by the judge, the tribunal of fact (jury), the
parties, and their counsel.
489. In M v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] EWHC 752 (Admin);
[2009] 2 Cr App R 12 the English Queen’s Bench Divisional Court
held that what was critical before a court embarked upon a view was
that there was absolute clarity as to precisely what was to happen at
the view, about who was to stand in what position, about what, if any,
objects should be placed in a specific position and about who would
do that. A view of a scene should be conducted without discussion.
The jury
490. The provisions of the Jury Act 1980 deal with the procedure in respect
of the jury selection process including challenges by the prosecution
and the defence.
491. DPP of the Virgin Islands v William Penn (Privy Council judgment
delivered 8th May 2008) dealt with defects in the preparation and
publication of a list of those qualified to serve as jurors. Tibbetts v
Attorney General of the Cayman Islands [2010] UKPC 8 dealt with
issues concerning whether a verdict was infected by apparent bias on
the part of the jurors. The question being whether the fair-minded and
informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that
there was a real possibility that the jury were biased.
492. The following are extracts from the Jury Act 1980:
“24 Number of persons on jury in criminal matters
The offence of treason or the offence of murder shall be tried by a jury of twelve
persons.
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All other offences triable on information shall be tried by a jury of seven persons:
Provided that a Deemster may in the case of the trial of any person for any
offence, by reason of the gravity of the matters in issue, direct that the offender
shall be tried by a jury of twelve persons …
27 Challenges in criminal trials
(1) As heretofore accustomed, upon the trial of any person for an offence on
information the Attorney General or any advocate on behalf of the Attorney
General shall continue to have the unlimited right to challenge without cause
individual members of a jury before they are sworn.
(2) A person (other than the Attorney General) who having a right to do so prefers
an information and a person tried on information may challenge not more than
three jurors without cause and any juror or jurors for good and sufficient cause.
(3) Upon the trial of any person for an offence on information any challenge to
jurors for cause shall be tried by the Deemster before whom the accused is to be
tried.
(4) Upon the trial of any person on information the whole or any two of the jury
may be sworn together, provided that an opportunity to challenge each man
separately shall be furnished to the prosecutor and the accused before the oath is
administered.
(5) If, by reason of the prisoner or the prisoners (if two or more prisoners shall be
placed on their trial together) exercising his or their right of several challenges or
by reason of the challenges by or on behalf of the Attorney General, or by reason
of the challenges of the person (other than the Attorney General) preferring the
information or from the illness or absence of jurors, or from all or any of the said
causes, a sufficient number of the jurors returned on the panel for the then Court
of General Gaol Delivery shall not remain to try the said prisoner or prisoners,
such jurors (if any) as shall be present and able to serve, and shall remain
unchallenged, shall serve on the said jury and the said panel shall be again called
and the challenge shall be allowed in such case of such jurors only as shall be
challenged for good and sufficient cause.
28 Death or illness, etc of member of jury in a criminal trial
Where, in the course of any trial on information, any member of the jury dies or is
discharged by the Deemster as being through illness incapable of continuing to act
or for any other reason, the jury shall nevertheless, subject to the consent being
given in writing by or on behalf of both the Attorney General and the accused and
so long as the number of its members is not reduced below ten (in the case of a
trial by a jury of twelve persons) or below six (in the case of a trial by jury of
seven persons), be considered as remaining for all the purposes of that trial
properly constituted, and that trial shall proceed and a verdict may be given
accordingly.”
493. In Manx law the verdict of the jury must be unanimous.
494. If a note is received from a juror whilst the jury are deliberating that
note should be considered by the presiding Deemster and prosecution
and defence counsel. The Deemster may indicate to counsel how he is
minded to deal with the note and what further directions, if any, may
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be appropriate. Counsel should make submissions as to how they
suggest the Deemster should respond to the note. In Crossley v R
1993-95 MLR N4 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and
Deemster Corrin) held that if a jury wishes to ask a question of the
judge once it has retired, the question should be written down and,
without the jury being brought into court, shown to the judge who
should in turn show it to both counsel. Any submissions or assistance
sought from counsel should take place in the absence of the jury,
which should return to court only to hear the resulting direction. The
Appeal Division in Chambers (judgment 12th August 2010) dealt with
a submission in respect of how the trial Deemster had dealt with a
question from the jury.
495. R v Smith [2005] UKHL 12, [2005] 2 Cr App R 10 emphasised the
need for the trial judge to give the jury comprehensive and emphatic
directions to follow the judge’s directions as to the law and to
consider the evidence without speculating. In that case a juror felt that
other jurors were disregarding the judge’s directions as to the law and
were indulging in speculation contrary to the judge’s instructions.
496. R v Wilson [2008] 2 Cr App R 3 held that where an application was
made for a trial judge, in his discretion, to discharge a jury, the test to
be applied was to decide whether circumstances had arisen as a result
of which a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that
there was a real possibility or danger that the jury would be biased.
Where admissible material, (such as bad character) was inadvertently
disclosed to a jury and it was capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation by jurors, the test should be applied on the basis of the
most damaging reasonable interpretation.
497. See also the Appeal Division’s judgment in Devo (judgment delivered
29th October 2008) from paragraph 170 onwards in respect of possible
interference with the jury. There was an order that a senior police
officer undertake an inquiry. The court heard evidence and the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) stated:
“177 At such hearing it was agreed that the test we should adopt was firstly,
whether there was a real danger that there had been contact between a member of
the jury and an employee of Y’s firm and secondly, if there had been such contact
whether there was a real danger that Mr Devo and Mr Riedel had been
prejudiced.”
498. AG v Seckerson and Times Newspapers Limited [2009] EWHC 1023
(Admin) dealt with the position in English law of the secrecy of the
deliberations of the jury. The English Court of Appeal in R v S(K)
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(The Times 25th November 2009) dealt with the position under section
46 of the English Criminal Justice Act 2003 where a judge may
continue with a case having discharged the jury because of jury
tampering.
499. It is assumed that if jurors are told to put matters out of their mind
they will do so. In R v Carter [2010] EWCA 201 it was held that no
direction is required to remaining jurors to ignore views expressed by
discharged jurors. In R v Roberto Malasi [2008] EWCA Crim 2505
Thomas L J stated:
“18 … First of all, it is very much within the discretion of the trial judge as to the
way in which he handles a difficult matter of this kind. It is all too easy these days
for people to seek to intimidate an individual member of the jury. It must be for
the judge to decide whether it is, in all the circumstances, right to continue with
the trial in respect of all or part of the jury concerned, and, secondly, what
warnings to give. In most cases it is the experience of each and every member of
this court that when a jury is told that it must put a matter out its mind, it is true to
its oath, as we would expect from an institution so central to the image and
discharge of our system of justice. In this case it is clear that the judge felt that the
jury could continue and that they would, in accordance with the directions he
immediately gave, be true to their oaths.”
500. A jury should normally be trusted to faithfully adhere to any
directions given to them by the presiding Deemster. In Snape (Court
of General Gaol Delivery judgment 14th May 2004) there was an issue
with some evidence as to the defendant’s fingerprints being held on
the national database and an inference of bad character. The jury had
to be discharged on a separate point. I stated:
“14. If the prosecution wish to proceed and there is a re-trial the jury will be
directed to decide the case on the evidence before them and not to engage in
speculation. These are standard directions. As was stated by the English Court of
Appeal (Criminal Division) in the case of R v Barraclough [2000] Crim L.R. 324
although people and members of the jury are fallible and they can ignore
warnings given to them by judges “The court will usually proceed on the
assumption that jurors will obey clear instructions.” We can rely on the common
sense and sense of fair play of a Manx jury. Counsel, and indeed on occasions
judges, have a habit of putting microscopes and spotlights on fine legal points and
in some cases throwing matters out of all proportion. Members of the jury and
potential members of the jury do not live with criminal matters and Archbold on a
daily basis as Counsel and the Deemsters do. What Counsel may consider as a
reasonable inference for the jury may be a matter that never crosses the minds of
the jury who come to the matter afresh, with a blank piece of paper and open
minds uncluttered with the legal baggage that advocates and Deemsters carry with
them on a regular basis. I think it dangerous to speculate on what may or may not
be in the minds of jurors.
15. I am not for one moment suggesting that Mrs Jones is playing a tactical game
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indeed quite the contrary. Mrs Jones as an experienced criminal defence lawyer
with her usual skill and vigour is doing her utmost to ensure that the Defendant’s
interests are well protected and that he receives a fair trial. I have to consider the
interests of the Defendant and the interests of the prosecution. I am acutely
conscious of the need to balance the interests of the prosecution and the defence
when dealing with issues of fairness. As was re-emphasised in Munnery (1992) 94
Cr App R 164 it is justice that matters both to the public as represented by the
prosecution as well as to the defence. As Lord Justice Auld stated in R v Gleeson
judgment October 16 2003 ‘A criminal trial is not a game. Its object is to ensure
that the guilty are convicted and the innocent acquitted.’ ”
501. If counsel has an issue to raise which is properly dealt with in the
absence of the jury counsel should simply invite the Deemster to
request the jury to withdraw so that a matter can be raised on which
the ruling of the Deemster is required.
502. In Evanson Mitcham v the Queen (Privy Council judgment delivered
on the 16th March 2009) the Privy Council dealt with the situation
where inappropriate comments had been made in court in the presence
of the jury. In that case counsel in the presence of the jury stated that
“certain destructing developments have occurred which threaten the orderly
conduct of the matter. It relates to threats.” The judge enquired as to
whether it was something the jury should hear and defence counsel
stated that they did not object to the jury being excused for the
purpose of prosecution counsel’s observation. The following are
useful extracts from the judgment of the Privy Council:
“12. Mr Nicol QC submitted on behalf of the appellant that the reference before
the jury to “destructing developments” and “threats” was capable of prejudicing
the appellant. If there were two or more possible meanings which could be taken
out of the remark, it should be assumed that the jury may have taken that which
was most damaging to the defendants. There was therefore a real risk that it could
be construed as a reference to threats from one or more defendants. The jury
might, he argued, have attributed the issue of threats to the appellant, particularly
since his co-defendants sought in their statements to exculpate themselves and
throw the blame for the shooting on to the appellant as the third man present.
Although the defendants’ counsel did not ask for the jury to be discharged, it was
the judge’s duty to advert to the possible need to take that course, as part of his
function to ensure a fair trial. The necessity for discharge was reinforced by the
mention of threats in the subsequent evidence, when Lake said that he was warned
by the appellant “ah you ain’t seen me” and Ms Hendrickson was cross-examined
about threats alleged to have been made by her to get the appellant sent to prison.
Accordingly, even if, contrary to his submission, the judge was right not to
discharge the jury immediately after the reference by the Director of Public
Prosecutions to threats on 22 May 2002, he should have reviewed the necessity in
the light of the later evidence and then discharged them.
13. When an issue arises such as that which occurred in the present case,
where a matter has to be mentioned to the judge which the jury should not hear,
241
the preferable course is for a procedure to be followed analogous to that described
by the Board for initiating a voir dire relating to the admissibility of a contested
confession statement. This was set out by Lord Steyn in Mitchell v The Queen
[1998] AC 695, 704:
“At the appropriate time counsel must ask the judge to request the jury to
withdraw so that a matter can be raised on which the ruling of the judge is
required. No discussion of an intended objection must take place in front
of the jury. The judge should simply tell the jury that a matter has arisen
on which his ruling is required and that they must please retire for the time
being. When the voire dire has been completed, and the judge has given
his ruling, the judge should give no explanation of the outcome of the
voire dire to the jury.”
If counsel had taken this course, no question could have arisen. The judge did,
however, follow an appropriate procedure once the matter was mentioned in open
court.
14. Once a matter has been referred to in the presence of the jury which could
give rise to possible prejudice, the trial judge has a choice of courses open to him.
He could elect to take no action, on the basis that the matter was insufficient to
create a degree of prejudice which would make the trial unfair and that to refer to
it again would only draw attention to it. He could at the appropriate stage or
stages give the jury a warning to disregard what was said, if he considers that that
would be sufficient to minimise the prejudice and prevent the trial from being
unfair. Finally, he could decide to discharge the jury, if he considers that there is
prejudice which would make the trial potentially unfair and that warnings would
not diminish it to a sufficient extent. He should give consideration to the course
which he should take, even if counsel have, for whatever reason, not asked for the
jury to be discharged or even submitted that he should not do so: cf R v Azam
[2006] EWCA Crim 161, [2006] Crim LR 776; Millar v Dickson [2001] UKPC
D4, [2002] 1 WLR 1615. It is a decision which lies within the discretion of the
trial judge, and an appellate court will not interfere with a decision made by him
about the proper conduct of the case, unless satisfied that it was wrong and that
the trial was unfair to the defendant, in consequence of which the conviction
would be unsafe and in contravention of article 10(1) of the Constitution of Saint
Christopher and Nevis. It is always relevant for an appeal court to bear in mind
that the trial judge had the advantage of knowing the atmosphere of the case and
the way in which the matter later complained of appeared in court at the time.
15. The principles to be applied were set out by Auld LJ in R v Lawson [2005]
EWCA Crim 84, [2007] 1 Cr App R 20, a case concerning the improper
admission of potentially prejudicial evidence, at para 65:
“Whether or not to discharge the jury is a matter for evaluation by the trial
judge on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, and this court
will not lightly interfere with his decision. It follows that every case
depends on its own facts and circumstances, including: 1) the important
issue or issues in the case; 2) the nature and impact of improperly admitted
material on that issue or issues, having regard, inter alia to the respective
strengths of the prosecution and defence cases; 3) the manner and
circumstances of its admission and whether and to what extent it is
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potentially unfairly prejudicial to a defendant; 4) the extent to and manner
in which it is remediable by judicial direction or otherwise, so as to permit
the trial to proceed. We repeat, all these matters and their combined effect
are very much an evaluative exercise for the trial judge in all the
circumstances of the case. The starting point is not that the jury should be
discharged whenever something of this nature is put in evidence through
inadvertence. Equally, there is no sliding scale so as to increase the
persuasive onus on a defendant seeking a discharge of a jury on this
account according to the weight or length of the case or the stage it has
reached when the point arises for determination. The test is always the
same, whether to continue with the trial would or could, by reason of the
admission of the unfairly prejudicial material, result in an unsafe
conviction.”
As Auld LJ pointed out, this does not purport to be an exhaustive list of factors,
and their relative importance will vary from case to case: for example, the
strength of the respective cases will be more relevant in an appeal concerning the
improper admission of evidence. The issue in a case such as the present will
always come back to the question whether a fair-minded and informed observer,
having considered the facts, would consider that there was a real possibility or
danger that the jury would have been prejudiced against the appellant: cf Porter v
Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] AC 357.
16. Mr Nicol submitted that the words of the Director of Public Prosecutions
should be given the most unfavourable interpretation which the jury might take
from them, which could be that they took them as referring to threats made by the
appellant against a witness or witnesses. In so submitting he relied on R v
Docherty [1999] 1 Cr App R 274, a case of indecent assault in which a witness
had made a reference to the defendant’s having been in prison. The trial judge
refused to discharge the jury, stating that the remark could well have been taken
to mean that that the defendant was a dishonest person whose word could not be
believed, rather than that he had been convicted of a sexual offence, which was
not the inevitable inference to be drawn from the remark. The Court of Appeal
stated in the course of their judgment that the judge had been wrong to apply the
test which he adopted. Roch LJ stated at page 280:
“In weighing up the danger of bias on the part of this jury arising from
these answers, the judge should, in our judgment, have approached the
issue on the basis of the more prejudicial meaning that could reasonably
be placed on these answers rather than some lesser prejudicial
interpretation.”
In Docherty it was quite possible to place a prejudicial interpretation on the words
spoken, which would have been a reasonable conclusion for the jury to draw from
them. In the present case it is rather less clear that threats had been made by any
of the defendants, rather than some other person, and it was submitted in the
respondent’s printed case that it was not a reasonable interpretation to attribute to
the appellant, rather than a co-defendant, any threat that might have been made.
In their Lordships’ view such an interpretation of the remark might be regarded as
possible, although other meanings might readily be taken from it, and they
approach the matter on that basis.
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17. The trial judge did not overtly refer to an exercise of his discretion,
although he may have given the matter consideration without discussing it. In
these circumstances it is for the Board to determine whether it considers that the
risk of prejudice to the appellant was sufficient to make the trial unfair, applying
the test set out in paragraph 15 above.
18. Their Lordships do not consider that the risk of prejudice was more than
minimal. The reference to threats by the Director of Public Prosecutions was
fleeting and oblique, very far from being a specific reference to any action of the
appellant. The jury were sent out for a short time, then there was no more
reference to the matter during the rest of the trial, which continued until 10 June
2002, some 19 days later. In their Lordships’ view it was best that the matter be
left in that way, rather than that the judge should highlight it by giving the jury
directions about disregarding it. No request was made to him to discharge the
jury, and if one had been made he would have been justified in refusing it. Nor
was any point taken about the incident when the case went to the Court of Appeal.
Their Lordships are satisfied that the trial was fair and the appellant’s conviction
safe.
19. For these reasons the Board will humbly advise Her Majesty that the
appeal should be dismissed.”
Opening remarks
503. The Deemster at the outset of the trial will make certain opening
remarks and may request confirmation from counsel that the court and
jury bundles have been checked by counsel and are agreed. The
potential members of the jury are ushered in by the Coroner (an
officer of the court) and the Deemster makes introductory comments
to the potential members of the jury. The clerk and Coroner then
ballot for the jury. The Deemster deals with any challenges to
potential jurors. After the balloting is complete the defendant is asked
to stand and the jury are informed that the defendant is entitled to be
tried fairly and impartially.
504. The prosecution are invited to read the list of witnesses and others
connected with the case. The jury are asked to consider whether they
have any connections with the defendant, the witnesses or the other
names referred to by counsel. The jury are asked to write a note for
consideration by the Deemster if they do not feel able to try the
defendant fairly or impartially and if they have any connections with
the defendant or the witnesses.
505. The jury then take the relevant oath or affirmation that they will
faithfully try the defendant and give true verdicts according to the
evidence. The Deemster makes further introductory comments to the
jury warning them not to make their own enquiries and to decide the
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case only on the evidence adduced during the trial. The Deemster
directs the jury not to discuss the case with any third parties and
highlights their duty to bring to the attention of the court through the
Coroner any behaviour amongst themselves or by others in relation to
the case that causes them real concern or upsets them either inside or
outside the court room. For example in the unlikely event of someone
attempting to talk to them about the case.
506. The prosecution are then invited to outline their case. The prosecution
should well before the trial file with the court and serve on the
defence a copy of their opening note and the defence should liaise
with the prosecution immediately if they have any issues on the
contents of the opening note for example references to inadmissible
evidence. Those issues should be dealt with well before the first day
of the trial.
Interpreters
507. See Archbold at paragraph 4-34 indicating that the procedure is that
the prosecution and the defence will be responsible for arranging
interpreters for their own witnesses. Interpreters will be expected to
have knowledge of court procedures. Ideally they will be selected
from the National Register of Public Service Interpreters.
508. At paragraph 4-37 of Archbold it is indicated that the accused must
fully comprehend the charge which he faces, the full implications of it
and the ways in which a defence may be raised to it, and further must
be able to give full instructions to his advocate so that the court can be
sure that he has pleaded with a full and understanding mind. See R v
Iqbal Begum 93 Cr App R 96 where the English Court of Appeal
indicated in effect that if these requirements are not fulfilled the trial
is a nullity. If the prosecution or defence require an interpreter they
should ensure that the necessary arrangements have been made.
509. See Kunnath v The State 98 Cr App R 455 (a decision of the Privy
Council). When a defendant is ignorant of the English language and is
unrepresented the evidence at the trial must be translated to him.
Where the accused is represented, the evidence should be interpreted
to him, except when he or his counsel expresses a wish to dispense
with the translation, and the judge thinks fit to permit the omission.
The judge should not permit it unless he is of the opinion, by reason
of what has passed before the trial, that the accused substantially
understands the evidence to be given and the case to be made against
him at the trial. However any substantial variation from accounts
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given in previous statements or any additional evidence should be
translated to the accused even though he may be indifferent upon the
matter or might not wish it.
510. The judge, being the ultimate guardian of the fairness of the
proceedings, has a duty to ensure that the accused understands the
proceedings.
511. In respect of interpreters for witnesses it is important to ensure that
the interpreter is a person who can be expected to interpret impartially
(R v Mitchell [1970] Crim LR 153, CA). The English Court of Appeal
in R v Sharma [2006] Cr App R (S) 63 dealt with the need for an
interpreter to be determined by the court and not by the witness.
512. The interpreter’s oath is as follows:
“I swear by Almighty God that I will well and faithfully interpret and true
explanation make of all such matters and things as shall be required of me
according to the best of my skill and understanding.”
Evidence
513. See generally the excellent publication entitled Criminal Evidence (5th
Ed) by May and Powles (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell). Counsel
should ensure that questions are directed at adducing relevant and
admissible evidence. Counsel should ensure that questions are well
focused. Counsel should beware of open ended questions. Counsel
should encourage the witness to speak slowly and clearly. Counsel
should ensure that the jury can follow and understand the evidence.
Counsel should ensure that exhibits are properly produced and given
an appropriate exhibit number and that the court is provided with an
updated list of exhibits.
514. In DS v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Privy Council judgment delivered
22nd May 2007) at paragraph 73 it is stated:
“… any evidence or questioning at trial must be relevant to the issues to be
decided by the jury: at common law evidence or questioning on collateral matters
is generally excluded.”
515. In Dobbie (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 23rd March
2009) it was stressed that there should be proper cooperation with
counsel and with the court. Sensible concessions should be made and
cross examination should be kept short and to the point. Counsel
should focus on the critical issues rather than peripheral issues. A
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blanket defence request that all witnesses are required without due
regard to the main issues in the case does not assist in the proper and
efficient administration of justice. If too much time is given to one
case other cases then suffer. Counsel must be reasonable in their time
estimates and must be reasonable in their requests for the attendance
of witnesses at trial. Counsel should concentrate on the main issues in
the case. Counsel should consider if any evidence can be agreed.
Counsel should consider if any statements can be read. Counsel
should consider whether any admissions can be made. See section 16
of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. In McVey (Court of General
Gaol Delivery judgment 30th October 2009) it was stressed that
counsel should take steps to agree uncontentious evidence and that
where admissions could be made and where evidence could be agreed
admissions should be made and evidence should be agreed. At
paragraph 16 of my judgment inMcVey I stated:
“Justice is not a game to be played with defendants trying to unreasonably require
attendance of unnecessary witnesses and trying unreasonably to delay trial dates
in the hope that the case against them will disappear. These cases will not
disappear. These cases will go to trial and justice will be done.”
516. For the importance of the prosecution to adduce evidence in respect of
formal matters (such as the need to prove that an individual was
disqualified from driving at the appropriate time where there was no
admission in that respect and no certificate of conviction produced)
seeMills v DPP [2008] EWHC 3304 (Admin). Scott Baker L J stated:
“7. We have been referred to the decision of Newman J in the case of Pattison v.
DPP (2006) 170 JP 51, [2005] EWHC 2938 (Admin). He referred to a number of
authorities and then recited various principles. Two of them are of significance, in
my judgment, in the present appeal. The first is that, as with any other essential
element of an offence, the prosecution must prove to the criminal standard that the
person accused was a disqualified driver, and secondly it can be proved by any
admissible means, such as an admission - even a non-formal one by the accused -
that he was a disqualified driver. As I have already mentioned, there was no
formal admission in this case. There is a clear procedure under the Criminal
Procedure Rules for formal admissions in criminal proceedings. That was not
followed in this case. What is said is that at the preliminary hearing it was agreed
by the parties that the appellant was disqualified on the relevant date, October 30,
2006. There is however nothing to support that …
13. This, in my judgment, is an unsatisfactory case, where neither the prosecution
nor the defence come out of it with any credit because the issue about
disqualification could easily have been resolved one way or the other at the
hearing before the justices. It appears that the prosecution in particular simply sat
back and did nothing. They had the opportunity to apply for an adjournment to
rectify the matter by proper formal proof, and if costs were thrown away in doing
so, to ask for a wasted costs order against the appellant’s solicitor. They chose,
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however, to do nothing, and the result is this case stated that comes before this
court today.”
517. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Flanagan (judgment 29th July 2004) at paragraph 25
stated:
“We believe it is the responsibility of the prosecution to ensure that only items
which have a probative value are introduced into evidence.”
518. Counsel should ensure that only relevant evidence is adduced. The
English Court of Appeal in Gordon [1995] 2 Cr App R 61 held that
evidence of marginal relevance may and should be excluded if it
would lead to a multiplicity of subsidiary issues. Henry L J stated:
“The judge cannot in advance know what evidence is or will be prejudicial to the
defendant. When he is conscious that such evidence has been heard, he must
ensure in his summing-up that the jury disregard it. And in cases like this, where
the evidence can, if not contained by the ring fence of relevance, range far and
wide, the judge should ascertain in advance what the prosecution case is, and how
the defence propose to meet it. He should not be too easily deterred by non-
cooperation from the defence in this process.”
519. Counsel should ensure that evidence to be adduced before the jury is
relevant and admissible. It is a matter for the jury what weight they
attach to admissible evidence. Lord Morris, who was a Judge of
Appeal on the Island some years ago now, in Lowry v R [1974] AC 85
at 99 stated:
“When considering evidence which is tendered to a court it is always helpful to
distinguish between relevance and admissibility and weight … Questions of
weight are for a jury … The questions arise whether the evidence was (a) relevant
and (b) admissible : not all evidence that is relevant is admissible. In some
circumstances evidence that may have some relevance is not admissible because
its prejudicial effect heavily over balances its probative value and as a matter of
fairness or of public policy a court will not allow the prosecution to call such
evidence.”
520. R v Horncastle and others [2009] EWCA Crim 964 dealt with the
admission of hearsay evidence in English criminal proceedings. In R v
J (DC) [2010] 2 Cr App R 2 (a case involving disclosure of
documents from social security files to demonstrate bad character of
complainants) it was stressed that it was essential, where evidence
was to be put to the jury by agreement and an order of the court was
not required, that the court was informed what had been agreed and
how the advocates proposed that the agreed evidence was to be placed
before the jury. If an agreement was made during the trial, then the
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judge should be told immediately after the agreement. This is in the
interests of good trial management, so that the judge can consider the
advocates’ proposals as to the timing and manner of putting the
evidence before the jury and the directions of law that are needed in
the summing up.
521. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish)in Devo (judgment delivered 29th October 2008) at
paragraph 133 stated:
“133 It is settled law that if the prosecution intend to ask the jury to disbelieve
the evidence of a witness called by the defendant, such witness ought to be
challenged in cross-examination or at the very least it should be made plain, while
the witness is in the witness box, that his evidence is not accepted: see R v Hart
[1932] 23 Cr App R 302.”
522. Lord Bingham delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Bain
on the 10th May 2007 at paragraph 115 stated:
“ … a fair trial ordinarily requires that the jury hears the evidence it ought to hear
before returning its verdict, and should not act on evidence which is, or may be,
false or misleading. Even a guilty defendant is entitled to such a trial.”
523. The prosecution should ensure that all relevant evidence is served
well in advance of the trial. If the prosecution serve, for example,
further expert evidence late and shortly before trial leaving the
defence inadequate time to respond the prosecution run the risk of
judicial criticism and the risk of such evidence being excluded rather
than the trial dates being vacated. See Bates judgment of Acting
Deemster Montgomerie delivered on the 7th May 2007.
524. Consider the detailed provisions of Police Powers and Procedures Act
1998 and the various Orders, Regulations and Codes in respect of
evidential matters. Consider especially section 70 (inferences from
accused’s silence), section 71 (effect of accused silence at trial),
section 72 (effect of accused’s failure to account for objects
substances or marks) and section 73 (effect of accused’s failure or
refusal to account for presence at a particular place).
525. See Maguire [2008] EWCA 1028 April 25, 2008 in respect of
evidence, inferences from silence, differing accounts at interview and
trial and the danger of over-formalising directions. In that case where
the Crown sought to rely on inconsistencies between M’s interviews
and his evidence at trial, and M argued on appeal that the judge had
been wrong to accede to a prosecution application that he give a
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.34 direction, the
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English Court of Appeal did not consider that the question of s.34
should even have been raised. With or without the direction, the
Crown’s case would include the argument that the way M’s account
had changed indicated that he was lying, and the judge would have
adverted to it and directed the jury that it was up to them whether M’s
explanation might be innocent or whether his evidence was untruthful.
The s.34 direction was simply a rather formalised way of saying
precisely the same. Section 34 was necessary to reverse the old
common law that because defendants were entitled to remain silent in
interview they could not be criticised as untruthful if they availed
themselves of that entitlement. But for generations, a defendant would
be cross-examined upon the difference between an account given in
interview and at trial. Endorsing what had been said in Brizzalari
[2004] EWCA Crim 310, [57] (prosecutors should be cautious about
too readily inviting the directions under s.34), the court added that it
also discouraged anything which over formalized common sense.
Advocates should be cautious about making submissions which
sought unnecessary formalism from judges in their directions, and
equally judges should avoid employing it, unless it became essential.
526. In R v Cowan [1996] 1 Cr App R 1 9G Lord Taylor C J stated:
“We wish to make it clear that the rule against advocates giving evidence dressed
up as a submission applies in this context. It cannot be proper for a defence
advocate to give the jury reasons for his clients’ silence at trial in the absence of
evidence to support such reasons.”
527. See also R v Becouarn [2005] UKHL 55; [2006] 1 Cr App R 2 and
Zander’s The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
528. Consider also the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, Shillito
(Appeal Division judgment delivered on the 29th July 2004), Grant
(Privy Council judgment delivered 16th January 2006) and Cole
[2007] EWCA Crim 1924 in respect of statements where the maker is
unable to attend as a witness.
529. In R v Horncastle and others [2009] EWCA Crim 964; [2009] 2 Cr
App R 15 the English Court of Appeal held that the right to confront
prosecution witnesses under art.6(3)(d) of the European Convention
on Human Rights was not absolute and could in certain limited
circumstances be restricted, provided that the trial was fair. In
considering whether the trial was fair, a legitimate justification for the
admission of an absent witness’s statement must be established and
appropriate counterbalancing measures must be taken to ensure that
the defendant was not placed at an unfair disadvantage and that his
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rights were respected. The adequacy of such counterbalancing
measures could only be judged by the criterion whether the
proceedings as a whole were fair. There was no breach of art.6 , and
in particular art.6(3)(d) , if a conviction was based solely or to a
decisive degree on the hearsay evidence of an identified but absent
witness, provided that the provisions of Criminal Justice Act 2003
(Act of Parliament) were observed. Where a witness was absent
through fear, s. 116 of the 2003 Act did not impose a requirement that
the fear must be attributable to the defendant. If the witness could
give evidence which should be heard by the court in the interests of
justice but was clearly too frightened to attend court then it mattered
not whether that fear was brought about by or on behalf of the
defendant: there was a justifiable reason for the absence. Accordingly,
on the facts, the hearsay evidence in the first two cases was properly
admitted and the convictions were safe. In the third case the judge’s
failure to explain the use that might be made of the memorandum was
a material misdirection and the conviction would be quashed. The
hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act are concerned with identified but
absent witnesses. They do not permit the admission of the evidence of
anonymous witnesses, to which different considerations apply. The
right to confront prosecution witnesses is only to be departed from in
the limited circumstances and under the conditions set out in the 2003
Act. It is of special importance that assurances are never given to
potential witnesses that their evidence will be read. Unless the
defendant consents, it is only the court applying the strict conditions
of the 2003 Act based on evidence that can admit such a statement.
530. In Horncastle the English Court of Appeal considered the phrase ‘sole
or decisive’ and felt that the observations of the court in Luca v Italy
(2003) EHRR 46 (emphasised and relied upon by the Appeal Division
in Shillito judgment delivered 29th July 2004) went further than the
facts that that or previous cases required. The 5 person English Court
of Appeal in Horncastle distinguished Doorson v The Netherlands
(1996) 22 EHRR 330 and declined to apply Al-Khawaja and Tahery v
United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 110. An appeal against the Court of
Appeal’s judgment was unanimously dismissed by the Supreme Court
on the 9th December 2009 and is reported at [2009] UKSC 14.
531. Section 14 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 deals with the
admission of depositions generally and section 15 deals with the
admission of depositions of absent witnesses.
532. Section 16 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that a
person accused of an offence triable on information may, at the trial
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or any previous inquiry, himself or by his advocate admit any fact
alleged against him so as to dispense with proof of it.
533. In R v DT (Absent witness : evidence) [2009] EWCA Crim 1213 the
English Court of Appeal held, that on an application for the admission
of the statement of an absent witness, meeting the condition in section
116(2)(d) Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the relevant person could not
be found although such steps as it was reasonably practicable to take
to find him had been taken, required the calling of formal evidence,
unless the relevant facts were set out in an agreed statement of facts.
534. The Times Law Report of the DT case published on the 16th July 2009
summarised the judgment as follows:
“LORD JUSTICE THOMAS said that the appeal related to a written statement by
a witness that the defendant had admitted the crime. The witness had said that she
was leaving the area and would not give evidence in court.
The prosecution called no evidence but applied for the admission of the written
statement on the basis that an attempt to serve a witness summons had failed and
her mobile telephone was turned off.
His Lordship said the right to confront a prosecution witness was fundamental:
see R v Horncastle (The Times June 3, 2009). Informality would not do.
In the absence of a written statement of agreed facts, evidence had to be called to
establish that all reasonably practicable steps had been taken but the witness could
not be found.”
535. The following are extracts from the judgment of Thomas L J (sitting
with King J and Judge Moss QC sitting as a judge of the Court of
Appeal Criminal Division) in R v DT (Absent witness : evidence) :
“The approach to s116(2)(d)
25. In the recent decision of this court in Horncastle [2009] EWCA Crim 964 the
court dealt with the position of witnesses who were in fear. At paragraph 87 the
court said:
“It is, however, important that all possible efforts are made to get the witness to
court. As is clear, the right to confrontation is a longstanding requirement of the
common law and recognised in Article 6(3)(d). It is only to be departed from in
the limited circumstances and under the conditions set out in the CJA 2003. The
witness must be given all possible support, but also made to understand the
importance of the citizen’s duty ...”
26. Although the court was in that instance dealing with witnesses who were kept
from court through fear, the principle applicable is the same in the case of a
witness who is reluctant to come to court and absents himself. It is important that
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all efforts are made to get the witness to court; this must start with the witness
being given all possible support and made to understand the importance of the
citizen’s duty to give evidence.
27. The right to confrontation is a long-standing right of the common law and is
reflected in the European Convention at Article 6(3)(d). The right to confrontation
is not to be lightly departed from. The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act
2003, described in Horncastle as a carefully crafted code, need to be observed
carefully.
28. It seems to us that in a case of this kind, unless there is a written agreed
statement of facts, it is simply not possible to proceed to consider an application
without evidence as to the steps taken to find the witness.
29. Our conclusion
30. If an agreed statement of facts had been produced in this case, it would have
exposed the error in the approach of the learned judge, which was to look at the
matter, as if this witness was reluctant from the time when the police started to
make enquiries after the PCMH in the month before the trial. It is apparent from
the witness’s own statement that she was reluctant from the day she made the
statement. She said she would not come and therefore was at risk of breaking
contact so she could not be found.
31. There was, because matters proceeded so informally before the judge, no
attempt to try and explore what steps the police had taken through the well-known
programme established for Witness Care to keep contact with her, to explain to
her her duty, to try and find where she had gone in the months before the PCMH.
No doubt the constabulary at Portsmouth have a Witness Care Unit, but there was
no evidence before the judge as to what steps it had taken. Nor was there any
evidence when enquiries came to be made in the early part of 2008 and in the
month or two before the trial as to what information the witness’s mother had
about her location, no evidence as to what enquiries had been made of social
security (as one assumes that the witness concerned was on social security). She
had been on the telephone. There was no evidence as to whether any attempt had
been made to trace her through cell site analysis. It is said that all of this might be
expensive. It may be. We do not know, however, because there was no evidence
about that either.
32. It seems to us, and in particular from the judge’s remarks, that there must be a
suspicion that this kind of application is being dealt with far too informally. Given
the importance of the right to confrontation under our law, it is quite
impermissible to proceed with an application of this kind informally.
33. It is to be hoped in applications of this kind that the facts can be agreed, but, if
not, evidence must be called and the judge must make findings of fact. With
respect to the judge in this case, he did not make any findings. He merely
expressed a summary of what he was told. It follows, therefore, first that there
was no evidence properly before the judge on which he could have made any
findings at all. Secondly, even if the limited matters that had been relied on by the
Crown had been facts upon which they had established by evidence, it would have
been hopeless to expect a judge to say that such steps as were reasonably
253
practicable had been taken. If there was a problem with the cost of caring for a
reluctant witness and finding her, then that needed to be dealt with by evidence.
There was no such evidence.
34. In the result, therefore, we are of the clear view that this evidence was
wrongly admitted as there was no evidence to establish that such steps as were
reasonably practicable to find SD had been taken. It is accepted that if the
evidence was wrongly admitted, the conviction cannot be considered safe. In the
circumstances, therefore, we have no alternative but to quash this conviction.”
536. See section 27 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 and the relevant rules.
Consider also Davies [2008] UKHL 36, May and Powles on Criminal
Evidence 5th Edition and Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App R 299. The English
Court of Appeal in that case considered section 32 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 and concluded that once it is established that there is
difficulty in obtaining the evidence of witnesses abroad where the
evidence is relevant to the defence the judge should normally exercise
his discretion in favour of admitting the evidence to be given by
television link though in particular cases there may be reasons to
refuse it. Consider also the Camberwell Green Youth Court case
[2005] UKHL 4, McGlinn v Waltham Contractors Ltd [2006] EWHC
2322, Polanski v Condé Nast Publications Ltd [2005] UKHL 10 and
Yamaichi 22nd April 1999 (QBD).
537. See also R v Ukpabio [2007] EWCA Crim 2108 in respect of live
video links.
538. See the provisions of the Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007
in respect of use of live television links at preliminary hearings and
video evidence and the relevant rules. See Section 30 of the 2007 Act
and Forsythe [1997] 2 Cr App R 299. Section 30(1) of the Criminal
Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 provides that a witness (other
than the accused) may if the court so directs, give evidence through a
live link in criminal proceedings, in, amongst other courts, the Court
of General Gaol Delivery. Such a direction should not be given unless
the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the efficient or
effective administration of justice for the person concerned to give
evidence in the proceedings through a live link. Section 33(2) of the
Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 provides that the
Deemster may give the jury (if there is one) such direction as the
Deemster thinks necessary to ensure that the jury gives the same
weight to the evidence as if it had been given by the witness in the
courtroom or other place where the proceedings are held. Section 36
concerns evidence by video recording.
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539. See section 40 of the Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 in
respect of the abolition of the right of the accused to make an unsworn
statement.
540. Section 56 of the Criminal Justice Act 2001 abolished the need for
corroboration.
541. Devo (Appeal Division judgment delivered 29th October 2008) dealt
with certificates of foreign law pursuant to section 37(2) of the
Misuse of Drugs Act 1976.
542. In R v Finch [2007] EWCA Crim 36 it was held that a defendant in a
joint trial could not only cross examine his co-defendant on his
confession if the latter gave evidence, but could also adduce the
confession if the co-defendant declined to give evidence. A co-
defendant who pleaded guilty was compellable as a witness for any
remaining defendant on trial. It will often not be in the interests of
justice for evidence which the giver is not prepared to have tested to
be put untested before the jury.
543. On a separate point in what circumstances are out of court admissions
made by one accused admissible in evidence against another? See R v
Hayter [2005] 1 WLR 605 and Persad (Privy Council judgment 23rd
July 2007). In Hayter the House of Lords held (3:2) that in a joint trial
of two or more defendants a jury is entitled to consider first the case
in respect of one defendant (defendant A) based on his own out of
court admissions and then use their findings of A’s guilt and the role
A played as a fact when considering the case in respect of defendant
B. The Privy Council in Persad explored the limits of this decision
and stressed that the facts of cases and the charges must be carefully
considered. The Privy Council at paragraph 15 of Persad said that “In
the ordinary way, of course, out of court admissions are inadmissible against a co-
accused for all purposes.” Hayter concerned a joint trial of defendants for
a joint offence. In Persad the offences were not joint offences. In that
case, on the facts, the Privy Council held that the out of court
statement by one defendant should not have been regarded as
evidence admissible against the appellant for any purpose. If,
consistently with Hayter, it is right in any particular case to allow an
out of court admission to be used in evidence against a co-accused,
the jury must also be directed to have regard to any part of the
statement which could be understood to assist that co-accused’s
defence.
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544. Myers [1998] AC 124 dealt with the right of the co-accused to lead
evidence relevant to his defence. See also R v Johnson [2007] EWCA
Crim 1651.
545. In Atrium Trading Ltd 2003-05 MLR 91 the Appeal Division (Judge
of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) held that information
given under compulsion pursuant to the Banking Act 1998 by
directors as individuals rather than as representatives of the company
can be used against the company in criminal proceedings. See also an
interesting note by Professor Joseph of the University of Canterbury,
New Zealand entitled Self-incrimination and Retrospectivity (2004)
120 LQR 378 which begins with the sentences:
“Judicial decisions from the Isle of Man do not often excite academic interest
warranting comments in the journals. The decision of the Manx Court of Appeal
in Re Atrium Trading Ltd (in liquidation), Garrett and others, 2 DS 2001/32,
September 19, 2003 is an exception.”
546. Perhaps Professor Joseph and other academics should read and
comment upon more of the judgments at www.judgments.im
547. In R v Baines (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 24th
November 2008) I concluded that it would be unfair to allow the
prosecution to admit into evidence in criminal proceedings before the
Court of General Gaol Delivery a deposition of one of the defendants
taken pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement in civil
proceedings. I also ruled that an affidavit of one of the defendants
filed in civil proceedings could not be adduced into evidence by the
prosecution in proceedings before the Court of General Gaol
Delivery. Put simply I held that it would have been unfair in the
circumstances of the case to allow the prosecution to admit into
evidence in the criminal proceedings before the Court of General
Gaol Delivery the deposition and the affidavit taken in civil
proceedings. In arriving at my conclusion in that case I took into
account all the circumstances including the fact that the deposition
and affidavit were produced in a context other than the context of a
criminal investigation and criminal proceedings where the defendants
would have had certain safeguards to their rights in respect of silence
and the privilege against self incrimination.
548. Section 14 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 deals with the time for
taking the accused’s evidence during the course of the trial and
provides as follows:
“If at the trial of any person for an offence -
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(a) the defence intends to call 2 or more witnesses to the facts of the case; and
(b) those witnesses include the accused,
the accused shall be called before the other witness or witnesses unless the court
in its discretion otherwise directs.”
549. Section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 makes provision for the
competence and compellability of the accused’s spouse. It provides as
follows:
“(1) In any proceedings the wife or husband of the accused shall be competent to
give evidence-
(a) subject to subsection (4), for the prosecution; and
(b) on behalf of the accused or any person jointly charged with the accused.
(2) In any proceedings the wife or husband of the accused shall, subject to
subsection (4), be compellable to give evidence on behalf of the accused.
(3) In any proceedings the wife or husband of the accused shall, subject to
subsection (4), be compellable to give evidence for the prosecution or on behalf of
any person jointly charged with the accused if and only if-
(a) the offence charged involves an assault on, or injury or a threat of injury to,
the wife or husband of the accused or a person who was at the material time under
the age of 16; or
(aa) the offence charged is a sexual offence against the wife of the accused; or
(b) the offence charged is a sexual offence alleged to have been committed in
respect of a person who was at the material time under that age; or (c) the offence
charged consists of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of aiding, abetting,
counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of, an offence falling within
paragraph (a) or (b) or of attempting to commit any offence falling within
paragraph (aa).
(4) Where a husband and wife are jointly charged with an offence neither spouse
shall at the trial be competent or compellable by virtue of subsection (1)(a), (2) or
(3) to give evidence in respect of that offence unless that spouse is not, or is no
longer, liable to be convicted of that offence at the trial as a result of pleading
guilty or for any other reason.
(5) In any proceedings a person who has been but is no longer married to the
accused shall be competent and compellable to give evidence as if that person and
the accused had never been married.
(6) Where in any proceedings the age of any person at any time is material for the
purposes of subsection (3), his age at the material time shall for the purposes of
that provision be deemed to be or to have been that which appears to the court to
be or to have been his age at that time.
(7) In subsection (3) ‘sexual offence’ means an offence under the Sexual Offences
Act 1992.
(8) The failure of the wife or husband of the accused to give evidence shall not be
made the subject of any comment by the prosecution.”
550. In respect of the protection of witnesses see the offences specified in
Part 8 of the Criminal Justice, Police and Courts Act 2007 (section 25
deals with intimidation in respect of police investigations, section 26
intimidation of witnesses and section 27 deals with harming
witnesses).
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Exhibits
551. The general rule is that objects which may be the evidence of crime
and which come into the possession of the prosecuting authorities
should be preserved and retained for use in court (Lushington v Otto
[1894] 1 QB 420, 423 Wright J, Uxbridge JJ ex p Sofaer (1987) 85 Cr
App R 367, 377). Sometimes exhibits go astray. In these
circumstances it may be possible for the prosecution to rely on
secondary evidence (See DPP v BT plc [1991] Crim LR 532).
552. An object does not have to be produced in order that evidence may be
given about it (Hocking v Ahlquist [1944] KB 120 DC Miller v Howe
[1969] 1 WLR 1510, DC).
553. Video recordings of relevant events can be produced as exhibits. They
can be real evidence to prove what is recorded on the tape i.e. what
was seen happening at a particular time and place. See paragraph 2-31
onwards of May and Powles Criminal Evidence 5th Edition. The
authenticity and provenance of the recording must be established. The
recording must be relevant to an issue in the case. The usual
exclusionary rules apply. The judge has a discretion to exclude a
recording which it would be unfair to admit. If the original is not
available a copy may be admissible (Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App
R 149. If the original or copy is not available evidence from a witness
who viewed video may be admissible (Taylor v Chief Constable of
Cheshire [1986] 1 WLR 1479). Once a tape is admitted in evidence
any question relating to its interpretation is ultimately for the jury. As
a general rule no evidence is admissible to explain the tape and it is
produced and played to the court without comment. There are
exceptions to this general rule. May and Powles helpfully set them out
as follows:-
“(1) Eye-witnesses
2-35 If a witness himself made a videotape of an event he is entitled to
authenticate it, produce it in evidence and describe what he saw by reference to it.
Similarly, if the tape was made by another witness and produced in evidence by
him, an eye-witness of the events shown on the tape may be asked about incidents
which he saw. Such a witness may be asked to look at the tape and say what is
happening; he may also be asked to identify people he knows. He is not then
giving evidence of opinion since he is describing (a) something he himself saw
and (b) somebody he recognises.
(2) Experts
2-36 An expert may give evidence about incidents within his field of expertise
which are shown on a tape. Thus, if a video recording of a game of cards or
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chance were shown to a jury, a suitably qualified expert could give evidence
explaining how the game was played and explaining the steps in the game as they
appeared on the recording. Without such evidence the jury would be completely
in the dark.
(3) Identifying witnesses
2-37 If the identification of a defendant on a video recording is in dispute, a
witness who knows him may give evidence identifying him as the person on the
recording. This is because there is no distinction between the evidence of a
witness who sees an occurrence and recognises somebody he knows and a witness
seeing somebody he knows on videotape. In Grimer [1982] Crim LR 674 a
security officer saw the tape and recognised the thief as the defendant whom he
knew. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence of the security officer was
admissible to identify the defendant. But where the prejudicial effect outweighs
probative value, the court should exclude the evidence, as in Fowden and White
[1982] Crim LR 588 where the witnesses who identified the defendants knew
them from a similar offence committed a week later. However, the mere fact that
a police officer’s knowledge of a defendant comes from the latter’s criminal
activities cannot operate to bar this type of evidence: that would give an unfair
advantage to criminals [Caldwell (1994) 99 Cr App R 73].
There is clearly a danger of misidentification in such cases, particularly if the tape
recording is not clear or the suspect is under arrest at the police station.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal in Caldwell recommended that procedures be
instituted for regulating the showing of recordings in cases where there were
known suspects. (The Court pointed out that there was an analogy with the
showing of photographs to a witness in order to identify a suspect (para.14—35,
below)).
The same rules may also apply in the case of a witness who does not know the
accused, provided that by close study he has made himself sufficiently familiar
with the material on which the identification is based so that he can assist the
court with his special knowledge. In Clare and Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 a
number of defendants were charged with offences involving violent disorder
following a football match. There was an unclear video recording of the actual
events together with better quality film and photographs taken before and during
the match. A police constable made a lengthy and detailed comparison of the
video and the film and photographs and was thus able to identify the defendants
as being among the perpetrators of the violent acts. The Court of Appeal held that
the constable’s evidence was admissible because he had acquired special
knowledge which the Court did not possess by lengthy and studious application to
material which was itself admissible evidence; and to afford the jury the time and
facilities to conduct the same research would be impracticable. The Court said
that it was legitimate to allow the constable to assist the jury by pointing to what
he asserted was happening on the film and to identify the individual actors: such
identifications were not secondary evidence and, although the officer
did not know the defendants, he was well-qualified to identify them as a
result of his repeated study of their likenesses on the colour film and
photographs.
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A further example is to be found in a similar case in New Zealand, Howe [1982]
NZLR 618. In that case a police officer, having viewed video-tapes of a riot and
studied films and photographs, was allowed to give evidence identifying
individual defendants and describing what they appeared to be doing. The New
Zealand Court of Appeal said that the police officer should be regarded as
sufficiently “expert ad hoc” to give identification evidence and held that his
evidence was admissible as an aid to the jury in a case where the action was
confused. In Clare and Peach the Court of Appeal (although not commenting on
whether the phrase “expert ad hoc” was appropriate or not) said that the trial
judge was right to follow Howe [See also Steele v HM Advocate 1992 SCCR 30].”
554. Having reviewed some of the relevant authorities May and Powles
conclude at paragraph 2-40 as follows:
“It is submitted that a similarly practical approach should be normally adopted in
order to prevent the jury being deprived of necessary assistance. Accordingly, the
judge has a discretion to admit such evidence provided (a) the jury require
assistance in interpreting the tape because, without it, the significance of what is
shown would not be apparent; (b) the witness is thoroughly familiar with the
material; and (c) the jury are directed that ultimately it is for them to decide
whether they accept the witness’s evidence or not.”
Transcripts of interviews
555. Hollyoak v R 1990-92 MLR 329 stresses the importance of counsel
carefully checking the recordings and transcripts of the defendant’s
interviews with the police. In that case transcripts of the recordings
had been sent to the defence in advance of the trial and the defence
had not objected to their contents. Parts of the tapes were played in
the course of the hearing and were referred to by the jury during its
deliberations, although a document referred to in the course of the
police interviews contained possible hearsay information and might
well have been inadmissible. Counsel for the appellants referred in
her opening address to the jury to evidence that her clients would give
that would refute or challenge evidence given by a prosecution
witness. In the event the appellants did not give evidence, and in his
closing address counsel for the prosecution referred to the fact that the
witness’s evidence stood alone. In his summing up Deemster Callow
failed to direct the jury that evidence given in interview by one
accused should not be used against another. On appeal the appellants
submitted that the court should have directed the jury that (a) the
taped interviews were inadmissible as containing hearsay information
and that (b) the evidence given in interview by one appellant could
not be used against the other.
556. The Appeal Division dismissed the appeal and held that (1) the court
had not erred in admitting the contents of the tapes. Since full
arguments on the subject of tape recordings of police interviews to be
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used in evidence had not yet been addressed to the Manx courts,
English practice should be followed pending a case where full
arguments are forthcoming. On that basis, it was not open to the
appellants to claim on appeal that the tapes had been inadmissible,
even though part of the transcript should properly have been
excluded, when they had failed to ask the prosecution to edit the
tapes, or to notify the court of their objections so that it could order a
pre-trial review of the tapes. As a general rule, however, it was
undesirable for a jury to listen, while deliberating, to tape recordings
which had not previously been played in open court and heard by the
judge and counsel (2) the court should have directed the jury that what
one of the appellants said in interview with the police could not be
used in evidence against the other. The omission was not, however,
sufficient for the appeal to succeed, since the prosecution case did not
depend on those interviews : it was based largely on the allegation of
a third party and neither of the appellants, whose defence was
identical, had given any evidence to challenge or explain those
allegations (3) it was inadvisable for defence counsel, in an opening
statement, to inform the jury of the details of any evidence the
accused would given because there was no guarantee that this
evidence would in fact be given. It was also inadvisable for counsel
for the prosecution to comment in any way on the fact that the
accused did not give evidence, although in the present case counsel’s
actual words could be faulted. Judge of Appeal Hytner delivering the
judgment of the court at page 336 stated:
“In this particular case, as I have indicated, no application of any sort was made to
the learned Deemster either to alter the transcript or cut out parts of the tape. It is
very difficult to fault the judge who makes no order when no objection has been
made to him.”
557. May Criminal Evidence 4th Edition at paragraphs 2-29 to 2-30
provides a useful summary of the procedure to be taken in respect of
transcripts of interviews with the police:
“11.If a transcript has been prepared, the interviewing officer (or other officer
present at the interview) may produce it, provided that he has first checked its
accuracy against the tape: there is no need to call the audiotypist. Of course, if the
typist is called he can produce the transcript and prove it as an accurate record of
what he heard on the tape.
12. Once a transcript is produced, copies are usually given to the jury to assist
them in following the evidence and to take with them into the jury room when
they retire. In most cases copies go before the jury without dispute. However, if
there is a dispute, the judge will have to decide whether to allow the jury to have
copies or not. In Rampling the defence objected to a transcript going before the
jury on the ground that it was not evidence and could not be produced to the jury
without the consent of the defence. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had
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correctly exercised his discretion in allowing the jury to have the transcript: the
consent of the prosecution and defence was not required; the transcript is an
administrative convenience comparable to a schedule and its use is a matter to be
decided within the judge’s-discretion. In many cases it is essential that the jury
have a transcript. If they did not, the recording would have to be played over time
and again, e.g. cases where the sound quality is poor. In Maqsud Ali the Court of
Appeal held that the jury may have a copy of the transcript, properly proved,
provided that they are guided by what they hear themselves and base their
decisions upon that.
13. If a translation is produced, it will usually be appropriate for it to be exhibited
and for the jury to have copies. This is for reasons of practicality. If the jury do
not have copies, they cannot follow the case. Thus, in the Australian case of
Butera v. D.P.P (Vic.) a tape recording had been made of a conversation in
English and other languages. Two interpreters listened to the tape and prepared
English translations. At the trial the tape was played to the jury and the
interpreters listened to the tape and produced and verified their respective
translations in evidence. The translations were exhibited and copies given to the
jury. The High Court of Australia held that this course was appropriate because if
the jury had not had the copies it would have been impossible for the jury to
follow the lengthy cross- examination relating to the translations.”
558. May and Powles Criminal Evidence 5th Edition:
“C. Procedure at trial
2-25 1. In most cases, it is anticipated that the summary of the tape recorded
interview contained in the interviewing officer’s statement will be sufficient for
evidential purposes. In these cases it will not be necessary to play the tape. The
fact that counsel agree that a summary should be put before the jury will not
prevent the tape itself being played. For instance, if an issue emerges during the
trial which can only be resolved by playing the tape, it should be admitted.
Indeed, the tape may be played after the speeches of counsel (provided that no
injustice would be done thereby to the defendant).
2. In other cases where a transcript of the tape recording has been prepared, the
defence will agree that the transcript is correct. In these cases the transcript can be
read and the tape need not be played.
3. The procedure for the preparation of transcripts and editing of tapes is now
governed by the Practice Direction (Evidence of Tape Recorded Interviews). The
Practice Direction lays down a timetable to be followed if the parties are unable
to agree a record of interview and specifies that editing should be based on the
usual principles: discussed at para.9-54, below.
4. If it is necessary to produce the tape, the interviewing officer or any other
officer present at the interview should produce and prove it: Practice Direction,
above. The officer should listen to the tape before the trial. He can then give
evidence as to who spoke the recorded words and deal with questions of accuracy
and suggestions of falsification. In the case of recordings other than police
interviews, the person who made the tape recording must produce it.
5. The tape is then played to the jury [Counsel should indicate the parts which it is
necessary to play in order to avoid the playing of irrelevant matter]. In this way
the court obtains the evidence of the conversation or other sounds recorded. If the
authenticity of the tape is in issue, the jury must be satisfied of its authenticity
beyond reasonable doubt before relying on its contents. It is then for the jury to
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determine what was said, if this be in dispute. It is also for the jury to decide what
weight to give to the evidence.
6. Once the tape has been played, it is normally made an exhibit. It is then
available for reference during the trial. Parts can be played during counsel’s
speeches and the summing-up. The jury, if they wish, should be able to hear it
after they have retired to consider their verdict. In an appropriate case they may
be able to hear it in their room. It is not improper for the judge to allow them to do
so. On the other hand, it may be more appropriate for the parts which they wish
to hear to be played to them in court, for example if there is a danger that they
will receive a partial or misleading impression of the evidence on a particular
point unless all the relevant parts are played to them.
In Emmerson the Court of Appeal said that if any part of the tape had been
played in court the jury could take (a) the whole tape if they had a transcript, but
(b) only that part played in court if they had no transcript. The Court of Appeal
also said that there was no need for the trial judge to re-assemble the court to hear
passages already heard in open court. How ever, in Riaz and Burke a differently
constituted Court of Appeal disagreed and said that, while it was a matter for the
judge’s discretion, the better practice was for the jury to be brought back and for
the tape to be played in open court. While it is submitted that this is the
appropriate course in most cases, particularly where a tape has been edited, it
must be doubted whether it is necessary if the interview is straightforward and
neither side objects. Thus in Tonge the Court said the judge should normally
require the tape to be played in open court unless he thought it more convenient
for the jury to hear it in their room. If the tape is to be heard in the jury room, the
court must make arrangements. Normally this will present no difficulty. It will be
a matter for the court to ensure that no injustice is done. In Dempster the Court of
Appeal held that there had been no material irregularity in a case where
arrangements had been made for the jury to communicate by radio to a technician
in court who played the required part to them in their room. The Court said that
some system had to be devised for the jury to hear the tape in order to assess the
evidence given by experts about it and it was impracticable for them to have to
come into court every time they wished to hear it.
7. If, after retirement, a jury who have been provided with a transcript wish to
hear a tape which has not been played in open court they should be allowed to do
so: Riaz and Burke, above. They may wish to do so, for instance, to assess the
tone of voice on the recording. However, the judge must first consider whether in
the particular circumstances of the case it is fair to allow the tape to be played for
the first time after the jury have retired.
8. If the tape is available, secondary evidence of its contents should not be
admitted (except in the circumstances mentioned above, where there is no dispute
about the contents). If it is available the tape should be played. On the other hand,
if there is difficulty in deciphering what is said on the tape, the evidence of a
person who has heard it several times may be admissible to assist the jury. In
Hopes and Lavery v H.M. Advocate the High Court of Justiciary doubted whether
the evidence of an unskilled person was admissible for this purpose. (In that case
a tape recording of a conversation between a blackmailer and his victim had been
played to the jury. A typist made a shorthand analysis of what she heard on the
tape after hearing it played several times). However, as was pointed out, the
difficulty would be overcome if the prosecution could call a witness skilled in the
interpretation of tape recordings. Such an expert may be able to decipher the
sounds on the recording by using machinery which repeats particular parts of the
tape. Thus, in Robb the Court of Appeal held that evidence of voice identification
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given by a suitably qualified expert was admissible even if he used a technique
supported by a minority of his profession.
9. If the original tape is not available, the court may admit a copy in order to
prove the sounds or conversation recorded, provided that the court is satisfied of
the provenance and authenticity of the original tape and the copy tape. Thus, the
Divisional Court held in Kajala v Noble that justices were entitled to rely on a
copy of a film shown on a BBC television news bulletin provided that they were
satisfied that it was an authentic copy of the original. The court said that the old
rule that a party must produce the best evidence was limited to written documents
and had no relevance to tapes and films.
10. If neither original nor copy is available it would seem that the court, if
satisfied that the absence of the tape can be explained satisfactorily, may receive
secondary evidence of its contents from a witness who has heard it. This evidence
would not be hearsay because A is not repeating what B told him, but what he (A)
heard on the tape.
11. If a transcript has been prepared, the interviewing officer (or other officer
present at the interview) may produce it, provided that he has first checked its
accuracy against the tape: there is no need to call the audio-typist. Of course, if
the typist is called he can produce the transcript and prove it as an accurate record
of what he heard on the tape.
12. Once a transcript is produced, copies are usually given to the jury to assist
them in following the evidence and to take with them into the jury room when
they retire. In most cases copies go before the jury without dispute. However, if
there is a dispute, the judge will have to decide whether to allow the jury to have
copies or not. In Rampling the defence objected to a transcript going before the
jury on the ground that it was not evidence and could not be produced to the jury
without the consent of the defence. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had
correctly exercised his discretion in allowing the jury to have the transcript: the
consent of the prosecution and defence was not required; the transcript is an
administrative convenience comparable to a schedule and its use is a matter to be
decided within the judge’s discretion.
In many cases it is essential that the jury have a transcript. If they did not, the
recording would have to be played over time and again, for example cases where
the sound quality is poor. In Maqsud Ali the Court of Appeal held that the jury
may have a copy of the transcript, properly proved, provided that they are guided
by what they hear themselves and base their decisions upon that.
13. If a translation is produced, it will usually be appropriate for it to be exhibited
and for the jury to have copies. This is for reasons of practicality. If the jury do
not have copies, they cannot follow the case. Thus, in the Australian case of
Butera v DPP (Vic.) a tape recording had been made of a conversation in English
and other languages. Two interpreters listened to the tape and prepared English
translations. At the trial the tape was played to the jury and the interpreters
listened to the tape and produced and verified their respective translations in
evidence. The translations were exhibited and copies given to the jury. The High
Court of Australia held that this course was appropriate because if the jury had not
had the copies it would have been impossible for the jury to follow the lengthy
cross- examination relating to the translations.”
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No comment responses
559. In R v Lashley [2006] Crim LR 83 defence counsel submitted that
questions asked in interview which elicited no comment responses
were not evidence. It was held that the questions asked by the police
officer did not constitute evidence for or against the defendant.
Although the answers to those questions might do so, if the only
answers given in the course of the interview consist of ‘no comment’
then in reality the questions were not being answered at all. At that
stage ‘no comment’ did not amount to evidence for or against the
defendant. See section 71 of the Police Powers and Procedures Act
1998 in respect of the effect of the accused’s silence at trial. See
Chambers (Appeal Division judgment 12th August 2010) in respect of
section 70 of the Police Powers and Procedures Act 1998 and
inferences that may be drawn by the jury from a defendant’s failure to
answer questions when interviewed.
Examination in chief
560. Examination in chief is designed to elicit evidence favourable to one’s
own case. Two important restrictions are placed on the advocate’s
conduct of the examination. The first rule is that counsel must not
prompt his own witness on contentious matters. He therefore must not
ask “leading questions” i.e. questions framed so as to suggest a particular
answer. Questions that begin with “is it fair to say” or “do you say” or “I
would suggest that” are classic examples of questions containing some
of the ingredients of leading questions. Counsel is also not allowed to
refer his own witness to any statement the witness has made (for
example at committal proceedings). This is sometimes inconvenient
where the witness has simply forgotten some detail or is so
overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the court that he cannot recollect
it. There are two partial exceptions to the rule:
(1) The witness may “refresh his memory” by referring to any notes
or documents including a witness statement made either at the
time of the matter in question or shortly afterwards while the
events were fresh in his memory.
(2) The witness may be shown his statement to the police before he
comes into court.
The second rule is that counsel may not contradict the testimony of his
own witness by referring to a prior inconsistent statement (except in
the very unusual case of a witness who can be shown to be hostile).
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Thus if the witness says something quite different from what is
contained in counsel’s proof of evidence, he must accept the answer
given, and is not allowed to refer the witness to what he had said
when the proof was taken.
561. It is a general rule that in a direct examination of a witness, he shall
not be asked leading questions or in other words questions framed in
such a manner as to suggest to the witness the answers required of
him. The primary test as to whether a question is leading is whether it
suggests to the witness what the answer should be. There are
exceptions. For example where a witness swears to a certain fact and
another witness is called for the purposes of contradicting him, the
latter may be asked in direct terms whether that fact ever took place.
Questions on undisputed matters can in general be allowed without
objection. Counsel should check with their opposite number in
advance. If an irrelevant or leading question is put on a contentious
issue counsel on the other side should object and state clearly the
reasons for the objection. If a witness is asked whether a certain
written representation was made the writing should be put to him.
562. It is undesirable for the prosecution to attempt to take the defence by
surprise by endeavouring to adduce from a witness significant fresh
evidence not canvassed in the witnesses statement served in advance
on the defence.
Cross-examination on the character of a witness
563. Within certain limits the character of witnesses may be attacked and
they may be cross-examined about their previous convictions and bad
character (Criminal Evidence 4th Edition May at page 155). Cross
examination as to credit is to show that the witness ought not to be
believed on oath.
564. In respect of a prosecution witness, the provisions of section 1(f) (ii)
of the Criminal Evidence Act 1946 apply so that imputations made on
prosecution witnesses will result in the defendant becoming liable to
cross examination as to his own previous convictions and bad
character.
565. The Deemster should stop a purely vexatious cross examination. To
be admissible questions must be relevant to the standing of the
witness and the tribunal of fact – the jury. If they are designed purely
to smear the witness’s character and can have no material bearing on
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the witness’s standing after cross-examination they will be disallowed
(See Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 per Lawton J).
566. Lord Carswell delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in Bernard
(10th May 2007) and at paragraph 27 stated:
“it should be pointed out, however, that as it was a matter of credit, counsel would
have been bound by his answer if it had been put to him in cross-examination and
it is hardly to be supposed that he would have made any damaging admissions.”
Defendant’s loss of shield
567. Section 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1946 in effect provides
that the defendant is a competent witness for the defence provided
that a person charged and called as a witness pursuant to the Act shall
not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any
question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of
or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then
charged, or is of bad character, unless he has asked questions of the
witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establishing his own
good character or has given evidence of his good character or “the
nature and conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the
character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution or the deceased
victim of the alleged crime.” It can be seen that the defendant has a shield
in relation to his bad character that can be lost in certain
circumstances.
568. Section 1(f)(i) concerns the situation where proof that a defendant has
committed or been convicted of some other offence is admissible
evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then
charged and section 1(f) (iii) deals with a situation where a defendant
has given evidence against any other person charged in the same
proceedings.
569. The judge has a discretion whether to allow cross-examination even if
the nature and conduct of the defence fall within the statutory
provisions. The overriding duty of the trial judge is to secure that the
trial is fair. Where a defendant has a particularly bad or damaging
record a judge is likely to admit it only if the imputations made
against the prosecution witnesses were correspondingly grave (R v
Taylor and Goodman [1999] 2 Cr App R 163, CA).
570. It is desirable that a warning should be given by the judge when it
becomes apparent that the defence is taking a course which may
expose the accused to cross examination under the section. In the
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absence of the jury and the witness the defence should be asked is it
the intention of the defendant to lose his shield? What is the proposed
cross examination?
571. If the defence do not admit the previous convictions the prosecution
have to prove the defendant’s previous convictions if defendant loses
his shield and the prosecution wish to refer to them.
572. Consider the caselaw on the phrase “imputations on the character of the
prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution.” An imputation on character
includes charges of faults or vices whether reputed or real which are
not criminal offences. However merely to put to witness he was drunk
or swearing is insufficient to result in the loss of the defendant’s
shield. If the defence suggest that a prosecution witness committed
the crime the defendant’s shield could be lost. If what is said amounts
in reality to no more than an emphatic denial of the charge it should
not however be regarded as an imputation.
573. Counsel should have regard to section 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence
Act 1946 and to the authorities referred to at May Criminal Evidence
4th Edition page 141 onwards, Archbold 8-182 onwards, the important
case of Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 and the subsequent authorities.
574. See also the old Judicial Studies Board Direction 24 set out at
paragraph 744.
Cross-examination generally
575. Cross-examination is designed to elicit evidence favourable to the
case of the party cross examining and to discredit the testimony of
the witness.
576. Leading questions are permissible and counsel may refer the witness
to any prior inconsistent statement he made and ask him to explain
why his evidence is now different. If a previous inconsistent statement
is being put to a witness the date of the statement, the specific
wording of the statement and the apparent inconsistency should be
clearly and fully put to the witness who should be given an
opportunity to respond. The witness should be supplied with their
original statement and asked to identify it and should be given a fair
opportunity to consider it. The extract should be put in context and the
witness should be given time to read the statement and consider the
extract being put to him.
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577. Consider the position in respect of previous inconsistent and previous
consistent statements. There is a general rule of evidence that
statements may be used against a witness as admissions but that you
are not entitled to give evidence of statements on other occasions by
the witness in confirmation of the testimony. The rule is sometimes
expressed as being that a party is not permitted to make evidence for
himself. Thus a defendant is not permitted to call evidence to show
that after he had been charged with an offence he told a number of
persons what his defence was. The evidential value of such testimony
is nil. At common law there were three well established exceptions to
the general rule:
(1) statements constituting recent complaints in sexual cases
(2) statements forming part of the res gestae
(3) statements which tended to rebut an allegation of recent
fabrication.
In (1) and (3) the statement was not admissible as evidence of the
truth of its contents. A recent complaint was admitted to show
consistency on the part of the complainant and as tending to negative
consent.
578. Questions put in cross-examination must be either relevant and
pertinent to the matter in issue or calculated to attack the credibility of
the witness.
579. Hobson [1998] 1 Cr App R 32 at 35 indicated that defence advocates
were not mere mouthpieces. Counsel should exercise judgment as to
the way the client’s case can best be put: “Because a client wishes a
particular question to be asked, point to be made or witness to be called it does
not follow that the question must be asked, the point made or the witness called.”
580. A judge should endeavour to restrain unnecessary cross-examination.
581. Although counsel must not be deterred from doing his duty counsel
should exercise a proper discretion not to prolong the case
unnecessarily. It is no part of his duty to embark on lengthy cross
examination on matters which are not really in issue (R v Kalia (1974)
60 Cr App R 200 CA, R v Maynard 69 Cr App R 309, CA). See also
R v Flynn [1972] Crim LR 428 McFadden (1976) 62 Cr. App R. 187,
Chaaban (2003) EWCA Crim 1012 and Simmonds (1967) 51 Cr App
R 316).
582. Counsel should not, during the giving of evidence by a witness,
comment on any replies to questions such as “excuse me if I find that
difficult to believe” or “I don’t believe you.” Those are matters for the jury.
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Counsel should avoid sarcasm or being argumentative with a witness.
Counsel should not express personal opinions.
583. In R v Naylor February 6th, 1995 (unreported) the English Court of
Appeal discouraged advocates from “time wasting and argumentative cross
examination.” Although the court would always be astute to guard
against unfairness it would robustly support judges who intervened to
prevent cross examination of this type. The Court of Appeal went on
by stating that time wasted in one person’s defence was court time
and legal aid money denied to another. Judges could and should stop
time being wasted. In R v B [2006] Crim LR 54 it was held that where
counsel indulged in prolix and repetitious questioning judges were
fully entitled, indeed obliged, to impose reasonable time limits. It was
no part of the duty of counsel to put every point of a defendant’s case,
however peripheral, to a witness or to embark on lengthy cross
examination on matters not really in issue. It was the duty of counsel
to discriminate between important and relevant features of a defence
case which had to be put to a witness and minor and/or unnecessary
matters which did not need to be put. Counsel should focus on the
core central issues in the case. See also Dobbie (Court of General
Gaol Delivery judgment delivered on the 23rd March 2009) and
McVey (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment delivered on the
30th October 2009).
584. The trial takes place in public and names of third parties should not be
bandied about unless it is necessary for the proper conduct of the trial.
Care should be taken in making allegations against third parties who
are not present to answer such allegations.
585. Counsel should not make cross examination unduly lengthy. An
effective cross examination does not have to take up a great deal of
time and there are dangers in asking too many questions. Counsel
should focus on the main issues and make economic use of the limited
time available. Time is not an endless commodity. Judges are entitled
to impose time limits on cross examination where it was repetitious
and time being wasted (R v Butt, The Times May 2, 2005 English
Court of Appeal – gentle plea to counsel, followed by imposition of
time limit to conclude – take care of adverse comments in presence of
jury). See also R v Brown (Milton) [1998] 2 Cr. App R 364.
586. In cross-examination counsel may ask leading questions, that is he
may ask questions which suggest what the answer should be.
Questions should not be put in such a manner as to be in the nature of
270
invitations to argument rather than to elicit answers to matters of fact
which is the true purpose of cross-examination.
587. Where two defendants are jointly charged and are defended by
different counsel the established rule is that, in the absence of
agreement between counsel, the court will call on them to cross-
examine and address the jury in the order in which the names of the
defendants whom they represent stand on the indictment or
information (R v Barber (1844) 1 C & K 434; R v Richards (1844) 1
Cox 62).
588. The defence advocate must not in the course of cross examination
state matters of fact or opinion or say what someone else has said or is
expected to say. Cross examination must not be used for making
comments which should be confined to speeches. Archbold at
paragraph 8-116 indicates that some flexibility should be allowed
where strict adherence to the rules may hinder the witness or the jury.
Thus in a long or complex case a witness may be reminded of the
evidence of another witness but should not be invited to comment on
or explain any discrepancy in the evidence.
589. See Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales, Bar Council
Statements and Archbold paragraphs 4-307 and 8-118.
590. In addition to his duties to the defendant, counsel also has a duty to
the court and to the public. This duty includes the clear presentation
of the issues and the avoidance of waste of time, repetition and
prolixity. In the conduct of every case counsel must be mindful of this
public responsibility.
591. Where the defence make strong attacks on witnesses (e.g. police beat
defendants to get confessions R v O’Neil 34 Cr App R 108, R v
Callaghan 69 Cr App R 88) and the defendant is not called to give
evidence to support such allegations the judge will probably make a
very strong comment upon his failure to support the allegation on oath
(R v Brigden [1973] Crim LR 579).
592. A failure to put to a witness a matter which tends to contradict the
evidence of the witness does not render such matter inadmissible, the
proper course is for the witness to be recalled in order that he has the
opportunity to deal with the matter (R v Cannan [1998] Crim LR
284). See also R v McFadden 62 Cr App R 187.
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593. If cross examining counsel puts a paper in the witness’s hands and
puts questions on it, and anything comes of those questions, his
opponent has a right to see the paper and re-examine on it. Before
cross examining counsel should put the paper to their opposite
number if they have not seen it before. It should also be shown to the
Deemster.
594. A document which is inadmissible cannot be made admissible simply
because it is put to a witness in cross examination.
595. A witness may be cross examined as to credit. The credibility of a
witness depends upon (a) his knowledge of the facts to which he
testifies (b) his disinterestedness (c) his integrity (d) his veracity and
(e) his being bound to speak the truth.
596. In addition to questions concerning a witness’s means of knowledge,
opportunity of observation, reasons for recollection, or belief, a
witness may be asked questions about his antecedents, associations or
mode of life which although irrelevant to the issue would be likely to
discredit his testimony. However such cross examination must be
within the prescribed limits. Since the purpose of cross examination
as to credit is to show that the witness might not be believed on oath
the matters about which he is questioned must relate to his likely
standing after cross examination with the tribunal which is trying him
or listening to his evidence (R v Sweet-Escott 55 Cr App R 316 and R
v Funderburk 90 Cr App R 466).
597. Generally evidence is not admissible to contradict answers given on
cross examination as to credit i.e. the answer cannot be impeached by
the other party calling witnesses to contradict a witness on collateral
matters (See Archbold at paragraph 8-146). There are exceptions to
the general rule including bias, previous convictions, evidence of
reputation for untruthfulness and medical evidence relating to
reliability of the evidence of a witness. The list of exceptions is not
closed. In general the answers given by a witness in cross examination
in respect of credibility matters are final except where they can easily
be rebutted for example by the production of a list of previous
convictions where the witness denies having any.
598. It is the duty of counsel for the defence to put his case to the
prosecution witness i.e. to cross-examine them on all points where the
defence case differs from the evidence of the witness. In general
defence counsel may ask a prosecution witness any question in cross
examination provided it is relevant and provided the answer will not
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involve inadmissible material such as hearsay or non-expert opinion.
A question is relevant if it concerns an issue in the case, i.e. it relates
directly as to whether the accused committed the offence, or it relates
to a fact which increases or decreases the likelihood of his having
done so. A question is also relevant if it concerns the credit of the
witness, i.e. it relates to a fact from which the jury may conclude that
he is not the sort of person who can be trusted to speak the truth.
599. MWJ v R [2005] HCA 74 dealt with the rule in Browne v Dunn
concerning fair conduct in the examination of witnesses in civil cases
at paragraphs 38 and 39:
“38 …The rule is essentially that a party is obliged to give appropriate notice to
the other party and any of that person’s witnesses, of any imputation that the
former intends to make against either of the latter about his or her conduct
relevant to the case, or a party’s or a witness’ credit.
39. One corollary of the rule is that judges should in general abstain from making
adverse findings about parties and witnesses in respect of whom there has been
non-compliance with it. A further corollary of the rule is that not only will cross-
examination of a witness who can speak to the conduct usually constitute
sufficient notice, but also, that any witness whose conduct is to be impugned,
should be given an opportunity in the cross-examination to deal with the
imputation intended to be made against him or her.”
600. Libke v R [2007] HCA 30 concerned the duties of prosecution counsel
in respect of fair trials and cross examination.
601. Defence counsel may call for a police officer’s note books (whether
used to refresh memory or not). See Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr
App Rep 191.
602. There can be strong and direct challenges to the evidence of a witness
and strong criticisms can be made of a witness or a defendant but
evidence is for factual matters not the exchanging of insults. Any
justifiable and relevant disparaging comment on a witness or
defendant should be reserved for a closing speech.
603. Counsel should take care to formulate precise questions. Counsel will
be in difficulties in complaining if inadmissible evidence is given in
response to a badly framed, vague, argumentative or provocative
question put by counsel. Counsel should ask precise questions.
604. Counsel for a co-defendant can cross examine another co- defendant
whether or not his evidence is in any way adverse to his client
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(Archbold at paragraph 8-163 and R v Bingham and Cooke [1999] 1
WLR 598 HL).
605. Counsel should respect rulings on admissibility and not attempt to
“appeal” them in counsel’s speech to the jury. See R v Lashley [2006]
Crim LR 83 where it was held that right or wrong a judge’s ruling was
the end of an argument or application. The remedy for an incorrect
ruling is to appeal at the appropriate stage.
606. Heydon J in Libke v The Queen [2007] HCA 30 provided a detailed
and useful guide to those who undertake cross examinations of
witnesses. The following are extracts from his comprehensive
judgment (footnotes omitted which should please Justice Stephen
Breyer of the United States Supreme Court):
“117. I agree with Hayne J, and would add only the following remarks about the
cross-examination. The criticisms made must be read keeping in mind that the
cross-examiner was not represented in this appeal.
The powers of a cross-examiner
118. There were many respects in which the cross-examination of the appellant
was in breach of ethical duties flowing from the position of the cross-examiner as
counsel for the prosecution, and in breach of other ethical duties. For present
purposes, what is important is that those breaches were also breaches of rules
established by the law of evidence. While breaches of these evidentiary rules do
not often result in appeals being allowed, while there are relatively few reported
cases about them, and while writers have given less attention to them than to more
fashionable or interesting subjects, there is no doubt that they exist and no doubt
that they are well settled.
119. They are rules which necessarily developed over time once it came to be
established that oral evidence should be elicited, not by means of witnesses
delivering statements, and not through questioning by the court, but by means of
answers given to a succession of particular questions put, usually by an advocate,
and often in leading form. A cross-examiner is entitled to ask quite confined
questions, and to insist, at the peril of matters being taken further in a re-
examination which is outside the cross-examiner's control, not only that there be
an answer fully responding to each question, but also that there be no more than
an answer. By these means a cross-examiner is entitled to seek to cut down the
effect of answers given in chief, to elicit additional evidence favourable to the
cross-examiner's client, and to attack the credit of the witness, while ensuring that
the hand of the party calling the witness is not mended by the witness thrusting on
the cross-examiner in non-responsive answers evidence which that witness may
have failed to give in chief. To this end a cross-examiner is given considerable
power to limit the witness's answers and to control the witness in many other
ways.
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120 "Cross-examination is a powerful and valuable weapon for the purpose of
testing the veracity of a witness and the accuracy and completeness of his story. It
is entrusted to the hands of counsel in the confidence that it will be used with
discretion; and with due regard to the assistance to be rendered by it to the Court,
not forgetting at the same time the burden that is imposed upon the witness."
Hence the powers given to cross-examiners are given on conditions, and among
the relevant conditions are those which underlie the rules of evidence contravened
in this case.
Offensive questioning
121. The most striking characteristic of the cross-examination in this case was
its wild, uncontrolled and offensive character.
122. A prosecutor must "conduct himself with restraint and with due regard to
the rights and dignity of accused persons. A cross-examination must naturally be
as full and effective as possible, but it is unbecoming in a legal representative -
especially in a prosecutor - to subject a witness, and particularly an accused
person who is a witness, to a harassing and badgering cross-examination." One
reason why there is a rule prohibiting this type of questioning was put thus by
Wigmore:
"An intimidating manner in putting questions may so coerce or disconcert the
witness that his answers do not represent his actual knowledge on the subject. So
also questions which in form or subject cause embarrassment, shame or anger in
the witness may unfairly lead him to such demeanor and utterance that the
impression produced by his statements does not do justice to his real testimonial
value." (emphasis in original)
Another was advanced by Lord Langdale MR when he deprecated "the confusion
occasioned by cross-examination, as it is too often conducted", for it tended to
"give rise to important errors and omissions". Yet another was suggested by an
American judge: "a mind rudely assailed, naturally shuts itself against its
assailant, and reluctantly communicates the truths that it possesses."
123. In this case the questioning was conducted "without restraint and without
the courtesy and consideration which a witness is entitled to expect in a Court of
law", and, as a result, it was "indefensible". The cross-examination was improper
because it was "calculated to humiliate, belittle and break the witness". Its tone
"was often sarcastic, personally abusive and derisive". It resorted to remarks "in
the nature of a taunt". It amounted to "bullying, intimidation, personal vilification
or insult", none of which is permissible.
124. The cross-examination not only offended these common law rules. Many
of the questions were annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive or oppressive,
contrary to s21 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Q).
Comments
125. The cross-examination also contravened the rules of evidence in that many
things said by the cross-examiner were not questions at all. To adopt the language
of the Ontario Court of Appeal, counsel for the prosecution infringed the rules of
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evidence when he "regularly injected his personal views and editorial comments
into the questions he was asking". One vice of comments made in the course of
questioning is that although they may be potentially damaging in the jury's eyes,
they are not questions, and thus the witness has no opportunity of dealing with the
sting in the comments. Another vice is that the jury may regard counsel as a
person of special knowledge and status and therefore pay particular regard to the
comments - particularly where it is counsel for the prosecution who chooses "to
throw the weight of his office" into the case. The time for comments, at least
legitimate ones - for disparaging comments based on evidence or the lack of it can
be legitimate - is the time of final address. "Statements of counsel's personal
opinion have no place in a cross-examination." The role of prosecution counsel in
the administration of justice should not be "personalized". Their own beliefs
should not be "injected" into the case. Thus in R v Hardy junior counsel (the
future Gibbs J) for one of the accused asked a witness who had attended certain
allegedly seditious meetings: "Then you were never at any of those meetings but
in the character of a spy?" The future Lord Ellenborough CJ, appearing for the
prosecution, objected to this line of questioning. Eyre LCJ said to defence
counsel:
"[Y]our questions ought not to be accompanied with those sort of comments:
they are the proper subjects of observation when the defence is made. The
business of a cross-examination is to ask to all sorts of acts, to probe a witness
as closely as you can; but it is not the object of a cross-examination, to
introduce that kind of periphrasis as you have just done."
After junior counsel for the accused sent for leading counsel (the future Lord
Erskine LC), and the point was debated further, Eyre LCJ upheld the objection:
"I think it is so clear that the questions that are put are not to be loaded with
all of the observations that arise upon all the previous parts of the case, they
tend so to distract the attention of every body, they load us in point of time so
much, and that that is not the time for observation upon the character and
situation of a witness is so apparent, that as a rule of evidence it ought never
to be departed from ...".
126. Comments are particularly objectionable when they are sarcastic or
insulting. They are even more objectionable when they are statements indicating
the personal belief of prosecution counsel in the credibility or guilt of the accused:
that is not something to be said in address, and a fortiori is not something to be
said during questioning.
Compound questions
127. Partly by reason of the interspersing of both comments and questions
between the accused's answers, and partly by reason of other defects in the form
of the questions, some "questions" asked during this cross-examination were not
single questions, but were compound questions. "A compound question
simultaneously poses more than one inquiry and calls for more than one answer.
Such a question presents two problems. First, the question may be ambiguous
because of its multiple facets and complexity. Second, any answer may be
confusing because of uncertainty as to which part of the compound question the
witness intended to address." But compound questions have additional vices. It is
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unfair to force a witness into the position of having to choose which questions in a
compound question to answer and in which order. Cross-examiners are entitled, if
they can, to frame questions so as to seek a particular answer - either "Yes" or
"No". Even though the answers desired by the cross-examiner to a compound
question may be all affirmative or all negative, the witness may wish to answer to
some affirmatively and some negatively. To place witnesses in the position of
having to reformulate a compound question and answer its component parts bit by
bit is unfair to them in the sense that it prevents them from doing justice to
themselves. Some "questions" asked in this case contained at least four questions
within them.
Cutting off answers before they were completed
128. On occasion during his cross-examination the accused's answers were cut
off either by a comment or by some further question even though it was clear that
there was more which the accused wished to say. "Evidence should ordinarily be
given without interruption by counsel." The cutting off of an answer by a further
question, though always to be avoided as far as possible, can happen innocently
when a questioner is pursuing a witness vigorously and the witness pauses in such
a fashion as to suggest that the answer is complete; it can happen legitimately if a
witness's answer is non-responsive. But very few of the interruptions here can be
explained away on these bases. They were usually interruptions of responsive
answers, often by offensive observations. The rule against the cutting off of a
witness's answer follows from the encouragement which the law gives to short,
precise and single questions. It is not fair to ask a question which is disparaging of
or otherwise damaging to a witness and to cut off an answer which the cross-
examiner does not like. The right of a cross-examiner to control a witness does
not entail a power to prevent the witness from giving any evidence other than that
which favours the cross-examiner's client.
Questions resting on controversial assumptions
129. The cross-examiner on occasion alleged that the accused was inventing
evidence when in fact the proposition supposedly invented corresponded with
evidence given by the complainant in the prosecution case. The cross-examiner
also put implicitly unfounded assertions that the accused was being evasive. And
the cross-examiner, in putting a question about the accused's dishonesty, wrapped
up in it an assumption that there had been an earlier and different piece of
dishonesty.
130. A question put in chief which assumes a fact in controversy is leading and
objectionable, "because it affords the willing witness a suggestion of a fact which
he might otherwise not have stated to the same effect." While leading questions in
the cross-examination of non-favourable witnesses are not intrinsically
objectionable, "[w]itnesses should not be cross-examined on the assumption that
they have testified to facts regarding which they have given no testimony. Such
questions have a tendency to irritate, confuse and mislead the witness, the parties
and their counsel, the jury and the presiding judge, and they embarrass the
administration of justice." This is because a leading question put in cross-
examination which assumes a fact in controversy, or assumes that the witness has
in chief or earlier in cross-examination given particular evidence which has not
been given, "may by implication put into the mouth of an unwilling witness, a
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statement which he never intended to make, and thus incorrectly attribute to him
testimony which is not his." A further vice in this type of questioning is: "An
affirmative and a negative answer may be almost equally damaging, and a
perfectly honest witness may give a bad impression because he cannot answer
directly, but has to enter on an explanation." Questions of this character are
misleading and confusing, within the meaning of both the statutory and common
law rules.
Argumentative questions
131. Another vice in the questioning in this case stemmed from the fact that
some of the questions and observations of counsel for the prosecution did not seek
to elicit factual information, but rather provided merely an invitation to argument.
Examples include: "That doesn't tell us much, does it?", "Look, I'm giving you
every opportunity?", "I'll shift to another topic whenever you're prepared to finish
it", and "We want honesty at all times, of course". In form these remarks seemed
apt to trigger a debate about how much the accused's hearers had been told,
whether he was being given every opportunity, whether he had finished a topic,
and whether he was being honest. The vice in a particular type of argumentative
cross-examination was described thus by the English Court of Appeal:
"One so often hears questions put to witnesses by counsel which are really of
the nature of an invitation to an argument. You have, for instance, such
questions as this: 'I suggest to you that ...' or 'Is your evidence to be taken as
suggesting that ...?' If the witness were a prudent person he would say, with
the highest degree of politeness: 'What you suggest is no business of mine. I
am not here to make any suggestions at all. I am here only to answer relevant
questions. What the conclusions to be drawn from my answers are is not for
me, and as for suggestions, I venture to leave those to others.' An answer of
that kind, no doubt, requires a good deal of sense and self-restraint and
experience, and the mischief of it is, if made, it might very well prejudice the
witness with the jury, because the jury, not being aware of the consequences
to which such questions might lead, might easily come to the conclusion (and
it might be true) that the witness had something to conceal. It is right to
remember in all such cases that the witness in the box is an amateur and the
counsel who is asking questions is, as a rule, a professional conductor of
argument, and it is not right that the wits of the one should be pitted against
the wits of the other in the field of suggestion and controversy. What is
wanted from the witness is answers to questions of fact."
Like several other of the rules discussed above, the rule against argumentative
questioning rests on the need not to mislead or confuse witnesses.
The effect of the rules on the value of testimony
205. It is not unique in the law of evidence to find that the more closely the rules for
admissibility are complied with, the greater the utility of the testimony from the
point of view of the party eliciting it. It is certainly the case in this field. The rules
permit a steady, methodical destruction of the case advanced by the party calling
the witness, and compliance with them prevents undue sympathy for the witness
developing. It is perfectly possible to conduct a rigorous, testing, thorough,
aggressive and determined cross-examination while preserving the most
278
scrupulous courtesy and calmness. From the point of view of cross-examiners, it
is much more efficient to comply with the rules than not to do so.”
Cross-examination in rape and other sexual offences cases
607. Section 36 of the Sexual Offences Act 1992 provides as follows:
“36 Evidence: general
(1) If at a trial any person is for the time being charged with an offence under this
Act to which he pleads not guilty, no evidence and no question in cross-
examination shall, without the leave of the court, be adduced or asked at the trial
by or on behalf of any defendant at the trial about any sexual experience of a
complainant with a person other than that defendant.
(2) Leave shall not be given under subsection (1) except on an application in that
behalf, made (in the case of a trial on information) in the absence of the jury.
(3) Leave shall not be given under subsection (1) unless the court is satisfied that
it would be unfair to the defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced
or the question asked.
(4) Where a court of summary jurisdiction inquires into an offence under this Act
pursuant to section 5 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989, no evidence and no
question shall, without the leave of the court, be adduced or asked at the inquiry
which, if-
(a) the inquiry were a trial at which a person is charged as mentioned in
subsection (1); and
(b) each of the accused were at the trial charged with the offences of which he is
accused,
could not be adduced or asked without leave under subsection (1).
(5) Leave shall be given under subsection(4) if, and only if, the court is satisfied
that leave under subsection (1) in respect of the evidence or question would be
likely to be given at the relevant trial.
(6) If at a trial for an offence under this Act the jury has to consider whether a
person believed that a person with whom he was committing a sexual act was
consenting to the act, the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for such a
belief is a matter to which the jury is to have regard, in conjunction with any other
relevant matters, [which can properly be put before the jury : Barton (1987) 85 Cr
App R 5] in considering whether he so believed.
(7) In this section ‘complainant’ means a person with respect to whom, in a
charge for an offence under this Act to which the trial relates, it is alleged that the
sexual act was committed, attempted or proposed.”
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608. See May on Criminal Evidence 4th Edition commenting on section
2(1) of the old English Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 at
page 156 paragraph 7-79:
“… the purpose of the Act is to protect the complainant from offensive and
irrelevant cross-examination, while not preventing the defendant from developing
his defence. Accordingly the first question for the judge in deciding whether to
grant leave for cross-examination is whether the proposed questions are relevant
or not under the common law rules of evidence. If the questions are irrelevant
they may not be put. Relevance in this context means relevant both to an issue in
the case and to the witness’s credibility.”
609. Whether there is material or not to support the cross examination may
not matter but counsel must have reasonable grounds for making the
assertion and the trial judge is entitled to ask what the proposed
questions are and what supports them. The points to be put in cross
examination should not be based on rumour or gossip. They should be
supported by reasonable grounds.
610. If the questions are relevant and before deciding whether it would be
unfair to refuse leave the judge must be satisfied that the proposed
cross examination might lead the jury to take a different view of the
complainant’s evidence.
611. In deciding whether to allow cross examination the judge has to
balance justice to the defendant and fairness to and protection of the
complainant (Fenlon (1980) 71 Cr App R 307). In striking this
balance leave may be granted subject to limitations in particular to
prevent fishing expeditions by the defence as to the complainant’s
previous sexual experience with other men. If the sole purpose of the
questions is to establish such experience in order to suggest that he or
she should not be believed on oath leave should be refused. InViola
(1982) 75 Cr App R 125 it was stated:
“On the other hand if the questions are relevant to an issue in the trial in the light
of the way in which the case is being run … they are likely to be admitted,
because to exclude a relevant question on an issue in the trial as the trial is being
run will usually mean that the jury are being prevented from hearing something
which, if they did hear it, might cause them to change their minds about the
evidence being given by the complainant.”
612. May continues:
“A test for cases in which consent is in issue may be formulated in this way: does
the complainant’s attitude to sexual relations provide material upon which a jury
could reasonably rely in determining whether she consented or not?
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… The section appears to have been interpreted so as to give it a wide ambit.
Thus, in Hinds v. Butler, Swanwick J. held that leave was needed when it was
proposed to cross-examine a 14-year-old complainant about a conversation
immediately before the alleged offence, in which she spoke of having sexual
intercourse with young men other than the defendant. It was held that leave was
needed because inferentially the questions could be said to be about the sexual
experience of the complainant with a person other than the defendant.
The Act does not authorise the asking of questions which could not be
asked at common law. The questions in Hinds and Butler were permissible
because they were relevant to an issue in the case, i.e. the preliminaries to sexual
intercourse.
Two examples of the operation of the section may be given:
1. In Cox the complainant made no complaint of rape until many hours after
sexual intercourse had occurred. The defendant alleged that it had occurred with
consent. There was no evidence of any injury to the complainant or damage to her
clothing. Defence counsel sought to cross examine the complainant about another
occasion when she had had sexual intercourse with another man and then falsely
alleged that he had raped her. The defence had a proof of evidence from the man.
Leave to cross- examine was refused. The Court of Appeal held that it should
have been given because the chances were that, if the cross-examination had been
allowed, the jury might have come to a different conclusion from the one to which
they actually came.
2. In Redguard the issue was consent. In evidence the complainant said that she
would not allow anyone other than her boyfriend to stay in her flat and have
sexual relations with her. The defendant was refused leave to cross-examine her
about a sexual encounter with another man who stayed the night in her flat two
weeks after the alleged rape. The Court of Appeal held that the cross-examination
should have been permitted because it was relevant to the complainant’s
credibility and her evidence that only her boyfriend would be permitted to stay the
night: it was also relevant to the issue of consent. The fact that the encounter
occurred after the alleged rape was held not to matter. The Court said that the trial
judge’s decision was not a matter of discretion but of judgment in which the Court
of Appeal could form as valid a view as the trial judge.”
Re-examination
613. Re-examination of a witness is designed to obviate the effects of cross
examination and must be confined to points arising therefrom and not
be used as a means of producing new evidence which should have
been led in chief.
614. In re-examination counsel is limited to asking questions in relation to
matters arising from cross-examination. There is no right to go further
and to introduce matter new in itself. It is not a right at a second bite
of the cherry to cover a matter that counsel forgot to cover in
examination in chief. It is not an opportunity for counsel to endeavour
to summarise their case.
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Identification evidence issues
615. May and Powles Criminal Evidence (5th Edition) at Chapter 14 deal
comprehensively with identification evidence issues and a lot of what
follows is based on the useful summary provided by May and Powles
supplemented by some local Manx caselaw and some judgments of
the Privy Council.
616. Experience shows that visual identification is imperfect.
617. The following are extracts of the judgment of the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Doyle) delivered on the 20th
August 2003 in Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8:
“ The failure to withdraw the case from the jury
16. Miss Hannan submitted that at the conclusion of the prosecution case the
Acting Deemster should have acceded to the defence application for the case to be
withdrawn from the jury on the ground that the identification evidence was poor
and unsubstantiated. She referred to the evidence of Miss Middlesborough and Mr
Brady. As to the former we were reminded that Miss Middlesborough described a
woman jumping on a man lying on the ground and that there was a discrepancy in
the description of the clothing such woman was wearing. Furthermore what she
had seen was by means of a momentary glance from a distance. That having been
said, the Appellant concedes that she was at the scene at the time of the assault on
Mr Griffin.
17. Relying on R v Turnbull [1977] 1 QB 224, Miss Hannan submits that although
a Turnbull direction is not required where a defendant admits that he is present at
the scene of criminal activity but denies any participation therein, the better and
safer course is to give a warning to the jury modified to meet the facts of the case.
In due course this submission became more refined and amounted to an obligation
on a Deemster to expose the weaknesses of the prosecution case when summing
the case up to the jury. At first sight this is a somewhat startling proposition,
given that, certain situations such as identification apart, the Deemster`s role has
invariably been seen to be one of neutrality when reminding the jury of the
evidence.
18. In refusing Miss Hannan`s application that the case be withdrawn from the
jury, the Acting Deemster made two particular observations. Firstly, that the
Appellant`s case, as put forward when interviewed by the police and at the trial,
was that she was present when Mr Griffin was assaulted. Accordingly the Acting
Deemster rejected the contention that identification was in issue : what was in
issue was what, if anything, the Appellant had done or said. The fact that there
was a dispute as to what clothing the Appellant was wearing did not make
identification an issue at the trial. Secondly, the fact that what Miss
Middlesborough observed was by means of a momentary glance, did not mean
that it was not proper for the jury to consider it, particularly given that
identification was not an issue. The weight which was to be given to such
evidence was for the jury to assess.
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19. We agree that if identification is in issue in a case, a Deemster ought to
withdraw the case from the jury when the quality of the identification evidence is
poor and there is no other evidence to support the correctness of the identification.
20. Visual identification of an offender by a person unknown to him is a
particularly fallible process. Such perception was powerfully articulated in the
Devlin Report [Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the
Departmental Committee of Evidence on Identification in Criminal Cases : 29th
April 1976] which stated [at paragraph 8.1] :
`We are satisfied that in cases which depend wholly or mainly on eye-witness
evidence of identification, there is a special risk of wrong conviction. It arises
because the value of such evidence is exceptionally difficult to assess : the
witness who has sincerely convinced himself and whose sincerity carries
conviction is not infrequently mistaken`.
21. In Turnbull, at 229, Lord Widgery CJ stated :
`When in the judgment of the trial judge, the quality of the identifying evidence is
poor, as for example when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer
observation made in difficult conditions, the situation is very different. The judge
should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is
other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification.`
22. In R v Fergus [1994] 98 Cr App R 313, at 318, the Court of Appeal
recognised that such observation may appear to be trite but stressed that the trial
judge`s duty to withdraw the case from the jury in an identification case is wider
than the general duty of the trial judge in respect of a submission of no case to
answer.
23. Further Turnbull establishes that even if the case is allowed to go to the jury,
the judge is required to warn the jury of the special need for caution before
convicting a defendant in reliance on visual identification, to explain that a
mistaken identification may be a convincing one, to direct the jury to examine the
circumstances in which the identification was made and, probably most
importantly, to remind the jury of any specific weaknesses which had appeared in
the identification evidence.
24. We think that the facts of this case can be distinguished from Turnbull. The
Appellant admits that she was present when the assault on Mr Griffin took place
and that she was the only woman present. As we have previously emphasised this
is not a case where the identification of the Appellant was an issue. The only issue
for the jury to determine was what the Appellant did or said. Such issue did not
require the Acting Deemster to give a Turnbull direction and in particular it did
not require her to remind the jury of any specific weaknesses in the prosecution
case although she remained obligated to give a fair summary of the evidence
which had been given.
25. We have considered the directions of the Acting Deemster when she reminded
the jury as to the evidence which had been given. In fact she did give a very
careful direction to the jury as to how they should approach the evidence. She
said:
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`The next direction I give you is regard to the question of eye-witness evidence or
identification. …You must assess that evidence with great care. No one in this
case suggested that any of the prosecution witnesses were dishonest or
deliberately lying or giving you evidence in an attempt to deceive you. But we all
know from experience that honest witnesses can be mistaken. They may think
they saw something that they did not. You must assess their evidence carefully.
You must assess what opportunity they had to see what they say they saw. Was it
a momentary glance, or were they looking for a long [time], did they have an
opportunity of a longer observation ? Is a witness describing somebody they know
or are they merely describing what someone is wearing and is a stranger to them ?
Some … people are more observant than others. They notice more things. They
notice better. In this case, some witnesses may well have seen the same events but
from a different angle, a different stand point or they may have seen different
stages in the incident. Some witnesses may have seen the beginning, some may
have seen the middle, some may have seen the end, some may have seen it all.
But you have to take that into account. From what vantage point did a witness see
an incident ? Was it from close by or was it from far away ? What obstacles were
in the way ? …
The Acting Deemster then continued by examining the evidence in the case.
26. We are satisfied that such directions were proper and fair and that no
legitimate complaint can be made about them. If any criticism were to be made of
the Acting Deemster`s directions, and we stress that we make no such criticism, in
our judgment it could only be that the Acting Deemster gave extensive Turnbull
directions in a case where, because identification was not an issue, such were
unnecessary. However, we are satisfied that, as directed by the Acting Deemster,
the jury were properly able to determine the extent, if any, of the Appellant`s
participation in the assault on Mr Griffin.”
618. In Turnbull [1977] QB 224 the English Court of Appeal laid down
various guidelines as follows:
“First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on
the correctness of one of more identifications of the accused which the defence
alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury of the special need for
caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the
identification or identifications. In addition, he should instruct them as to the
reason for the need for such a warning and should make some reference to the
possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of
such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear terms the judge
need not use any particular form of words.
Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in
which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the
witness have the accused under observation? At what distance? In what light?
Was the observation impeded in anyway, as for example by passing traffic or a
press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If
only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How
long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to
the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the
accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual
284
appearance? If in any case, whether it is being dealt with summarily or on
indictment, the prosecution have reason to believe that there is such a material
discrepancy they should supply the accused or his legal advisers with particulars
of the description the police were first given. In all cases if the accused asks to be
given particulars of such descriptions, the prosecution should supply them.
Finally, he should remind the jury of any specific weaknesses which had appeared
in the identification evidence. Recognition may be more reliable than
identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is purporting to recognise
someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in
recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.”
619. May and Powles summarise the position as follows:
“Turnbull thus makes it clear that: (a) there is a special need for caution when the
prosecution case depends on evidence of visual identification; (b) the summing-up
should contain a warning of the need for caution and an explanation as to why
caution is needed; (c) the summing-up should deal with the circumstances of the
identification in the particular case; and (d) the judge should point out that a
convincing witness may be mistaken.”
620. The principles in Turnbull should be followed but Turnbull should not
be treated as a statute and followed slavishly and inflexibly. Each
summing up must be tailored to each particular case. A mechanistic
approach should not be adopted. The Privy Council in R v Mills
[1995] 1 WLR 511 at 518 stressed that what was required was to
comply with the sense and spirit of the guidance in Turnbull. See also
R v Ley [2007] Crim LR 642.
621. The judge should warn the jury that a mistaken witness may be a
convincing one. The judge should list the weaknesses in the
identification evidence either when dealing with the Turnbull
directions or at appropriate points when reviewing the evidence. It
would be useful for prosecution counsel to provide the court with
submissions as to the perceived strengths of the identification
evidence and for defence counsel to provide the court with
submissions as to the perceived weaknesses of the identification
evidence.
622. Turnbull is concerned with the identification of a defendant. In Bath
[1990] Crim LR 716 the English Court of Appeal held that where in
such a case there is evidence that at the relevant time the defendant
was with another person, the purported identification of the other
person should be the subject of a Turnbull direction.
623. Lord Widgery in Turnbull emphasised that when in the judgment of
the trial judge the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, as for
example when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer
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observation made in difficult conditions, the judge should withdraw
the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other
evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification. It
is the quality of the evidence that counts. If the quality is good the
case can, with the appropriate directions, be left to the jury even
though there is no other supporting evidence. If on the other hand the
quality of the evidence is poor and there is no evidence to support the
identification the judge should withdraw the case from the jury. See
paragraph 14-08 of May and Powles for examples of supporting
evidence of a visual identification. Odd coincidences can, if
unexplained, be supporting evidence. The judge should point out to
the jury evidence which is capable of supporting the identification.
The judge may direct the jury that the identification by one witness
can constitute support for the identification by another provided the
judge warns them that even a number of honest witnesses can all be
mistaken (Weeder (1980) 71 Cr App R 228). See also Barnes (1995) 2
Cr App R 491.
624. Consider carefully the position of false alibi and lies (Keane (1977)
65 Cr App R 247, Drake (1996) Crim LR 109 and Lucas [1981] QB
720). The judge should also warn the jury about circumstances which
the jury may think support an identification but which in fact do not
do so, for example the fact that the defendant has not given evidence
or the fact that the jury reject alibi evidence (Pemberton (1994) 99 Cr
App R 228). The judge must make it clear that it is for the jury to
decide whether they accept the evidence and, if they do, whether it in
fact supports the evidence of identification (Akaidere [1990] Crim LR
808).
625. Turnbull was intended primarily to deal with cases involving “fleeting
encounters” (Oakwell [1978] 1 WLR 32, 37). Where however, for
instance, one or two known people are responsible for an offence and
the issue is which of the two was the offender it is not appropriate to
apply Turnbull. In Hewitt [1978] RTR 174 the issue was who of two
known people in the car was driving the car. A Turnbull direction is
not necessary when the defendant’s presence at the scene of an
offence is admitted and the only issue is as to what he is doing. See
Slater [1995] 1 Cr App R 584, Oakwell [1978] 1 WLR 32 and
Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8 (Appeal Division judgment 20th August
2003). On the other hand a Turnbull direction will be necessary if
there is a possibility that a witness may have mistaken one person
(who was at the scene) for another. In Thornton [1995] Cr App R 578
the English Court of Appeal held that a warning was necessary in a
case where the defendant had admitted he was present at the scene but
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there were others similarly dressed also present and there was a
possibility that the witness may have mistaken the defendant for one
of them. In Cape [1996] 1 Cr App R 191 the English Court of Appeal
said that a Turnbull warning is not necessary where the only issue is
whether the witness is truthful or not. But in Shand [1996] 2 Cr App
R 204 the Privy Council said that, even where credibility is the sole
line of defence, the judge would normally have to tell the jury to
consider whether they are satisfied that the witness was not mistaken
in view of the dangers of mistake referred to in Turnbull.
626. A Turnbull direction is also necessary:
(1) if the prosecution rely chiefly on circumstantial evidence and,
only additionally, on evidence of visual identification (Spencer
[1995] Crim LR 235)
(2) where there are a number of identifications (all alleged to be
mistaken) which are said to support one another (Grant [1996]
2 Cr App R 272)
(3) where a person is seen on a video camera going into a place and
is arrested there shortly afterwards (Campbell [1996] Crim LR
500).
627. See Browning (1992) 94 Cr App R 109, 121-123 in respect of the
identification of motor cars.
628. In Maharaj v The State (Privy Council judgment delivered 8th May
2008) the trial judge did not give a detailed Turnbull direction. In that
case the complainant was the stepdaughter of the appellant and it was
not suggested that any other man had been present on the relevant
evenings. The Privy Council were of the view that the complaint that
the judge did not give the full Turnbull direction on identification was
wholly without merit. Lord Rodger stated at paragraph 9:
“So the challenge to the virtual complainant’s evidence was not so much that she
was mistaken in her identification of the appellant as her assailant, as that she had
fabricated the accusation against him.”
And at paragraph 10:
“In his summing-up the trial judge reminded the jury of the point put to the virtual
complainant, that it would have been dark in the room and difficult for her to see.
She had replied that the light was on in the kitchen and reflected into the
bedroom. He also reminded the jurors that she had said that, from 1996 to 1998,
she would see the petitioner almost every day. The judge told the jury that, in
these circumstances, it was up to them to decide whether they had any doubts
about the virtual complainant’s identification of the petitioner. If the jury accepted
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her evidence that these incidents had occurred on seven consecutive evenings,
then it seems utterly inconceivable that she could have been mistaken about the
identity of the man who came into her bed on those evenings. In that situation -
especially since it was not suggested that any other man had been in the house -
their Lordships are satisfied that the directions on identification were quite
adequate.”
629. The following are extracts from the majority judgment of the Privy
Council in Ronald John v The State of Trinidad and Tobago
(judgment delivered 16th March 2009):
“14 As a basic rule, an identification parade should be held whenever it would
serve a useful purpose… Plainly an identification parade serves a useful purpose
whenever the police have a suspect in custody and a witness who, with no
previous knowledge of the suspect, saw him commit the crime (or saw him in
circumstances relevant to the likelihood of his having done so, for example en
route to a robbery). Often, indeed usually, that is the position and, when it is, an
identification parade is not merely useful but, assuming it is practicable to hold
one, well-nigh imperative before the witness could properly give identifying
evidence. In such a case, Lord Hoffmann said in Goldson, “a dock identification
is unsatisfactory and ought not to be allowed,” although he added: “Unless the
witness had provided the police with a complete identification by name or
description, so as to enable the police to take the accused into custody, the
previous identification should take the form of an identification parade.”
15. At the opposite extreme lies a case where the suspect and the witness are
well known to each other and neither of them disputes this. It may be, of course,
that on the critical occasion when the witness saw the crime being committed (or,
for example, the person concerned en route), he thought it was the person he knew
but was mistaken as to this. An identification parade obviously cannot help in
this situation. Indeed, as Lord Hoffmann pointed out in Goldson, a parade then
would be not merely unnecessary but could be “positively misleading”:
“The witness will naturally pick out the person whom he knows and whom
he believes that he saw commit the crime. In fact, the evidence of the
parade might mislead the jury into thinking that it somehow confirmed the
identification, whereas all that it would confirm was the undisputed fact
that the witness knew the accused. It would not in any way lessen the
danger that the witness might have been mistaken in thinking that the
accused was the person who committed the crime. (sic)
16. A third situation arises when the witness claims to know the suspect but
the suspect denies this…
27. It by no means follows, however, that the failure to hold a parade here can
be regarded as having caused a miscarriage of justice…”
630. The following are extracts from the concurring judgment of Lord
Hoffmann in the Ronald John case :
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“35. There are three points upon which the Board is agreed. The first is that it
would have been better if there had been an identification parade. The second is
that the absence of a parade was not a ground for withdrawing the case from the
jury. That is important, because if it was fatal to the State’s case that the appellant
was not given the opportunity to demonstrate, by a failed identity parade, that
Lewis was lying or mistaken, then logically the case should have been stopped.
The third is that the judge gave the jury careful directions about assessing the
accomplice’s credibility and the possibility that even a credible witness might
make a mistaken identification.”
631. The following are extracts from the dissenting judgment of Baroness
Hale in the Ronald John case:
“42. The Board has held more than once in Caribbean cases that a parade
should be held unless it would serve no useful purpose …
44. The failure to hold an identification parade therefore deprived the accused
of the possibility (whether fanciful or not is a matter to which I will return) that
Mr Lewis would not have picked him out. (I appreciate that, had there been a
parade, and Mr Lewis had picked him out, the jury would have had to be given
some careful directions about that. But we are concerned with a different
situation.) What then is the consequence? In England and Wales, there would
have been a vigorous debate about whether the judge should have allowed the
accused to be identified in the dock or admitted evidence of the dock
identification in the committal proceedings. The test which appears in some of the
cases is whether the judge is sure that the witness knew the accused so well that
he would inevitably have picked him out: see R v Trevor Elton Gardner [2004]
EWCA Crim 1639. In the circumstances of this case, that would have been
difficult for him to conclude without knowing what the jury made of Mr Lewis’
evidence. But no-one questions that evidence of a dock identification is
admissible.
Once a dock identification was permitted, the jury should have been directed
about the circumstances in which an identification parade should have been held
and warned that the failure to hold one deprived the accused of the possibility of
an inconclusive parade…
48 In my view, therefore, thorough and careful though this summing up
undoubtedly was, it did not deal satisfactorily with the lack of an identification
parade and the potential advantage that this might have brought, whether or not
they believed that Mr Lewis did know the accused by sight beforehand.
52… The reality is that Mr Lewis provided the police with two clues which
enabled them to pick up the accused and after that no further steps were taken to
confirm that they were right. This was a serious failure in a case which depended
entirely upon the evidence of an accomplice. The majority may believe that the
possibility that the police had leapt to the wrong conclusion is so slim that there is
no risk of a miscarriage of justice. But this would not be the first time that the
police had, quite understandably, leapt to a conclusion which turned out to be
wrong. I may be more cynical than the majority, but I could not in all conscience
send a man to his death on that basis.”
289
632. See R v Chaney [2009] 1 Cr App R 35 in respect of CCTV
identification issues.
633. See Archbold paragraph 14-42 in respect of dock identifications. The
practice of inviting a witness to identify a defendant for the first time
when the defendant is in the dock has long been regarded as
undesirable (R v Cartwright 10 Cr App R 219). The judge however
retains a discretion to permit a dock identification. The authors of
Archbold submit that in practice the exercise of such discretion should
not even be considered unless:
(a) a defendant has (presumably unreasonably) refused to comply with
a formal request to attend an identification parade (John [1973] Crim
LR 113) and
(b) none of the other identification procedures has been carried out as
a result of the defendant’s default.
634. There may be cases where there is an issue of identification because
the witness had to pick out one person from two or more persons
known to him previously. In these circumstances a dock identification
may be proper (Fergus [1992] Crim LR 366 and May and Powles).
635. Where a witness volunteers a dock identification the summing up
should make it plain that such evidence is undesirable; that the proper
practice is to hold a parade; and that the evidence should be
approached with great care (Williams [1997] 1 WLR 548 Privy
Council and R v Graham [1994] Crim LR 212). If the jury is not
discharged the safer course would normally be to inform them why
such evidence is unreliable and to direct them to disregard it. See Pop
v The Queen [2003] UKPC 40, Holland v HM Advocate Times June
1st 2005 Privy Council and Pipersburgh v R 21st February 2008 Privy
Council. See also Young v The State (Privy Council judgment
delivered 6th May 2008) on the desirability of identification parades,
the undesirability of dock identifications and the necessary directions
to the jury on identification matters.
636. May and Powles state that the general principle is that unless there are
exceptional circumstances a witness should not be allowed to identify
a defendant for the first time in the dock. The reason is that the
witness might well be influenced in making an identification by the
sight of the defendant in the dock and therefore more likely to be
mistaken. See Hunter 1969 Crim LR 262, Howick [1970] Crim LR
403, Horsham JJ ex p Bukhari (1981) 74 Cr App R 291, Williams
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(1995) 159 JP 303, Barnes Times May 6th 1997, John [1973] Crim LR
113 and Caird The Times August 20th 1970. If counsel inadvertently
elicits a dock identification the judge should either discharge the jury
or consider a warning to jury in respect of the dangers. Juries are
frequently discharged if an inadvertent dock identification has taken
place.
637. If the prosecution apply to the court for leave to ask a witness to make
a dock identification consider the following. Evidence of dock
identification is legally admissible. There is however a discretion to
exclude it if the prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence outweighs
the probative value (See Horsham Justices ex p. Bukhari (1982) 74
Cr. App R 291).
638. Dock identifications are usually undesirable. See the judgment of the
Privy Council in Pipersburgh and Robateau v R (judgment delivered
21st February 2008). In that case prosecuting counsel adduced a total
of five dock identifications of the appellants who were charged with
murder. The police did not hold an identification parade for either of
the appellants. Lord Rodger at paragraph 6 stated:
“In the Lordships’ view, in a serious case such as the present, where the
identification of the perpetrators is plainly going to be a critical issue at any trial,
the balance of advantage will almost always lie in holding an identification
parade.”
639. Lord Rodger added:
“9. As Mr Fitzgerald very frankly admitted, his primary submission - that
evidence by way of a dock identification is inadmissible where the witness has
not previously attended an identification parade - flies in the face of what the
Board said in its judgment in Pop v The Queen [2003] UKPC 40. In that case, no
identification parade had been held and the dock identification of the appellant by
a witness, Adolophus, had occurred as a result of what appeared to have been a
slip by prosecuting counsel in formulating one of his questions. Against that
background, the Board said this, at para 9:
“First, the police held no identification parade and in consequence the
identification of the appellant was a dock identification. The failure to hold an
identification parade was contrary to the practice in Belize as explained by the
Court of Appeal in Myvett and Santos v The Queen (unreported) (9 May 1994,
Criminal Appeals Nos 3 and 4 of 1994):
‘The detailed code adopted in England for the holding of identification parades to
have suspects identified is intended to ensure that the identification of a suspect
by a witness takes place in circumstances where the recollection of the identifying
witness is tested objectively under safeguards by placing the suspect in a line
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made up of like looking suspects; the English procedure is in practice followed
here in Belize.’
The facts that no identification parade had been held and that Adolphus identified
the appellant when he was in the dock did not make his evidence on the point
inadmissible. It did mean, however, that in his directions to the jury the judge
should have made it plain that the normal and proper practice was to hold an
identification parade. He should have gone on to warn the jury of the dangers of
identification without a parade and should have explained to them the potential
advantage of an inconclusive parade to a defendant such as the appellant. For
these reasons, he should have explained, this kind of evidence was undesirable in
principle and the jury would require to approach it with great care: R v Graham
[1994] Crim LR 212 and Williams (Noel) v The Queen [1997] 1 WLR 548.”
10. Their Lordships see no reason to depart from their clear decision in Pop that
the facts that no identification parade had been held and that the witness identified
the appellant when he was in the dock did not make his identification evidence
inadmissible. They accordingly reject the first of the grounds of appeal advanced
by Mr Fitzgerald.”
640. At paragraph 16 of Pipersburgh the following is stated:
“ 16. The problems posed by dock identifications as opposed to identifications
carried out at an identification parade are well known and were summarised in
Holland 2005 SC (PC) 1, 17, at para 47:
“In the hearing before the Board the Advocate-depute, Mr Armstrong QC,
who dealt with this aspect of the appeal, accepted that identification
parades offer safeguards which are not available when the witness is asked
to identify the accused in the dock at his trial. An identification parade is
usually held much nearer the time of the offence when the witness’s
recollection is fresher. Moreover, placing the accused among a number of
stand-ins of generally similar appearance provides a check on the accuracy
of the witness’s identification by reducing the risk that the witness is
simply picking out someone who resembles the perpetrator. Similarly, the
Advocate-depute did not gainsay the positive disadvantages of an
identification carried out when the accused is sitting in the dock between
security guards: the implication that the prosecution is asserting that he is
the perpetrator is plain for all to see. When a witness is invited to identify
the perpetrator in court, there must be a considerable risk that his evidence
will be influenced by seeing the accused sitting in the dock in this way. So
a dock identification can be criticised in two complementary respects: not
only does it lack the safeguards that are offered by an identification
parade, but the accused’s position in the dock positively increases the risk
of a wrong identification.”
Allowing for any differences in practice, their Lordships consider that these
observations apply equally to the position in Belize.”
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641. Where there has been no identification parade in a case where such
should have taken place the trial judge must refer to the lack of the
identification parade and point out the advantages of such a parade.
The judge should stress in such a situation that the defendant has lost
the potential advantage of an inconclusive parade. In dock
identification cases the judge should warn the jury of the distinct and
positive dangers of a dock identification without a previous
identification parade. In particular the judge should draw to the jury’s
attention the risk that witnesses might have been influenced to make
their identifications by seeing the defendant in the dock. The judge
should stress that this type of identification evidence is undesirable in
principle and explain that they must approach it with great care. All
this, of course, assumes that the judge has decided not to discharge the
jury.
642. I turn now to consider issues concerning identification out of court. A
witness of an offence may very soon after it identify the offender. The
witness in these circumstances may be permitted to give evidence of
his previous identification and identify the offender in the dock. On
the other hand if there has been a lapse of time since the offence the
witness (depending on the circumstances) may identify the defendant
at a video identification, an identification parade, a ‘group’
identification or a confrontation. Police practice in relation to such
identification is governed by Code D issued under the Police Powers
and Procedures Act 1998.
643. The procedures set out in Code D are designed to test the witness’
ability to identify the person they saw on a previous occasion, and to
provide safeguards against mistaken identification.
644. Section 75 of the Police Powers and Procedures Act 1998 provides
that the Department of Home Affairs shall by order provide for codes
of practice in connection with numerous matters including
“identification of persons by police officers.” Section 76 of the Police
Powers and Procedures Act 1998 provides that a police officer shall
be liable to disciplinary proceedings for a failure to comply with any
provision of a Code. Moreover courts can take the provisions of a
Code into account if they are relevant to the determination of any
question arising in the proceedings.
645. The Police Powers and Procedures Codes (Amendment) Order 2007
came into operation on the 18th May 2007 and set out a new Code D
(Code of Practice for the identification of persons by police officers).
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646. Paragraph 2.0 of the Code provides that a record shall be made of the
description of the suspect as first given by a potential witness. This
must be done before the witness takes part in the forms of
identification listed in paragraph 2.1 or Annex E and a copy provided
to the suspect or his advocate before any such procedure is carried
out.
647. Paragraph 2.3 of the old Code provided that whenever a suspect
disputes an identification an identification parade shall be held if the
suspect consents unless certain paragraphs of the Code applied.
648. Under the new Code (paragraph 2.1) in a case which involves
disputed identification evidence and where the identity of the suspect
is known to the police and he is available the methods of
identification by witnesses which may be used are:
(i) a video identification
(ii) an identification parade
(iii) a group identification
(iv) a confrontation.
649. Paragraph 2.17 of Code D provides:-
“Circumstances in which an identification procedure must be held
2.17 Whenever:
(i) a witness has identified or purported to have identified a suspect prior to any
identification procedure set out in paragraphs 2.6 to 2.16 having been held; or
(ii) there is a witness available, who expresses an ability to identify the suspect, or
where there is a reasonable chance of the witness being able to do so, and the
witness has not been given an opportunity to identify the suspect under any of the
procedures set out in paragraphs 2.6 to 2.16,
and the suspect disputes being the person the witness claims to have seen, an
identification procedure shall be held unless it is not practicable or it would serve
no useful purpose in proving or disproving whether the suspect was involved in
committing the offence. For example, when it is not disputed that the suspect is
already well known to the witness who claims to have seen the suspect commit
the crime.”
650. In Forbes [2001] AC 473 the House of Lords held that under a
previous version of the Code an identification parade was necessary
where the suspect disputed identification evidence and consented to a
parade, the only exception being those expressed in the Code or in a
case of “pure recognition of someone well-known to the eye-witness.” A prior
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identification, however complete, was held not to mean that a parade
need not be held and a failure to hold a parade in such circumstances
could amount to a breach of the Code. May and Powles state that
under the version of the English Code in force until April 2002 in
most cases of disputed identification a parade was mandatory (see
footnote 78 on page 410 of May and Powles).
651. May and Powles say that following the amendment of the Code in
England there are conflicting views as to whether Forbes remains
applicable and whether a formal identification procedure is required
where the suspect has already been identified following a street
identification.
652. See May and Powles in respect of video identification procedure,
group identification or confrontation and street identifications.
653. When an identification procedure is required, in the interests of
fairness to both suspects and witnesses, it must be held as soon as
practicable.
654. In Smith (Privy Council judgment delivered 23rd June 2008) at
paragraph 26 it is indicated that even in jurisdictions where there are
not mandatory requirements for identification parades “it should be
regarded as desirable practice to hold an identification parade where there has
been an identification which is disputed by the suspect.” At paragraph 27 of
the judgment it was noted that if a parade is not held the court may
have to consider the effect of its absence on the fairness of the trial
and the safety of the conviction and in doing so it will have regard to
the strength of the prosecution case on the evidence adduced,
including the quality of the identification of the suspect by the
witness.
655. In Beveridge (1987) 85 Cr App R 255 the court said that when a point
is taken on an identification parade the trial judge must consider the
depositions, statements and submissions of counsel but the court also
said that there may be occasions (which will be very rare) when the
judge may think it desirable to hold a trial within a trial. In Martin
and Nichols [1994] Crim LR 218 the English Court of Appeal said
that the trial judge should not determine issues of fact but make an
objective assessment.
656. In accordance with their duty of disclosure the prosecution should
disclose the notes relating to an identification procedure. It is also
normal for the police to disclose any description of an offender given
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by a witness and any photograph of the defendant taken on arrest (See
Fergus (1994) 98 Cr App R 313 and Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R1).
657. See page 422 onwards of May and Powles in respect of evidence of
out of court identification. See in particular Christie [1914] AC 545,
Osbourne and Virtue [1973] 1 QB 678 and McCay [1990] 1 WLR
645.
658. See May and Powles page 425 onwards in respect of the use of
photographs for identification, page 428 in respect of admissibility of
identification based on photographic images, and page 429 in respect
of admissibility of photofits and sketches.
659. As to other forms of identification refer to May and Powles at page
431 onwards in respect of identification by fingerprints and at page
432 onwards in respect of identification by DNA.
660. As to possession of incriminating articles as evidence of identity see
May and Powles at page 435 onwards and see page 436 onwards in
respect of voice identification and pages 437-439 in respect of
miscellaneous identification cases.
661. Specimen Direction 30 of the Specimen Directions of the Judicial
Studies Board provides as follows:
“30. Visual Identification
The case against the defendant depends [wholly][to a large extent] on the
correctness of one [or more] identification[s] of him which he alleges to be
mistaken. To avoid the risk of any injustice in this case, such as has happened in
some cases in the past, I must therefore warn you of the special need for caution
before convicting the defendant in reliance on the evidence of identification. A
witness who is convinced in [his][her] own mind may as a result be a convincing
witness, but may nevertheless be mistaken. [The same may apply to a number of
witnesses.] [Add if and as appropriate: Mistakes can also be made in the
recognition of someone known to a witness, even of a close friend or relative.]
You should therefore examine carefully the circumstances in which the
identification [by each witness] was made. For how long did he have the person
he says was the defendant under observation? At what distance? In what light?
Did anything interfere with the observation? Had the witness ever seen the person
he observed before? If so, how often? If only occasionally, had he any special
reason for remembering him? How long was it between the original observation
and the identification to the police? Is there any marked difference between the
description given by the witness to the police when he was first seen by them, and
the appearance of the defendant?
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(If appropriate:) I must remind you of the following specific weaknesses which
appeared in the identification evidence ...
Notes
1. See R v Turnbull 63 Cr App R 132.
2. The importance of the rules laid down in R v Turnbull was emphasised
by Lord Lane CJ in R v Clifton [1986] Crim LR 399.
The basic principle is the special need for caution when the issue turns on
evidence of visual identification. The summing-up in such cases must not only
contain a warning but expose to the jury the weaknesses and dangers of
identification evidence both in general and in the circumstances of the particular
case. Turnbull is intended, primarily, to deal with the 'ghastly risk' in cases of
fleeting encounters: see Lord Widgery CJ in R v Oakwell 66 Cr App R 174 and
also R v Pattinson and Exley [1996] 1 Cr App R 51. The rule is equally applicable
to police witnesses: see R v Reid 90 Cr App R 121, PC.
3. Where the quality of the identifying evidence is poor the judge should
withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other
evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification. See R v
Fergus (Ivan) 98 Cr App R 313, CA. The identification evidence can be poor,
even though given by a number of witnesses. They may all have had only the
opportunity of a fleeting glance or a longer observation made in difficult
conditions. Where, however, the quality is such that the jury can safely be left to
assess its value, even though there is no other evidence to support it, the trial
judge is entitled (if so minded) to direct the jury that an identification by one
witness can constitute support for the identification by another, provided that he
warns them in clear terms that even a number of honest witnesses can all be
mistaken: see R v Weeder 71 Cr App R 228 and R v Breslin 80 Cr App R 226. The
judge should identify the evidence he regards as capable of supporting the
evidence of identification.
4. In R v Etienne (1990) The Times, 16 February, the court was not at all
sure that previous sightings of the suspect could render the identification more
reliable if the identification was, on any view, an identification amounting to no
more than a fleeting glimpse recognition. The court was left with a lurking doubt
as to the safety of the conviction.
5. Such a direction is not required in every case, e.g. where the
identification is not challenged or where it is not regarded by the judge as
requiring supportive evidence. See R v Deeble, unreported (836461B82) and R v
Penman 82 Cr App R 44. Neither is such a direction required when the
identification is by description rather than by facial features - see eg R v Doldur
[2000] Crim LR 178 and R v Gayle [1999] 2 Crim App R 131. See also R v Byrne,
unreported (98/02206/W3).
6. Where identification involves recognition, remind the jury that mistakes
in recognition, even of close friends and relatives are sometimes made. As to the
cumulative effect of a number of identifying witnesses, see R v Barnes [1995] 2
Cr App R 491.
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7. Care should be taken in directing about support to be derived from the
jury's rejection of an alibi. There may be many reasons for putting forward a false
alibi. Alibi witnesses may be genuinely mistaken as to dates, etc. Only if satisfied
that the sole reason for the fabrication was to deceive them, may the jury find
support for poor identification evidence. The mere fact that the defendant has lied
about his whereabouts does not of itself prove that he was where the identifying
witness said he was.
8. R v Galbraith 73 Cr App R 124 was not intended to affect in any way
the Turnbull guidelines as to the withdrawal of a case dependent upon poor
identifying evidence: see R v Fisher, unreported, (835923C82).
9. For the relationship between the Turnbull directions and (now
discretionary) directions on corroboration in sexual cases where identification is
in issue, see the important case of R v Chance 87 Cr App R 398 and R v Barnes
[1995] 2 Cr App R 491. See Note replacing the Corroboration direction, page
21.2, ante.
10. As to the obligation to hold an identity parade after a street
identification see R v Forbes [2002] 1 Crim App R 1. Wherever evidence is
admitted, despite a breach of the Codes, the jury should be informed of the breach
and directed to take it into account along with the other evidence in the case: see
Archbold (2003) 14-33b and 41. Note the new provisions relating to identification
procedures under PACE Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Temporary Modifications
to Code D) Order 2002 (in force 1 April 2002).
11. As to identification by comparison of a defendant with a film or
photograph from the crime scene, see the useful summary in AG's Reference (No
2 of 2002) The Times, 17 October.”
“30a. Identification by DNA
In R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Crim App R 369 at p 375, Phillips LJ gave the
following guidance on summing-up in a DNA case:
The judge should explain to the jury the relevance of the random occurrence ratio
in arriving at their verdict and draw attention to the extraneous evidence which
provides the context which gives that ratio its significance, and that which
conflicts with the conclusion that the defendant was responsible for the crime
stain. In so far as the random occurrence ratio is concerned, a direction along
these lines may be appropriate, although any direction must always be tailored to
the facts of the particular case:
'Members of the jury, if you accept the scientific evidence called by the Crown,
this indicates that there are probably only four or five white males in the United
Kingdom from whom that semen stain could have come. The defendant is one of
them. If that is the position, the decision you have to reach, on all the evidence, is
whether you are sure that it was the defendant who left that stain or whether it is
possible that it was one of that other small group of men who share the same
DNA characteristics.'”
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“30b. Identification by Fingerprints
The effect of R v Giles, unreported (97/05495/W2), R v Charles, unreported
(98/00104/Z2) and R v Buckley (1999) The Times, 12 May [1999] 6 Archbold
News 4 is to allow the admission of fingerprint evidence where the number of
matching characteristics is less than 16. In Buckley Rose LJ laid down the
following guidelines:
(a) If there are fewer than 8 similar ridge characteristics, it is highly
unlikely that the judge will admit such evidence. Save in wholly exceptional
circumstances, the Crown should not seek to adduce such evidence.
(b) If there are 8 or more similar characteristics, a judge may allow the
evidence to be admitted. How the discretion will be exercised will depend on all
the circumstances of the case, including:
(i) the experience and expertise of the witness;
(ii) the number of similar ridge characteristics;
(iii) whether there are dissimilar characteristics; and
(iv) the size, quality and clarity of the print relied on.
(c) In every case where the evidence is admitted and challenged, it will
generally be necessary to warn the jury that it is evidence of opinion, that the
evidence is not conclusive, and that it is for the jury to determine guilt or
otherwise in the light of all the evidence.”
“30c. Identification by Voice
In R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 and R v Gummerson and Steadman [1999]
Crim LR 680, the Court of Appeal held that in cases of identification by voice, the
judge should direct the jury by the careful application of a suitably adapted
Turnbull direction (see Direction 30). See also 'Sounds Familiar' by David
Ormerod [2001] Crim L R 595, in particular at page 619.
In R v Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183, the Court of Appeal referred to academic
research indicating that voice identification was more difficult that visual
identification, and concluding that the warning given to jurors should be even
more stringent than that given in relation to visual identification.
It is clear from these authorities that it is not necessary to hold a voice
identification procedure to render admissible evidence of identification by voice.
In R v Doherty [2003] 1 Crim App R 77 (Northern Ireland Court of Appeal) it was
held that where the prosecution rely on voice identification, expert evidence both
of auditory and of acoustic analysis should normally be adduced.”
662. See R v Flynn [2008] EWCA Crim 970 in respect of voice recognition
evidence.
663. In R v Kempster (English Court of Appeal Criminal Division Times
16th May 2008) it was held that evidence of those experienced in
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comparing ear-prints was capable of being relevant and admissible
but such comparison would provide information which could identify
the person who had left it on a surface only when sufficient minutiae
could be identified and matched.
Breaches of codes of practice
664. In R v Shillito 2001-03 MLR 356 Deemster Kerruish considered the
position where there had been a significant and substantial breach of
Code C and excluded certain parts of the evidence under section 13 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1991. See also the Appeal Division’s
judgment in Openshaw (judgment delivered 28th September 2000).
665. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 provides:
“13 Exclusion of unfair evidence
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which
the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court
that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of
the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court
to exclude evidence.”
666. Consider Ironside 1999-01 MLR 177, Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8
(Appeal Division judgment 20th August 2003), Sayle 2005-06 MLR
196, Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473 and Slater (judgment delivered 24th
March 2009).
667. May and Powles state that a breach of Code D may lead to the
exclusion of evidence of identification if its admission would have an
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. This was accepted
by the English Court of Appeal without argument in Gall (1990) 90
Cr App R 64. In that case there was a breach of the Code and the
Court of Appeal held that the evidence of identification should have
been excluded. In Jones (1994) 158 JP 293, however, the English
Court of Appeal emphasised that Code D set out practices to be
followed by the police and was not concerned directly with the
admissibility of evidence, even though the consequences of a breach
of the Code might be the exclusion of the evidence. Accordingly the
fact that there have been breaches of the Code is not conclusive as to
whether evidence of identification will be admitted or not. While the
importance of compliance with the Code could not be over-
emphasised, failure to comply with it is not necessarily fatal in every
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case (Kelly (1998) 162 JP 231). This will depend on the nature of the
breach and all the circumstances.
668. May and Powles submit that if the police have deliberately flouted the
Code so as to make any identification inherently unfair, the
identification should be excluded.
669. In Finley [1993] Crim LR 50 the police persistently breached the
Code (the Court of Appeal suspected deliberately). The Court held
that the judge should have withdrawn the case from the jury at the
close of the prosecution.
670. Even in cases of accidental non-compliance with the Code by police,
in certain circumstances, it will be right to exclude the identification
evidence (Lennon 63 Jo Crim L 459).
671. But not every breach of the Code will lead to exclusion of evidence of
identification. In Gammell (1990) 90 Cr App R 149 procedures
relating to group identification were not followed. The Court of
Appeal said that simply because there was a breach of the Code it did
not mean that the evidence was inadmissible. It was important to see
whether any unfairness followed from the evidence.
672. In DPP v D The Times August 7th 1998 a witness identified two
suspects before during and after the commission of an offence : he
then described them to the police by reference to their clothing and
approximate age. Acting on this information the police arrested the
defendants at the scene. One suspect asked for an identification
parade but none was held in breach of the Code. The justices admitted
evidence of this “informal identification.” The Divisional Court held that
the breach was not of such substance, having regard to the nature of
the identification evidence, as to cause unjust prejudice to the
defendant. The Court observed that there never was an actual
identification to the police and the holding of a parade would serve no
useful purpose since nothing of what the witness had seen could
usefully be challenged on a parade.
673. Even if there has been a substantial breach of the Code a judge may
admit the evidence of identification in the exercise of his discretion.
In Ryan [1992] Crim LR 187 the trial judge found that there had been
a ‘major’ breach of Code D but admitted the evidence in the exercise
of his discretion.
674. May and Powles state:
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“In exercising discretion … the court must take into account the relevant
provisions of the Code, and all the circumstances of the case. It is otherwise not
possible to lay down general rules for the exercise of discretion: it will depend on
the nature of the breach and the circumstances of the particular case. A technical
breach which had no effect on the reliability of the identification will hardly lead
to exclusion. On the other hand, it is submitted that if a breach caused the parade
to be so unfair that no identification could be properly relied on, the court should
exclude it.”
675. The Court of Appeal has said that it will not interfere with the
exercise of the judge’s discretion unless it is satisfied that no
reasonable judge, having heard the evidence, could have reached the
conclusion that he did (Quinn [1995] 1 Cr App R 480, 489). The
judge should give reasons for admitting the evidence when breaches
of the Code were admitted or proved (Allen [1995] Crim LR 643).
676. In Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473 the House of Lords held that in any case
where a breach of Code D had been established and the trial judge has
refused to exclude the evidence the judge in summing up should (a)
explain to the jury that there has been a breach (forcefully if needs be)
and how it has arisen, and (b) invite the jury to consider the possible
effect of that breach. The terms of the appropriate direction will vary
from case to case and breach to breach. But where the breach relates
to the failure to hold an identification parade the jury should
ordinarily be told that an identification parade enables a suspect to put
the reliability of an eye-witness’s identification to the test and that the
suspect has lost the benefit of that safeguard, so that the jury should
take account of that failure in its assessment of the case giving it such
weight as it thinks fair.
677. The following are further relevant extracts from the judgment of the
Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Doyle) in
Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8, delivered on the 20th August 2003:
“27. Paragraph 2-3 of Code D [`Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons
by Police Officers`] of the Codes of Practice made under the Police Powers and
Procedures Act 1998 provides that :
`Whenever a suspect disputes an identification, an identification parade shall be
held if the suspect consents unless paragraphs 2.4 or 2.7 or 2.10 apply. A parade
may also be held if the officer in charge of the investigation considers that it
would be useful and the suspect consents`
28. It is thus clear that the holding of an identification parade is only mandatory
where a suspect `disputes an identification` : in all other cases it is discretionary.
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29. It is agreed that the police held no identification parade in respect of the
Appellant. The Appellant contends, and it is not disputed, that at all times she was
willing to consent to the holding of an identification parade.
30. Miss Hannan submitted that notwithstanding that the Appellant admitted her
presence at the incident, because she disputed that she was involved in the assault
on Mr Griffin, there was an obligation on the police, pursuant to paragraph 2-3, to
hold an identification parade.
31. The Acting Deemster rejected this submission. In her directions to the jury,
she stated :
`Detective Constable Pearson described himself as being the Officer in the case.
He said that so far as he was concerned, he was not aware that there was any
question of identification. He accepted that there was a code of practice which
said that if identification is in issue, an identification [parade] shall take place. But
he said as Michelle Williams was admitting [the] fact that she was the only
woman … up on the colonnade he did not consider that she was, in effect, calling
in question the identification, merely denying that she`d done what the witness
had said the witness had seen. … As a matter of law, I rule that there is no breach
of the code of practice, but of course you take into account in Mrs Williams`
favour that Miss Middlesborough did not have an opportunity subsequently to see
whether she could identify the woman and you will remember the description of
the clothes that was given was of the woman wearing [a] blue tracksuit with white
stripes and we know from other evidence that that does not appear to be what Mrs
Williams was wearing.`
32. In our judgment Miss Hannan`s submission fails on the simple ground that the
Appellant was not disputing her identification. If the Appellant had denied being
present when the assault on Mr Griffin took place, she would have been disputing
the identification of any witness who contended that she was so present, and there
would have been an obligation to hold an identification parade. However, the
mere fact that the Appellant disputed committing the act alleged to constitute the
offence did not trigger the provisions of paragraph 2-3. Were it otherwise the
holding of an identification parade would be mandatory in most cases where a
defendant denied his guilt, albeit that the purpose of an identification parade is to
establish presence and not the degree of participation. Such is not the law - see R
v Chen [2001] EWCA Crim 885 : a person who admits presence at the scene of
criminal activity but denies criminal participation therein, is not disputing
identification for the purposes of Code D.
33. It follows that we agree with the Acting Deemster`s ruling.”
Refreshing memory
678. A witness giving evidence may refresh his memory by reference to
any writing, concerning the facts to which he testifies, made or
verified by himself at a time when his memory was clear (See
Archbold 2004 at paragraph 8-74 and AG’s Ref (No 3 of 1979) 69 Cr
App R 411).
303
679. An alternative (common) way of stating the rule is to say that the
writing must have been made contemporaneously with the events.
680. A witness can also, in certain circumstances, be permitted to refresh
his memory from previous statements made when his memory was
clearer even though such a statement was not “contemporaneous.”
681. The courts must take care not to deprive themselves by artificial rules
of the best chances of learning the truth.
682. Testimony in the witness box becomes more a test of memory than of
truthfulness if witnesses are deprived of the opportunity of refreshing
their memories in the witness box from statements or notes made
when the events were clear in the mind.
683. The memory may be refreshed from a document in court in front of
the witness. It would be unusual to allow an adjournment for the
witness to consider the document outside court.
684. “Contemporaneous” is a matter of fact and degree. The mere fact that
the note was not written at the first available opportunity does not
mean that if fails the test of contemporaneity. The true test is that the
document must have been written (or checked) either at the time of
the transaction or so shortly afterwards that the facts were still fresh in
the witness’s memory. The definition provides a measure of elasticity
and should not be taken to confine witnesses to an over-short period.
Recent complaints in criminal cases
685. The general rule is that a witness may not seek to confirm or
strengthen his evidence by saying in the witness box that he has made
a similar statement on a previous occasion.
686. One of the exceptions to the rule is where complaints are made at an
early opportunity, in sexual cases known as “recent complaints.” See
May and Powles Criminal Evidence 5th Edition chapter 20. The
following, in the main, is taken from that chapter.
687. In cases of rape, indecent assault and other sexual offences evidence
that the complainant made a complaint is admissible to show that the
complainant’s conduct in complaining was:
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(a) consistent with the complainant’s evidence in the witness
box; and
(b) (if consent is in issue) inconsistent with her consent to the
actions complained of.
688. It should be borne in mind that the evidence of complaint is only
admissible to show consistency. Such evidence is not admissible as
evidence of the facts complained of.
689. It follows that the judge must direct the jury that the evidence should
not be treated as evidence of the facts complained of but used only for
the purpose mentioned (i.e. to show consistency).
690. The Judicial Studies Board standard direction which was approved by
the English Court of Appeal in Islam [1999] 1 Cr App R 22 is to the
effect that the evidence may help the jury decide whether the
complainant has told them the truth but it cannot be independent
confirmation of the complainant’s evidence since it does not come
from a source independent of the complainant.
691. Note that in England the position is now governed by section 120 of
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Under that section a complaint of any
offence is now admissible as evidence of the matters complained of if
certain conditions are met and certain kinds of previous statements are
also available of the truth of their contents if certain conditions are
met. If the previous statement was made in a document which
becomes an exhibit it must not accompany the jury when they retire to
consider their verdict unless the court considers it appropriate or all
the parties agree that it should (see section 122).
692. The August 2000 Specimen Direction 31 of the Judicial Studies Board
provided as follows:
“31. Sexual Offence, Recent Complaint
In R v Islam, [1999] 1 Crim App R 22 and in R v NK [1999] Crim LR 980, the
Court of Appeal stated the need to direct the jury on the evidential significance of
a complaint in a sexual case. In White v The Queen [1999] 1 Crim App R 153, it
was emphasised that there must be evidence of the complaint from a third party
who heard the complaint being made…
You have heard evidence that shortly after this alleged incident X made a
complaint to Y [her mother, a passer-by, the police etc]. This is not evidence as to
what actually happened between X and the defendant. Y was not present, and did
not see what happened between them. It is evidence which you are entitled to
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consider because it may help you to decide whether or not X has told you the
truth. [The prosecution say that her complaint is consistent with her account and
therefore she is more likely to be truthful. On the other hand the defence say …] I
It is for you to decide whether the evidence of this complaint helps you to reach a
decision, but it is important that you should understand that the complaint is not
independent evidence of what happened between X and the defendant, and it
therefore cannot of itself prove that the complaint is true.
Notes
1. The admissibility of a complaint depends upon proof of the facts by other
evidence: see R v Wright and Ormerod 90 Cr App R 91, CA.
2. If the complaint is one to the emergency services it will likely have been
recorded, and the recording itself may constitute ‘primary evidence’ of the
complainant’s condition.”
693. In R v Birks [2003] Crim LR 401 the appellant was charged with three
counts of indecent assault and one count of indecency with a child.
The complainant who was 19 at the time of the trial gave evidence
that she was sexually abused by the appellant for a period of about 12
months when she was six or seven years old. She said in evidence in
chief that she first made complaint to her mother some two months
after the last incident but in cross examination said it could have been
up to six months after the last incident. She explained how she had
been watching a programme on television with her mother about child
abuse and this acted as a catalyst and she told her mother. Her mother
gave evidence and said she thought the complaint related to events
that had finished one year before. The judge basing himself on
Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 held that the complaint was
admissible because it had been made at the first reasonable
opportunity. The appellant was convicted and appealed. The Crown
argued that in light of new understanding of the difficulties facing
victims of sexual abuse in speaking to other people of the abuse to
which they had been subjected the courts should be readier than
perhaps they were in the past to accept that complaints had been made
as soon as reasonably possible even if that was not until months or
even years later. It was held:
“allowing the appeal, that although there was sympathy for the Crown’s
submissions, in the current state of the law it was not possible to extend the test of
a complaint being made in a reasonable time as far as the Crown urged. The
language that had been used in the authorities, regarding whether a complaint had
been made in a reasonable time, had all referred to times of delay which were
very short indeed. The doctrine of recent complaint had developed as an
exception to the doctrine that evidence of previous consistent statements, whether
of witnesses for the prosecution or the defence, was not permitted. As a matter of
authority, the test that a complaint had to be made “within a reasonable time of
the alleged offence” could not be understood to mean that it had to be made
“within a reasonable time of the alleged offence whether the complaint was recent
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or not”. If the law were to be allowed to develop in the way put forward by the
Crown, then the classic directions given to the jury in this context would also
have to be developed. Accordingly, with some reluctance, it was concluded that
the judge had erred in this case in admitting the evidence in the first place and, a
fortiori, in not discharging the jury once it emerged that the time in question was
perhaps a year. Cases considered: Lillyman [1896] 2 Q.B. 167, Cummings [1948]
1 All ER. 551 and Valentine [1996] 2 Cr.App.R. 213.
Per curiam: It would be preferable if the law could be developed in the way
argued for by the Crown because it was undesirable for juries to be kept in the
dark as to what had happened between the time, sometimes many years in the
past, of the alleged abuse and the time at which they were trying the case. If
complaints, even if not recent complaints, had come forward in circumstances
which were safe to put before the jury for their evaluation, then that should
happen and it would be for the jury, subject to proper directions, to decide what
they made of a proper narrative of events which would explain to them how it was
that the charges put before them for their decision arose when they did, either
against the background, depending on the facts of the case, of a complete silence
of decades, however that was explained, or against some other possibly highly
significant background.”
694. Consider whether a more robust approach could be taken under Manx
common law which favours all relevant and admissible evidence
going before the jury and the jury being trusted to use their common
sense.
695. Both the fact of the complaint and the terms in which it was made
may be proved (Lilyman (1896) 2 QB 167). This is for the purpose of
enabling the jury to judge for themselves whether the conduct of the
complainant was consistent with her evidence on oath.
696. Evidence of a complaint is not admissible if the complainant gives no
evidence about the matter complained of (Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr
App R 153 and Wright and Ormerod (1987) 90 Cr App R 91).
697. Conversely evidence of a previous complaint is not admissible from
the complainant unless the person to whom the complaint was made
gives evidence (White [1999] 1 AC 210 Privy Council). Accordingly
not only must the complainant testify as to the making of the
complaint but the recipient should prove its terms.
698. In order to be admissible, the complaint must have been made at the
first reasonable opportunity. The complaint must be “recent.” It is a
matter for the court to determine whether the complaint was made as
speedily as could reasonably be expected (Cummings [1948] 1 All ER
551). May and Powles add at page 581:
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“Circumstances in this sort of case will vary. Thus in one case a complaint made
after a day had elapsed was rejected (Rush (1896) 60 JP 777); in another, a
complaint made after a week had elapsed was admitted (Hedges (1909) 3 Cr App
R 262). Generally, however, complaints of more than a week old will not be held
admissible (Birks [2003] Crim LR 401).”
699. In Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 the English Court of Appeal said
that a complaint can be recent and admissible although not made at
the first opportunity which presented itself, provided it is made at the
first reasonable opportunity. At 223 the English Court of Appeal
stated:
“What is the first reasonable opportunity will depend on the circumstances
including the character of the complainant and the relationship between the
complainant and the person to whom she complained and the persons to whom
she might have complained but did not do so.”
700. There is no reason to prevent more than one complaint being admitted
if both were made within a reasonable time (Lee (1911) 7 Cr App R
31). However this does not allow the prosecution to adduce evidence
of several complaints made in similar terms, where to do so would be
prejudicial since it might lead a jury to consider the contents of the
complaints to be evidence of the truth of what they asserted
(Valentine).
701. The complaint must be voluntary in the sense that it was not made as
a result of “leading, inducing or intimidating questions” (Osborne [1905] I
KB 551, Norcott [1917] 1 KB 347). Questions such as “Did x assault
you” would render the answers inadmissible but neutral questions such
as “why are you crying” would not. Whether or not the complaint is
voluntary is a matter to be determined by the trial judge.
702. The evidence of the recent complaint is usually given by the person to
whom it was made: the complainant’s own evidence to this effect is of
little value in showing consistency.
703. If such evidence is given by the complainant, (query admissible on its
own? See White, Wallwork and Wright and Ormerod ) the judge must
give the jury a careful direction as to its limited value (White, The
Times, September 25 1998).
704. In R v D [2008] EWCA Crim 2557 the English Court of Appeal dealt
with delayed complaints and approved the following direction (the
very general terms of which need to be tailored to the facts of each
case):
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“Experience shows that people react differently to the trauma of a serious sexual
assault. There is no one classic response. The defence say the reason that the
complainant did not report this until her boyfriend returned from Dubai ten days
after the incident is because she has made up a false story. That is a matter for
you. You may think that some people may complain immediately to the first
person they see, whilst others may feel shame and shock and not complain for
some time. A late complaint does not necessarily mean it is a false complaint.
That is a matter for you.”
705. Consider also the abrogation of corroboration rules. Section 56(1) of
the Criminal Justice Act 2001 provides that any requirement whereby
at a trial on information it is obligatory for the court to give the jury a
warning about convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence
of a person merely because the person is (a) an alleged accomplice of
the accused or (b) where the offence charged is a sexual offence, the
person in respect of whom it is alleged to have been committed, is
hereby abrogated.
Hostile witnesses
706. Section 10 of the Evidence Act 1871 under the title “How a party may
contradict his own witness” provides that:
“A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by
general evidence of bad character, but he may, in case the witness shall, in the
opinion of the Court, prove adverse, contradict him by other evidence, or, by
leave of the Court, prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent
with his present testimony; but before such last-mentioned proof can be given, the
circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular
occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not
he has made such statement.”
(similar to section 3 of English Criminal Procedure Act 1865 –
Denman’s Act).
707. See also sections 11 (proof of contradictory statements of adverse
witness), 12 (cross examination as to previous statements in writing),
13 (proof of previous conviction of a witness may be given) and 14
(impeachment of credit of witness by evidence as to character) of the
Evidence Act 1871.
708. See Archbold at paragraph 8-94.
709. Before any question arises under the Act counsel and the Deemster
should keep in mind the possibility of the witness being allowed to
refresh his memory from his witness statement.
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710. The question of the hostility of a witness should be determined as a
result of his answers and demeanour when being questioned in the
presence of the jury.
711. The word “adverse” means “hostile” and not merely “unfavourable”.
712. See also Article 147 of Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence. If a
witness called by a party to prove a particular fact in issue or relevant
to the issue fails to prove such fact or proves an opposite fact the party
calling him may contradict him by calling other evidence and is not
thereby precluded from relying on those parts of such witnesses’
evidence as he does not contradict. If a witness appears to the judge to
be hostile to the party calling him, that is to say, not desirous of telling
the truth to the court at the instance of the party calling him the judge
may in his discretion permit his examination by such party to be
conducted in the manner of a cross examination to the extent to which
the judge considers necessary for the purpose of doing justice. Such a
witness may by leave of the judge be cross-examined as to (1) facts in
issue or relevant or deemed to be relevant to the issue (2) matters
affecting his accuracy, veracity or credibility as to the particular
circumstances of the case; and as to (3) whether he has made any
former statement, oral or written, relative to the subject-matter of the
proceedings and inconsistent with his present testimony. In the case of
a witness who is treated as hostile proof of former statements oral or
written made by him inconsistent with his present testimony may by
leave of the judge be given.
713. To be inconsistent the statement need not be directly or absolutely at
variance.
714. It is possible to treat a witness as hostile at any stage of his evidence
including re-examination. Hostility may be indicated by inconsistent
statements, or a witness who is reluctant to say anything, or professes
to have forgotten what happened.
715. The judge has a discretion at common law. See for example R v
Thompson 64 Cr App R 96, CA. Where a witness having been sworn
answers certain preliminary questions and then indicates he is not
going to give evidence that witness may be treated as hostile.
716. If a witness by his conduct in the witness box during examination in
chief shows himself decidedly adverse it is always in the discretion of
the judge to allow cross examination.
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717. In each particular case there must be some discretion in the presiding
judge as to the mode in which the examination shall be conducted in
order to best answer the purpose of justice.
718. At common law a previous inconsistent statement is not evidence of
the truth of its contents. As to the obvious need for caution when
assessing the weight to be attached to the statements of a person who
has said different things on different occasions see Archbold 2006 at
paragraph 8-101 and R v Maw [1994] Crim L R 841. See R v
Bilingham English Court of Appeal Criminal Division 23 January
2009 to the effect that in England it is sufficient that the jury conclude
that a previous inconsistent statement exculpatory of a defendant
might be true they do not have to be sure it was true.
719. In R v Greene [2009] EWCA Crim 2282 the English Court of Appeal
held that where a judge ruled that a witness could be treated as hostile
at trial by the party calling him but that witness did not in the event
prove to be hostile, the judge still had to warn the jury to approach
that witness’s evidence with caution, and the nature of that direction
depended on the particular circumstances of the case. In Greene the
judge should, without making reference to hostility, have advised the
jury to treat the witness’s evidence with caution in light of the
different accounts he gave, albeit that he ultimately reverted to his
original account.
Vulnerable witnesses
720. Counsel should consider the relevant Acts, Rules and authorities in
relation to the steps that may have to be taken in respect of vulnerable
witnesses. Counsel should make prompt applications for any
necessary arrangements in respect of vulnerable witnesses well in
advance of the trial and ensure in liaison with court administration
that the appropriate facilities are put in place. See the relevant
provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1990 (in particular section 27)
and the relevant rules including the Criminal Jurisdiction (Television
Link and Video Evidence) Rules 1993 as amended.
721. In respect of hearings involving children endeavour to keep the
procedure simple and unintimidating, less formal, wigs off, explain
the position clearly and take frequent breaks. See Archbold at
paragraph 4-96a onwards and the relevant authorities including T v
UK, V v UK 30 EHRR 121 and Practice Direction [2007] 1 WLR
1790. The authorities indicate that similar procedures may be adopted
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to cover adults suffering from mental disorder or some other
significant impairment of intelligence or social function.
722. Consider whether young witness can understand the questions put and
give answers that can be understood. Consider whether the child
understands the duty of telling the truth (R v MacPherson [2006] 1 Cr
App R 30).
723. In respect of the competence of young complainants see R v Powell
[2006] 1 Cr App R 31 and R v MacPherson [2006] 1 Cr App R 30.
See R v Hanton [2005] EWCA Crim 2009 and R v K (Howard)
[2006] EWCA Crim 472 in respect of the test in relation to the
standard of conduct of an interview with a minor and the requirement
to give guidance to the jury on any breaches of the guidelines.
724. In respect of the video recording of evidence in chief of vulnerable
witnesses even where there has been breaches of good practice
consider whether the witness has given a credible and accurate
account (R v K (Howard) [2006] EWCA Crim 472).
725. Counsel should take especial care in relation to dealing with and
questioning young children and other vulnerable witnesses.
726. Section 77 of the Children and Young Persons Act 2001 provides that
the child’s evidence in criminal proceedings shall be given unsworn.
Section 3 of the Interpretation Act 1976 provides that a child is a
person under 14 and a young person is a person who has reached the
age of 14 but is not 17.
727. Counsel should address the court on any appropriate directions. The
court should endeavour to put the young witness at ease and to
ascertain that the witness knows the difference between the truth and
a lie and that the important thing is the need to tell the truth. The court
should also stress that it is important not to leave anything out when
answering questions. If the witness does not understand a question the
witness should not hesitate to say so. It is important that the witness
does not guess the answers to questions. Regular breaks should be
taken. See the Judicial Studies Board’s publication Fairness in Courts
and Tribunals July 2004 page 3.
728. The full name and age of witness should be given. Counsel should be
introduced. The Deemster should check who is in the room with the
witness. The Deemster should ask the witness whether the witness
knows what telling a lie means and that telling a lie is wrong. The
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Deemster should endeavour to put the witness at ease without being
patronising or condescending. The Deemster and counsel should
speak in a language that the witness can understand.
729. Advocates should not attempt over-vigorous cross examination of
vulnerable witnesses. Advocates should use language which is free
from jargon and which is appropriate to the age of the child. The
questions should be kept short and simple and the witness should be
given an opportunity to respond. Counsel should not engage in
repetitive questioning.
730. See English Criminal Justice System Home Office Report Achieving
Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on Interviewing
Victims and Witnesses, and Using Special Measures.
731. See also the NSPCC video A case for balance demonstrating good
practice when children are witnesses which makes the following
points:
- child witness cases need to be identified and expedited at all
stages. Judicial control is essential.
- introductions and explanations should be given prior to the
child giving evidence.
- the child’s views should be sought as to whether wigs and
gowns will be worn.
- the prosecution and defence advocates should be introduced
to the child.
- the judge should make sure that the child understands who
people are and what is going to happen.
- familiarity with the TV link equipment is important.
- out of the presence of the jury the judge should set ground
rules for the examination of children.
732. The judge should request that questions be short and simple; ask how
long cross- examination is likely to take and indicate that breaks will
be taken if necessary.
The judge should advise children:
- to listen carefully to the questions
- not to guess
- not to rush; people in court are writing down their answers
- when they know the answer to reply and not leave anything
out
- to say if they do not understand the question, do not know
the answer or do not remember
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- that the judge can always see the child on the TV link even
though the child cannot always see the judge
- how to catch the judge’s attention e.g. by raising a hand
- they need not give their full name and address out loud
- to tell the truth.
When questioning younger children, ‘signposting’ is helpful:
- tell the child the subject matter (e.g. “Now about guessing. I
don’t want you to guess.”), ask the question, then recap and
check that the child understands.
Questions should:
- be short and simple
- be asked one at a time
- use pauses where appropriate
- give the child time to answer
- follow a structured approach
- use the child’s own vocabulary e.g. for parts of the body or
for family members
- cease if the child loses concentration or becomes distressed.
Intervention is not necessary if questioning is appropriate. However,
judges and advocates need to be alert to:
- the child’s demeanour
- multiple questions or questions combined with assertions
- questions taken literally but mistakenly
- questions with double negatives
- a sequence of questions which may be regarded as
oppressive e.g. those ending with a negative assertion, or
repetitious questions which may press the child to change
the answer
- inappropriate tone
- conduct which amounts to bullying
- questions about previous inconsistent statements which may
confuse the child
- questions about ‘inconsistencies’ which are, in fact, irrelevant
to the charge or trivial
- the need for special techniques to facilitate the child’s
communication.
- the prosecution advocate should shield the child witness
from unnecessary or unfair attack by drawing the judge’s
attention to questioning which is inappropriate in tone or
content or which is framed as an assertion or which is
clearly repetitive.
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733. Judge Hedley: “The first obligation of intervening on behalf of a witness
should actually be on prosecuting counsel, but judges certainly recognize that
they have a role to do so.”
734. Graham Trembath: “A good cross-examiner will achieve a situation where
children relax and become themselves. In these circumstances the cross-
examination is more likely to be successful, so far as persuading a jury to
question the truthfulness of what is being said. A child should be cross-examined
gently and with respect. If I am aggressive, any useful answers that may result
will be ignored or overlooked by the jury because they take the view the answer
has come simply because I have bullied the child or have been bombastic.”
735. Nigel Pascoe QC: “When I start to cross-examine, I say something like, shall
we strike a bargain? If I am wrong, will you tell me? And the child says yes. And
if I am right, will you also tell me? And the child says yes. That’s a perfectly
straightforward way of telling the child that I am gong to be putting things that
the child won’t agree with. The child is going to have the freedom to say, no, I
don’t agree. If I make a child cry in cross-examination, I have probably failed in
the eyes of the jury. They will say, look what he’s done. I will also have failed in
terms of my duty to the child, because I do not believe that cross-examination,
doing your job properly, can ignore the effect of questioning on the child.”
Witness anonymity
736. R v Davies [2008] UKHL 36 is an important English case in respect
of issues relevant to witness anonymity. It is not permissible at
common law for a defendant to be fairly convicted where the
conviction is based solely or to a decisive extent upon the testimony
of one or more anonymous witnesses. Counsel need names and
addresses and details of any previous convictions of witnesses to
enable credibility and reliability to be tested. The defendant needs to
see the accusers. Following Davies subsequent legislation was quickly
implemented in England and Wales covering this issue in the form of
the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 (Act of
Parliament). See R v Mayers [2008] EWCA Crim 2989 and Practice
Direction (Criminal Proceedings : Witness Anonymity and Forms)
[2009] 1 WLR 157. See commentary on the Mayers case at [2009]
Crim LR pages 277-279. See R v Powar [2009] EWCA Crim 594;
[2009] 2 Cr App R 8. See also the New Zealand Law Commission’s
Report 42 Evidence Law: Witness Anonymity (1997).
Good character
737. If a defendant is of good character this is an issue he may wish to
raise at trial. He may elicit confirmation from the officer in charge of
the case giving evidence that he has no previous convictions or there
may be admissions to that effect. Moreover he may call witnesses to
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testify as to his positive good character. If a defendant wishes to rely
on his good character he must establish the evidential foundation
which will enable him to do so.
738. In Gilbert (Privy Council judgment 27th March 2006) it was stressed
that defence counsel should ensure that the judge clearly understands
whether the defendant is relying upon his good character. Paragraph
11 of the judgment referred to the general rule as to counsel’s
responsibility of raising the issue of the defendant’s good character
and calling evidence in this respect or putting the relevant questions to
prosecution witnesses. Counsel should consider the impact of good
character, the need to adduce evidence of good character and assist
the court in respect of the necessary directions to the jury.
739. See also Muirhead (Privy Council judgment 28th July 2008) especially
at paragraph 32 which stresses that the judge’s duty to give the
direction only arises when evidence of good character is before the
court.
740. In Smith (Privy Council judgment 23rd June 2008) the following was
stated:
“29.The final issue is that of the absence of a good character direction. It was not
the judge’s duty to give such a direction if evidence of good character had not
been brought before her, rather it was the responsibility of defence counsel to
ensure that it was so brought…
30. The law has become clearer since the time of this trial and it hardly
needs repetition now that a defendant is entitled to have a good character direction
from the judge when the facts warrant it and that its absence may be a ground for
setting aside a verdict of guilty. It is the duty of defence counsel to ensure that the
defendant’s good character is brought before the court, and failure to do so and
obtain the appropriate direction may make a guilty verdict unsafe: Sealey &
Headley v The State [2002] UKPC 52, (2002) 61 WIR 491; Teeluck & John v The
State [2005] UKPC 14 [2005] 1 WLR 2421. It has, however, been emphasised by
the Board in recent cases that the critical factor is whether it would have made a
difference to the result if the direction had been given: see, eg Bhola v The State
[2006] UKPC 9, (2006) 68 WIR 449, para 17, per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-
Heywood. In the present case the appellant did not give evidence and merely
made an unsworn statement from the dock, so that the credibility limb of the
direction would have been of lesser consequence. The propensity limb might have
been of some relevance, but their Lordships do not consider that, looking at the
trial as a whole, it would have made any difference to the verdict.”
741. The Privy Council in DPP v Varlack (judgment 1st December 2008)
stated:
“26. The final issue is that of the refusal of a good character direction. It is now
well established that in any case where the defendant is of good character, in the
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sense of having no criminal convictions, he or she must have the benefit of an
appropriate direction, covering both credibility and propensity: see the summary
of the applicable principles in Teeluck v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005]
UKPC 14, [2005] 1 WLR 2421, 2430-31, para 33. The respondent did not give
evidence, although she made a largely self-serving written statement, which
removed much of the need for a direction relating to her credibility. That leaves
the element directed towards propensity, that a person of good character is less
likely to commit a crime, especially a grave crime such as that with which she
was charged. The judge declined to give a good character direction because of the
respondent’s conduct, in that she said that she connived at Todman’s liaison with
Kishma Martin, contracted for the purpose of exploiting her generosity. This in
itself, though reprehensible behaviour, would not have been enough to warrant
depriving the respondent of a good character direction, though it could have been
tempered by some appropriate comment. The same applies to the rather more
serious aspect for present purposes, that the respondent’s defence involved
suggesting an inference that she may have been contacting Hamm on the evening
of 29 August to arrange or confirm a meeting in connection with Todman’s drug
dealing. It would have been legitimate for the judge to make some comment
about the respondent’s criminal propensity, but their Lordships do not consider
that a good character direction should have been withheld altogether, since that
propensity by no means necessarily extends as far as demonstrating a propensity
to murder.
28. That is not, however, the end of the matter. It has been emphasised by the
Board in a number of recent cases that the critical factor is whether it would have
made a difference to the result of the case if a good character direction had been
given: see, eg, Bhola v The State [2006] UKPC 9, (2006) 68 WIR 449, para 17,
per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Their Lordships consider, looking at
the trial as a whole, that it would have not made sufficient difference to the trial to
alter the verdict.”
742. The following is an extract from the Specimen Directions of the
Judicial Studies Board in respect of a defendant’s good character:
“23. Defendant's Character - Good
Wherever there is any doubt as to whether both limbs of the character direction
apply, or wherever it is thought that it may be necessary in the particular
circumstances to modify a 'character direction', it is desirable to canvass the
proposed direction with counsel before their closing speeches. In R v Durbin
[1995] 2 Cr App R 84, 91, the court laid down guidelines for cases in which it
might be appropriate to give a modified direction. The court stressed the
importance of the principle that 'The jury should not be directed to approach the
case on a basis which ... is artificial or untrue.' Generally, however, this direction
should not be watered down: see eg Note 5 overleaf.
You have heard that the defendant is a man/young man of good character [not just
in the sense that he has no convictions recorded against him, but witnesses have
spoken of his positive qualities]. Of course, good character cannot by itself
provide a defence to a criminal charge, but it is evidence which you should take
into account in his favour in the following way/s:
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First limb
If a defendant does not give evidence and he has not made any statement to the
police, or other authority or person which is admitted in evidence, ignore 1
below.
1. (If a defendant has given evidence) In the first place, the defendant has
given evidence, and as with any man of good character it supports his credibility.
This means it is a factor which you should take into account when deciding
whether you believe his evidence.
(If a defendant has not given evidence, but has e.g. made a statement to the police
or has answered questions in interview, see Note 2, below). In the first place,
although the defendant has chosen not to give evidence before you, he did, as you
know give [an explanation to the police]. In considering [that explanation] and
what weight you should give it, you should bear in mind that it was made by a
person of good character, and take that into account when deciding whether you
can believe it.
Second limb
2. In the second place, the fact that he is of good character may mean that he
is less likely than otherwise might be the case to commit this crime now. (In cases
where it is necessary to give the Delay direction, see direction 37, para 4).
I have said that these are matters to which you should have regard in the
defendant's favour. It is for you to decide what weight you should give to them in
this case. In doing this you are entitled to take into account everything you have
heard about the defendant, including his age, [...] and [...]. (Obviously the
importance of good character will vary from case to case, and becomes stronger
if the defendant is a person of unblemished character of mature years, or has a
positively good character, and at this stage the benefit of this to a defendant
whose good character justifies it may be pointed out to the jury, with words such
as:) Having regard to what you know about this defendant you may think that he
is entitled to ask you to give [considerable] weight to his good character when
deciding whether the prosecution has satisfied you of his guilt).
Notes
1. See R v Vye, Wise and Stephenson 97 Cr App R 134; R v Aziz and
Others [1995] 2 Cr App R 478. In Aziz the House of Lords referred to the
'veritable sea-change in judicial thinking in regard to the proper way in which the
judge should direct the jury on the good character of the defendant' and to the
recognition that 'the good character of a defendant is logically relevant to his
credibility and the likelihood that he would commit the offence in question.' Also
see: R v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 and R v Hickmet [1996] Crim LR 588.
2. In the case of R v Napper [1996] Crim LR 591, Lord Taylor CJ held
that the requirement to give a 'Vye' direction is unaffected by the situation arising
when it may be appropriate to give an Inference direction under Section 35 of the
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Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (see post, page 39.1). See also R v
Kanuga [1998] 2 Archbold News 3, CA.
3. If the judge rules that a defendant should be treated as a man of good
character even though strictly speaking he is not (for example because he has
spent convictions), the full direction on good character should be given to the
jury: R v Miller and others, unreported (97 /02841/X4). See also R v M (Ian)
[1999] 6 Archbold News 3.
4. For the application of this direction to a case in which a defendant had
cautions but no convictions, see R v Martin [2000] 2 Cr App R 42.
5. A good character direction should be given in the form of an affirmative
statement rather than a rhetorical question (R v Lloyd [2002] Cr App R 355) and
should not be qualified by suggesting that its significance in relation to propensity
is less when the offence is spontaneous (R v Fitton [2001] 3 Archbold News 2).”
Archbold (2003) 4-406 page 482 et seq.
Blackstone (2003) F13.1 page 2177 et seq.”
Bad character
743. If the defendant does not lose the shield provided by section 1(f) of
the Criminal Evidence Act 1946 then in the normal course of events
his bad character and any previous convictions would not be referred
to during the course of the trial. If however the defendant loses his
shield by attacking prosecution witnesses or if similar fact evidence is
properly admitted or if he chooses to put his bad character before the
jury it is important that the jury are directed to consider the position in
its proper context. See Chambers (Appeal Division judgment 12th
August 2010) which deals with issues relating to the bad character of
a defendant and evidence of the same before the jury.
744. Consider the old Specimen Direction 24 of the Judicial Studies Board
(prior to significant changes in English law which have not yet been
followed in Manx law). For the position in England see Criminal
Justice Act 2003 and Campbell [2007] EWCA Crim 1472; [2007] 2
Cr App R 28. The old Judicial Studies Board Direction 24 was as
follows : -
“24. Defendant’s Character - Bad
(where not introduced as evidence of propensity)
You have heard that the defendant has previous convictions [for .... ]. This has
been given in evidence because he [has attacked the character of a prosecution
witness and it is right that in those circumstances you should know the character
of the person making that attack] [has claimed to be of good character] [has given
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evidence against a co-defendant, who has cross- examined him on his character].
[has chosen to do so ] <if defendant puts his previous in evidence>
What is the relevance of the defendant’s convictions in this case? The only reason
why you have heard about his previous convictions is that knowledge of the
character of the defendant [who has made this attack] may assist you to judge the
truthfulness of his evidence when you come to consider this matter.
You must not automatically assume either that the defendant is guilty or that he is
not telling the truth just because he has previous convictions. His convictions are
not relevant at all to the likelihood of his having committed the offence nor are
they evidence that the defendant committed the offence for which he stands trial
now. They are relevant only as to whether you can believe him. You do not have
to allow these convictions to affect your judgement. It is for you to decide the
extent to which, if at all, his previous convictions help you about that.
(Add as appropriate:)
[The defendant tells you that although he has convictions, he has always pleaded
guilty on his previous appearances before the court. This is a matter which you
may take into account when deciding what impact his convictions have upon his
truthfulness].
[The defendant has admitted that he has on ... occasion[sJ pleaded not guilty but
has been found guilty by a jury after having given evidence on oath in that case.
You are entitled to consider this when deciding whether you can believe him].
Notes
1. See R v Prince [19901 Crim LR 49, CA and the principles set out in R v Burke
82 Cr App R 156, R v McLeod [1995] 1 Cr App R 591, R v Carter (1996) The
Times, 14 November and R v Miller (1996) The Times, 28 November. See also R v
Jones (1997) 8 Archbold News 3, CA.
Archbold (2000) 4-410 page 463, 8-199 page 1111 et seq.
Blackstone (2000) F14.1 page 2147 et seq. F14.29 page 2165 et seq.
August 2000 Judicial Studies Board”
745. In R v Moore (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 10th
September 2004) I dealt with an application which concerned what is
commonly referred to as “similar fact evidence” in respect of an arson
case. I endeavoured to review some of the relevant law (including
DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447 and In Re Beaumont 1999-01 MLR 149
judgment of Deemster Kerruish) and concluded as follows:
“43. Great caution needs to be taken in respect of applications of this nature and
all the relevant details need to be carefully considered. I note in particular the ten
characteristics and the seven additional factors stressed by the prosecution.
Although the disputed evidence is prejudicial against the Defendant in my
judgment the probative force in support of the allegation being tried is sufficiently
great to make it just to admit the disputed evidence notwithstanding that it is
prejudicial to the accused. In the present case there is evidence of a number of
fires at a number of properties at which Mr Moore was a tenant. The fires all
started in similar circumstances and Mr Moore is frequently found at the scene of
the fires. In my judgment it would be an affront to common sense to describe that
as a mere coincidence…
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47. It is time that the law on the admissibility of evidence and common sense got
a little closer. We should have confidence in the ability of a Manx jury with an
abundance of common sense and fairness to reach a verdict on the evidence
before it. In my judgment the disputed evidence does have sufficient probative
force to enable it to be admissible. What weight the jury will attach to it is entirely
a matter for them. The explanation of the disputed evidence on the basis of
coincidence is, in my judgment, an "affront to common sense" and the
prosecution should therefore be entitled to put it before the jury for their
consideration. To explain the disputed evidence on the basis of coincidence would
cause common sense to revolt. It would be artificial in the extreme to keep the
evidence from the jury. A criminal case needs to be fair to the defendant, fair to
the prosecution, fair to the complainant and fair to the community as a whole. The
objective is for innocent defendants to be acquitted and guilty defendants to be
convicted. Fairness demands that all relevant and admissible evidence be placed
before the jury to enable them to come to a 'not guilty' or 'guilty' verdict.
48. Having had full regard to the issues in this case I rule as a matter of law that
the disputed evidence the prosecution seek to adduce is admissible.”
746. Lord Carswell in DPP v Hurnam (Privy Council judgment delivered
25th April 2007) at paragraph 22 stated:
“…One of the principles underlying the rule allowing the admission of evidence
of bad character is that where a defendant has attacked the character of a
prosecution witness, with the object of impugning his veracity, he cannot then put
himself forward as a man of unblemished character whose word is to be accepted:
see, eg, R v Cook [1959] 2 QB, 340, 348, per Devlin J. It is a matter then for the
discretion of the trial court to determine whether any evidence of bad character
which the prosecution proposes to adduce should be excluded. The Board would
ordinarily be very slow to interfere with the exercise of such a discretion. Nor did
it receive any argument as to the ambit of the evidence of bad character which
may be admitted in Mauritius under this principle. Prosecuting counsel attacked
the respondent vigorously, but in their Lordships’ judgment his conduct did not
exceed permissible bounds or come near equating with the type of behaviour
exemplified by that portrayed in Randall v The Queen [2002] UKPC 19, [2002] 1
WLR 2237 or Benedetto v The Queen [2003] UKPC 27, [2003] 1 WLR 1545,
both of which were relied on by the respondent.”
747. In Shetty (judgment 4th January 2007) I stated:
“22. Generally evidence of a defendant’s disposition or bad character or acts of
previous misconduct is inadmissible. There are exceptions to this general position
such as the situation where a defendant loses his shield or the situation where a
defendant’s previous misconduct may be admitted under the law relating to
similar fact evidence. Another important exception is dealt with by Archbold 2005
at paragraph 13-42 onwards under the heading “Motive and Background”. The
common law does permit evidence to be adduced as to the background to an
offence where this is relevant to the offence charged and where the account to be
placed before the court would be incomplete and incomprehensible without the
background evidence, and this is so notwithstanding that such background
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evidence might include evidence establishing that the accused was guilty of an
offence with which he was not charged.”
748. In Oates (judgment 14th February 2007) I stated:
“13. In general, as Manx law presently stands, a defendant’s bad character is
not a matter which is put before the jury (See generally pages 118-155 under the
heading Character of the Defendant in May’s Criminal Evidence 4th Ed). That no
longer appears to be the position under English law. See the Criminal Justice Act
2003.
14. The common law allows for the admissibility of evidence that may show
the defendant to have had a bad character where it is legitimate to do so for the
purpose of proving the case against him. Evidence admissible for this purpose is
normally brought under one of two heads namely similar fact evidence and
evidence of background or motive. In Moore (judgment September 2004) I dealt
with the issue of similar fact evidence. Similar fact evidence does not appear
relevant in the matter presently before the court. In Snape (judgment 14th May
2004) at paragraphs 6 and 7 I stated:
“6. I accept that when one is considering fairness that it is of
fundamental importance that the previous convictions or bad character of a
Defendant should not in the normal course of events be put before the jury. One
only needs to look at the cases referred to in Archbold 8-203 and Blackstone
D12.21 on the position of discharging juries when there are inadvertent references
to previous convictions and bad character to appreciate that. See also Archbold 4-
258.
7. Subject to the Defendant losing or surrendering his shield under
Section 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1946 (or to other specific statutory
exceptions, such as the handling cases as referred to by Mrs Jones this morning)
the principle is that there should be no reference to the bad character or previous
convictions of the Defendant, presumably on the basis that the prejudicial nature
of such evidence far outweighs its probative value. Previous convictions are not
relevant at all to the likelihood of a defendant having committed future offences.
People should not automatically assume that a defendant is guilty or that he is not
telling the truth just because he has previous convictions.”
15. Archbold 2005 edition at paragraph 13-44 refers to the comments of
Purchas LJ in R v Pettman unreported May 2 1985 CA and the principle that:
“where it is necessary to place before the jury evidence of part of a
continual background of history relevant to the offence charged in the indictment
and without the totality of which the account placed before the jury would be
incomplete or incomprehensible, then the fact that the whole account involves
including evidence establishing the commission of an offence with which the
accused is not charged is not of itself a ground for excluding the evidence”.
This statement was accepted by the English Court of Appeal as a “useful
formulation” of the law in R v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251”.”
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[In Oates an order was made that the information be amended to delete one count
which the defendant had pleaded guilty to and one count which the prosecution
were not proceeding with leaving one count on the information which was
contested]
749. In say an attempted murder case or a grievous bodily harm with intent
case in relation to an offence that took place on a specified day it may
be the prosecution case that some of the background and the history to
the relationship between the complainant and the defendant is relevant
and admissible and some of the allegations and evidence in respect of
a defendant’s previous misconduct or alleged acts of violence against
the complainant are also relevant. Consider the applicable legal
principles to such a case. See for example May Criminal Evidence 4th
Edition Chapter 7 and an old edition of Archbold 2005 Chapter 13
which deals with the position under English law prior to the
commencement of Chapter 1 of Part II of the Criminal Justice Act
2003.
750. A general principle in Manx law is that the evidence of a defendant’s
bad character is normally inadmissible in a criminal trial.
751. The general rule is that the prosecution may not adduce evidence of
bad character of the defendant i.e. evidence of his bad reputation,
disposition and previous misconduct.
752. There are exceptions to that general rule including where a defendant
loses his shield for example by putting his character in issue or by
attacking prosecution witnesses. Another exception is that evidence of
a defendant’s previous misconduct may be admitted under the rule
relating to similar fact evidence.
753. Another important exception is dealt with by Archbold 2005 at
paragraph 13-42 onwards under the heading ‘Motive and Background’.
Consider in detail the authorities referred to in Archbold in this area of
the law. See also Archbold paragraphs 13-29 to 13-36.
754. The relationship of a complainant and a defendant can sometimes be
properly admitted as an integral part of the history of the alleged
crime so far as they might reasonably and fairly shed some significant
light on the alleged conduct of the defendant.
755. See the comments of Purchas L J in R v Pettman 1985 Court of
Appeal unreported May 2nd, 1985 CA (5048/C/82), R v Fulcher
[1995] 2 Cr App R 251 CA and R v Ball [1911] AC 47 HL. Where it
is necessary to place before the jury evidence of part of the continual
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background of history relevant to offences charged in the information
and without the totality of which the account placed before the jury
would be incomplete or incomprehensible then the fact that the whole
account involves including evidence in relation to previous alleged
misconduct on the part of a defendant is not of itself a ground for
excluding such evidence.
756. It will often be relevant for the jury to know about the personal
relationship of a complainant and a defendant in order to make a
properly informed assessment of the entire evidence. For example in a
threat to kill case evidence of previous history between the parties is
admissible as tending to prove that the defendant intended his words
to be taken seriously (R v Williams 84 Cr App R 299).
757. See also the provisions of section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991
and the case of Ironside 1999-01 MLR 177.
758. Sometimes evidence in relation to previous recent history of the
relationship between a complainant and a defendant and alleged
previous acts of violence towards the complainant by the defendant is
relevant and admissible. It could be vital background evidence which
is both explanatory and probative in that it goes to issues in the trial
such as the defendant’s intent or previous threats by the defendant
against the complainant or to rebut certain suggestions. These may be
crucial issues in the proceedings.
759. Moreover in certain circumstances the admission of such evidence
would not have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. As was referred to in
Ironside the function of the judge is to protect the fairness of the
proceedings and normally proceedings are fair if a jury hears all
relevant evidence which either side wishes to place before it (that
would mean relevant and admissible evidence and may beg the
question but the comments are nevertheless of assistance). The
defendant should have a full opportunity of challenging such
evidence. If he does not it may be unfair to allow the evidence in.
760. The jury should normally be given all the relevant and admissible
pieces of the jigsaw. Which pieces they accept and which pieces they
reject and how they put them together will be entirely a matter for the
jury.
761. The common law permits evidence to be adduced as to the
background to an offence, where this is relevant to the offence
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charged and where the account to be placed before the court would be
incomplete and incomprehensible without the background evidence.
This is so notwithstanding that such background evidence might
include evidence establishing that the accused was guilty of an
offence with which he was not charged.
762. Consider each case on its own facts, circumstances and merits.
Consider fairness to all concerned and any prejudice also.
763. Snape (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 14th May 2004)
concerned the issue of a defendant’s bad character being inadvertently
placed before the jury and also an issue in respect of the defendant’s
fingerprints being on the national database. I did not regard the issues
raised by the defence in respect of the difficulties presented by the
fingerprint evidence as being persuasive enough to indicate that a fair
trial was no longer possible. The jury were, however, discharged on a
separate ground. I accepted at paragraph 6 of the judgment that, as the
law stood, it was considered of fundamental importance that the
previous convictions or bad character of a defendant should not in the
normal course of events be put before a jury. At paragraph 13 of the
judgment I stated:
“13. If there is to be a re-trial the prosecution and the defence should continue to
do their best to ensure that no information is brought to the jury’s attention that
may indicate or imply that the Defendant has previous convictions and is of bad
character. I am impressed with the sensible and pragmatic efforts of both
prosecution and defence counsel todate in dealing with these issues including the
editing of the transcripts of the interviews and indeed the entire exclusion of some
of the interviews and the agreed statement for the jury signed by the advocate for
the Defendant and the advocate for the prosecution. It is clearly important that
members of the jury are not misled but it is equally important that evidence is
duly filtered to ensure that no inadmissible evidence or irrelevant evidence is
inadvertently placed before the jury. Although it is not for the prosecution to
coach their witnesses it is to my mind incumbent upon the prosecution to ensure
that they frame questions to witnesses with great care especially in the
circumstances of this case and to ensure, so far as humanly possible, that no
witness inadvertently refers to the previous convictions or bad character of the
Defendant.”
764. Lady Hale in DS v Her Majestys Advocate (Privy Council judgment
22 May 2007) at paragraph 64 stated:
“Our historic reluctance to trust the jury with this information [accused’s
character and conduct] arises from the fear that they may give it more weight than
it deserves or regard it as proving that which it does not prove.”
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765. Lord Brown in DS at paragraph 103 in relation to the legal position in
his jurisdiction (which should be contrasted with the present position
in Manx law) commented as follows:
“Plausible and beguiling though at first blush this argument may appear, it is to
my mind founded upon a central fallacy. The long and the short of it is that the
accused has no fundamental right to keep his past convictions from the jury.
There is nothing intrinsically unfair or inappropriate in putting these into evidence
and, indeed, in doing so not merely on the limited basis that they go only to the
accused’s credibility (the fiction which to my mind disfigured the administration
of criminal justice in England and Wales for far too long, now at last ended by the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 – see particularly sections 101(1)(d) and 103(1)(a)) but
on the wider ground that they bear also on the accused’s propensity to commit
offences of the kind with which he is charged.”
766. In causing death by dangerous driving cases it is especially important
to focus on the important and relevant issues. The raising of contested
collateral issues (such as previous alleged bad driving prior to the
incident) had the dangers not only of unduly adding to the length and
cost of the trial but of complicating the issues which the jury had to
decide and taking the focus away from the most important issue or
issues. Allegations of prior but uninvestigated misconduct were likely
to involve stale and incomplete evidence possibly unduly prejudicing
the defendant by reason of the evidence being difficult to meet (See R
v McKenzie [2008] RTR 22 a decision based on section 101 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003).
Exclusion of confessions
767. Section 11 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 provides as follows:
“11 Confessions
(1) In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in
evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the
proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section.
(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a
confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the
confession was or may have been obtained-
(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which
might be made by him in consequence thereof,
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the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except
in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the
confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.
(3) In any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a
confession made by an accused person, the court may of its own motion require
the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do so, to prove that the confession
was not obtained as mentioned in subsection (2).
(4) The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of this
section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence-
(a) of any facts discovered as a result of the confession; or
(b) where the confession is relevant as showing that the accused speaks, writes or
expresses himself in a particular way, of so much of the confession as is necessary
to show that he does so.
(5) Evidence that a fact to which this subsection applies was discovered as a result
of a statement made by an accused person shall not be admissible unless evidence
of how it was discovered is given by him or on his behalf.
(6) Subsection (5) applies-
(a) to any fact discovered as a result of a confession which is wholly excluded in
pursuance of this section; and
(b) to any fact discovered as a result of a confession which is partly so excluded,
if the fact is discovered as a result of the excluded part of the confession.
(7) Nothing in Chapter 1 shall prejudice the admissibility of a confession made by
an accused person.
(8) In this section ‘oppression’ includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment,
and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture).”
Exclusion of unfair evidence
768. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 provides as follows:
“13 Exclusion of unfair evidence
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence
was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to
exclude evidence.”
327
769. See Archbold 15-452 and also the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 5th Edition by Zander.
770. Deemster Kerruish in Ironside 1999-01 MLR 177 at 192-193 stated:
“I refer to R. v. Quinn (2), in which Lord Lane, C.J. underlined the general nature
of the discretion under s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (of
Parliament), which is equivalent to s.13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 ([1990]
Crim L.R. at 583):
“The function of the judge is therefore to protect the fairness of the proceedings
and normally proceedings are fair if a jury hears all relevant evidence which either
side wishes to place before it, but proceedings may become unfair if, for example,
one side is allowed to adduce relevant evidence which, for one reason or another,
the other side cannot properly challenge or meet. . .”
In this case, I do not consider that the defence is restricted in challenging the
relevant evidence at trial.
I also refer to Archbold (op. cit., para. 15-430(g), at 1438) which reads:
“There are two stages in the application of section 78: first, the circumstances in
which the evidence came to be obtained; secondly, whether admission of the
evidence would have an adverse effect upon the fairness of the proceedings. In
considering fairness, a balance has to be struck between that which is fair to the
prosecution and that which is fair to the defence (see R. v. Hughes [1988]
Crim.L.R. 519, CA). The final aspect of the fairness test appears to relate only to
the defendant: whether the admission of the evidence would have ‘such an
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit
it’.”
In this case I do not consider on the evidence before me that the circumstances in
which the relevant evidence came to be obtained would justify my exercising my
discretion under s.13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 in favour of the defendant.
In considering “the fairness test,” I do not consider that the admission of the
relevant part of Mr. Kelly’s second statement and the relevant part of Miss
Harvey’s fourth statement would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of
the proceedings that the court ought not to admit them. Accordingly I reject Mr.
Verardi’s application.”
771. See also R v Corkill 1999-01 MLR N 14 unfairly obtained evidence –
interrogation when in custody for another offence. Consider whether
there have been significant and substantial breaches. See Shillito
2001-03 MLR 356, R v Bell 2005-06 MLR 327, Sayle 2005-06 MLR
196, Openshaw (Appeal Division judgment delivered 28th September
2000), R v P [2002] 1 AC 146 and Slater (Court of General Gaol
Delivery judgment delivered 24th March 2009).
772. The following are extracts from the Appeal Division’s judgment in
Openshaw (judgment delivered 28th September 2000):
328
“The Law
The Code, and specifically Code C, which we are considering is a section of the
Police Powers and Procedures Code created pursuant to section 75 of the Police
Powers and Procedures Act 1998. It is a code which sets out in plain and
untechnical language the obligations falling on those having responsibility for
persons held in custody and the rights of those so detained. It is a document
which, in theory at least, could be made available to a detained person. The
Respondent in the instant case was detained in custody for a period in excess of
seven hours. Self-evidently the Codes of Practice and specifically Code C applied
to and indeed regulated his detention.
Code C paragraph 9.2 is headed “Medical treatment” and reads so far as is
material to this appeal as follows:-
“The custody officer must immediately call the Police Surgeon or in urgent cases
for example where a person does not show signs of sensibility or awareness must
send the person to hospital or call the nearest available medical practitioner if a
person brought to a police station or already detained there:
(a) appears to be suffering from physical illness or mental disorder or
(b) is injured …
(d) fails to respond normally to questions or conversation or
(e) otherwise appears to need medical attention.
This applies even if the person makes no request for medical attention whether or
not he has already had medical treatment elsewhere.”
This section, in our judgment, sets out the obligation of a Custody Officer to call
the Police Surgeon if he believes medical attention may be required. Further
assistance to a Custody Officer in determining the ambit of his responsibilities is
given in the Notice for Guidance at 9A and 9B.
Paragraph 9.4 is in substantially different terms altogether. It reads as follows:
“If a detained person requests a medical examination the Police Surgeon must be
called as soon as practicable. He may in addition be examined by a medical
practitioner of his own choice at his own expense.”
I should say in passing that it is common ground in this case that the Respondent
had sufficient money in his possession to pay any charges incurred in the calling
of a medical examiner.
Mr. Montgomerie, on behalf of the Chief Constable, argues that paragraph 9.4
does not give to a detained person an absolute or unfettered right. He submits that
paragraph 9.4 must be read in conjunction with paragraph 9.2 and that in some
way the right of a detained person to seek to secure the attendance of a doctor,
whether the doctor is a Police Surgeon or a doctor of his own choosing, is limited
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only to obtaining a medical examination if be feels unwell or feels that for reasons
of his own good health such an examination is necessary.
Mr. Montgomerie further submits that the Custody Officer retains a discretion
over whether and in what circumstances a detained person’s request for a medical
examination should be met .
In our judgment there is nothing in the language of paragraph 9.4 which supports
such a construction. Indeed we can see Custody Officers being left in a wholly
impossible position if we acceded to the submissions being made. The language
of the Code is clear and unambiguous. If a detained person requests a medical
examination the Police Surgeon must be called. Further, if a detained person
wishes to be examined by a medical practitioner of his own choice then he is
entitled to be so examined. It is, in our judgment, a right irrespective of whether
the detained person’s motive is to safeguard his own health or as here to give a
blood sample and/or to be examined by a doctor to assess whether he was sober or
not… ..
It follows from this that we conclude that the High Bailiff was entitled to come to
the conclusion that he did and accordingly we answer the first question posed in
the affirmative.
In the course of submissions, we have been invited by Mr. Montgomerie to give
guidance as to how police officers should deal with paragraph 9.4 in a variety of
different factual situations but we feel, in the context of this judgment, that it
would be inappropriate to accept such a general invitation. Our function in this
appeal is to consider whether the High Bailiff’s conclusion was one to which he
was entitled to come having regard to the clear and mandatory nature of the
language of the Code and as we have indicated he was plainly so entitled.
The effect of a breach of this or indeed any other part of the Code will depend
upon all the circumstances of a particular case; sometimes it may lead to evidence
otherwise relevant and probative being ruled inadmissible; sometimes it may have
a less significant effect or indeed no effect at all. In his ruling, the High Bailiff
recognised that it may have “fatal consequences” as he put it; sometimes as he
clearly recognised it would not. He plainly understood and it is accepted before us
that he bad a discretion when considering the effect of the breach on other
evidence in the case…
Clearly the High Bailiff had to consider the fairness of the proceedings. In R v
Quinn (1990) Criminal Law Review 581, Lord Lane CJ. considered how a judge
should consider a breach of the equivalent codes under the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984. He said as follows:
“The function of the judge is therefore to protect the fairness of the proceedings
and normally proceedings are fair if a jury hears all the relevant evidence which
either side wishes to place before it, but proceedings may become unfair if, for
example, one side is allowed to adduce evidence which, for one reason or another,
the other side cannot properly challenge or meet, or where there has been an
abuse of process e.g. because evidence has been obtained in deliberate breach of
procedures laid down in an official code of practice.”
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In the end we are unhesitatingly of the view that on the facts of this case the High
Bailiff was fully entitled to exclude from his consideration the intoxilyser reading
and self-evidently, without that, there was no case whatsoever.”
773. In Slater (judgment delivered 24th March 2009) I stated the following:
“32. I turn now to the relevant law and procedure.
33. I accept, as do the prosecution and the defence, that a judge has a discretion at
common law to exclude evidence if it is necessary in order to secure a fair trial for
the accused and that evidence may be excluded on the grounds that its prejudicial
effect exceeds its probative value.
34. I note the provisions of section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The court
may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be
given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances,
including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of
the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings
that the court ought not to admit it.
35. I have considered Ironside 1999-01 MLR 177, R v Corkill 1999-01 MLR N 14
Shillito 2001-03 MLR 356, Bell 2005-06 MLR 327, Sayle 2005-06 MLR 196,
Newbery (Appeal Division judgment delivered 30th September 2004) Openshaw
(Appeal Division judgment delivered 28th December 2000), R v P [2002] 1 AC
146 and the other authorities referred to by counsel including Crampton (1991) 92
Cr App R 369.
36. I have considered Code C. Code C is a code of practice for the detention,
treatment and questioning of persons by police officers.
37. Paragraph 6.1 of Code C provides that subject to the provisos in Annex B all
people in police detention must be informed that they may at any time consult and
communicate privately, whether in person, in writing or by telephone with an
advocate, and that independent legal advice is available free of charge from the
duty advocate. Paragraph 6.4 of Code C provides that no police officer shall at
any time do or say anything with the intention of dissuading a person in detention
from obtaining legal advice. Note 6K provides that a person is not obliged to give
reasons for declining legal advice and should not be pressed if he does not wish to
do so.
38. Paragraph 9.2 of Code C provides that the custody officer must immediately
call the police surgeon if a person brought to a police station or already detained
there appears to be suffering from physical illness or a mental disorder, is injured,
fails to respond normally to questions or conversation (other than through
drunkenness alone) or otherwise appears to need medical attention. This applies
even if the person makes no request for medical attention and whether or not he
has already had medical treatment elsewhere (unless brought to the police station
direct from hospital). Paragraph 9.4 of Code C provides that if a detained person
requests a medical examination the police surgeon must be called as soon as
practicable. He may in addition be examined by a medical practitioner of his own
choice at his own expense.
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39. Note 9B provides that it is important to remember that a person who appears
drunk or behaving abnormally may be suffering from illness or the effects of
drugs or may have sustained injury (particularly head injury) which is not
apparent, and that someone needing or addicted to certain drugs may experience
harmful effects within a short time of being deprived of their supply. Police
should therefore always call the police surgeon when in any doubt, and act with
all due speed.
40. Paragraph 11.2 of Code C provides that immediately prior to the
commencement or re-commencement of any interview at a police station or other
authorised place of detention the interviewing officer shall remind the suspect of
his entitlement to free legal advice and that the interview can be delayed for him
to obtain legal advice (unless the exceptions in paragraph 6.6 or Annex C apply).
It is the responsibility of the interviewing officer to ensure that all such reminders
are noted in the record of interview.
Determination of the Application
41. I turn now to my determination of the Application.
42. I am not persuaded that there has been a breach of Code C serious, significant
and substantial or otherwise. I am not persuaded in the circumstances of this case
that the police were duty bound to arrange for a medical examination of the
Defendant prior to interview. I am not persuaded that the police were duty bound
to encourage the Defendant to take legal advice.
43. The Defendant was advised of his rights both before and during interview and
declined the services of an advocate. The police are not under a duty to insist that
a defendant takes legal advice prior to interview. The police are not under a duty
to persuade a Defendant to take legal advice prior to interview. The duty is simply
to inform a defendant of his rights. If a defendant is aware of his legal rights and
declines the services of an advocate then that is a matter for a defendant.
44. The duties of the police in such circumstances are plain. They must inform the
Defendant of his rights. They did that in this case. They must not say or do
anything with the intention of dissuading a person in detention from taking legal
advice. There is no evidence that the police said or did anything in this case with
the intention of dissuading the Defendant from taking legal advice.
45. The Defendant in this case had been informed of and was well aware of his
rights. With knowledge of his rights he declined the services of an advocate. It
may well be that he now, with hindsight and advice, regrets that decision but the
police cannot take the blame for the Defendant's decisions on the night of 9th May
2008. The Defendant must take responsibility for his own decisions and his own
actions. He cannot justifiably blame the police for his predicament.
46. The custody officer plainly did not believe that medical attention was
required. The Defendant did not appear to be suffering from physical illness or
mental disorder. The Defendant did not appear to be injured. The Defendant did
not fail to respond normally to questions or conversation. The Defendant did not
appear to need medical attention. The Defendant did not request a medical
examination. There was no evidence that the Defendant was acting abnormally.
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The police did not believe that a medical examination was necessary and in the
circumstances of this case the police were fully justified in holding that belief.
47. I have watched the images of the Defendant within the Custody Suite. I have
listened to a tape of the Defendant's interview. I appreciate that I am not
medically qualified but my impression of the Defendant within the Custody Suite
and during the interview is of a young man who is alert and aware of what is
happening. He is cooperative and there is nothing in what I have seen or heard to
indicate that he did not appear fit to be interviewed.
48. No acceptable evidence (medical or otherwise) has been presented to this
court that leads the court to conclude that the police should have arranged for the
attendance of the police surgeon or another doctor.
49. I hear all that the Defendant and Mr Sharpe have had to say in relation to the
Defendant being under the influence of cannabis that day. I have also heard the
evidence from the police officers who came into contact with the Defendant. No
medical evidence has been presented to this court as to the Defendant's medical
condition on the 9th May 2008 or indeed as to the possible affects of taking
cannabis.
50. Moreover where there is conflict in their evidence I prefer the evidence of the
Police Constables Ross and McLean and Sergeant Jones to the evidence of the
Defendant and Mr Sharpe. The Defendant may well have smoked some cannabis
that day but I find that the Defendant and his friend Mr Sharpe have exaggerated
the extent of the Defendant's cannabis intake that day and the affect of it upon the
Defendant. Frankly, it is plain to me that the Defendant gave his evidence with a
view to having his admissions excluded and I consider it in light of that
motivation.
51. The Defendant has, in parts, a very clear and detailed recollection of the
events of the 9th May 2008, the time leading up to his arrest, the searches, the
detention and interview.
52. The Defendant's answers at interview appear lucid, comprehensive and frank.
It appears that he understood the process and the questions and that he was able to
respond to them. On some occasions, as is his right, he declined to respond to
questions or to give names. The Defendant was making decisions as to how he
would respond to questions, if at all. The Defendant was, so far as the police were
concerned, fit to be interviewed. He was advised of his rights and proper
procedures were followed in respect of the interview. There has been no breach of
Code C.
53. The police cannot be validly criticised in the circumstances of this case.
54. There is no unfairness either at common law or under section 13 of the
Criminal Justice Act 1991 in adducing the transcripts of the Defendant's
interviews into evidence. It is not necessary to exclude such evidence to secure a
fair trial. Indeed if such evidence were excluded that would be unfair to the
prosecution. Fairness is not all one sided. The court must consider fairness to the
defence, fairness to the prosecution and fairness to the community generally.
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55. Having regard to all the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, it
does not appear to this court that the admission of the evidence which is the
subject of the Application would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Indeed in fairness that evidence
must be admitted.
56. The Defendant's responses at interview contain clear admissions by an
individual who had been advised of his rights on several occasions and who
appeared fit to be interviewed. There is no medical evidence before the court
which indicates that the Defendant was not fit to be interviewed on the 9th May
2008.
57. In justice and in fairness the prosecution should be permitted to adduce into
evidence the clear admissions made by the Defendant during the course of his
properly conducted interview on the 9th May 2008.
58. I do not therefore exclude the relevant and admissible evidence contained in
the transcript of the Defendant's interview on the 9th May 2008.
59. I dismiss the Application for the reasons stated.”
774. See R v Drowner [2009] EWCA Crim 1361 in respect of the
exclusion of guilty pleas of co-defendants where such evidence had
no apparent probative value on the issue before the jury and would
have had a potentially adverse effect on the fairness of the trial for the
accused.
775. In R v Newbery (Appeal Division judgment 30th September 2004) the
Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish)
agreed with the Acting Deemster’s approach to the exercise of his
discretion under section 13(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The
Acting Deemster considered that the admission of the evidence would
not have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings and
added:
“It must be remembered that the court needs to consider fairness, not only to a
defendant, but also for the public acting through the prosecutor.”
776. The position in respect of consequences following breaches of the
Codes of Practice is dealt with elsewhere in this book at paragraphs
664 to 677.
777. The Privy Council in Eiley v The Queen [2009] UKPC 39 at
paragraph 49 stated:
“49 A judge enjoys a discretion to exclude evidence if the circumstances in which
it has been obtained are such as to render its admission contrary to the interests of
justice. One circumstance where it may be appropriate to do so is where the
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witness has received an inducement to give evidence for the prosecution that will
render the evidence suspect - see R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr. App. R. 67 at p. 78.
The discretion is one that should be used sparingly. Such promises, when made to
an accomplice to a crime, have been described as distasteful - see Turner at p. 80.
They are nonetheless capable of being justified in the public interest. While the
Board has reservations as to whether it was appropriate for the Director of Public
Prosecutions to enter into the immunity agreement that was concluded with Mr
Vasquez, their Lordships do not consider that the trial judge should have refused
to received the evidence of Mr Vasquez of his own motion.”
778. In R v Baines (General Gaol Delivery judgment 24th November 2008)
I reached the conclusion having regard to all the circumstances
including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained that
the admission in criminal proceedings of a deposition and affidavit
produced in civil proceedings would have such an adverse effect on
the fairness of the criminal proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it. At paragraphs 76 to 78 of the judgment I touched upon the
provisions of section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and some of
the local jurisprudence on those provisions. See Rottmann v Brittain
[2009] EWCA Civ 473 in respect of the priviledge against self
incrimination in the context of bankruptcy proceedings and foreign
criminal proceedings. See also R v K(A) [2009] EWCA Crim 1640.
Witness refusing to give evidence and contempt
779. Take care in dealing with a witness who refuses to give evidence. A
reluctant witness should be given the opportunity of giving an
explanation and of being represented and hasty action by the trial
Deemster should be avoided.
780. Rose LJ in Yusuf [2003] 2 Crim App R 32 at paragraph 16 stated:
“The role of the courts in seeking to protect the public … can only properly be
performed if members of the public cooperate with the courts. That cooperation
includes participation in the trial process … as a witness. Witnesses who may
have important evidence to give must come to court if they are summoned… if
they choose to ignore a summons, they are in contempt of court and can expect to
be punished because their failure to attend is likely to disrupt the trial process and
in some cases to undermine it entirely.”
781. A witness who without just cause disobeys a witness order or
summons is guilty of contempt of court as if it were committed in the
face of the court (See Archbold at paragraph 28-111, Ex p. Fernandez
(1861) 10 CB (NS) 3). In Lennock, 97 Crim App R 228 it was said
that culpable forgetfulness could not amount to a “just excuse” for not
attending in response to a summons.
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782. However where there is no witness summons or witness order a
witness is not in contempt if he deliberately fails to attend trial (R v
Wang [2005] 4 Archbold News 1, CA). The position may be
otherwise, if knowing that a witness summons is about to be served
the witness evades service.
783. See H v Wood Green Crown Court [2006] EWHC 2683 (Admin) in
respect of a witness who had been arrested after non compliance with
a witness summons and then attended and turned hostile in the
witness box.
784. It is contempt for a witness to refuse to be sworn or affirmed, to leave
the court before his examination is completed or to refuse to answer
an admissible question unless he makes a claim of privilege which the
court upholds (Ex p. Fernandez (1861) 10 CB (NS) 3, AG v Clough
[1963] 1 QB 773 and AG v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477).
785. As to the adoption of a summary procedure in respect of contempt
generally see paragraphs 28-115, 28-116 and 28-117 onwards of
Archbold. The decision to imprison a person for contempt should
never be taken too quickly. There should always be time for reflection
as to what is the best course to take. If it is possible for the contemnor
to have legal advice he should be given an opportunity of having it,
but justice does not always require that in every circumstance of
contempt the contemnor has a right to legal advice. Situations arise in
court sometimes where a judge has to act quickly and to pass such
sentence in respect of the contempt as he thinks proper at once.
Giving a contemnor an opportunity to apologise is one of the most
important aspects of the summary procedure. In Lewis (The Times,
November 4, 1999) the English Court of Appeal stated that in the face
of an outburst of protest from the public gallery it is often wise for a
judge to rise, leaving anyone intent on misbehaving to do so in his
absence and to face the consequences. Where however, as in R v Hill
[1986] Crim LR 457 a person disturbs the court by abusing the judge
in a way that cannot be overlooked it is for the judge to take steps to
safeguard the court’s authority. Steps additional to those indicated in
R v Moran 81 Cr App R 51 include (a) the immediate arrest and
detention of the offender (b) telling the offender what the contempt is
said to have been (c) considering counsel’s submissions (d) if satisfied
that punishment is merited imposing it. See also R v Phelps [2009]
EWCA Crim 2308.
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786. Where circumstances dictate that a judge conducts an immediate
inquiry into an allegation of intimidation of a prosecution witness by
the defendant the questioning of the witness should be undertaken by
counsel for the prosecution, so as to avoid any impression of the judge
acting as prosecutor; and if the contempt is found proved, it might be
better to postpone both the giving of reasons and the imposition of a
penalty to the end of the trial (R v Macleod [2001] Crim LR 589).
787. In R v K 78 Cr App R 82 CA the English Court of Appeal said that a
witness who, by refusing to give evidence, is liable to be found in
contempt of court and thus risks committal to prison, should be given
the opportunity of legal representation. It is wise not to take any
action in respect of contempt in haste. See also Phillips (1984) 78
Crim App R 88, Montgomery [1995] 2 Crim App R 23 and Robinson
[2006] EWCA Crim 613 in respect of sentences for contempt in this
area of the law.
788. If a witness refuses, or appears to be disposed to refuse, to give
evidence a judge is perfectly justified in making it clear to the witness
that the consequences of his refusing might be serious and might
involve punishment of the witness.
789. People who without proper cause refuse to give evidence would
normally be punished with imprisonment. In some cases however
inaction or a warning is the best policy. See Archbold at paragraph
28-126 onwards in respect of appropriate sentences.
790. In R v Popat [2008] EWCA Crim 1921 it was held that in addition to
service of the summons, bringing the document to the attention of the
witness was sufficient to give rise to an obligation to attend so that
failure to attend may be contempt of court. Hughes L J stated that
where a witness is reluctant and has failed to appear in response to a
summons very often the mere issue of a warrant for arrest is enough
to achieve attendance. It is very common for judges to give a direction
at the time of issuing a warrant for arrest which is designed in the
interests of the witness to avoid the witness having to be locked up
overnight or perhaps longer. It could be directed that the police officer
need not execute the warrant if he is satisfied that the witness is going
to attend voluntarily or need not execute it if the witness agrees to
come with the officer. In some circumstances a warrant can be issued
backed for bail.
791. See Jackson v Radcliffe 1921-51 MLR 344 in respect of contempt and
publications tending to prejudice a fair trial. The Appeal Division
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(Judge of Appeal Hytner and Deemster Callow) in Barr 1990-92
MLR 398 dealt with the law of contempt in relation to comments in
the media. I, along with T W Cain QC in his capacity as Attorney
General, appeared as counsel in that case. I well remember the
developments during the weekend hearing and the robust performance
of the late Geoffrey Kinley for the appellants.There were some fierce
exchanges between Mr Kinley and Judge of Appeal Hytner. The
appeal was dismissed and on the 12th May 1993 the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council refused the appellants special leave to
appeal.
Witness/defendant becoming ill
792. In respect of a witness becoming ill part way through his evidence see
Archbold at paragraph 8-254 and R v Symmons [2009] EWCA Crim
654.
793. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Doyle) in Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8 (judgment delivered on the 20th
August 2003) at paragraph 13 stated:
“ … there is no doubt that the Acting Deemster applied the correct test, namely,
whether, in the absence of Mr Griffin [a potential witness], it was possible for the
Appellant to have a fair trial, which is simply another way of asking whether any
injustice would result from the trial proceeding. She concluded that a fair trial was
possible even in the absence of Mr Griffin.”
794. In respect of defendants becoming ill part way through the trial see R
v Taylor [2008] EWCA Crim 680. In that case Moses L J stated:
“13 Having recorded his views as to the cogency of the defence and recalled the
medical evidence, the judge concluded that the appellant was afflicted by an
involuntary illness or incapacity. The judge found as a fact that the appellant was
not voluntarily absent from the trial. He then considered both the House of Lords'
decision in R v Jones [2003] 1 AC 1 and its endorsement of the earlier decision of
Rose LJ [1981] Crim LR 720 . Having considered those cases and directed
himself as to the factors which had to be considered in such a situation, the judge
ruled that there was no realistic possibility of knowing when it would be that the
appellant would recover and ordered that the trial should continue.
14 Thereafter, the appellant attended court between 15 and 20 September 2006.
His presence should not be held against him since it is plain that he had been
advised not only of the judge's conclusion but of the way in which the judge had
expressed himself. He clearly felt difficulties in attending. This culminated in an
application on 21 September 2006 for the judge to recuse himself. The application
was made because of the way the judge had expressed himself as to the merits or
otherwise of the defence, despite the fact that he had ruled that the appellant had
not voluntarily absented himself from the trial. Later that same day the appellant
collapsed in the dock. An ambulance was called and a doctor called. No further
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medical report was obtained. The doctor reported that tests revealed that the
appellant's position had been stabilised and the appellant asked to remain in court.
Subsequently the appellant gave a full uninterrupted evidence, which took place
over five days.
15 The first question therefore in this appeal is whether the judge correctly
directed himself as to the principles to be applied and was correct to conclude that
the trial should continue, despite the appellant's obvious health difficulties. These
were, as the judge found, involuntary, and for three days, possibly longer, he
could not attend court.
16 It is not submitted that where a defendant is involuntarily absent it inevitably
follows that the trial cannot continue. The right to be present at court is vital. It is
not only a right so that the defendant can participate by giving instructions and
following the trial, but also so that he can see and hear the witnesses who are
giving evidence against him. This is not only part of the process by which a
defendant participates at trial, but is also a sanction by which the public can be
confident that there are pressures on those witnesses who give adverse evidence
against a defendant to tell the truth. To give an account of events in a witness
statement or within the seclusion of a police station is one thing. It is quite another
to have to stand up in public, face-to-face with a defendant, and repeat those
assertions. Thus Rose LJ in Halson emphasised the importance of the right of a
defendant to be present at his trial and to be legally represented. In considering
the factors which a judge has to take into account, as explained by the House of
Lords in Jones , it is apparent that that right is not absolute. Even in cases where a
defendant is not voluntarily absent, a judge must consider for how long an
adjournment is likely to be and also the extent to which legal representatives in
the absence of a defendant are able to receive and act upon their instructions. The
court is also enjoined to take into account the public interest in the pursuit of a
continuous trial and the interest not only of victims but also of witnesses. There is
a public interest in not allowing a trial to be put off for an indefinite period.
17 Nevertheless, where a defendant is absent through ill-health, the judge must be
astute to see that an adjournment for a short period until he recovers will not be
refused, save in circumstances where he is compelled to take the opposite course.
18 It is plain that the judge had concerns as to whether the appellant really was
suffering to the extent which the doctor and the appellant said. Were it not so, he
would not have made a number of comparatively disparaging comments about not
only “the good doctor”, but also as to the appellant's need to “pull himself
together”. Those remarks in our judgment were inapposite. If, as he was entitled
to do, the judge had doubts about either the genuineness of the symptoms or their
gravity, the proper course was to adjourn and invite another medical report to be
prepared (if the appellant was agreeable) in order to check upon those symptoms.
It was not for the judge to exercise some medical expertise which he did not have.
19 The judge found that the appellant had not voluntarily absented himself. The
correct question was, therefore, as Mr Long rightly pointed out, to consider what
flowed from that finding. It did not inevitably follow that the judge was bound to
allow the adjournment. Uppermost in his mind was whether an adjournment
would resolve the problem. There was ample medical evidence, to which we have
already referred, to indicate that it would not have done so. The appellant's
anxiety and stress was of some considerable standing and length. He had
apparently suffered an alcohol problem and was often anxious and of low mood
or depressed. The stress of a trial would inevitably exacerbate those symptoms. In
those circumstances the judge was entitled to consider whether an adjournment
for a few days would have remedied the problem and to conclude that it would
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not have done so. He was entitled to take that view. His concern to press on and
his belief that the appellant would be able to cope with the trial were, as it turned
out, proved to be correct. Moreover, the judge was entitled to consider what was
likely to happen during the appellant's absence. It is true that witnesses were
called, but their evidence was hardly the subject of any fierce cross-examination.
Having regard to the issues, it was not likely to have been subjected to such
treatment. Since the appellant's general defence was, “I was in the house, but
others in the house would not have noticed”, it is difficult to see why those
witnesses needed to be there, let alone cross-examined in his presence. Since the
appellant's defence in relation to playing music was the general defence, “I do not
know who these people were who impersonated me, but they were not me”, again
it is unlikely that the cross-examination could have been particularly fierce or
focused, or that much difference would have been made by the appellant being
present in the dock. There was always the danger after all that one of those
witnesses might recognise him.
20 In short, whilst the imperative is clear that a defendant ought to be present
during the trial and that in most cases an adjournment should be granted where he
is ill, this was one of those rare cases where we conclude that the judge was right
to allow the prosecution to continue to adduce evidence. He was wrong, however,
to be so scathing about the paucity of the defence. That was not relevant to his
ruling and can only have excited feelings both in the appellant's representative
and in the appellant himself of antagonism towards the case he was advancing.
That antagonism was not relevant and ought not to have been expressed. What
was relevant was the extent to which the appellant was prejudiced in the context
of the defence that he was proffering by not being present whilst those witnesses
were called. Having regard to the nature of the defence and having regard to the
evidence that the witnesses gave, in our view the appellant was not prejudiced. In
those circumstances, whilst we would criticise the terms in which the judge
expressed himself, for the reasons we have given we take the view that he reached
the correct conclusion entirely consistent with what their Lordships said in Jones
and what Rose LJ said in Halson. We have not cited the important passages in
either of those cases lest mere reiteration detracts from the importance of the
words there used. It suffices to say that the right to be present at trial is not
absolute; a judgment must in some circumstances be exercised as to whether an
adjournment will be of benefit or cause any prejudice. In our judgment the judge
was correct to foresee that it would not have done any good and correct to
consider that there was no prejudice. For those reasons the first and main ground
of the appeal is rejected.”
795. In R v Gray 1990-92 MLR 74 the first defendant was in a poor state
of health and Acting Deemster Field-Fisher held that his trial should
be adjourned. The court had a discretion to continue the trial if he
were to be absent because of illness, but it was held that such
discretion should be exercised sparingly and never when it would
seriously prejudice a defence. It was further held that the complicated
nature of the case, the mass of detail involved, the recent
deterioration in the first defendant’s health, particularly in memory
and concentration, and the likelihood of hospital visits during the trial
period, together all added up to certain prejudice, making an
adjournment necessary. A stay of the proceedings was also granted on
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the basis of delay and abuse of process. Gray was the highwater mark
in Manx common law in respect of abuse of process applications. The
tide has retreated somewhat since Gray. A separate section of this
book deals with stays and abuse of process applications at paragraphs
812 to 844.
Failure to call witness
796. In respect of the failure to call particular witnesses see Archbold at
paragraph 4-400.
797. Beldam L J in Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App R 299 at 323 stated:
“A question from the jury asking why a particular witness has not been called is
not unusual and normally the judge answers such an enquiry by giving a direction
that they must not speculate about the evidence such a witness might or might not
have given, and that they must decide the case on the evidence they have heard.
Where, as in this case, a defendant has no need to call the witness having regard
to the issues raised, the judge explains this to the jury.”
798. Acting Deemster Montgomerie in McStay 2005-06 MLR N9 usefully
set out the relevant law in respect of the duty on the prosecution to
have witnesses available. The note in the Manx Law Reports reads as
follows:-
“The decision whether to call prosecution witnesses to give evidence at trial is
primarily a judgment for the prosecution to make. The court will, in general, only
interfere with the decision if it is wrong in principle or if the court is required to
do so in the interests of justice and/or to promote a fair trial. The general
principles governing such decisions by the prosecution may be summarized as
follows (R. v. Russell-Jones, [1995] 3 All ER. 239, followed):
(a) the prosecution must generally have at court all witnesses whose statements
have been served as witnesses on whom the prosecution intends to rely, if the
defence wants those witnesses to attend;
(b) the prosecution has an unfettered discretion over which statements to serve,
but must normally disclose all material statements not served;
(c) the prosecution has a further discretion over whether to call or tender any
witnesses, but this is not unfettered;
(d) such discretion must be exercised in the interests of justice and to promote a
fair trial, with the prosecution having in mind their overall duty of fairness;
(e) further, the prosecution ought normally to call or offer to call all witnesses
who give direct evidence of the primary facts of a case, unless it has good reason
to regard the witness as unworthy of belief. The defence cannot always be
expected to call witness of primary facts whom the prosecution have discarded;
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(f) it is for the prosecution to decide which witnesses give direct evidence of the
primary facts and whether those witnesses are unworthy of belief, but a witness
cannot properly be regarded as unworthy of belief merely because he provides
evidence contradicting that of a larger number of other witnesses; and
(g) the jury should have available all direct evidence which the prosecution
considered material when serving statements, even if there are inconsistencies
between witnesses. The prosecution, however, is not obliged to tender witnesses
merely to provide the defence with material with which to attack the other
prosecution witnesses.
These principles are not to he regarded as a rule book to provide for all
circumstances. Special situations may arise which these principles have not
considered.
In view of the conflicting authorities, however, the court’s power to order the
calling of a prosecution witness remains unclear.”
799. Acting Deemster Montgomerie in Myers (judgment delivered on the
26th March 2009, unreported) at paragraph [22] of his comprehensive
judgment stated:
“ [22] The extent of the Prosecution obligation to call witnesses has been raised
by the Defence. I shall therefore deal with the law in relation to that. It was
considered in R. v. Russell-Jones [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 538. At page 542 the
Court of Appeal set out the following principles which emerge from the
authorities and from rules of practice:-
(1) Generally speaking the Prosecution must have at Court all the witnesses
whose statements have been served as witnesses on whom the Prosecution intend
to rely, if the Defence want those witnesses to attend. In deciding which
statements to serve, the Prosecution have an unfettered discretion, but must
normally disclose material statements not served.
(2) The Prosecution enjoy a discretion whether to call, or tender, any witness they
require to attend, but the discretion is not unfettered.
(3) The first principle which limits this discretion is that it must be exercised in
the interests of justice, so as to promote a fair trial. Per Fullagar J. in Ziems v.
The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] 97 C.L.R.
279, 292:
“The present case, however, seems to me to call for a reminder that the discretion
should be exercised with due regard to traditional considerations of fairness.”
The dictum of Lord Thankerton in Adel Muhammed El Dabbah v. The Attorney-
General for Palestine [1944] A.C. 156 that the Court will only interfere if the
Prosecutor has been influenced by some oblique motive does not mean that the
Court will only interfere if the Prosecutor has acted out of malice. It means that
the Prosecutor must direct his mind to his overall duty of fairness, as a minister of
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justice. Were he not to do so, he would have been moved by a consideration not
relevant to his proper task - in that sense, an oblique motive.
(4) The next principle is that the Prosecution ought normally to call or offer to
call all the witnesses who give direct evidence of the primary facts of the case,
unless for good reason, in any instance, they regard the witness’ evidence as
unworthy of belief. In most cases, the jury should have available all of that
evidence as to what actually happened, which the Prosecution, when serving
statements, considered to be material, even if there are inconsistencies between
one witness and another. The Defence cannot always be expected to call for
themselves witnesses of the primary facts whom the Prosecution have discarded.
For example, the evidence they may give, albeit at variance with other evidence
called by the Crown, may well be detrimental to the Defence case. If what a
witness of the primary facts has to say is properly regarded by the Prosecution as
being incapable of belief, or as some of the authorities say “incredible”, then his
evidence cannot help the jury assess the overall picture of the crucial events;
hence, it is not unfair that he should not be called.
(5) It is for the Prosecution to decide which witnesses give direct evidence of the
primary facts of the case. A Prosecutor may reasonably take the view that what a
witness has to say is at best marginal.
(6) The Prosecutor is also the primary judge of whether or not a witness to the
material events is incredible, or unworthy of belief. It goes without saying that he
could not properly condemn a witness as incredible merely because, e.g., he gives
an account at variance with that of a larger number of witnesses, and one that is
less favourable to the Prosecution case than that of the others.
(7) A Prosecutor properly exercising his discretion will not therefore be obliged
to proffer a witness merely in order to give the Defence material with which to
attack the credit of other witnesses on whom the Prosecution rely. To hold
otherwise would, in truth, be to assert that the Prosecution are obliged to call a
witness for no purpose other than to assist the Defence in its endeavour to destroy
the Crown’s own case. No sensible rule of justice could require such a stance to
be taken.
Finally, the Court added that these principles should not be regarded as a lexicon
or rule book to cover all cases. There may be special situations that have not been
adverted to, and in every case it is important to emphasise the judgment to be
made is primarily that of the Prosecutor, and in general the Court will only
interfere with it if he has gone wrong in principle.”
800. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Doyle) in Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8 (judgment 20th August 2003)
stated:
“7. Miss Hannan submitted, and we regard this as uncontroversial, that the
prosecution are under a duty to take all reasonable steps to secure the attendance
of a witness required by the defence, but that if it is impossible to have the
witness present the court, in its discretion, is entitled to allow the trial to proceed
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provided that no injustice thereby results - see Attorney General v Brown, Shaw,
Fulcher & Cole [19th February 1999] and Attorney General v Tully [2nd July
2003].”
No case to answer
801. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Devo (judgment delivered 29th October 2008) stated:-
155. It is settled law that a submission of no case to answer should be allowed
when there is no evidence upon which, if the evidence adduced was accepted, a
reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict : see R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr
App R 124 where the earlier authorities were reviewed and guidance given as to
the proper approach by Lord Lane CJ, at 127, in the following terms :
`(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the
defendant there is no difficulty. The judge will stop the case. (2) The difficulty
arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for example,
because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other
evidence. (a) Where the judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution
evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not
properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission being made, to stop the
case. (b) Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or
weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witness`s reliability, or other
matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on
one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly
come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow
the matter to be tried by the jury.`
Lord Lane observed that borderline cases could be left to the discretion of the trial
judge.
156. Where the prosecution case depends on the jury drawing an inference, as in
this case that since Mr Riedel had been intimately involved in dealing in
Somatropin through Hatcher, he was still so involved in dealing in Somatropin
through Apelbe, the correct approach is for the judge to ask whether a reasonable
jury, properly directed, would be entitled to draw the inference : see R v Jabber
(2006) 10 Archbold News 3.”
802. In R v Christian (judgment delivered 5th December 2007) I dealt with
a powerful submission of no case to answer and stated:
“5 I turn now to the relevant law. I have considered Archbold Criminal
Pleading Evidence and Practice 2008 paragraphs 4-294 to 4-295, Blackstone’s
Criminal Practice 2003 from paragraph D14.26 under the heading of ‘Submission
of No Case to Answer’ to paragraph D14.32, the Privy Council case of Daley v
The Queen [1994] 1 AC 117 and R v Colin Shippey 1988 Crim LR 767.
6. Archbold paragraphs 4-294 and 4-295 sets the position out as follows:
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“In R. v. Galbraith 73 Cr.App R. 124 CA, the earlier authorities were reviewed
and guidance given as to the proper approach:
‘(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the
defendant there is no difficulty—the judge will stop the case.
(2) The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous
character, for example, because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is
inconsistent with other evidence. (a) Where the judge concludes that the
prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed
could not properly convict on it, it is his duty, on a submission being made to stop
the case. (b) Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or
weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witness’s reliability, or other
matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on
one possible view of the facts there is evidence on which the jury could properly
come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow
the matter to be tried by the jury’ (per Lord Lane C.J. at p, 127).
The Lord Chief Justice then observed that borderline cases could be left to the
discretion of the judge. For an example of the approach of the Court of Appeal to
the exercise of this discretion, see R. v Lesley [1996] 1 Cr.App.R. 39.CA.
In R. v. Shippey [1988] Crim. L.R. 767, Crown Court (a decision on its facts,
laying down, no new principle of law: R v Pryer, Sparkes and Walker, unreported,
April 7, 2004, CA [2004] EWCA Crim. 1163), Turner J. held that the
requirement to take the prosecution evidence at its highest did not mean “picking
out all the plums and leaving the duff behind’ The judge should assess the
evidence and if the evidence of the witness upon whom the prosecution case
depended was self-contradictory and out of reason and all common sense then
such evidence was tenuous and suffered from inherent weakness. His Lordship
did not interpret Galbraith as meaning that if there are parts of the evidence which
go to support the charge then that is enough to leave the matter to the jury, no
matter what the state of the rest of the evidence is. It was, he said, necessary to
make an assessment of the evidence as a whole and it was not simply a matter of
the credibility of individual witnesses or of evidential inconsistencies between
witnesses, although those matters may play a subordinate role. In Brooks v. DPP
[1994] 1.A.C. 568 at 581, PC, it was said (in the context of committal
proceedings) that questions of credibility, except in the clearest of cases, do not
normally result in a finding that there is no prima facie case.
Where the prosecution case depends upon the jury drawing a particular inference
from the evidence, the correct approach at the close of the prosecution ease is to
ask whether a reasonable jury, properly directed, would be entitled to draw the
inference: R. v. Jabber [2006] 10 Archbold News 3, CA (rejecting an argument,
based on an observation in Kwan Ping Bong v. The, Queen [1979] A.C. 609, PC
that the inference must be one that no reasonable person could fail to draw from
the facts proved).
As to the evidential value of the defendant’s statements for the purposes of a
submission of no case, see post § 15-408; and for reliance upon a co defendant’s
confession where there is a case for the co defendant to answer and the co-
defendant’s guilt would be probative in the case against the defendant, see R. v
Hayter [2005] 2 Cr.App.R.3. HL, post § 9-85”.
7. Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2003 at paragraph D14.26 deals with the
topic of a submission of no case to answer and refers in detail to Galbraith and
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some of the subsequent cases including Shippey. At paragraph D14.28 the
position in respect of identification cases is outlined as follows:
“The correct approach to submissions of no case to answer in prosecutions
turning upon identification evidence was laid down by the Court of Appeal in
Turnbull [1977] QB 224 (see F18.2 and F18.26). As one of several safeguards
against erroneous convictions based on witnesses mistakenly identifying the
accused, the Court of Appeal stated that, if the quality of the identification
evidence on which the prosecution case depends is poor and there is no other
evidence to support it, then the judge should direct the jury to acquit (pp. 229H -
230A). However, supporting evidence capable of justifying leaving a case to the
jury even if identifying evidence is poor need not be corroboration in the strict
sense (p. 230B - D). Although Turnbull predates Galbraith [1981]1 WLR 1039,
there is no suggestion that the principles in it have been affected by the later
decision. In fact, the obligation on the trial judge to uphold a submission if the
identifying evidence is poor and there is no supporting evidence may be regarded
as the clearest example of the application of the second limb of the Galbraith test.
This is because the identifying witness undoubtedly provides some evidence of
the accused’s guilt (therefore a submission on the first limb would be bound to
fail) but it is so weak or tenuous that no jury properly directed could properly
convict on it (see Daley v The Queen [1994] 1 AC 117).”
8. Reference should also be made to the Appeal Division’s judgment in
Williams delivered on the 19th August 2003.
9. The headnote to Daley v The Queen [1994] 1 AC 117 reads as follows:
“The defendant was charged with the murder of a woman who had been shot by
one of two men who had broken into her house. The prosecution case depended
wholly on visual evidence of identification by the deceased’s husband, which the
defence alleged to have been mistaken. At the close of the prosecution case the
judge rejected a submission of no case to answer. The judge in her summing up
referred to serious weaknesses in the identification evidence. She warned the jury
that the identification had not been very good and expressed her opinion that the
prosecution had not made the identification clear enough. The defendant was
convicted and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica dismissed his application for leave
to appeal against conviction. On the defendant’s appeal to the Judicial
Committee:—
Held, allowing the appeal, that where the trial judge considered that the quality of
the identification evidence was poor and insufficient to found a conviction, and
there was no other evidence to support that identification evidence, he should
withdraw the case from the jury at the end of the prosecution case; but that where
the strength of the prosecution evidence depended on the determination of a
witness’s reliability, and on one possible view of the facts there was evidence
upon which a jury could properly convict, the judge should not stop the trial even
if he regarded the prosecution evidence as uncreditworthy but should leave the
case to the jury; that since the trial judge had rationally considered the
prosecution’s case on identification to be too weak to sustain a conviction she
should have withdrawn the case from the jury with a direction to acquit the
defendant; and that, therefore, a miscarriage of justice had occurred and the
conviction would be quashed (post, pp. 125B - C, 126E - F, 127G - 128A, 129D -
F, l30A). Reg. v. Turnbull [1977] Q.B. 224, C.A. and Reid (Junior) v. The Queen
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[1990] 1 A.C. 363, P.C. applied. Reg. v. Galbraith [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1039, C.A.
considered”
10. The short report in the Criminal Law Review in respect of Shippey reads
as follows:
“High Court sitting at Sheffield, Turner J.; May 23 to 25, 1988.
The defendant Shippey was charged alone with rape and all three defendants were
charged jointly with a further rape on a different day of the same girl. The
prosecution case rested entirely upon the evidence of the complainant and there
was effectively little or no corroboration. After the close of the prosecution case
submissions of no case to answer were made by all defence counsel on the basis
of Galbraith (supra) namely that the evidence was so inherently weak and
inconsistent that no jury properly directed could properly convict. The
prosecution opposed the application arguing that although there were weaknesses
and inconsistencies in the evidence nevertheless there was evidence, which
evidence must be taken at its highest in accordance with Galbraith and once that
was done, it could not be said that a jury properly directed could not properly
convict; there being evidence it was a matter for the jury under limb 2(b) of
Galbraith to assess its strength or weaknesses and accordingly the case should go
to the jury. The prosecution referred his Lordship to the cases of R. v. Beckwith 81
C.L.R. 646 and Haw Tua Tua v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 3 All E.R. 14 at p. 19
and the article: submission of no case to answer—some recent developments, 82
C.L.R. 558.
Decision : His Lordship considered the case of Galbraith in great detail
emphasising that it had to be understood that that case was resolving the division
of opinion which had arisen between the cases of Barker and Mansfield (cited
therein) and resolving it in favour of Barker. The instant case was clearly not a
case under limb 1 of the Galbraith formulation and His Lordship therefore moved
directly to limb 2. It was conceded by the defence that there was undoubtedly
some evidence which went to support “on a minimum basis” the proposition that
the crimes allegedly committed by the defendants had been so committed by
them. However, taking the prosecution case at its highest did not mean picking
out the plums and leaving the duff behind. His Lordship found that he must assess
the evidence and if the witnesses’ evidence was self-contradictory and out of
reason and all commonsense then such evidence is tenuous and suffering from
inherent weakness. He did not interpret the judgment in either Galbraith or
Barker as intending to say that if there are parts of the evidence which go to
support the charge then no matter what the state of the rest of the evidence that is
enough to leave the matter to the jury. Such a view would leave part of the ratio of
Gaibraith tautologous. He found that he had to make an assessment of the
evidence as a whole. It was not simply a matter of the credibility of individual
witnesses or simply a matter of evidential inconsistencies between witnesses,
although those matters may play a subordinate role. He found that there were
within the complainant’s own evidence inconsistencies of such a substantial kind
that he would have to point out to the jury their effect and to indicate to the jury
how difficult and dangerous it would be to act upon the plums and not the duff.
His Lordship then went on to identify parts of the complainant’s own evidence
which he found to be totally at variance with other parts which were supportative
of the prosecution case. He labelled those parts variously as being “frankly
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incredible” as having “really significant inherent inconsistencies” and as being
“strikingly and wholly inconsistent with the allegation of rape,” (e.g. her
voluntary return to the defendant Shippey after he had allegedly earlier informed
her that he wanted sexual intercourse with her, that he would not leave until he
had had the same and after he had earlier allegedly threatened her with violence if
he did not get the same). His Lordship found that he could only accept the
prosecution submission that the case must be left to the jury when taken at its
highest if he were to ignore the inconsistencies which he had earlier outlined (as
described above). He could not ignore those inconsistencies and bearing them in
mind he found that a jury properly directed could not properly convict.
Accordingly the submissions were allowed and formal verdicts of not guilty
directed”.
11. I have also considered further authorities in respect of a judge’s power to
stop a case and to direct a verdict of not guilty. Those authorities include Heston-
Francois (1984) 78 Cr App R 209, Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 and R
v Brown 1998 Crim LR 196.
12. In Heston-Francois (1984) 78 Cr App R 209 the English Court of Appeal
referred to there being no doubt that the court had an inherent jurisdiction to stop
a prosecution.
13. In Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 Roskill L J in the English
Court of Appeal at page 357 stated:
“… the learned judge, having ruled that there was evidence to go to the jury, went
on almost to invite the jury to stop the case. This Court has repeatedly said in
recent years that this practice should not be followed. If a judge thinks that the
case is tenuous, then, even though there is some evidence against the accused
person, the judge, if he thinks it would be unsafe or unsatisfactory to allow the
case to go to the jury even with a proper direction, should take upon himself the
responsibility of stopping it there and then. If the judge is not prepared to stop the
case on his own responsibility it is wrong for him to try and cast the responsibility
of stopping it on the jury. In this case the jury declined to take the hint the judge
offered”.
14. The following is an extract from the short report of R v Brown [1998]
Crim LR 196 (a decision of the English Court of Appeal Criminal Division):
“It seemed to the Court that throughout the trial the judge has a responsibility not
to allow a jury to consider evidence on which they could not safely convict …if,
at the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge is of the opinion that no
reasonable jury properly directed could safely convict, he should raise the matter
for discussion with counsel even if no submission of no case to answer is made. If
having heard submissions he is of the same opinion, he should withdraw the case
from the jury”.”
803. A submission of no case can be made at the close of the case for the
prosecution (sometimes exceptionally at end of defence case). The
submission is made in the absence of the jury (unless possibly the
defence ask that jury remain in which case judge should hear
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submissions from the defence in the absence of jury as to why the
normal procedure should not be followed). If a submission of no case
is rejected, there should be no comment to the jury. If the court rejects
some counts but not others the judge can comment to the jury briefly
as long as he says nothing to the jury which might be construed as
indicating a belief that any remaining counts are well-founded.
804. The following are relevant extracts from Archbold :
“4-294 In R v Galbraith, 73 Cr.App.R.124,C.A, the earlier authorities
were reviewed and guidance given as to the proper approach:
“(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the
defendant there is no difficulty – the judge will stop the case. (2) The difficulty
arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for example,
because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with
other evidence. (a) Where the judge concludes that the prosecution evidence,
taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly
convict on it, it is his duty, on a submission being made, to stop the case. (b)
Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness
depends on the view to be taken of a witness’s reliability, or other matters which
are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on one
possible view of the facts there is evidence on which the jury could properly
come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow
the matter to be tried by the jury”. (per Lord Lane C.J. at p. 127).
The Lord Chief Justice then observed that borderline cases could be left to the
discretion of the judge. For an example of the approach of the Court of Appeal
to the exercise of this discretion, see R v Lesley [1996] 1 Cr. App.R. 39, C.A.
4-295 In R.v. Shippey [1988] Crim L.R. 767, Crown Court, Turner J. held
that the requirement to take the prosecution evidence at its highest did not mean
“picking out all the plums and leaving the duff behind”. The judge should assess
the evidence and if the evidence of the witness upon whom the prosecution case
depended was self-contradictory and out of reason and all common sense then
such evidence was tenuous and suffered from inherent weakness. His Lordship
did not interpret Galbraith as meaning that if there are parts of the evidence
which go to support the charge then that is enough to leave the matter to the
jury, no matter what the state of the rest of the evidence is. It was, he said,
necessary to make an assessment of the evidence as a whole and it was not
simply a matter of the credibility of individual witnesses or of evidential
inconsistencies between witnesses, although those matters may play a
subordinate role. In Brooks v DPP [1994] 1 A.C. 568 at 581, PC, it was said (in
the context of committal proceedings) that questions of credibility, except in the
clearest of cases, do not normally result in a finding that there is no prima facie
case.”
805. When the prosecution evidence has been concluded it is open to
counsel for the defence to invite the Deemster to direct the jury as a
matter of law that they should acquit the Defendant either because (1)
the prosecution have failed to produce any evidence to establish some
essential ingredient of the offence or (2) the evidence produced is so
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weak or so discredited by cross examination that no reasonable jury
could convict.
806. The Deemster should take care not to usurp the function of the jury.
The Appeal Division in Warren (judgment 1st February 2010) stressed
that the proper determination of a submission of no case in a jury trial
involves the striking of a balance between a usurpation by the judge
of the jury’s functions and the danger of an unjust conviction. If
issues of credibility arise these are issues within the province of the
jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence on
which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant
is guilty then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury.
807. In DPP v Varlack (Privy Council judgment delivered 1st December
2008) the following is stated:
“14. Submissions of no case were made to the trial judge at the end of the
prosecution evidence on behalf of each defendant and their counsel applied to the
judge to have the case against their clients withdrawn from the jury. The judge
gave a reserved judgment in writing, in which she acceded to the application in
respect of the murder charge against Pemberton but rejected all the other defence
submissions. At the outset she set out the governing principle in determining
applications of no case, based on R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 and
Labrador v R (BVI Criminal Appeal No 10 of 2001). The essential statement of
the law for present purposes is a sentence from the judgment of Lord Lane CJ in
Galbraith at page 1042:
“Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or
weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witness’s reliability, or
other matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury
and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which
a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty,
then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury”.
This has long been regarded as a canonical statement of the law, and was so
accepted by both parties to the appeal before the Board.”
808. See R v P [2008] 2 Cr App R 6 in respect of a submission of no case
to answer in the context of a prosecution which is dependent on
circumstantial evidence. In such a case the judge ought to look at the
evidence in the round and ask whether there was a case on which a
jury properly directed could convict.
809. In R v N Ltd and C Ltd [2008] EWCA Crim 1223 it was confirmed
that an English Crown Court judge had no jurisdiction at common law
to rule that there was no case to answer before the conclusion of the
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prosecution case. See also Baines (judgment 24th November 2008 at
paragraphs 117 and 119).
810. The Privy Council in DPP v Varlack (judgment delivered 1st
December 2008) stated:
“21. The basic rule in deciding on a submission of no case at the end of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is that the judge should not withdraw the
case if a reasonable jury properly directed could on that evidence find the charge
in question proved beyond reasonable doubt. The canonical statement of the law,
as quoted above is to be found in the judgment of Lord Lane CJ in R v Galbraith
[1981] 1 WLR 1039, 1042. That decision concerned the weight which could
properly be attached to testimony relied upon by the Crown as implicating the
defendant, but the underlying principle, that the assessment of the strength of the
evidence should be left to the jury rather than being undertaken by the judge, is
equally applicable in cases such as the present, concerned with the drawing of
inferences.
22. The principle was summarised in such a case in the judgment of King CJ
in the Supreme Court of South Australia in Questions of Law Reserved on
Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1, 5 in a passage which their Lordships
regard as an accurate statement of the law:
“It follows from the principles as formulated in Bilick (supra) in connection with
circumstantial cases, that it is not the function of the judge in considering a
submission of no case to choose between inferences which are reasonably open to
the jury. He must decide upon the basis that the jury will draw such of the
inferences which are reasonably open, as are most favourable to the prosecution.
It is not his concern that any verdict of guilty might be set aside by the Court of
Criminal Appeal as unsafe. Neither is it any part of his function to decide
whether any possible hypotheses consistent with innocence arc (sic) reasonably
open on the evidence … He is concerned only with whether a reasonable mind
could reach a conclusion of guilty beyond reasonable doubt and therefore exclude
any competing hypothesis as not reasonably open on the evidence…
I would re-state the principles, in summary form, as follows. If there is direct
evidence which is capable of proving the charge, there is a case to answer no
matter how weak or tenuous the judge might consider such evidence to be. If the
case depends upon circumstantial evidence, and that evidence, if accepted, is
capable of producing in a reasonable mind a conclusion of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and thus is capable of causing a reasonable mind to exclude any
competing hypotheses as unreasonable, there is a case to answer. There is no case
to answer only if the evidence is not capable in law of supporting a conviction. In
a circumstantial case that implies that even if all the evidence for the prosecution
were accepted and all inferences most favourable to the prosecution which are
reasonably open were drawn, a reasonable mind could not reach a conclusion of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or to put it another way, could not exclude all
hypotheses consistent with innocence, as not reasonably open on the evidence.”
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A similar statement appears in a recent judgment of the English Court of Appeal,
Criminal Division in R v Jabber [2006] EWCA Crim 2694, where Moses LJ said
at paragraph 21:
“The correct approach is to ask whether a reasonable jury, properly directed,
would be entitled to draw an adverse inference. To draw an adverse inference
from a combination of factual circumstances necessarily does involve the
rejection of all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence. But that is not the
same as saying that anyone considering those circumstances would be bound to
reach the same conclusion. That is not an appropriate test for a judge to apply on
the submission of no case. The correct test is the conventional test of what a
reasonable jury would be entitled to conclude.”
Cf R v Van Bokkum (unreported) 7 March 2000 (EWCA Crim, 199900333/Z3),
para 32; R v Edwards [2004] EWCA Crim 2102, paras 83-5; Blackstone’s
Criminal Practice, 2008 ed, para D15.62.
23. The judge held that the evidence was such that a reasonable jury might
convict. The Court of Appeal held, on the other hand, that because it was in their
view as likely that the respondent was a party only to a purpose which did not
involve contemplation of the killing of Todman, there was “no basis but
speculation on which to ascribe to Varlack participation in one as opposed to the
other” (para 31). They did not apply the test of determining what inferences a
reasonable jury properly directed might draw, as distinct from those which they
themselves thought could or could not be drawn.
24. Their Lordships consider that the Court of Appeal were in error in this
respect. The trial judge correctly approached the submission of no case by
reference to the test whether a reasonable jury properly directed might on one
view of the evidence convict. When one applies this principle, it follows that the
fact that another view, consistent with innocence, could possibly be held does not
mean that the case should be withdrawn from the jury. The judge was in their
Lordships’ opinion justified in concluding that a reasonable jury might on one
view of the evidence find the case proved beyond reasonable doubt and convict
the respondent…”
811. The Privy Council in Eiley v The Queen [2009] UKPC 39 dealt with a
case in which the prosecution withdrew a charge of murder against an
individual (Mr Vasquez) who had entered into an agreement with the
Director of Public Prosecutions under which he was promised
immunity from prosecution if he gave truthful evidence at the trial.
Lord Phillips stated:
“50. None of the defence counsel applied to have the trial stopped at the end of
the prosecution case under the principle in R v Gaibraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039.
Had such an application been made the Board considers that it would have had
merit. It would, however, have been an unusual and extreme step for the judge to
have ruled that there was no case upon which the jury could safely convict in the
absence of any submission to this effect from any defendant. The critical question
is whether having regard to the nature of the evidence given by Mr Vasquez, the
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circumstances in which it was given and the terms in which the judge summed up
the evidence to the jury, the appellants’ convictions are safe. The Board has
concluded that they are not. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise
Her Majesty that the three appeals should be allowed and the convictions of the
appellants quashed.”
Stay on grounds of abuse of process
812. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Devo (judgment delivered 29th October 2008) stated:
“43. We are satisfied that as a matter of law the power to stay a prosecution
arises only where firstly, the prosecution have so manipulated or misused the
process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by the
law or to take advantage of a technicality and that such would be inconsistent with
the due administration of justice or, secondly, on the balance of probability the
defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation or conduct of his
defence by unjustifiable behaviour on the part of the prosecution which deprives
him of a fair trial : see the authorities already referred to above.
44. This is an approach which existed before the advent of the Human Rights
legislation and is consistent with the obligations imposed by Article 6 of the
Human Rights Act 2001. Such was expressly confirmed by the House of Lords in
R v Looseley where the House did not discern any appreciable difference between
the requirements of Article 6 or the Strasbourg jurisprudence thereon and English
law as it had developed in recent years.
45. But some important matters must be noted .
46. Firstly, because prima facie it is the duty of a court to try a person who is
charged before it with an offence which the court has power to try, the jurisdiction
to grant a stay must be exercised carefully and sparingly and only for very
compelling reasons. A stay should not be imposed as a disciplinary measure : R v
Horseferry Road Magistrates` Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, at 74,
where the English police, having decided not to use the extradition process,
colluded with the South African police to have the appellant arrested in South
Africa and forcibly returned the UK against his will.
47. Secondly, the fairness of a trial is not one-sided : R v Derby Crown Court ex p
Brooks and Attorney General`s Reference (No 1 of 1990) [1992] 95 Cr App R
296, at 302.
48. Thirdly, the trial process itself is equipped to deal with the bulk of complaints
which found applications for a stay and an argument solely based on the assertion
that inadequate disclosure prevents a fair trial will not pass the high threshold
because the very fact that the fault in disclosure has been revealed will usually
mean that it can be appropriately remedied by judicial control of the proceedings :
R v Togher, Doran and Parsons.”
813. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Lawrence 2003-05 MLR N27 (judgment delivered 28th
353
July 2004) confirmed the court’s jurisdiction in respect of stays. That
case involved substantial delays in respect of historic sex offences.
Having reviewed the authorities the Appeal Division usefully
summarised the position at paragraph 16 of the judgment as follows:
“Having regard to all such authorities, we have no doubt a stay of proceedings on
the ground of delay or any other reason should only be ordered in an exceptional
case where a defendant establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the delay
has caused him to suffer serious prejudice, such that no fair trial is possible. In
reaching his conclusion, on the facts of a particular case, a Deemster is required to
consider the extent to which any possible unfairness to a defendant can be dealt
with during the trial process, for example, by ruling evidence inadmissible. Each
case will need to be determined on its own facts and there may be some cases,
such as R v Dutton [1994] Crim. LR 910, where the prejudice is such that an order
to stay proceedings is justifiable. Furthermore it may be the case that in
exceptional situations, although it is debatable whether B can properly be so
regarded, this court will quash a conviction where it concludes that the conviction
is unsafe because the appellant was put in an impossible position to defend
himself. But these cases will be exceptional.”
814. Bingham L J, as he then was, in R v Liverpool Stipendiary
Magistrates ex p. Ellison [1990] RTR 220, 227 stated that:
“If any criminal court at any time has cause to suspect that a prosecutor may be
manipulating or using the procedures of the court in order to oppress or unfairly to
prejudice a defendant before the court, I have no doubt that it is the duty of the
court to inquire into the situation and ensure that its procedure is not being so
abused. Usually no doubt such inquiry will be prompted by a complaint on the
part of the defendant. But the duty of the court in my view exists even in the
absence of a complaint.”
815. Circumstances have to be exceptional to justify a stay. The
jurisdiction to decline to allow criminal proceedings to continue
should be used sparingly. There are safeguards to a defendant in the
trial process itself. These principles shout loudly from the pages and
pages of the law reports reporting judgments in respect of applications
for stays.
816. Tully 2003-05 MLR N1 concerned difficulties in the prosecution
providing material to the defence who wished to use such material to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses on character. The prosecution
had made reasonable attempts to obtain certain medical records and a
fair trial could take place even though certain records appeared to be
missing. A stay was not granted in the particular circumstances of that
case.
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817. Beckford [1996] 1 Cr App R 94 contains a useful summary of the two
main established categories:
(1) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial and
(2) cases where it concludes that it would be unfair for the
defendant to be tried
(for example where the prosecution have been guilty of such serious
misbehaviour that they should not be allowed to benefit from it to the
defendant’s detriment).
818. In R v Momodou and Limani (2005) 2 Cr App R 6 at 99-110 Judge L J
indicated that a judge can stay proceedings even if the prosecution
were blameless and the difficulties were created by third parties.
819. In Bell 2005-06 MLR 327 at pages 347-348 I stated:
“57. Mr Bell has yet to plead to the charges and presently enjoys the presumption
of innocence. It is not for me to determine the innocence or guilt of the
Defendant. If he pleads not guilty and is acquitted after a trial he will be innocent.
If he pleads guilty or is found guilty after a trial he will be guilty. Those issues are
yet to be determined. Mrs Jones is right to submit that this court should be
concerned to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system. This court is
indeed concerned with the maintenance of the integrity of the criminal justice
system. As regards the position generally, I remind myself that the criminal
justice system does not involve a game where otherwise guilty defendants should
be permitted to rely upon technical irregularities to, in colloquial terms, “get away
with it”. In more judicial terms I would refer to the comments of Lord Justice
Auld in the case of R v Gleeson (the Court of Appeal Criminal Division Times
Law Reports 30th October 2003) where Lord Justice Auld is credited with the
comments “a criminal trial is not a game. Its object is to ensure that the guilty are
convicted and the innocent acquitted”. Those comments also reflect the comments
of Lord Scarman in the Sang case (1979) 69 Cr. App R. 282 at page 307 where
Lord Scarman indicated that the test of unfairness is not that of a game. A
defendant should not be permitted to take unfair advantage of a technicality or
procedural irregularity to escape trial any more than the prosecution should be
permitted to take advantage of a technicality as the authorities on abuse of process
make plain. If Mr Bell is innocent he should be acquitted. If he is guilty he should
be convicted and dealt with accordingly. Justice must be done in respect of Mr
Bell and in respect of the community in which he lives. The Court of Appeal also
made it clear in the case of Vincent Munnery (1992) 94 Cr. App. R. 164 that in a
criminal prosecution it was justice that mattered both to the public as represented
by the prosecution as well as to the defence.
58. I am not for one moment suggesting that the police should feel free to breach
mandatory statutory or common law requirements and cause unlawful detentions
or commit unlawful arrests. Nor am I suggesting that the unlawful interference
with the liberty of the individual should be regarded as a mere technicality or a
minor procedural matter. I am however suggesting that defendants against whom
there is a prime facie case to answer should not be permitted to walk away from
the consequences of their potentially serious criminal conduct by endeavouring to
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rely upon procedural irregularities committed by the police in good faith by
inadvertence or neglect (rather than in bad faith or otherwise in circumstances
where an abuse of process argument would be successful). In cases where the
prosecution have acted in bad faith or otherwise abused the process then the court
does have ample power to stop a prosecution. I entirely accept that the court can
order a stay of proceedings in the absence of bad faith. This court in a proper case
will not hesitate to intervene if the police or the prosecution authorities have
seriously abused their powers. There is however no evidence of a serious abuse in
the circumstances of the case presently before me which would justify an order
being made in effect stopping these proceedings.”
820. In Colvin (judgment delivered 19th June 2002, unreported) certain
evidence was not produced but a stay was not granted.
821. R v Gray 1990-92 MLR 74 was the high water mark in respect of
stays in Manx law. The stay in that case was granted on grounds of
illness of one of the accused and on the grounds of significant delays
in commencing proceedings.
822. In respect of the judge’s power to stop a case and direct a verdict of
not guilty see Heston - Francois (1984) 78 Cr App R 209 and
Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348. In R v Brown 1998 Crim LR
196 it was held that a judge’s concern in respect of conviction by the
jury was immaterial. A judge has the power to withdraw the case from
jury. In R v N Ltd [2008] EWCA 1223 Crim 1223 it was held that a
judge had no jurisdiction to entertain a submission of no case to
answer or direct that a not guilty verdict should be entered before the
conclusion of the Crown’s evidence. In R v N Ltd it was also indicated
that it may sometimes be appropriate and convenient for the parties to
ask the judge to rule, either before any evidence is called or before the
conclusion of the Crown’s evidence, whether on agreed, admitted or
assumed facts that the offence charged is made out as a matter of law,
but any direction to the jury to return a verdict of not guilty should
wait until the end of Crown’s case. It is open to the judge in a proper
case to suggest to the parties that he be invited to make such a ruling.
823. In R v Baines (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment delivered on
the 24th November 2008) I held that the court did not have jurisdiction
prior to trial to dismiss the charges against the defendants on the basis
of insufficiency of evidence. A submission of no case to answer
would have to wait until the close of prosecution case. The court did
not have jurisdiction to hear such a submission prior to trial or prior to
the close of the prosecution case.
824. See R (FB) v DPP [2009] EWHC 106 in respect of decisions by
prosecutors that evidence is not reliable and cannot be put before the
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jury with the result that no evidence is offered and not guilty verdicts
directed.
825. In R v Grant (2005) 2 Cr App R 28 at 409 the issue of abuse of
process was raised in the context of covert recordings of matters
covered by legal professional privilege. See also McE v Prison
Service of Northern Ireland [2009] UKHL 15.
826. Whilst on the topic of legal professional privilege see Wishart [2005]
EWCA Crim 1337, Loizou [2006] EWCA Crim 1719, Matthews
[2006] EWCA Crim 2759 and Hall-Chung [2007] EWCA Crim 3429.
Basic principles in respect of waiver of legal privilege and silence
during police interviews on legal advice were laid down in Condron
[1997] 1 Cr App R 185 and Bowden [1999] 2 Cr App R 197. See also
Beckles [1005] 1 Cr App R 23 and Lord Woolf’s reference to “a
notorious minefield” (paragraph 6) and the “singularly delicate” (paragraph
43) position where a defendant relies on legal advice as a reason for
not answering questions in interview. Legal professional privilege is a
fundamental privilege on which the administration of justice as a
whole rests. A suspect must be free to consult his legal advisers
without fear of his communications being revealed (R v Derby
Magistrates Court ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487). A suspect does not
waive privilege where he or his lawyer states in interview that he will
not answer questions on the basis of legal advice. If a suspect goes
further and explains the basis on which he has been so advised, or if
his lawyer acting as his authorised representative gives such an
explanation, a waiver of legal professional privilege may be involved.
Where a defendant gives evidence at trial that he declined to answer
questions on legal advice that does not in itself waive privilege.
Where a defendant or his lawyer gives evidence about the content of
that advice privilege may well be waived. Some suggest that adducing
evidence of legal advice at the police station should do no more than
waive privilege for that stage of the proceedings. Where a defendant
calls a lawyer to give evidence about an account which he has given
to his lawyer at the police station in order to rebut an allegation of
recent fabrication this does not automatically involve any waiver of
privilege.
827. In Collister 2003-05 MLR 150 there was no stay despite serious
concerns in relation to the prosecution. At paragraph 111 of the
judgment I stated that:
“The prosecution should have had sufficient resources to prosecute this case
properly, efficiently, fairly and within a reasonable time.”
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828. In respect of publicity and applications for stays see Teare 1993-95
MLR 212, Rosemary West 1996 2 Cr App R and Flanagan (Appeal
Division judgment 29th July 2004). In Flanagan the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) stated:
“15. We are satisfied that the real issue here, where the publicity was far less
significant than that in Teare, was whether on the balance of probabilities any
such publicity had caused such prejudice to the Appellant to the extent that no fair
trial was possible, making allowances for the fact that in a compact jurisdiction
information about a defendant is easily disseminated and acquired.. In a compact
jurisdiction such as this it is sometimes inevitable that jurors will know some
background to a case : such is sometimes inevitable even in much larger
jurisdictions when crimes and prosecutions have generated enormous pre-trial
publicity. In such cases fairness to a defendant is achieved by the Deemster giving
a firm direction to the jury that they must only decide the case on the basis of the
evidence before them and nothing else and it has to be assumed that the jury has
followed that direction.
16. On the facts of this case we are satisfied that the learned Acting Deemster
adopted the correct approach. Given that the newspaper report did not identify the
Appellant and that any sensible reader would have assumed that the mitigation
advanced by Miss Shillito was only her version of events, it would have been
foolish to expressly draw the jury’s attention to the report. In our judgment it was
sufficient for the learned Acting Deemster to direct the jury that they must only
decide the case on the evidence adduced before them and, since such a direction
would correct any possible injustice to the Appellant and enable him to have a fair
trial, no adjournment of the trial was necessary or desirable.”
829. See also Watterson 1978-80 MLR 105 where the Appeal Division
dealt with issues concerning media coverage of a case and a fair trial.
The Appeal Division stressed that if an issue in respect of the same
was to be raised it should be raised before the trial commenced and
not merely on appeal.
830. In Fulcher and Shaw Crim 1997/45 (judgment delivered 30th July
2001) Deemster Cain granted a stay in somewhat exceptional
circumstances. See R v R [2010] EWCA Crim 924 in respect of a stay
of proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process where the
prosecution were willing to give the defendant’s legal advisers access
to certain indecent images, the subject matter of the charges against
the defendant, but were unwilling for the defendant to be shown the
images.
831. There is an obligation on the prosecution to disclose any material in
their possession which may assist the defence. Failure to provide
essential disclosure may offend the defendant’s right to a fair trial. It
is rare for a judge to grant a stay for abuse of process and normally
the trial process is expected to deal with allegations of unfairness. See
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R v O [2007] EWCA Crim 3483 in respect of non-disclosure by the
prosecution and the consequences. In that case where the defence had
been pressing for disclosure and the prosecution had delayed for over
a year, had breached a court order and only produced over 8000
pages of documentation on, virtually, the first day of the trial Teare J
stayed the indictment against the defendant as an abuse and the Court
of Appeal did not interfere with the decision. The Court of Appeal
would only interfere if no reasonable judge could have reached the
conclusion the trial judge had reached.
832. Acting Deemster Montgomerie in R v Cubberley (judgment 20th
November 2007) ordered a stay of the proceedings. The Acting
Deemster considered the position in respect of the non-availability of
material, in that case a diary. The Acting Deemster referred to the
duty of the prosecution in relation to securing material which may be
relevant to the investigation.
833. In Morris v DPP [2008] EWHC 2788 (Admin) it was held that in
certain cases there was no automatic requirement on the prosecution
to retain CCTV and audio evidence where potentially it recorded the
giving of statutory warnings under the Road Traffic Act 1998. Prior to
the trial the defence had not indicated that they considered the CCTV
to be relevant material. There was other evidence supporting the fact
that the warning had been given. The Crown Court declined to stay
the proceedings. The conviction imposed at trial was upheld.
834. Acting Deemster Montgomerie in R v Myers (judgment 28th
November 2008) refused to order a stay of proceedings in the
circumstances of that case which involved the failure of the
prosecution in respect of disclosure. The Acting Deemster at
paragraph [28] of his judgment stated: “There is a strong public interest in
criminal charges being decided on their merits.” At paragraph [29] the
Acting Deemster added: “it is not the role of this Court to stay the
proceedings by way of punishment of the prosecution.” The Acting Deemster
was unimpressed with defence submissions that an element of
surprise would be removed by the retrial and the defence would lose
the impact of the body language of a prosecution witness.
835. See also Acting Deemster Montgomerie’s judgment in Myers
delivered on the 26th March 2009, unreported, where another
application that the proceedings be stayed was dismissed. The Acting
Deemster did not consider that the defendant had suffered serious
prejudice to the extent that a fair trial could not take place.
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836. In R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Ex p Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 it
was held that the court had the power to prevent the abuse of
executive powers which threaten the rule of law. See R (Corner
House Research and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office
[2008] UKHL 60, Panday v Senior Superintendent Wellington Virgil
(Privy Council Judgment delivered 9th April 2008), R v Mullen [2004]
2 Cr App R 29, R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 and R v Looseley [2001]
1 WLR 2060.
837. In R v Redmond [2006] EWCA Crim 1744; [2009] 1 Cr App R 25 the
defendant was charged with conspiracy to evade the prohibition on
the importation of a class B drug. The case against him relied on the
evidence of two undercover police officers who gave evidence of
conversations they had had with the defendant while he was in Spain
and Ireland. Most of those conversations were tape recorded covertly
and the recordings and transcripts produced in evidence. The
defendant argued that the covert recordings were illegal under the law
of the relevant jurisdiction and that the officers had knowingly broken
the rules. He applied for the proceedings to be stayed as an abuse of
process. The judge heard evidence from the officers as to their state of
mind and expert evidence as to the content of Spanish law. He held
that the evidence had not been unlawfully obtained and refused the
application. The defendant was convicted. He applied for leave to
appeal. The English Court of Appeal held, refusing the application,
that irrespective of whether the judge had fallen into error in
concluding that the evidence had been lawfully obtained, his
conclusion that he could properly permit the prosecution to proceed
was one that was within his discretion unless the conduct of the police
officers had involved riding roughshod over the Spanish and Irish
rules. Moreover, even if evidence probative of guilt had been obtained
unlawfully, such evidence was not automatically rendered
inadmissible and nor was it automatically the case that it would be
unfair for that evidence to be considered by a jury. The crucial issue
was whether the prosecuting authorities had knowingly abused their
executive powers, and that issue turned on the judge’s assessment of
the credibility of the officers. The witnesses were seen and heard by
the judge who was in a good position to evaluate their honesty and
credibility; and he was entitled to conclude on the evidence before
him that the police had not acted in bad faith. Accordingly, the
English Court of Appeal held that there were no grounds for arguing
that the judge’s conclusion was erroneous in law.
838. In DPP v Cooper 172 JP 195 (judgment delivered 3rd March 2008)
evidence was rendered incapable of independent testing by the
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defence and the English Administrative Court (Silber J) held that in
the particular circumstances of that case the absence of the evidence
was an impediment to the defence in undermining the prosecution’s
case, but the justices would have been able to make allowance for that
and if the trial had been before a jury the judge would have explained
the position and directed them to bear certain factors in mind when
considering the guilt of the defendant which would have compensated
him adequately for the lack of the evidence. It was held that it was
wrong to stay the proceedings in such circumstances.
839. See also the authorities referred to in Christian (Court of General
Gaol Delivery judgment delivered 5th December 2007) in respect of
the powers of Deemsters to prevent a case proceeding on the grounds
of abuse of process.
840. In Arrigo and Vella against Malta Application No 6569104 the
European Court of Human Rights sitting on 10th May 2005 stressed
that politicians and officials should take great care in commenting on
pending criminal proceedings as such comments may prejudice a fair
trial. On page 7 of the decision as to the admissibility of the
application it is stated:
“ …respect for the presumption of innocence requires that the
authorities use all the necessary discretion and circumspection (see Allenet de
Ribemont, judgment quoted above, ibidem). Article 6 § 2 will be violated if a
statement of a public official concerning a person charged with a criminal offence
reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved so according to law.
It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding, that there is some reasoning
to suggest that the official regards the accused as guilty. In this respect, the Court
has emphasised the importance of the choice of words by public officials in their
statements to the press before a person has been tried and found guilty of an
offence (Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98, § § 41 and 44, ECHR 2000-X, and
Butkevicius v. Lithuania, judgment quoted above, §§ 49-50).”
841. See R v Edwards [2009] HCA 20 in respect of Australian law on the
topic of permanent stays of criminal trials. The Australian High Court
confirmed that in exercising the discretion to grant a permanent stay
of proceedings, a court should consider whether, in all the
circumstances, the continuation of the proceedings would involve
unacceptable injustice or unfairness, or whether continuation would
be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of
process. The Court noted that it is not uncommon for trials to proceed
despite the unavailability of relevant evidence and held that the loss of
evidence did not prejudice the pilots. It concluded that no feature of
the delay or loss of evidence justified the extreme step of permanently
staying the proceedings. The Court set aside the order of the Supreme
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Court of Tasmania and dismissed the pilots’ application for a
permanent stay.
842. Judge Denyer QC in his useful book on Case Management in the
Crown Court at chapter 10 deals with abuse of process applications as
follows:
“10.1 This is not the place to recite all the case law that has now accumulated
around the rules relating to abuse of process. For our purposes, it is sufficient to
identify the two strands which have developed, namely cases where it is said that
the defendant cannot have a fair trial and those in which it is said that it would be
unfair to try the defendant [Beckford [1996] Crim App R 94 at 100]
10.2 As to delay and the inability to have a fair trial, the law was summarised thus
by Rose L J in S [2006] EWCA Crim 756 [at paragraph 21]
“In the light of the authorities, the correct approach for a judge to whom an
application for a stay for abuse of process on the ground of delay is made, is to
bear in mind the following principles—
(i) Even where delay is unjustifiable, a permanent stay should be the exception
rather than the rule.
(ii) Where there is no fault on the part of the complainant or the prosecution, it
will be very rare for a stay to be granted.
(iii) No stay should be granted in the absence of serious prejudice to the defence
so that no fair trial can be held.
(iv) When assessing possible serious prejudice, the judge should bear in mind his
or her power to regulate the admissibility of evidence and that the trial process
itself should ensure that all relevant factual issues arising from delay will be
placed before the jury for their consideration in accordance with appropriate
directions from the judge.
(v) If having considered all these factors, a judge’s assessment is that a fair trial
will be possible, a stay should not be granted.”
As to cases where evidence has been lost or destroyed, the following passage
from the judgment of Mantell L J inMedway [unreported] is relevant:
“We recognise that in cases where evidence has been tampered with, lost or
destroyed, it may well be that a defendant will be disadvantaged. It does not
necessarily follow that in such a case the defendant cannot have a fair trial or that
it would be unfair for him to be tried. We would think that there would need to be
something wholly exceptional about the circumstances of the cases to justify a
stay on the ground that evidence has been lost or destroyed. One such
circumstance might be if the interference with the evidence was malicious.”
10.3 In respect of situations where it is said that it is not fair to try the defendant
(a problem which often arises when entrapment is alleged by the defence) the
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following passage from the speech of Lord Steyn in Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104
suffices to illustrate the point. He said [at page 112]:
“In this case the issue is whether, despite the fact that a fair trial was possible, the
judge ought to have stayed the criminal proceedings on broader considerations of
the integrity of the criminal justice system. The law is settled. Weighing
countervailing considerations of policy and justice, it is for the judge in the
exercise of his discretion to decide whether there has been an abuse of process,
which amounts to an affront to the public conscience and requires the criminal
proceedings to be stayed ... The speeches in Bennett conclusively establish that
proceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only
where a fair trial is impossible but also where it would be contrary to the public
interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial should take
place.”
…In Smolinski [2004] EWCA Crim 1270 Lord Woolf said [at paragraphs 8 and 9]
“The making of applications to have cases stayed where there has been delay on
the basis of abuse of process has become prevalent ... The court questions whether
it is helpful to make applications in relation to abuse of process before any
evidence has been given by the complainants in a case of this nature. Clearly,
having regard to the period of time which has elapsed, the court expects that
careful consideration has been given by the prosecution as to whether it is right to
bring the prosecution at all. If having considered the evidence to be called, and the
witnesses having been interviewed on behalf of the prosecution, a decision is
reached that the case should proceed, then in the normal way we would suggest
that it is better not to make an application based on abuse of process. Unless the
case is exceptional, the application will be unsuccessful ... If an application is to
be made to a judge, the best time for doing so is after any evidence has been
called. This means that on the one hand the court has had an opportunity of seeing
the witnesses and, on the other hand, the complainants have had to go through the
ordeal of giving evidence. However, despite the latter point ... it seems to us that
on the whole it is preferable for the evidence to be called and for a judge then to
make his decision as to whether the trial should proceed or whether the evidence
is such that it would not be safe for a jury to convict.”
Quite how this differs from a judge dealing in the ordinary way with a submission
of no case at the close of the prosecution, is not immediately obvious. In
particular, it is not clear whether the judge is simply to apply the conventional
Galbraith test or whether some enhanced power is envisaged. It is hard to see
how, if it is proper applying conventional Galbraith principles for a judge to
decide that the case should continue, he should then be able to decide on abuse
grounds that the case should be stayed. It is not a logical division: it might involve
a judge in making a fairly naked usurpation of the function of the jury.
10.5 Not only is there an inconsistency between the Practice Direction [Part IV.36
of the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction which states that applications for
a stay on the grounds of abuse must be made prior to the trial] and the Smolinski
approach, there are other procedural rules which are predicated on the basis that
an application will be made before or at the start of the trial. For example, section
6A(1)(d) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, dealing with the
contents of a defence statement, requires that any point to be taken about abuse of
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process should be indicated in that statement. If in truth we are simply dealing
with an ‘enhanced’ Galbraith submission which, by definition, can only be made
after the prosecution case has closed, it is hard to see how a defendant could spell
that out in advance of the trial in his defence statement.”
843. On the Island advocates are encouraged to make applications at an
early stage and in advance of the trial where appropriate. This, in the
main, is to assist in the smooth running of the trial and to ensure that
any disputed issues are dealt with at an early stage of the proceedings.
Where applications have to wait until trial (such as a submission of no
case to answer after the close of the prosecution case) then such
applications are, of necessity, dealt with during the course of the trial.
844. In R v Gore [2009] EWCA Crim 1424 the English Court of Appeal
held that the issue of a fixed penalty notice asserting one offence did
not protect the recipient from further proceedings if and when it
became apparent that a more serious offence had in fact been
committed in the course of the same incident. The Lord Chief Justice
of England and Wales stated:
“16. There is a great deal of force in the judgment of the Divisional Court in
Guest v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] EWHC 594, where the Director
of Public Prosecutions was directed to reconsider a decision that a potential
defendant should be prosecuted for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, when
he had been given an inappropriate conditional caution for the offence. The court
rejected the argument that if the decision not to prosecute and the conditional
caution were quashed, any subsequent prosecution would fail on abuse of process
grounds. As Goldring L J explained, “criminal litigation is not a game... it does
not seem to me that, … a further prosecution would necessarily amount to an
affront to public justice... indeed, many might think that what so far has happened
deserves that description.” Naturally, and indeed we emphasise, decisions in this
type of case involve the application of well understood principles to fact specific
situations. There was here no improper escalation of charge, nor any departure
from any reasonable expectation that either appellant would not be prosecuted, if
any more serious consequences of their conduct, and evidence justifying
prosecution for an offence of violence came to light after the issue of the notice.
The reality is that on the night in question the defendants must have been thanking
their lucky stars that they got away with the serious violence they had perpetrated.
It was not an abuse of process for justice to catch up with them.”
Case for the prosecution
845. Counsel for the prosecution should fairly and robustly present the case
for the prosecution.
846. Prosecutors are to regard themselves as ministers of justice and should
not over zealously struggle for a conviction. Rule 19(9) of the
Advocates Practice Rules 2001 provides that when prosecuting a
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criminal case every advocate must ensure that although every material
point is made which supports the prosecution, the evidence must be
presented dispassionately and with scrupulous fairness.
847. The High Court of Australia in Libke v The Queen [2007] HCA 30
(20th June 2007) dealt with issues concerning the duties of
prosecutors. The following are extracts from the judgments in that
case (footnotes omitted):
“33. The appellant argued in this Court that a miscarriage of justice occurred by
reason of the prosecutor's cross-examination of him, and commentary
during it.
34. The principles governing the conduct of a prosecutor are well settled.
They were restated by Deane J inWhitehorn v The Queen:
"Prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial represents the State. The accused,
the court and the community are entitled to expect that, in performing his
function of presenting the case against an accused, he will act with
fairness and detachment and always with the objectives of establishing the
whole truth in accordance with the procedures and standards which the
law requires to be observed and of helping to ensure that the accused's trial
is a fair one. The consequence of a failure to observe the standards of
fairness to be expected of the Crown may be insignificant in the context of
an overall trial. Where that is so, departure from those standards, however
regrettable, will not warrant the interference of an appellate court with a
conviction. On occasion however, the consequences of such a failure may
so affect or permeate a trial as to warrant the conclusion that the accused
has actually been denied his fundamental right to a fair trial. As a general
proposition, that will, of itself, mean that there has been a serious
miscarriage of justice with the consequence that any conviction of the
accused should be quashed and, where appropriate, a new trial ordered."
In the same case, Dawson J said this:
"No doubt all of these observations are merely aspects of the general
obligation which is imposed upon a Crown Prosecutor to act fairly in the
discharge of the function which he performs in a criminal trial. That
function is ultimately to assist in the attainment of justice between the
Crown and the accused. In this respect the Crown Prosecutor may have
added responsibilities in comparison with other counsel but it does not
mean that his is a detached or disinterested role in the trial process."
35. The role of prosecuting counsel is not to be passive. He or she may be
robust, and be expected and required to conduct the prosecution
conscientiously and firmly. Because a criminal trial is an adversarial
proceeding, there is at least the same expectation of defence counsel. The
obligation of counsel extends to the making of timely objections to
impermissible or unacceptable questions and conduct. But it is also the
duty of the trial judge to make appropriate interventions if questions of
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those kinds, capable of jeopardizing a fair trial, are asked. The duty of the
trial judge is the highest duty of all. It is a transcendent duty to ensure a
fair trial…
37. In this case we are unable to conclude that the appellant did have a fair
trial. Whether a cross-examination and commentary during it were
excessive will usually be a question of degree. It would not be appropriate
to require a standard of perfection or to impose undue weight on the
occasional accidental slips and mistakes that can occur in the heat of a
trial. Further, it is true that the appellant's credit was in issue and a
rigorous cross-examination was therefore to be expected. However, it was
seriously objectionable for a counsel to say, during an address to the jury,
that he or she "did not buy" something said by a party in evidence, or that
"we've heard about that one". It is not acceptable for counsel to make that
comment, that is, to express a personal opinion about a party's, or indeed
any witness', evidence during cross-examination as the prosecutor did
here. It was equally inappropriate for counsel to comment after the
appellant had made a responsive answer "whenever you're prepared to
finish it". In the same category are these comments: "That doesn't tell us
much, does it?"; "I'm just trying to analyse your version of it" and,
"hopeless" in commentary upon an answer. These are but a few examples
of the inappropriateness of the cross-examination. Here, the sarcastic and
repeated commentary as a whole went too far. The appellant's counsel's
failure generally to object, regrettable as that may have been, provided no
antidote to the infection of the trial that the prosecutor's questions and
comments caused. The circumstances called for the trial judge to intervene
…
71. A criminal trial in Australia is an accusatorial and adversarial process. In
that process, prosecuting counsel has a role that is bounded by long-
established duties and responsibilities. Those duties and responsibilities
are summarised when it is said that "[t]he duty of prosecuting counsel is
not to obtain a conviction at all costs but to act as a minister of justice". In
the Supreme Court of Canada, Rand J described the role of the prosecutor
as being:
"not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown
considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.
Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is
presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength
but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion
of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in
civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It
is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the
seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings." (emphasis added)
A central, even the central, element in that role is "ensuring that the Crown
case is presented with fairness to the accused " .
72. The prosecution case is to be presented in the context of an adversarial
process in which each side "is free to decide the ground on which it or he
will contest the issue, the evidence which it or he will call, and what
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questions whether in chief or in cross-examination shall be asked". But
again, there are boundaries to that process. The choices that have been
described are to be made "subject to the rules of evidence, fairness and
admissibility". As Dawson J said inWhitehorn v The Queen:
"A trial does not involve the pursuit of truth by any means. The adversary
system is the means adopted and the judge's role in that system is to hold
the balance between the contending parties without himself taking part in
their disputations." (emphasis added)
It is not for the judge to attempt to remedy the deficiencies of a party's
case. As was pointed out in Whitehorn, and earlier in Richardson v The
Queen, the judge will frequently lack the knowledge and the information
that would be necessary to making a decision about whether and how any
deficiency would be remedied. But it is for the judge to "hold the balance
between the contending parties". It is for the judge to ensure that the trial
is conducted fairly.”
848. In McKinnon v Government of the United States of America [2008]
UKHL 59 the House of Lords considered abuse arguments in the
context of extradition proceedings and plea bargaining. The following
are extracts from the opinion of Lord Brown:
“The appellant’s argument
28. The appellant’s main argument focuses on the wide disparity between on the
one hand the predicted likely outcome if the appellant cooperated with the US
authorities - a sentence of 3-4 years of which 6- 12 months would be served in a
low security prison in the US after which there were good prospects of
repatriation with the expectation of release after serving only half the sentence -
and on the other hand the threatened likely outcome if the appellant refused to
cooperate - a sentence of 8-10 years or more in a US high security prison with
remission of only 15%. Such a disparity, it is submitted, is disproportionate and
subjected the appellant to impermissible pressure to surrender his legal rights,
particularly his right to contest extradition. Pressure of this kind, it is submitted,
indeed plea bargaining generally, runs flatly counter to the principle of English
law recently clarified in the judgment of the five-judge Court of Appeal delivered
by Lord Woolf C J in R v Goodyear [2005] 1 WLR 2532: essentially that a judge
may respond to a defendant’s request that he be told the maximum sentence that
would be imposed on a plea of guilty but is not to volunteer such information
unasked nor to indicate what sentence might be passed on the defendant’s
conviction by the jury. As the Court stated at para 54:
“With some defendants at any rate, the very process of comparing the two
alternatives would create pressure to tender a guilty plea.”
29. Where, as here, the respondent government is seeking the assistance of the
English courts to extradite an accused, it must, submits the appellant comply with
the legal principles of this jurisdiction. True it is that he has in fact resisted the
pressure improperly put upon him but that, he submits, is no answer to the
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contention that it constituted an abuse of process: it was calculated to interfere
with the extradition proceedings …
…
34. Before answering these questions, however, it is as well to recognise that the
difference between the American system and our own is not perhaps so stark as
the appellant’s argument suggests. In this country too there is a clearly recognised
discount for a plea of guilty: a basic discount of one-third for saving the cost of
the trial, more if a guilty plea introduces other mitigating factors, and more still
(usually one half to two thirds but exceptionally three-quarters or even beyond
that) in the particular circumstances provided for by sections 71-75 of the Serious
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 - see R v P; R v Blackburn [2007] EWCA
çrim 2290. No less importantly, it is accepted practice in this country for the
parties to hold off-the-record discussions whereby the prosecutor will accept pleas
of guilty to lesser charges (or on a lesser factual basis) in return for a defendant’s
timely guilty plea. Indeed the entire premise of the principle established in
Goodyear [2005] 1 WLR 2532 is that the parties will have reached an agreed
basis of plea in private before the judge is approached. What, it must be
appreciated, Goodyear forbids are judicial, not prosecutorial, indications of
sentence. Indeed, Goodyear goes further than would be permitted in the United
States by allowing the judge in certain circumstances to indicate what sentence he
would pass.
35. Your Lordships will also appreciate that in April 2008 the Attorney General
issued a consultation paper regarding the possible introduction here of a formal
court-sanctioned plea negotiation framework for fraud cases: “The Introduction of
a Plea negotiation Framework for Fraud Cases in England and Wales: a
consultation”. The framework would enable the prosecutor to agree (without
binding the court) that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate. The
paper summarises the current system, recognising the legitimacy of the informal
plea negotiations that currently take place, unregulated though these are. In the
Federal Courts of the United States, by contrast, the practice of plea bargaining is
regulated and the courts have a duty to discuss the consequences of a guilty plea
with the accused in open court and to ensure that it has been entered voluntarily
and with a full understanding of those consequences. The contents of any plea
agreement must be disclosed in open court and the trial judge has the power to
accept or reject it.
…
37. The Divisional Court expressed their “cultural reservations” about the general
American style of plea-bargaining (para 60) and in particular “a degree of
distaste” as to the prosecutor’s approach towards providing or withdrawing
support for repatriation (para 54). These comments seem to me somewhat
fastidious. Our law is replete with statements of the highest authority counselling
not merely a broad and liberal construction of extradition laws (to serve the
transnational interest in bringing to justice those accused of serious cross-border
crimes - see, for example, In re Ismail [1999] 1 AC 320, 326-327), but also the
need in the conduct of extradition proceedings to accommodate legal and cultural
differences between the legal systems of the many foreign friendly states with
whom the UK has entered into reciprocal extradition arrangements.
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38. Turning, with these considerations in mind, to the questions raised by Cobb
and central to the determination of the present appeal, I for my part would
unhesitatingly answer all of them in the negative. As the Divisional Court itself
pointed out (at para 34), the gravity of the offences alleged against the appellant
should not be understated: the equivalent domestic offences include an offence
under section 12 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 for which the
maximum sentence is life imprisonment. True, the disparity between the
consequences predicted by the US authorities dependent upon whether the
appellant cooperated or not was very marked. It seems to me, however, no more
appropriate to describe the predicted consequences of non-cooperation as a
“threat” than to characterise the predicted consequences of cooperation as a
“promise” (or, indeed, a “bribe”). In one sense all discounts for pleas of guilty
could be said to subject the defendant to pressure, and the greater the discount the
greater the pressure. But the discount would have to be very substantially more
generous than anything promised here (as to the way the case would be put and
the likely outcome) before it constituted unlawful pressure such as to vitiate the
process. So too would the predicted consequences of non-cooperation need to go
significantly beyond what could properly be regarded as the defendant’s just
desserts on conviction for that to constitute unlawful pressure.
…
40. The high watermark of the appellant’s case here consists of Mr Lawson’s
recollection that, unless the appellant consented to extradition (as opposed merely
to pleading guilty if extradited), the prosecuting authorities would oppose his
repatriation. That, however, even were it to be regarded as an unlawful threat, has
now been expressly repudiated by Mr Wiechering, again in marked contrast to the
position in Cobb.
41. In my judgment it would only be in a wholly extreme case like Cobb itself
that the court should properly regard any encouragement to accused persons to
surrender for trial and plead guilty, in particular if made by a prosecutor during a
regulated process of plea bargaining, as so unconscionable as to constitute an
abuse of process justifying the requested state’s refusal to extradite the accused. It
is difficult, indeed, to think of anything other than the threat of unlawful action
which could fairly be said so to imperil the integrity of the extradition process as
to require the accused, notwithstanding his having resisted the undue pressure, to
be discharged irrespective of the strength of the case against him.
42. In my judgment this is far from being such a case and accordingly I would
dismiss the appeal.”
Case for the defence
849. Defence counsel should also present the defence case fairly and avoid
any unnecessary surprises. Defence counsel should not engage in any
unnecessary or inappropriate attacks on prosecution witnesses or third
parties.
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850. It would appear that defence counsel can make an opening speech but
this is very rare in practice. If a defence opening speech is made it
would normally be before calling evidence if the defendant and other
witnesses as to the facts are to be called. Counsel would need to be
very confident as to what his client and witnesses were going to say.
The defence may however have a right to an opening speech in certain
circumstances (See Hill (1911) 7 Cr App R 1). An opening speech
appears to have been made by defence counsel in Hollyoak v R 1990-
92 MLR 329. In that case the Appeal Division did not adversely
comment on the fact that a defence opening speech had been made but
did comment adversely on the contents of such speech and the
difficulties that had been caused in that trial due to the defence
presenting an opening speech.
851. Counsel is, of course, under a duty to avoid wasting time by repetition
or prolixity and he must not be made the instrument of unnecessary
attacks on the witnesses or other third parties. It is however the duty
of counsel for the defence to use every proper line of questioning and
argument to secure the acquittal of his client.
Addresses to jury
852. At the conclusion of the evidence counsel are entitled to address the
jury. The prosecution are heard first and the defence would normally
have the last word before the Deemster’s summing up. Defence
counsel have a broad discretion to say anything he considers desirable
on the whole case, but he should not allege as fact matters of which
no evidence has been given. He should not ‘conjure up explanations out of
the air’ but is entitled to make points based on the evidence before the
jury.
853. Counsel should raise with the Deemster any necessary points of law
prior to closing speeches being delivered. The trial Deemster would
usually discuss in open court with counsel, in the absence of the jury,
the main areas to be covered in the summing up and invite
submissions as to any special directions that counsel feel are
appropriate. Counsel should make any necessary applications and
draw to the Deemster’s attention any directions they say are
appropriate.
854. In closing speeches counsel should avoid references to “my belief” or
“my opinion” (e.g. in my opinion this is the weakest prosecution case in
history; it is my belief that < > is lying). The beliefs and opinions of
counsel are irrelevant. Counsel deal in submissions based on the
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evidence. Counsel do not deal with their personal beliefs or personal
opinions.
855. The following is stated in Glanville Williams Learning the Law 13th
Edition at page 199:
“The most common breach of etiquette committed by the enthusiastic beginner
when arguing a moot case is the expression of a personal opinion on the merits of
the case being presented. Counsel may “submit” and “suggest” strongly, and may
state propositions of law and fact, but should not express a personal “belief” or
“opinion”. You should also avoid the expression “I think”, however natural it may
seem to employ it. It is regarded as being disrespectful to the Bench to say: “My
Lords, in my opinion the law is so-and-so”, still more to say: “My Lords, in my
opinion this man is innocent”. As an advocate you are paid to present your
client’s case, not to offer a sincere opinion on how you would decide if you were
the judge. It is only by maintaining this rule that the advocate can be kept free
from any possible charge of hypocrisy.”
856. Counsel should ensure that any points made have a foundation in the
evidence. Counsel should not make references to any likely custodial
sentences if the defendant is convicted or the likely length of
sentence. These matters are irrelevant to the jury’s consideration of
the case. Sentencing is of no concern of the jury. In AG for South
Australia v Brown [1960] AC 432 at page 454 it is indicated that if
counsel refer to sentencing consequences “it is incumbent upon the judge
to instruct the jury that such matters are not their concern and are completely
irrelevant to any issue they have to determine.” See however the Appeal
Division’s judgment in Sayle (judgment 24th May 2006) to the effect
that the trial Deemster has a discretion whether to direct a jury to
disregard such comments. Similar principles apply to any other
improper comments made by prosecution or defence.
857. Counsel should not appeal to emotions or subjective feelings. Counsel
should not engage in speculation. Counsel are not permitted to give
evidence. Counsel should not allude to alleged facts or other matters
which have not been the subject of evidence (See Shimmin (1882) 15
Cox CC 122). Counsel should not give evidence or make submissions
that are not based on evidence (e.g. there are infrequent fires in bedsit
land, or in the 1980’s there were few jobs around; or it is difficult to
get access to Lord Street) unless these issues have been dealt with in
the evidence. In R v Cowan [1996] 1 Cr App R 1 9G Taylor LCJ
stated: “We wish to make it clear that the rule against advocates giving
evidence dressed up as a submission applies in this context [failure to mention
fact when interviewed, on legal advice]. It cannot be proper for a defence
advocate to give the jury reasons for his client’s silence at trial in the absence of
evidence to support such reasons.”
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858. Counsel should not say to the jury that you have to be “absolutely certain
of guilt. If there is even the remotest possibility that my client may be not guilty
or even a hint of doubt however unreasonable you must acquit.” That, of
course, is not the proper test.
859. The defence may advance hypotheses which go beyond the client’s
version of events, always provided that other evidence has been called
which supports such hypotheses (Bateson (1991) Times 10 April
1991).
860. Mantoor Ramdhanie v The State (Privy Council judgment 15th
December 2005) refers to the standards to be expected of the
prosecutor’s closing speech (paragraph 18 onwards). The duty of
Crown counsel is to be impartial and excludes any notion of winning
or losing. Counsel should not use inflammatory and vindictive
language. Counsel should not express a personal opinion that the
accused is guilty or that the Crown investigators and experts are
satisfied as to his guilt. Counsel should not cast aspersions or make
improper imputations as to the integrity of the opposing counsel
unless in the most extreme circumstances and then only in the absence
of the jury. Emotional pleas for sympathy are inappropriate. The duty
of prosecuting counsel is not to obtain a conviction at all costs but to
act as a minister of justice.
861. In R v Bryant [2005] EWCA Crim 2079 the court referred to the
objective and dispassionate way prosecution counsel should exercise
the “fundamental obligation of counsel for the Crown to act as a minister of
justice.”
862. Reference should never be made to matters which may be prejudicial
to a defendant but which are not before the jury.
863. If there is to be a challenge to a witness (for example taking issue with
the independence of an expert witness) that should not, in the normal
course of events, be covered in closing speeches unless the point was
expressly put to the witness whilst giving evidence and the witness
given an opportunity to comment upon it.
Alternative verdicts
864. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Acting
Deemster King) in Brown (judgment 29th January 2007) considered R
v Coutts [2006] UKHL 1 and summarised the main applicable
principles in respect of alternative verdicts as follows:
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“30. We draw the following principles from these passages:
(1) the basic rule is that on a trial on information the trial Judge should leave to
the jury any obvious alternative which there is evidence to support. To which we
would add the rider: "so long as that alternative is open to the jury as a matter of
law under the material statutory provisions". These will usually be those set out in
s.22(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993;
(2) there must however be evidence upon which to support such alternative;
(3) further, the alternative must be obvious in the sense that it should suggest
itself to the mind of any ordinary knowledgeable and alert criminal Judge.
Alternatives identified only because of diligent research by ingenious Counsel
after trial, are excluded;
(4) the duty of the Judge is to act in accordance with these principles, irrespective
of the wishes of trial Counsel;
(5) however that duty is always tempered by the overriding duty not to infringe a
defendant's right to a fair trial. There may be circumstances where that overriding
duty will dictate that the alternative should not be left to the jury where, for
example, it were shown that decisions were made at trial which would not have
been made had the possibility of such a verdict been envisaged. Normally
however, the requirement of fairness will be satisfied if the proposed direction on
an alternative verdict is indicated to Counsel at some stage before their closing
speeches.”
865. In R v Coutts [2006] UKHL 39 Lord Bingham at paragraph 1 stated:
“The appellant, Mr Coutts, was convicted of murder on an indictment charging
him with that crime alone. Evidence was adduced at the trial which would have
enabled a rational jury, if they accepted it, to convict him of manslaughter. But
the trial judge, with the support of the prosecution and the consent of the defence,
did not leave an alternative count of manslaughter to the jury. He directed the jury
that they should convict of murder if satisfied that the appellant had committed
that offence and, if not so satisfied, acquit. On his appeal to the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) the appellant contended that a manslaughter verdict should
have been left to the jury for their consideration, irrespective of the parties’
wishes, since there was evidence to support it. The Court of Appeal rejected that
contention, and by leave of the House the appellant now challenges its decision.
The narrow question raised by the appeal is whether, on the facts of this case, the
trial judge should have left an alternative verdict of manslaughter to the jury. The
broader question, of more general public importance, concerns the duty and
discretion of trial judges to leave alternative verdicts of lesser-included offences
to the jury where there is evidence which a rational jury could accept to support
such a verdict but neither prosecution nor defence seek it.”
866. Lord Bingham added:
“23. The public interest in the administration of justice is, in my opinion, best
served if in any trial on indictment the trial judge leaves to the jury, subject to any
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appropriate caution or warning, but irrespective of the wishes of trial counsel, any
obvious alternative offence which there is evidence to support. I would not extend
the rule to summary proceedings since, for all their potential importance to
individuals, they do not engage the public interest to the same degree. I would
also confine the rule to alternative verdicts obviously raised by the evidence: by
that I refer to alternatives which should suggest themselves to the mind of any
ordinarily knowledgeable and alert criminal judge, excluding alternatives which
ingenious counsel may identify through diligent research after the trial.
Application of this rule may in some cases benefit the defendant, protecting him
against an excessive conviction. In other cases it may benefit the public, by
providing for the conviction of a lawbreaker who deserves punishment. A
defendant may, quite reasonably from his point of view, choose to roll the dice.
But the interests of society should not depend on such a contingency.
24. It is of course fundamental that the duty to leave lesser verdicts to the jury
should not be exercised so as to infringe a defendant’s right to a fair trial. This
might be so if it were shown that decisions were made at trial which would not
have been made had the possibility of such a verdict been envisaged. But no such
infringement has ordinarily been found where there is evidence of provocation not
relied on by the defence, nor will it ordinarily be unfair to leave an alternative
where a defendant who, resisting conviction of a more serious offence, succeeds
in throwing doubt on an ingredient of that offence and is as a result convicted of a
lesser offence lacking that ingredient. There may be unfairness if the jury first
learn of the alternative from the judge’s summing-up, when counsel have not had
the opportunity to address it in their closing speeches. But that risk is met if the
proposed direction is indicated to counsel at some stage before they make their
closing speeches. They can continue to discount the alternative in their closing
speeches, but they can address the jury with knowledge of what the judge will
direct. Had this course been followed in the present case there would have been
no unfairness to the appellant, and while taking a contrary view the Court of
Appeal did not identify the unfairness which it held would arise. It is not unfair to
deprive a defendant, timeously alerted to the possibility, of what may be an
adventitious acquittal.
25. The Court of Appeal rightly recognised the high sense of public duty
which juries customarily bring to their task. I would not wish to belittle that in
any way. But one does not belittle it to decline (as the High Court of Australia has
done) to attribute to juries an adherence to principle and an obliviousness to
consequences which is scarcely attainable.
26. Nor, with respect, is it an objection that the jury’s task would have been
more complicated had a manslaughter direction been given. Compared with many
directions given to juries, a manslaughter direction in this case would not have
been complicated. But even if it would, that cannot be relied on as a reason for not
leaving to the jury a verdict which they should on the facts have considered. If
juries are to continue to command the respect of the public, they must be trusted
to understand the issues raised even by a case of some complexity. For reasons
already given, the wishes of counsel cannot override the judge’s duty.
27. I am of opinion that the judge should have left a manslaughter verdict to
the jury. His failure to do so, although fully understandable in the circumstances,
was a material irregularity. While the murder count against the appellant was
clearly a strong one, no appellate court can be sure that a jury, fully directed,
would not have convicted of manslaughter. For these reasons, and those given by
my noble and learned friends Lord Hutton, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry and Lord
Mance, with which I agree, I would accordingly allow the appeal. I would remit
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the matter to the Court of Appeal and invite that court to quash the conviction. It
may also deal with any application for a retrial which may be made, the appellant
remaining in custody meanwhile.”
867. Lord Hutton stated:
“62. In conclusion I refer briefly to one further matter. The authorities make it
clear that an alternative verdict should only be left if it is one to which “a jury
could reasonably come” (per Lord Clyde in Von Starck at page 1275: see also
Mustill LJ in Fairbanks page 1205, “unless the alternatives really arise on the
issues as presented at the trial”). There- fore I am in full agreement with the test
proposed by Lord Bingham in paragraph 23 of his speech that the alternative or
alternatives “should suggest themselves to the mind of any ordinarily
knowledgeable and alert criminal judge, excluding alternatives which ingenious
counsel may identify through diligent research after the trial”. I also agree that the
rule discussed by Lord Bingham should not be extended to summary
proceedings.”
868. See the Appeal Division’s helpful and comprehensive judgment in
Brown (judgment delivered 26th January 2007) applying these
principles.
869. Coutts and Brown need to be read in the light of R v Foster [2007]
EWCA Crim 2869. The following are extracts from headnote to R v
Foster [2008] 2 All ER 597:
. .
“In July 2006 the House of Lords gave guidance relating to alternative verdicts in
R v Coutts [2006] 4 All ER 353. The House considered the statutory rules in s 6 of
the Criminal Law Act 1967 which provided (sub-s (2)) that on an indictment for
murder a person found not guilty of murder ‘may be found guilty—(a) of
manslaughter, or of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do so; or (b) of
any offence of which he may be found guilty under an enactment specifically so
providing, or under section 4(2) of this Act [assisting offenders]; or (c) of an
attempt to commit murder, or of an attempt to commit any other offence of which
he might be found guilty; but may not be found guilty of any offence not included
above’; and (sub-s (3)) that where, on a person’s trial on indictment for any
offence, except treason or murder, the jury found him not guilty of the offence
specifically charged in the indictment, but the allegations in the indictment
amounted to or included an allegation of another offence falling within the
jurisdiction of the court of trial ‘the jury may find him guilty of that other offence
or of an offence of which he could be found guilty on an indictment specifically
charging that other offence’. Three appeals were heard together because they
raised questions about the ambit and application of the decision in R v Coutts. F
was convicted of attempted murder. His conviction was referred to the Court of
Appeal because the trial judge had failed to leave to the jury the possibility of
conviction of an alternative offence, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, or
attempt to do so, or attempt to do grievous bodily harm with intent. N was also
convicted of attempted murder after a trial in which no alternative verdict had
been left to the jury. K was convicted of counts of burglary and attempted
burglary; no alternative verdicts of theft or handling stolen goods had been left to
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the jury. In a fourth case the defendant applied for leave to appeal against
conviction on different grounds. The first three defendants submitted that when at
trial a defendant admitted in evidence any lesser criminal offence to the offence
charged in the indictment the judge had always to direct the jury in a way that
enabled them to acquit of the more serious offence and convict of the offence
admitted by the defendant. They considered that R v Coutts demonstrated a
principle of law that in a trial on indictment any obvious and viable alternative
verdict should ordinarily be left to the jury where there was evidence to support it,
irrespective of the wishes of the parties and even where the alternative verdict
would be inconsistent with the prosecution case. The Court of Appeal considered
(i) whether it was possible to identify when, as a matter of law a judge’s failure to
leave an alternative verdict to the jury was erroneous; (ii) (in relation to K’s case)
whether the principles in R v Coutts extended beyond the ambit of s 6 of the 1967
Act; and (iii) the impact of an erroneous failure by a judge to leave an alternative
lesser verdict to the jury on the safety of the conviction in the individual case.
Held — (1) Any requirement to leave an alternative verdict to the jury did not
engage an absolute question of law. The situation which arose in the instant cases
would not always create an obligation on the trial judge to leave an alternative
lesser verdict whenever the defence to the more serious charge on the indictment
involved an admission of a lesser offence. In addition to any specific issues of
fairness there was a proportionality consideration. A judge would not be in error if
he decided that a lesser alternative verdict should not be left to the jury if that
verdict could properly be described in its legal or factual context as trivial or
insubstantial or where any possible compromise verdict would not reflect the real
issues in the case. He should reconsider any decision he might have reached about
alternative verdicts in the light of any question the jury saw fit to ask about them.
However, when the defence to a specific charge amounted to the admission or
assertion of a lesser offence, the primary obligation of the judge was to ensure
that the defence was left to the jury. If it were not, the summing up would be
seriously defective and the conviction would almost inevitably be unsafe. The
judgment whether a lesser alternative verdict should be left to the jury involved an
examination of all the evidence and the issues of law and fact to which it had
given rise. Within that case-specific framework the judge had to examine whether
the absence of a direction about a lesser alternative verdict would oblige the jury
to make an unrealistic choice between the serious charge and complete acquittal
which would unfairly disadvantage the defendant …; R v Coutts [2006] 4 All ER
353 explained.
(2) The principles derived from R v Coutts did not extend beyond the ambit of the
statutory framework in the 1967 Act …
(3) An erroneous failure by a trial judge to leave an alternative lesser verdict to
the jury did not change the statutory test relating to the safety, or otherwise, of
convictions returned by the jury. Ultimately the single issue for the Court of
Appeal was whether the conviction was unsafe. In the instant cases there was no
reason to doubt the safety of the convictions. The appeals would therefore be
dismissed.”
870. The following is the report of Foster at [2008] Crim LR 463:
“R. v Foster Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Sir Igor Judge P., Latham L.J.,
Grigson, Andrew Smith and Pitchford JJ.: November 30, 2007; [2007] EWCA
Crim 2869.
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In separate but conjoined appeals against conviction the Court of Appeal
considered the application and ambit of the decision of the House of Lords in
Coutts [2006] UKHL 39; [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. 6; [2006] Crim. L.R. 1065
concerning the general duty and discretion of a trial judge to leave to the jury the
possibility of returning an alternative verdict convicting the defendant of an
offence which had arisen on the evidence instead of an offence alleged in the
indictment. In particular, the court considered: (1) when, as a matter of law, a trial
judge’s decision not to leave an alternative verdict would be erroneous; (2)
whether the principle identified in Coutts extended beyond the ambit of s.6 of the
Criminal Law Act 1967, so that an alternative could be returned in respect of an
offence other than a lesser alternative included within the offence charged in the
indictment; and (3) the approach to appeals against conviction where it was
submitted that there had been an erroneous failure by a trial judge to leave an
alternative lesser verdict to the jury.
On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that when a defendant admitted in
evidence any lesser criminal offence to the offence charged in the indictment, the
trial judge must always direct the jury in a way which enabled them to acquit of
the more serious offence and to convict of the offence admitted by the defendant.
It was further submitted that Coutts demonstrated a principle of law that in a trial
on indictment any “obvious and viable alternative verdict” should ordinarily be
left to the jury where there was evidence to support it, irrespective of the wishes
of the parties, and even when the alternative verdict would be inconsistent with
the prosecution case. This principle, it was submitted, was not confined to cases to
which s.6(2) and (3) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 might apply, and an
indictment which failed to include an obvious and viable alternative offence, as
disclosed on the evidence at trial, would therefore be defective for the purposes of
s.5 of the Indictments Act 1915. As to the approach to appeals, it was submitted
that where a trial judge had erroneously failed to leave a lesser alternative verdict
obviously raised by the evidence, the conviction should be quashed as a serious
miscarriage of justice.
Held, (1) nothing in Coutts suggested expressly, or by necessary implication, that
there was an obligation on a trial judge to leave a lesser alternative verdict
whenever the defence to the charge on the indictment involved an admission of
the lesser offence. The danger highlighted by some of the speeches in Coutts,
underlining the duty of the trial judge to leave alternative verdicts to the jury, was
the risk that faced with the stark choice between convicting a defendant whose
behaviour was on any view utterly deplorable, and acquitting him altogether, the
jury may unconsciously but wrongly allow their decision to be influenced by
considerations extraneous to the evidence and convict of the more serious charges
rather than acquit altogether. But Coutts did not suggest that such a risk was
always present. In addition to any specific issues of fairness, there was a
proportionality consideration, such that a trial judge would not be in error if he
decided that a lesser alternative verdict should not be left to the jury because that
verdict could properly be described in its legal and factual context as trivial, or
insubstantial, or where any possible compromise verdict would not reflect the real
issues in the case. The trial judge must reconsider any decision he may have
reached about alternative verdicts in the light of any question which the jury
might see fit to ask; but when the defence to a specific charge amounts to the
admission or assertion of a lesser offence, the primary obligation of the trial judge
is to ensure that the defence is left to the jury. If it is not, on elementary
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principles, the summing-up will be seriously defective and the conviction would
almost inevitably be unsafe.
(2) There was no basis for concluding that the principles in Coutts extended
beyond the ambit of the statutory framework in the 1967 Act. It was undesirable
that a trial judge at the end of the evidence should be obliged to consider whether
the indictment should be amended to include all offences on which a jury properly
directed might convict, and where on the evidence possible further offences
appeared, which were not lesser included alternatives, to order an amendment of
the indictment to include them. To do so would overlook the true purpose of an
indictment, which was to specify the charges upon which the prosecution, not the
court, was seeking a conviction or convictions. It would be likely to obscure the
issues between the prosecution and the defence; it would complicate the task of
the jury, which until that moment would have been considering the evidence in
the light of the charges actually included in the indictment; it would complicate
the summing-up; and it would also open up the possibility of additional counts
being based on the evidence and at the behest of a co-defendant, and in theory at
least, but subject to the unfairness principle, permit an amendment to allege a
more serious charge.
(3) The judgment whether a lesser alternative verdict should be left to the jury
involved an examination of all the evidence, disputed and undisputed, and the
issues of law and fact to which it had given rise. Within that case-specific
framework the trial judge should examine whether the absence of a direction
about a lesser alternative verdict or verdicts would oblige the jury to make an
unrealistic choice between the serious charge and complete acquittal which would
unfairly disadvantage the defendant. In this context the trial judge enjoyed “the
feel of the case” which an appellate court lacked. On appeal the issue was not
whether a direction in relation to a lesser alternative verdict was omitted, and
whether its omission was erroneous, but whether the safety of the conviction was
undermined. Ultimately, therefore, the single issue for the Court of Appeal was
whether the conviction was safe.
Commentary. Failure to leave an alternative verdict.
In Coutts Lord Bingham stated:
“The objective must be that defendants are neither over-convicted nor under-
convicted, nor acquitted when they have committed a lesser offence of the type
charged. The human instrument relied on to achieve this objective in cases of
serious crime is of course the jury. But to achieve it in some cases the jury must
be alerted to the options open to it.” As stated in the commentary to Coutts
([2006] Crim. L.R. 1065 at 1067) it is clear that the duty to leave the alternative
offences to the jury lies with the judge, irrespective of the wishes of the trial
advocates This is confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Foster (at [51]). The
requirement is to leave any viable alternative offence, i.e. one for which there is
evidence which has been adduced, if it is an “obvious” alternative - obvious in the
sense that it “would suggest itself to the mind of the ordinary knowledgeable and
alert criminal judge”. But, as recognised in the instant case, it:
“[D]oes not necessarily follow from the defendant’s admission of a lesser or
different crime to the crime charged in the indictment that the jury must be given
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an opportunity to return a verdict on the basis of the admitted criminal conduct.”
(at [591).
There will be occasions when a defendant will admit to some criminal activity on
what might be seen as incontrovertible evidence but deny the more serious
charge. In some such cases the alternative verdict may be somewhat remote from
the real issue in the case and as such the defendant may be under-convicted. On
the other hand there may be situations which work to the detriment of the
defendant, as recognised in Coutts, where the jury may convict, having allowed
their determinations to be influenced by issues extraneous to the evidence, when
faced with a stark choice between convicting on serious charges a defendant who
has acted deplorably rather than acquit altogether. Such risks are not always
present, however, and as such it should not be a firm rule that every alternative
verdict should be left to the jury. The court recognised that the whole
administration of justice in the Crown Court depends upon the conscientiousness
of the jury and their ability to follow appropriate directions from the judge. As
such, whether or not a lesser alternative offence should be left to the jury must be
a judgment left to the trial judge who has a “feel for the case” (at [611]). It is the
judge who is best placed to consider whether the absence of a direction about a
lesser alternative verdict would disadvantage the defendant, and similarly he or
she is best placed to consider fairness to the prosecution and the wider interests of
society. Lord Bingham’s objective of avoiding over and under-conviction must
allow for a determination by the trial judge based upon the evidence and issues
raised rather an absolute question of law. The exercise of the discretion must of
course not prejudice the defendant and this has been supported by the European
Court of Human Rights in Pelissier v France (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 715.
Extending the ambit of the statutory framework. In the absence of any clear
indication by the House of Lords the suggestion that the principles in Coutts
extended beyond the statutory framework was rejected. A bill of indictment is
defined in Archbold as “a written or printed accusation of crime made at the suit
of the Crown against one or more persons” (para. 1-1). For the judge to consider
at the end of the evidence whether the indictment should be amended to include
all offences on which a jury might convict would change the nature of the
indictment to one which stated the charges identified by the court rather than the
prosecution. As this had not been envisaged explicitly by the House of Lords,
there was no reason for the Court of Appeal to develop the law in this way.
Safety. The impact of any erroneous failure by the trial judge to leave an
alternative lesser verdict to the jury would be governed in the usual way by
reference to the statutory test relating to the safety of conviction. The approach in
Maxwell (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 61 suggested that the appellate court should
interfere only where satisfied that the jury may have convicted out of a reluctance
to see the defendant getting clean away. This case was described in Coutts as “not
an easy authority” (at [19]), and the present court determined that the approach
taken in Maxwell is no longer good law, stating: “Lord Ackner’s test is no longer
applicable. Effectively, it has been extinguished” (at [51]).”
871. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Volante (judgment delivered on the 5th September 2008)
stated:
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“44. Mr Quinn submitted that the Acting Deemster erred in failing to direct the
jury that if they were satisfied that the Appellant had assaulted a girl but were not
satisfied that such occurred in circumstances of indecency they could return a
verdict of guilty of common assault. This submission was never made to the
Acting Deemster.
45. Mr Unsworth submitted that such submission was divorced from the factual
content of the allegations made by the girls. They had alleged that the Appellant
touched or kissed them or interfered with their clothing in circumstances from
which the jury could infer indecency. It was never the Appellant`s case that he
had inflicted common assaults on these girls and he never offered to, or did, plead
guilty to common assaults on such girls. When those representing the Appellant
were given the opportunity to discuss the Acting Deemster`s proposed legal
directions, this point was never raised.
46. In such circumstances and on the particular facts of this case we are satisfied
that there was no obligation on the Acting Deemster to direct the jury as to an
alternative offence of common assault. That was not the way in which his case
was being put and there was no submission by either prosecution or defence that
the jury should be so directed. We agree with Mr Unsworth that the issues for the
jury were essentially two-fold : firstly, did the incident as described by the girl
happen ? and secondly, did such incident constitute an indecent assault? We have
no doubt that, in the absence of the Appellant conducting his case with such an
alternative in mind, it would have been an unnecessary complication of an already
factually complex case for the Acting Deemster to have invited the jury to
consider an alternative offence of common assault.
47. For the sake of completeness we add that even had the Acting Deemster been
asked by those representing the Appellant to direct the jury as to an alternative
verdict of common assault, she would not have been required to do so if she
concluded, as she was entitled to do on the way the prosecution and defence
presented their cases, that a verdict of guilty to common assault could properly be
described in its legal and factual context as trivial, or insubstantial, or would not
reflect the real issues in the case : see R v Foster [2008] 1 WLR 1615.”
872. See also section 22 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 which
provides as follows:
“22 Alternative verdicts
(1) On an information for murder, a person found not guilty of murder
may be found guilty of –
(a) an offence under section 20 (manslaughter) or section 33
(grievous bodily harm) of the Criminal Code 1872;
(b) an offence under section 2(1) (abetting suicide) of the
Criminal Law Act 1981;
(c) any offence of which he may be found guilty under
subsection (4), or under any other enactment specifically
so providing;
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(d) any offence under sections 23 to 27 (attempted murder)
of the Criminal Code 1872, or an attempt to commit any
other offence of which he might be found guilty,
but may not be found guilty of any offence not included above.
(2) Where, on the trial of a person on information for any offence
except treason or murder –
(a) the jury finds him not guilty of the offence specifically
charged in the information, but
(b) the allegations in the information amount to or include
(expressly or by implication) an allegation of another
offence,
the jury may find him guilty of that other offence or of an
offence of which he could be found guilty on an information
specifically charging that other offence.
For the purposes of this subsection an allegation of an offence shall
be taken as including an allegation of attempting to commit that
offence.
(3) Without prejudice to subsection (2), where on the trial of a person
on information for an offence under section 1 (rape) or section 7)
(incest) of the Sexual Offences Act 1992 –
(a) the jury are not satisfied that he is guilty of the offence
charged or of an attempt to commit it, but
(b) the jury are satisfied that he is guilty –
(i) where charged with an offence under section 1, of
an offence under section 2 (procurement by threats
or lies) or section 3 (administering drugs to obtain
sexual act) of that Act, or
(ii) where charged with an offence under section 7, of
an offence under section 4 (intercourse with young
person) of that Act,
they may find him guilty of the latter offence.
(4) If on the trial of a person on information for an arrestable offence
the jury are satisfied that the offence charged (or some other
offence of which the defendant might on that charge be found
guilty) was committed, but find the defendant not guilty of it, they
may find him guilty of any offence under section 7(1) of the
Criminal Law Act 1981 (act to impede apprehension or
prosecution of offender) of which they are satisfied that he is guilty
in relation to the offence charged ( or that other offence).
(5) On the trial of a person on information of attempting to commit an
offence, he may be convicted of the offence charged even though
he is shown to be guilty of the completed offence, but he is not
afterwards liable to be prosecuted for the completed offence.
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(6) Subsection (5) is without prejudice to the power of the Attorney
General, at any time before a verdict, to enter a nolle prosequi, or
to the power of the court to discharge the jury, with a view to the
preferment of an information for the completed offence.
(7) Subsections (1) to (4) apply to an information containing more
than one count as if each were a separate information.
(8) Nothing in this section prejudices section 9 (attempt to commit
offence is an offence) of the Criminal Law Act 1981.
(9) In this section ‘arrestable offence’ has the meaning given by
section 4(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1981”.
[See s6(3) CJA 1967 Act of Parliament]
873. If the alternative count is in the information consider Specimen
Direction 4 of the Judicial Studies Board which reads as follows:
“4. Alternative Offences
Counts 1 and 2 are alternative counts. You cannot find the defendant guilty on
both. [First consider count 1, which is the more serious charge involving (set out
ingredients briefly). If you find the defendant guilty on that count, do not consider
count 2 at all. If you are not sure that the defendant is guilty on count 1, then
consider count 2 [which involves, etc].”
874. In respect of road traffic cases see Part IV of Schedule 6 to the Road
Traffic Act 1985 especially paragraphs 1(1), 1(2) and 1A, and 3.
875. In Brown the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Acting
Deemster King) in a judgment delivered on the 29th January 2007 at
paragraph 24 stated:
“For it to be open to the jury to return an alternative verdict not only must the test
in section 22(2) (b) be satisfied, but the alternative offence must be capable of
being tried by information. A purely summary offence will not qualify.”
876. Section 3 of the Criminal Code (Informations) Act 1920 provides that
charges for any offences, whether felonies or misdemeanours, may be
joined in the same information if those charges are founded on the
same facts, or form or are part of a series of offences of the same or a
similar character. The words “felonies or misdemeanours” were given
judicial attention in R v Collister 2003-05 MLR 150 (Court of General
Gaol Delivery Deemster Doyle) and R v Gibney and Jack Robinson
Trawlers (Court of General Gaol Delivery Acting Deemster Moran
judgment 18th May 2005). See also the earlier judgment of Acting
Deemster Moran in R v Gibney and Jack Robinson Trawlers (Court of
General Gaol Delivery 12th April 2005). Acting Deemster Moran
concluded as follows:
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“For all of those reasons, I am satisfied that the so called offence of corporate
manslaughter does not exist in the Isle of Man and that it was not open to the
prosecution to charge the second defendant with Manslaughter under section 20
of the Criminal Code of 1872 in this case.”
877. In R v McEvilly [2008] EWCA Crim 1162; [2008] Crim LR 968 it
was held that where there are two charges in the alternative on the
indictment arising from the same facts, and with one more serious
than the other, the judge should not take a verdict on the less serious
count until finality had been reached on the more serious charge. Such
finality might take the form of a not guilty verdict, or a decision to
discharge the jury on that count because there was no realistic
prospect of agreement on a verdict. If a verdict was prematurely
returned on an alternative count before the jury had given their verdict
on the more serious count, the judge should decline to accept the
verdict on the alternative count.
Counsel’s duty to assist Deemster in respect of summing up
878. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Duffy (judgment delivered 26th October 2004)
summarised the position succinctly in one line:
“15 … It is the duty of all advocates to give proper assistance to the court.”
879. In Kelly (judgment 8th November 2001) the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Cain) stated:
“16 … we are compelled to observe that at the conclusion of the evidence and
before the commencement of speeches Deemster Kerruish indicated what
directions he proposed to make and invited comment from the advocates thereon.
Neither advocate made any observation and in particular neither advocate
indicated that the learned Deemster should give the directions which both now
concede that he should have given. In our judgment a prosecuting advocate is
under a positive duty to draw to a Deemster’s attention any failure to give an
adequate and proper direction on the law - see R v Lang-Hall [“Times” 24th
March 1989] and such was emphasised in R v Roberts [1992] Crim LR 375 and R
v Donoghue [1988] 86 Cr App R 267 - and a Deemster is entitled to rely to an
extent on that assistance being available to him - see R v McVey [1988] Crim LR
127. The extent of the duty on a defence advocate may be somewhat less - see R v
Cocks [1976] 63 Cr App R 79 and R v Edwards [1983] 77 Cr App R 5 - although
in Edwards the court considered it to be inconceivable that defence counsel,
acting in a client’ s best interests, could have failed to draw a serious omission in
the summing-up to the attention of the judge.”
880. In Scambler (judgment 12th January 2004) the Appeal Division (Judge
of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Doyle) at paragraph 8 stated:
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“… it is the duty of those representing an appellant to clearly identify what
matters are relied upon by the appellant as supporting his contention that his
appeal against conviction should be allowed. This is particularly important in a
case such as this where the court is supplied with a complete transcript of the trial.
Furthermore it is incumbent on those representing an appellant to cite, and
produce copies of, all authorities relied upon and to identify what propositions of
law are to be relied upon from such authorities. It is insufficient merely to refer to
large sections of Archbold, helpful though Archbold may be to set the scene for
such submissions.”
881. In Scambler the Appeal Division added:
“17. However it important that we should record that at the conclusion of his
summing up the Acting Deemster asked both advocates whether there were any
further directions he should give the jury and both confirmed that there were
none. They too erred. We hope that all advocates will note what we said at
paragraph 16 of our judgment in Kelly as to the duties on all advocates to assist a
Deemster. Although we do not repeat such dicta in this judgment, advocates must
fulfil their responsibilities.”
882. At the appropriate stage of the trial and usually before the closing
speeches of counsel the trial Deemster will indicate to counsel the
main areas and directions the trial Deemster intends to cover in the
summing up. The trial Deemster will invite submissions and counsel
should not hesitate to offer assistance. It is counsel’s duty to be in a
position to assist the Deemster in respect of areas to be covered in the
summing up. Counsel should assist the Deemster in respect of the
areas counsel say should be dealt with in the summing up. For
guidance under the laws of England and Wales see the helpful website
of the Judicial Studies Board (www.jsboard.co.uk ).
883. Simon Brown L J, giving the judgment of the English Court of
Appeal in R v Nelson [1997] Crim L R 234, stressed that every
defendant has the right to have his defence, whatever it may be,
faithfully and accurately placed before the jury. A defendant is not
however entitled to have his defence rehearsed blandly and
uncritically in the summing up. No defendant has the right to demand
that the judge should conceal from the jury such difficulties and
deficiences as are apparent in his case. Of course, the judge must
remain impartial. But if common sense and reason demonstrates that
a given defence is riddled with implausiblities, inconsisticiences and
illogicalities there is no reason for the judge to withhold from the jury
the benefit of his own powers of logic and analysis. Why should
pointing out those matters be thought to smack of partiality? To play
a case straight down the middle requires only that a judge gives full
and fair weight to the evidence and arguments of each side. The judge
is not required to top up the case for one side so as to correct any
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substantial imbalance. He has no duty to cloud the merits either by
obscuring the strengths of one side or the weakness of the other.
Impartiality means no more or less than the judge shall fairly state and
analyse the case for both sides. Justice moreover requires that he
assists the jury to reach a logicial and reasoned conclusion on the
evidence. The judge should anaylise the competing cases and give the
jury the benefit of that reasoned analysis. The judge in his summing
up must, of course, make it abundantly plain that the all important
conclusion on the facts is for the jury alone.
884. In Devo (judgment delivered on the 29th October 2008) the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish)
commented in respect of the way the case had been presented before
the Court of General Gaol Delivery. The following are extracts from
the Appeal Division’s comprehensive judgment:-
“168. We cannot leave this case without observing that the Acting Deemster, a
very experienced Judge in both this jurisdiction and elsewhere, was not best
served by the case as presented to her. She was faced with an almost impossible
task. There were too many counts on the Information and a large number of
defendants. Non-disclosure was a continuing serious problem which permeated
throughout the whole trial and necessitated the recalling of witnesses, numerous
applications and much delay. It is unfortunate that in such circumstances she
erred.”
“65 … the task faced by the Acting Deemster was not an easy one. Whilst a
concise summing-up is to be commended, this was not a case where the Acting
Deemster could avoid a lengthy summing-up if she was to give the assistance to
the jury which it was entitled to expect from her. Although we do not criticise the
advocates who, during breaks in the summing-up, drew the Acting Deemster’s
attention to what they perceived to be errors in such summing-up, and we note
that many of such alleged errors were not pursued before this court, it must have
been very distracting for the Acting Deemster, as also it must have been to be
presented without any forewarning with written directions on the law which had
been agreed by all the advocates. Whilst the agreement of directions by advocates
can sometimes be a very useful approach, such an approach ought always to be
one adopted in conjunction with the Deemster.
66. We recognise that ultimately this court has to take the summing-up as a whole
and to ask themselves in the words of Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v R [1914] AC
599, at 615, whether there was :
‘Something which ... deprives the accused of the substance of a fair trial and the
protection of the law, or which, in general, tends to divert the due and orderly
administration of the law into a new course, which may be drawn into an evil
precedent in the future.’
67. But equally any appellate court must not lose touch with reality : see R v
Stoddart 2 Cr App R 217 where Lord Alverstone CJ, at 245, made some general
observations where a misdirection is alleged :
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‘Probably no summing up, and certainly none that attempts to deal with the
incidents as to which the evidence has extended over a period of twenty days,
would fail to be open to some objection. ... Every summing-up must be regarded
in the light of the conduct of the trial and the questions which have been raised by
the counsel for the prosecution and for the defence respectively. This Court does
not sit to consider whether this or that phrase was the best that might have been
chosen, or whether a direction which has been attacked might have been fuller or
more conveniently expressed, or whether other topics which might have been
dealt with on other occasions should be introduced. This Court sits here to
administer justice and to deal with valid objections to matters which may have led
to a miscarriage of justice.’ ”
“76. In our judgment if a Deemster decides to introduce an issue into his
summing-up which has not been actively canvassed in the course of the trial, he
should at least give ample warning of his intention to do so to advocates in the
absence of the jury and before the advocates` speeches so that there can be
discussion as to correctness of the approach proposed to be adopted by the
Deemster and an opportunity given to advocates to deal with that issue in their
speeches : see R v Cristini (Luigi) [1987] Crim LR 504 and R v Winn-Pope [1996]
CLR 521 where the judge’s comments went to the root of a defendant’s claim to
be an honest shopper by labelling him as a ‘con man’ - a notion which the
prosecution had been careful not to introduce.
77. The Acting Deemster did not adopt such approach. Moreover, as was
recognised by her, the issue of possible inconsistency raised by the Acting
Deemster went to the heart of Mr Devo’s defence.
78. In our judgment on the facts of this case it was impermissible for the Acting
Deemster to introduce this new issue for the first time in her summing-up because
firstly, the defence had no opportunity before the jury to deal with it either
evidentially or by argument; secondly, it undermined a central feature of the
defence, namely that there were different regulatory regimes for licences and that
Mr Devo would not knowingly act unlawfully ; and thirdly, it could, and in our
judgment probably would, raise concerns in the minds of the jury as to Mr Devo`s
overall credibility.”
“108. Whilst we accept that it was inappropriate for the Acting Deemster to use
the words `make you sure so that you think it is more likely than not`, this was a
brief mistake which the Acting Deemster immediately corrected.
109. Whilst Mr Hackett recognised that this was not a major point he submitted
that it formed part of the adverse factual matrix. We entirely disagree. A
Deemster is not to be impugned where he makes a mistake and corrects it in
circumstances where there can be no prejudice to a defendant. Here we are
satisfied that the jury were properly directed as to the standard of proof in respect
of Mr Devo, that in reality there was no misdirection and that there was no
prejudice to Mr Devo.”
“122. The Acting Deemster declined to adopt such framework [a framework for
directions submitted by counsel]. It may be that she believed, as we believe, that
such were unnecessarily complicated and would serve to confuse rather than
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assist the jury and certainly it is settled procedure that judges should avoid any
elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent : see Archbold 17-35(a). :
`When a judge is directing a jury upon the mental element necessary in a crime of
specific intent (such as murder), he should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of
what is meant by intent, and leave it to the jury`s good sense to decide whether
the accused acted with the necessary intent.`”
“125. On balance we concluded that whilst in all the circumstances it would have
been preferable for the Acting Deemster to direct the jury in the expanded terms
of the advocates` agreed direction, it was a fuller and more accurate direction than
that which she gave albeit that it would have probably been more confusing to the
jury, we do not think that by using a shorter more intelligible form of words the
Acting Deemster misdirected the jury.”
“142. Mr Lawson-Rogers submitted that the Acting Deemster failed to sum up the
evidence and the defence case in a coherent and fair manner so as to enable the
jury to appreciate the issues which they had to decide.
143 It was agreed that in her summing-up which lasted about 1½ days the Acting
Deemster referred to the evidence in the precise order in which it was given, did
not summarise the material parts of the evidence but recited it extenso, even when
the jury had transcripts of such evidence and did not attempt to identify what
evidence related to each count.
144. In R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510, at 519, Lord Hailsham LC described the
duty of a judge when summing-up thus :
`The purpose of a direction to a jury is not best achieved by a disquisition on
jurisprudence or philosophy or a universally applicable circular tour round the
area of law affected by the case. The search for universally applicable definitions
is often productive of more obscurity than light. A direction is seldom improved
and may be considerably damaged by copious recitations from the total content of
a judge`s note book. A direction to a jury should be custom-built to make the jury
understand their task in relation to a particular case. Of course it must include
references to the burden of proof and the respective roles of jury and judge. But it
should also include a succinct but accurate summary of the issues of fact as to
which a decision is required, a correct but concise summary of the evidence and
arguments on both sides and a correct statement of the inferences which the jury
are entitled to draw from their particular conclusions about the primary facts.`
145. Moreover it is important for a Deemster to marshal the evidence and arrange
it issue by issue : see R v Amado-Taylor [2000] 2 Cr App R 189 where, at 192,
Henry LJ stated :
`…generally speaking, the longer a trial lasts, the greater will be a jury`s need for
assistance from the judge relating to the evidence. Many jurors do not have the
experience, ability or opportunity of a judge to note significant evidence and to
cross reference evidence from different sources which relates to the same issue.
Accordingly, in a trial lasting several days or more, it is generally of assistance to
the jury if the judge summarises those factual issues which are not disputed, and,
where there is a significant dispute as to material facts, identifies succinctly those
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pieces of evidence which are in conflict. By so doing, the judge can focus the
jury`s attention on those factual issues which they must resolve. It is never
appropriate, however, for a summing-up to be a mere rehearsal of the evidence.`
146. Similarly in Berry v R [1992] 2 AC 364, at 383, Lord Lowry stated :
`The jury are entitled at any stage to the judge`s help on the facts as well as on the
law. To withhold that assistance constitutes an irregularity which may be material
depending on the circumstances, since, if the jury return a guilty verdict, one
cannot tell whether some misconception or irrelevance has played a part.`
147. Although we recognise that a Deemster has some discretion as to how he
thinks it is best to sum up a case, he is probably in the best position to make such
judgment, we have no doubt that much of evidence and the transcripts could have
been summarised by the Acting Deemster and that when summarising the
evidence she could have greatly assisted the jury by identifying to which count
such evidence might be relevant.
148. Ultimately we had to consider whether this summing up was unfair and gave
rise of a risk of a miscarriage of justice. With some hesitation we have concluded
that such risk existed for the following reasons.
149. Firstly, this trial began with 8 Defendants and 60 counts. There were
problems with late and non-disclosure. Witnesses had to be recalled. Defendants
were discharged after successful applications that they had no case to answer. The
Information was eventually reduced to 4 counts facing two defendants but counts
1 and 2, which related solely to Mr Devo, related to a completely different kind of
offence and a different regulatory regime than counts 3 and 4, which related to
both Mr Devo and Mr Riedel. During the trial, which lasted for over 7 weeks, the
jury did not sit for 9 days, during which the Acting Deemster was required to
address various applications and give both sides time to consider new
documentation. In such circumstances the jury were entitled to expect and greatly
needed assistance from the Acting Deemster to identify the issues which they had
to address and the available evidence which had been adduced on such issues.
150. Secondly, we do not believe that the structure of the Acting Deemster’s
summing up gave such assistance. In this case it was, we think, mandatory for the
Acting Deemster to make it clear what evidence related to which count and, in
relation to counts 3 and 4, to which defendant.
151. In not adopting such a structured summing up we have concluded that there
was a significant risk that the jury may have not identified the relevant issues and
evidence or at least may have been confused on such matters, making the
convictions of Mr Riedel on counts 3 and 4 unsafe.”
885. In Volante (judgment delivered on the 5th September 2008) the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) stated:
“66. Whilst we readily accept that it is the duty of a Deemster when summing up
to identify the defence, although how this is required to be done will depend on all
the circumstances of the case, we do not think that a Deemster is required to
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identify every part of cross examination which a defendant believes might assist
his case. To conclude otherwise would place an impossible burden on the
Deemster and would encourage prolixity rather than brevity. What is required is
that the Deemster should undertake a fair review of the essential features of the
evidence and strike a fair balance between the prosecution case and the defence
case.
67. We have carefully reviewed the entirety of the summing up and are satisfied
that not only was the defence case properly identified but that there was a fair
review of the totality of the evidence which had been adduced to the jury. We thus
reject this submission.
68. Although we do not make any criticism of Mr Quinn`s detailed submissions in
support of his contention that the convictions were generally unsafe and
unsatisfactory, we have to say that in our judgment his analytical approach in
dissecting the summing up did not acknowledge the reality of the overall impact
of the summing up on the jury which we are satisfied was fair to the Appellant.”
886. In Volante the Appeal Division also stated:
“21. Such submission is made notwithstanding that prior to her summing up the
Acting Deemster had provided both prosecution and defence with her draft
submissions as to the law [which in due course were incorporated in her summing
up] and the defence had raised no issue as to the appropriateness of such
directions. Whilst we accept that the failure of an advocate to adversely comment
on draft directions when given the opportunity to do so is not fatal to an appeal
based on an alleged misdirection, the absence of any comment is likely to affect
the assessment of the significance of the alleged deficiency : see R v Gammans &
Jarman [1999] 2 Archbold News 1…
31. The Acting Deemster continued thus :
`The second element is that of indecency. An assault by itself is not enough to
found a conviction, the assault must have occurred in circumstances of indecency.
Another way of expressing the same test is whether what occurred was so
offensive to contemporary standards of modesty and privacy as to be indecent.
You as the jury have to decide whether right minded persons would consider the
conduct indecent or not. Some assaults, if you are sure that they occurred, may
give rise you think to an irresistible inference that the Defendant intended to
assault the girl in a manner which right minded persons would clearly think was
indecent. On the other hand there may be assaults which you are sure occurred
where the circumstances are such that they are only capable of constituting an
indecent assault. In those circumstances you must be satisfied that the Defendant
intended to act indecently. You look at the following factors and any other factors
which you agree [and] regard as relevant : the relationship between the Defendant
and the girl ; how did the Defendant embark on this conduct and why was he so
behaving ; what did the Defendant say, if anything ; what were the surrounding
circumstances ; who was present ; what was the girl`s reaction to the behaviour ;
was she upset or not by the behaviour ; what has the Defendant told you about
these incidents in interview and in the course of his evidence.`
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32. Mr Quinn, in our judgment correctly, did not criticise such directions.
33. The Acting Deemster continued thus :
`But the issue of consent needs to be dealt with. All of these girls were under the
age of 16 at the time, so they were unable in law to consent to such behaviour.
Therefore, if the Defendant believed that they consented or that they did not mind
such behaviour that is no defence.`
34. Mr Quinn again did not criticise such directions which were founded upon
section 13(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 1992. We agree that such direction was
an impeccable one.
35. The Acting Deemster continued thus :
`But also it is not necessary for the Prosecution to prove that the Defendant had an
indecent motive when he performed any assault that you find proved. It is what
the Defendant did which is important, although you take into account any
evidence as to his motive in deciding whether right minded persons would
consider the conduct indecent or not. You must decide what right minded persons
would think of this conduct and decide whether you think it is indecent. It is not
what the Defendant thought of such conduct.`
36. This is the crucial passage relied upon by Mr Quinn. He submitted that in
these directions the Acting Deemster erred in law and, having correctly directed
the jury [as set out in paragraph 31 above] as to the requisite intent on the part of
the Appellant in respect of the offences alleged against him, the Acting Deemster
was here giving an inconsistent and contrary direction as to intent which was
wrong in law. If Mr Quinn`s analysis is correct it is surprising that no immediate
objection was made to the Acting Deemster and whilst recognising that it is not
easy for an advocate to interrupt a summing up in the presence of the jury, we
bear in mind that there were a number of opportunities during breaks in the
summing up when such objection could conveniently have been made to the
Acting Deemster in the absence of the jury.
37. We have given this submission careful consideration but are satisfied that it
lacks any merit…
60. Secondly, Mr Quinn submitted that in her summing up the Acting Deemster
erred in law in referring to inadmissible hearsay evidence. There were few
examples of this. They largely related to the girls saying during their dvd
interviews that other girls had seen things. No objection had been taken by the
defence to such evidence, no doubt because it was part of the Appellant`s case
that the girls had discussed matters and were in effect conspiring together to
present a false case against him. Mr Quinn thus contended that there should have
been warnings by the Acting Deemster to disregard hearsay evidence,
notwithstanding that he conceded that when summarising the evidence in relation
to count 6 the Acting Deemster had expressly directed the jury to disregard those
parts of the evidence which were hearsay and that the only purpose of some of
such evidence was to explain how matters came to be reported.
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61. We regard such submission as misconceived. The hearsay evidence had been
introduced into the trial without any objection by the defence. More importantly,
before she began to refer to the evidence the Acting Deemster gave the jury an
express direction as to the effect of hearsay evidence. She said this :
`Hearsay Evidence. During the course of the trial you heard me explain about
hearsay evidence. There are some exceptions but as a general rule you must only
rely upon direct evidence, that is where a witness says I was there and I saw and I
heard that. Girl A describing what another girl B told her is not evidence you
should rely on to establish the truth of what the girl B said. However, if girl B
tells you herself then it is direct evidence and it is evidence that you can rely on
providing you are satisfied it is accurate and truthful.`
62. In our judgment no legitimate criticism can be made of such direction and,
having given such a direction at the outset of her summing up we are satisfied that
there was no obligation on the Acting Deemster to repeat such direction each time
she referred to a piece of hearsay evidence.”
887. The Privy Council in Trimmingham v The Queen (judgment delivered
22nd June 2009) stated:
“12 There are few cases in which the judge’s summing up could not be
criticised in some respects and submissions advanced that the content or wording
could have been improved upon. The present case is no exception. It is possible
in various places to say that the judge should have spelled matters out more fully
or in a different fashion, but what an appellate tribunal must do is to look at the
thrust of the directions and consider if they have adequately put the several issues
before the jury and given them a proper explanation of their task in relation to
those which they have to decide. In particular, the Board must determine
whether, if there has been any defect, there has been any miscarriage of justice
which requires their intervention. Their Lordships are fully satisfied that the trial
judge’s careful summing up stated the law adequately and put the issues properly
and fairly before the jury. They consider that any deficiencies to which exception
might be taken were minor and that they fall well short of a miscarriage of justice
which should cause them to set aside the verdict.”
888. In Trimmingham the Privy Council also dealt with the law in respect
of accomplice evidence and lies as follows:
“10. Mr Fitzgerald QC for the appellant submitted that these directions were
defective, in that the judge did not spell out why it was dangerous to convict on an
accomplice’s evidence and failed to make it sufficiently clear that the evidence
relied on by way of corroboration only went so far as to contradict the appellant’s
alibi and fell short of pointing to him as the one who killed the deceased, rather
than Ding. It has to be borne in mind, however, that at the time of trial the
appellant was advancing an alibi and was not making the case upon which he
subsequently relied, that although both he and Ding were present at the scene it
was Ding who carried out the killing, contrary to the appellant’s wishes. In
negativing his alibi, the Crown evidence tended to show that he was making a
false case. The judge in such a situation had to make it sufficiently clear to the
jury that advancing a false alibi or lying in other respects did not of itself suffice
391
to establish guilt of the crime and that they had to consider possible reasons why
the appellant might have done so other than trying to cover up guilt. The issues of
corroboration and a Lucas direction are in this respect interdependent.”
889. The Privy Council in Trimmingham also stated the following in
respect of death sentences imposed by Carribean courts:
“20. Judges in the Caribbean courts have in the past few years set out the
approach which a sentencing judge should follow in a case where the imposition
of the death sentence is discretionary. This approach received the approval of the
Board in Pipersburgh v The Queen [2008] UKPC 11, and should be regarded as
established law.
21. It can be expressed in two basic principles. The first has been expressed in
several different formulations, but they all carry the same message, that the death
penalty should be imposed only in cases which on the facts of the offence are the
most extreme and exceptional, “the worst of the worst” or “the rarest of the rare”.
In considering whether a particular case falls into that category, the judge should
of course compare it with other murder cases and not with ordinary civilised
behaviour. The second principle is that there must be no reasonable prospect of
reform of the offender and that the object of punishment could not be achieved by
any means other than the ultimate sentence of death. The character of the
offender and any other relevant circumstances are to be taken into account in so
far as they may operate in his favour by way of mitigation and are not to weigh in
the scales against him. Before it imposes a sentence of death the court must be
properly satisfied that these two criteria have been fulfilled.
22. Mr Fitzgerald readily accepted that the appellant’s crime was a brutal and
disgusting murder, involving the cold-blooded killing of an elderly man in the
course of a robbery. He contended, however, that it fell short of being in the
category of the rarest of the rare. He submitted that the killing did not appear to
have been planned or premeditated and although the manner of the killing was
gruesome and violent, there was no torture of the deceased, nor prolonged trauma
or humiliation of him prior to death.
23. Their Lordships accept the correctness of this contention. It was undeniably a
bad case, even a very bad case, of murder committed for gain. But in their
judgment it falls short of being among the worst of the worst, such as to call for
the ultimate penalty of capital punishment. The appellant behaved in a revolting
fashion, but this case is not comparable with the worst cases of sadistic killings.
Their Lordships would also point out that the object of keeping the appellant out
of society entirely, which the judge considered necessary, can be achieved
without executing him.
24. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the Board to consider the factors
relating to the character and personality of the appellant, to which the content of
the medical reports, if admitted, would be material. Nor do they propose to
express an opinion on the other grounds of appeal against sentence advanced on
behalf of the appellant, save that they feel obliged to draw to the attention of
prosecutors once again the principles set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the
judgment of the Board in Randall v The Queen [2002] UKPC 19, [2002] 1 WLR
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2237 regarding the standard of conduct to be expected of them as ministers of
justice.”
890. See also Sayle (Appeal Division judgment 24th May 2006) in respect
of the discretion of the trial Deemster where an advocate wrongly
refers to sentencing matters in a closing address to the jury. In
Chambers (Appeal Division judgment 12th August 2010) helpful
guidance in respect of issues to be covered in summing up a case
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1976 including a paraphernalia
direction was provided.
891. See Ronald John v The State of Trinidad and Tobago (Privy Council
judgment delivered 16th March 2009) in respect of directions to the
jury where an accomplice who benefits from immunity from
prosecution has given evidence.
892. The English Court of Appeal in R v Harvey [2009] EWCA Crim 469
dealt with the directions a trial judge should give in respect of self-
defence. The following are extracts from the judgment of Moses L J:
“1. This is an appeal which demonstrates the importance of fashioning directions
to a jury to the issues of the case. The grounds of appeal are focussed on the
directions which the judge gave in relation to self-defence …
13. Although distinct grounds were advanced, their merits can only be judged by
consideration of the summing up as a whole. The sense of the directions must be
judged by the thrust of the summing up as a whole and not by analysis of isolated
extracts. Did the judge adequately explain that the burden remained on the
prosecution throughout to disprove self-defence? Did he make sufficiently clear
the essential elements of the law as to self-defence as applicable to the factual
issues of the case ?…
23. We acknowledge that a confused and confusing direction is an oxymoron. If a
judge is unclear he cannot be said to be directing the jury at all. We also recognise
that it is the prime function of a judge’s directions to a jury to spare the jury from
the law and not to inflict it upon them. No disquisition on the 19th century
statutory provisions was necessary. Nor was it necessary to give general
directions on the law of self-defence without reference to the factual issues in the
case …
30. The argument advanced in the third ground demonstrates the erroneous belief
that in every case of self-defence all the elements are always relevant and must be
mechanically recited to the jury. In any event in the passage we have cited at §10
the judge did make it clear that the defence was based upon the circumstances as
the defendant honestly believed them to be.
31. As the Privy Council said in Shaw (§20) the rudiments of self-defence must be
stated in clear and simple terms. The Privy Council was doing no more than
repeating what has been said so many times before:
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“The directions must be tailored to the factual dispute.”
The directions in law needed do no more than to guide the jury as to what the
essential factual dispute was and the conclusions to be drawn from the different
findings open to them on the evidence.”
893. The Privy Council in Jackson v The Queen (judgment delivered 7th
July 2009) provided some guidance in respect of the law on joint
enterprise and concluded that the trial judge had failed to give any
coherent directions on joint enterprise. The guidance was as follows:
“11. It was, of course, common ground before the Board that, for a conviction of
murder, the Crown has to prove that the person who struck the fatal blow did so
with the intention to kill or to cause serious injury. Both parties also accepted that,
for present purposes, the most up-to-date guidance on the law of joint enterprise
was to be found in the speech of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in R v
Rahman [2009] 1 AC 129, 165, para 68:
“If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may kill or
intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to participate with A
in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient mental element for B to be guilty of
murder if A, with the requisite intent, kills in the course of the venture unless (i) A
suddenly produces and uses a weapon of which B knows nothing and which is
more lethal than any weapon which B contemplates that A or any other
participant may be carrying and (ii) for that reason A’s act is to be regarded as
fundamentally different from anything foreseen by B.” ”
894. See also R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930 in respect of the law
concerning joint enterprise.
895. In Williams 2003-05 MLR N8 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Tattersall and Deemster Doyle) dealt with the offence of counselling
and procuring and held that there needed to be an intention to
encourage and actual deliberate encouragement of the offence
committed. Mere presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient
in itself.
896. The following are extracts from the Appeal Division’s judgment in
Williams 2003-05 MLR N 8, delivered on the 20th August 2003:
“The alleged misdirection on `encouragement`
34. This ground of appeal gives rise to two separate complaints, albeit that there is
some overlap between them. Firstly, that the Acting Deemster misdirected the
jury when referring to the factual issue as to whether the Appellant encouraged
Mr Renshaw to assault Mr Griffin. Secondly, whether the Appellant should have
been prosecuted for an offence of aiding and abetting Mr Renshaw in the
commission of the assault. Both complaints can conveniently be considered
together.
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35. Miss Hannan submits that encouragement is insufficient to justify a conviction
of inflicting grievous bodily harm although she concedes that it is sufficient to
justify a conviction for aiding and abetting. Mr Carle disagrees.
36. Throughout the trial the case was conducted by the prosecution on two
alternative bases : either the Appellant physically took part in the assault or she
encouraged it to take place. Such is apparent from the prosecution opening :
`[The Appellant] denied any involvement whatsoever in the assault herself.
Again, members of the jury, it will be up to you, having heard all the evidence, to
decide whether or not this is indeed the case or whether by encouragement and or
by taking part herself, she too is guilty of the involvement of the offence of
grievous bodily harm.`
37. Before she addressed the jury, Miss Hannan expressed her concern to the
Acting Deemster that in their closing address the prosecution had submitted to the
jury that the Appellant could be convicted of the offence of inflicting grievous
bodily harm if they were satisfied that she had encouraged the offence and that in
the event of a conviction the Acting Deemster would not know on what factual
basis - physical involvement or mere encouragement - the jury had convicted.
Accordingly she contended that there should be a count of aiding and abetting.
38. The Acting Deemster rejected such submission on the basis that, whatever
difficulties might result in sentencing, as a matter of law the Appellant could be
convicted of the offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm if she either physically
participated in the assault on Mr Griffin or if she encouraged Mr Renshaw to so
assault Mr Griffin.
39. As a matter of law we are satisfied that the Acting Deemster was right.
40. To establish criminal liability on the ground of encouragement, it must be
proved that a defendant intended to encourage and wilfully encouraged the crime
committed. This is a question of fact for a jury. Mere continued voluntary
presence at the scene of the commission of a crime, even when non-accidental,
does not necessarily amount to such encouragement. On the facts here there was
ample evidence from which the jury could legitimately conclude that the
Appellant had encouraged Mr Renshaw to continue to assault Mr Griffin. We do
not accept that it was necessary that there be an alternative count of aiding and
abetting. Whether this had been an aiding and abetting case or one of joint
enterprise, in our judgment the case was legitimately put to the jury on the basis
of encouragement.
41. However we do accept that had there been a count of aiding and abetting, the
jury could have been directed that if they were to be satisfied only that the
Appellant encouraged Mr Renshaw and were not satisfied that she physically
participated in the assault, they should convict only of the count of aiding and
abetting. Had that course been followed the jury`s findings would have been
capable of easy interpretation. Because there was no such count, and we stress
that in law there need be no such count, it was difficult to know on what basis the
jury had convicted the Appellant. It may be noted that in sentencing this
Appellant, the Acting Deemster assumed that the conviction was on the basis of
encouragement alone, namely the construction most favourable to the Appellant.”
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897. In Hollyoak v R 1990-92 MLR 329 at 337 Judge of Appeal Hytner
stated:
“When the learned Deemster summed the case up to the jury he made no
reference to various inconsistencies on these peripheral matters. On the whole,
and particularly when the defendants have not given evidence, it is as well for the
judge to remind the jury, not in detail, but of the fact that in cross-examination the
witness was not wholly consistent.”
898. In Shimmin v Oake 1993-95 MLR N 3 it was held by the Appeal
Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Acting Deemster Tattersall as
he then was) that when a person has been found in possession of
cannabis wrapped in a manner typical of that used by suppliers, it was
wrong to infer from that evidence alone that the person is a supplier,
since it might equally be inferred that the drug had recently been
received from the supplier.
899. In respect of Lovelock/Kelly directions regarding extravagant living or
drug paraphernalia found in the possession of those charged with
offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1976 see Kelly (judgment 8th
November 2001 Appeal Division), Flanagan (judgment 29th July
2004 Appeal Division), Scambler (judgment 12th January 2004
Appeal Division), Lovelock [1977] Crim LR 821 and Grant [1996] 1
Cr App R 73.
900. See also the Judicial Studies Board’s Specimen Direction 36 Drugs –
Money found in possession of Defendant/Evidence of Extravagant
lifestyle:
“The prosecution has called evidence that D [eg was found to be in possession of
£...] (and/or to the effect that he) [was living to a standard which they suggest was
much higher than that which might be expected of a man of his means].
That evidence, if you accept it, does not by itself prove anything against D.
However, if you are sure that:
(a) D's explanation for the [money][standard of living] is untrue; (adding, in a
supply or intent to supply case)
(b) the [money][standard of living] can only be explained by continuing dealing in
drugs as opposed to drug dealing in the past,
you may if you think fit take that evidence into account when deciding whether D
[was in possession of drugs][intended to supply drugs to another person][supplied
drugs to another person] as alleged in the indictment.
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Notes
1. See R v Gordon 2 Cr App R 61, R v Diane Morris 2 Cr App R 69, R v Grant
[1996] 1 Cr App R 73 and R v Malik, unreported (98/02540/43). Re
'lifestyle', see R v Scott [1996] Crim LR 652.
2. In R v Guney [1998] 2 Crim App R 242, the Court of Appeal held that it is
for the trial judge to determine whether cash and lifestyle may be relevant
and admissible to any issue in the case. The court decided that in limited
circumstances this kind of evidence might be relevant to the issue of
possession only. The admissibility of such evidence depends on the
particular circumstances of the case, and the issues raised (for example, the
defendant was not 'knowingly' in possession). Such evidence is more likely
to be relevant where the issue is possession with intent to supply. See also R
v Griffiths [1998] Crim LR 567, CA.
3. A similar direction should be given where the issue is intent to supply and
documents such as notes and jottings are admitted in evidence. See R v
Lovelock [1997] 2 Crim LR 821 and R v Chubb, unreported
(97/03840/X5).
Archbold (2003) 26-71 page 2272.
Blackstone (2003) F1.9 page 1957.”
901. As regards notebooks and money it is incumbent on a trial judge to
give a scrupulously fair direction to the jury that before the jury can
use evidence of documents or other drug paraphernalia as evidence of
an intent to supply they must be satisfied that it was not only
demonstrative of past dealing but also capable of going to intention to
supply in the future.
902. Is the finding of money in the possession of the defendant at his home
or perhaps more cogently in the possession of the appellant when
away from his home and in conjunction with a substantial quantity of
drugs relevant to the issue of intent to supply? It is a matter for the
jury to decide whether the presence of money, in all the
circumstances, is indicative of an ongoing trading in the drugs, so that
the presence of the drugs at the time of the arrest is capable of being
construed as possession with intent to supply.
903. It is necessary for the judge to indicate that any explanation for the
money which has been put forward by way of an innocent explanation
by the accused would have to be rejected by the jury before they
could regard the finding of the money as relevant to the offence.
Again the jury should be directed that if there was any possibility of
the money being in the accused’s possession for reasons other than
drug dealing, then the evidence would not be probative. If, on the
other hand, the jury were to come to the conclusion that the presence
of the money indicated not merely past dealing, but an ongoing
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dealing in drugs, then finding the money, together with the drugs in
question, would be a matter which the jury could take into account in
considering whether the necessary intent had been proved.
904. See also Dickson (Appeal Division judgment 6th January 2003). If the
alleged tick list is a part of a book it is desirable perhaps that the
whole book should be before the jury if that is the wish of the
defendant. In Dickson it was argued by the defence that Mr Duggan, a
prosecution expert, should not have been allowed to go as far as he
did in saying that the document was a tick list. The Appeal Division at
paragraph 5 stated:
“First we observe that there was no challenge made as to why he should not give
expert evidence and from the beginning of his evidence it is quite obvious that he
is very well qualified.
Thus, looking at the evidence as a whole we find that in the end result he only
goes as far as saying that this might be a tick list.”
905. In Dickson the Appeal Division also dealt with a submission that the
trial Deemster failed to direct the jury about the significance of and
the use which they could make of the books, the clingfilm, and what
in general is termed paraphernalia. The Appeal Division applied
Kelly.
906. In Pate v R 1981-83 MLR 130 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Hytner and Deemster Luft) held that the trial judge (Deemster Corrin)
had not acted improperly in giving a written note to the jury setting
out the essentials of his direction on provocation since counsel had
seen the note and not objected either to the note being given or its
terms. The Appeal Division indicated that such a practice could be
helpful, particularly after a long summing up, but its value should be
weighed against the attendant dangers and it should never be adopted
unless counsel had an opportunity to object.
907. The Privy Council in Eiley v The Queen [2009] UKPC 39 dealt with
issues in respect of a summing up where a prosecution witness had
been charged with murder and then done a deal with the DPP and was
giving evidence against the defendant.
Duties of advocates
908. In Parton (judgment delivered 30th July 2009) I endeavoured to set
out some of the duties of prosecution and defence counsel. I stated the
following:
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“49. Rule 19(1) of the Advocates Practice Rules 2001 provides that advocates
have an overriding duty to the court to ensure, in the public interest, that the
proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved; they must assist the
court in justice and must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court.
50. Rule 19 (6) of the Advocates Practice Rules 2001 provides that an advocate
must comply with any order of the court which the court can properly make,
requiring the advocate or his firm to take or refrain from taking some particular
course of action; equally an advocate is bound to honour an undertaking given to
any court or tribunal.
51. Rule 21 of the of the Advocates Practice Rules 2001 provides as follows:
“Application of Bar Council and the Law Society Codes
21. Unless there is a conflict with these Rules or with an Isle of Man statute or
decision of the Courts of the Isle of Man in the construction or interpretation of
these practice rules, reference shall be made to the provisions contained in the
Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors of England and Wales and the
Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales and such provisions will be
applicable and shall be followed unless they arise out of some statutory obligation
or duty imposed upon Solicitors or Barristers in England and Wales which does
not apply to advocates.”
52. Section 3 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales relates to
written standards for the conduct of professional work. Section 3 paragraph 10
refers to the responsibilities of prosecuting counsel. Paragraph 10.4(a) provides
that prosecuting counsel should settle an indictment promptly and within due time
and should bear in mind the desirability of not overloading an indictment with
either too many defendants or too many counts, in order to present the prosecution
case as simply and as concisely as possible. Paragraph 10.4(e) provides that
prosecuting counsel should eliminate all unnecessary material in the case so as to
ensure an efficient and fair trial and in particular should consider the need for
particular witnesses and exhibits and draft appropriate admissions for service on
the defence. Paragraph 10.8 concerns the duties of prosecuting counsel in relation
to sentence. Paragraph 10.8(e) provides that prosecuting counsel:
“(e) should draw the attention of the defence to any assertion of material fact
made in mitigation which the prosecution believes to be untrue: if the defence
persist in that assertion, prosecuting counsel should invite the Court to consider
requiring the issue to be determined by the calling of evidence in accordance with
the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Newton (1983) 77 Crim App R 13”.
53. Paragraph 11 refers to the responsibilities of defence counsel and provides as
follows:
“11 Responsibilities of Defence Counsel
11.1 When defending a client on a criminal charge, a barrister must endeavour to
protect his client from conviction except by a competent tribunal and upon legally
admissible evidence sufficient to support a conviction for the offence charged.
11.2 A barrister acting for the defence:
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(a) should satisfy himself, if he is briefed to represent more than one defendant,
that no conflict of interest is likely to arise;
(b) should arrange a conference and if necessary a series of conferences with his
professional and lay clients;
(c) should consider whether any enquiries or further enquiries are necessary and,
if so, should advise in writing as soon as possible;
(d) should consider whether any witnesses for the defence are required and, if so,
which;
(e) should consider whether a Notice of Alibi is required and, if so, should draft
an appropriate notice;
(f) should consider whether it would be appropriate to call expert evidence for the
defence and, if so, have regard to the rules of the Crown Court in relation to
notifying the prosecution of the contents of the evidence to be given;
(g) should ensure that he has sufficient instructions for the purpose of deciding
which prosecution witnesses should be cross-examined, and should then ensure
that no other witnesses remain fully bound at the request of the defendant and
request his professional client to inform the Crown Prosecution Service of those
who can be conditionally bound;
(h) should consider whether any admissions can be made with a view to saving
time and expense at trial, with the aim of admitting as much evidence as can
properly be admitted in accordance with the barrister's duty to his client;
(i) should consider what admissions can properly be requested from the
prosecution;
(j) should decide what exhibits, if any, which have not been or cannot be copied
he wishes to examine, and should ensure that appropriate arrangements are made
to examine them as promptly as possible so that there is no undue delay in the
trial.
(k) should as to anything which he is instructed to submit in mitigation which
casts aspersions on the conduct or character of a victim or witness in the case,
notify the prosecution in advance so as to give prosecuting Counsel sufficient
opportunity to consider his position under paragraph 10.8(e).
11.3 A barrister acting for a defendant should advise his lay client generally about
his plea. In doing so he may, if necessary, express his advice in strong terms. He
must, however, make it clear that the client has complete freedom of choice and
that the responsibility for the plea is the client's.
11.4 A barrister acting for a defendant should advise his client as to whether or
not to give evidence in his own defence but the decision must be taken by the
client himself.
11.5
11.5.1 Where a defendant tells his counsel that he did not commit the offence with
which he is charged but nevertheless insists on pleading guilty to it for reasons of
his own, counsel should:
(a) advise the defendant that, if he is not guilty, he should plead not guilty but that
the decision is one for the defendant; counsel must continue to represent him but
only after he has advised what the consequences will be and that what can be
submitted in mitigation can only be on the basis that the client is guilty.
(b) explore with the defendant why he wishes to plead guilty to a charge which he
says he did not commit and whether any steps could be taken which would enable
him to enter a plea of not guilty in accordance with his profession of innocence.
11.5.2 If the client maintains his wish to plead guilty, he should be further
advised:
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(a) what the consequences will be, in particular in gaining or adding to a criminal
record and that it is unlikely that a conviction based on such a plea would be
overturned on appeal;
(b) that what can be submitted on his behalf in mitigation can only be on the basis
that he is guilty and will otherwise be strictly limited so that, for instance, counsel
will not be able to assert that the defendant has shown remorse through his guilty
plea.
11.5.3 If, following all of the above advice, the defendant persists in his decision
to plead guilty
(a) counsel may continue to represent him if he is satisfied that it is proper to do
so;
(b) before a plea of guilty is entered counsel or a representative of his professional
client who is present should record in writing the reasons for the plea;
(c) the defendant should be invited to endorse a declaration that he has given
unequivocal instructions of his own free will that he intends to plead guilty even
though he maintains that he did not commit the offence(s) and that he understands
the advice given by counsel and in particular the restrictions placed on counsel in
mitigating and the consequences to himself; the defendant should also be advised
that he is under no obligation to sign; and
(d) if no such declaration is signed, counsel should make a contemporaneous note
of his advice.”
54. Paragraph 12 refers to confessions of guilt:
“12 Confessions of Guilt
12.1 In considering the duty of counsel retained to defend a person charged with
an offence who confesses to his counsel that he did commit the offence charged, it
is essential to bear the following points clearly in mind:
(a) that every punishable crime is a breach of common or statute law committed
by a person of sound mind and understanding;
(b) that the issue in a criminal trial is always whether the defendant is guilty of the
offence charged, never whether he is innocent;
(c) that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution.
12.2 It follows that the mere fact that a person charged with a crime has confessed
to his counsel that he did commit the offence charged is no bar to that barrister
appearing or continuing to appear in his defence, nor indeed does such a
confession release the barrister from his imperative duty to do all that he
honourably can for his client.
12.3 Such a confession, however, imposes very strict limitations on the conduct of
the defence. A barrister must not assert as true that which he knows to be false.
He must not connive at, much less attempt to substantiate, a fraud.
12.4 While, therefore, it would be right to take any objections to the competency
of the Court, to the form of the indictment, to the admissibility of any evidence or
to the evidence admitted, it would be wrong to suggest that some other person had
committed the offence charged, or to call any evidence which the barrister must
know to be false having regard to the confession, such, for instance, as evidence
in support of an alibi. In other words, a barrister must not (whether by calling the
defendant or otherwise) set up an affirmative case inconsistent with the
confession made to him.
12.5 A more difficult question is within what limits may counsel attack the
evidence for the prosecution either by cross-examination or in his speech to the
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tribunal charged with the decision of the facts. No clearer rule can be laid down
than this, that he is entitled to test the evidence given by each individual witness
and to argue that the evidence taken as a whole is insufficient to amount to proof
that the defendant is guilty of the offence charged. Further than this he ought not
to go.
12.6 The foregoing is based on the assumption that the defendant has made a clear
confession that he did commit the offence charged, and does not profess to deal
with the very difficult questions which may present themselves to a barrister when
a series of inconsistent statements are made to him by the defendant before or
during the proceedings; nor does it deal with the questions which may arise where
statements are made by the defendant which point almost irresistibly to the
conclusion that the defendant is guilty but do not amount to a clear confession.
Statements of this kind may inhibit the defence, but questions arising on them can
only be answered after careful consideration of the actual circumstances of the
particular case”.
55. Paragraph 13.1 provides as follows:
“13.1 Both prosecuting and defence counsel:
(a) should ensure that the listing officer receives in good time their best estimate
of the likely length of the trial (including whether or not there is to be a plea of
guilty) and should ensure that the listing officer is given early notice of any
change of such estimate or possible adjournment;
(b) should take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure that the case is
properly prepared and ready for trial by the time that it is first listed;
(c) should ensure that arrangements have been made in adequate time for
witnesses to attend Court as and when required and should plan, so far as
possible, for sufficient witnesses to be available to occupy the full Court day;
(d) should, if a witness (for example a doctor) can only attend Court at a certain
time during the trial without great inconvenience to himself, try to arrange for that
witness to be accommodated by raising the matter with the trial Judge and with
his opponent;
(e) should take all necessary steps to comply with the Practice Direction (Crime:
Tape Recording of Police Interviews) [1989] 1 WLR 631.”
909. Timely preparation is important for advocates and for judges. Know
the law, know the rules of evidence, know the procedure and know
the case. Be prepared. Anticipate the issues that may be raised.
Consider the admissibility of the evidence. Consider fairness to the
prosecution and fairness to the defence. The court endeavours to fairly
balance all the various interests. Be conscious of the strain and stress
that the criminal justice system places on all of those who come into
contact with it. Use your common sense and retain a sense of
perspective. Good professional work whether for the prosecution or
the defence can be hugely satisfying and rewarding. We all make
mistakes from time to time. The important thing is to learn from them
, to move on and to reduce the risk of the same mistakes happening
again in the future.
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910. When raising an issue advocates should assist the court by explaining
clearly what the issue or application is, exactly what order or direction
they are requesting and bringing to the court’s attention the relevant
statutory provisions and caselaw. Advocates should not endeavour to
spring surprises at the last minute on their opposite number or on the
court. Surprises run the risk of causing adjournments or other
injustices. Reduce surprises and you reduce the risk of injustice and
the risk of judicial criticism. Moreover you reduce the risk of not
acting in the best interests of your client.
911. The Chief Justice of Hong Kong, Andrew Kwok-Nang Li, on the 12th
May 2007 at the ceremony for admission of senior counsel stated:
“It must be strongly emphasised that the advocate plays a pivotal role in our
courts. The administration of justice depends to a large extent on the confidence
which judges at all levels of court could repose in the competence and integrity of
the advocates appearing before them. Whilst fearless in advancing their client’s
cause, advocates must discharge in full their duties to the court. Judges expect and
have a right to expect that submissions made by advocates relating to law and the
evidence are well considered and are justified by the authorities and the evidence.
The conduct of counsel, particularly Senior Counsel, should leave no room for
any doubt that their duties to the court have been fully discharged.”
912. Advocates should advise clients and not simply act on instructions as
the client’s mouth piece. Counsel should not make hopeless points or
applications or ask improper questions or raise inappropriate issues
simply because the client has instructed them to do so. District Judge
Peter Glover (SJ 20.07.07 at page 938) stated:
“A good advocate at any level will not slavishly follow his instructions.”
913. In Hobson [1998] 1 Cr App R 32 at 35 it was stated:
“Because a client wishes a particular question to be asked, point to be made or
witness to be called it does not follow that the question must be asked, the point
made or the witness called.”
914. Counsel do not act as a mere mouthpiece for the client. Advocates are
professionals and officers of the court. They are there to advise the
client and on some occasions that advice must be firm and robust. In
R v Ulcay and Toygun [2007] EWCA Crim 2379 the English Court of
Appeal made the following important points:
“27. The correct meaning of the phrase “acting on instructions”, as it applies to
the professional responsibility of the advocate in any criminal court, is sometimes
misunderstood, even by counsel. Neither the client, nor if the advocate is a
barrister, his instructing solicitor, is entitled to direct counsel how the case should
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be conducted. The advocate is not a tinkling echo, or mouthpiece, spouting
whatever his client “instructs” him to say. In the forensic process the client’s
“instructions” encompass whatever the client facing a criminal charge asserts to
be the truth about the facts which bring him or her before the court. Those
instructions represent the client’s case, and that is the case which the advocate
should advance. In practical terms, that will often mean that prosecution witnesses
will be cross-examined on the basis that they are lying or mistaken, or have
misunderstand or misinterpreted something said or done by the defendant;
however there is almost always some evidence advanced by the prosecution
which, on the basis of the client’s instructions, is not in truth in issue at all, either
directly, or indirectly. Some decisions, of course, must be made not by the
advocate, but by the defendant personally, for example, and pre-eminently, the
plea itself, and in the course of the trial, the decision whether or not to give
evidence. The advocate must give his best professional advice, leaving the
ultimate decision to the client. It is however always improper for the advocate to
seek to challenge evidence which is accepted to be true on the basis of the facts
agreed or described by the client, merely because the lay-client, or the
professional client, wishes him to do so. He may not accept nor act on such
instructions.”
915. See also McVey (Court of General Gaol Delivery judgment 30th
October 2009). In a civil context see the judgment in Pilling v
Department of Local Government and the Environment 1996-98 MLR
293. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and Acting
Deemster Sauvain) at page 311 stated:
“ … it is nevertheless essential that advocates do not permit their own judgment to
be clouded or eroded by client pressure… Of course, advocates must be fearless
in pursuit of the client’s case. The fact that a judge is not immediately receptive to
an argument does not necessarily mean that it lacks merit, and if an advocate
believes it to be arguable he or she is not only entitled, but has a duty to the client
to pursue it with vigour. Where, however, the advocate knows that the point lacks
merit, it is an abuse of the process of the court to pursue it simply to please the
client and alleviate pressures emanating from him or her.”
916. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner) in Clucas v Clucas
1981-83 MLR 5 at pages 15-16 stated:
“… advocates should always stand up to judges and it is their duty to do so…
This is the strength of having an independent Bar or an independent advocate; the
liberty of the subject depends upon a strong and independent-minded advocate,
when it is his duty to do so, standing up to a judge, and embarrassment should not
prevent him from so doing.”
917. The following are informative extracts from The Kalisher Lecture
2009 Developments in Crown Court Advocacy (6th October 2009)
delivered by Lord Chief Justice Judge:
“An observation I make based on the number of times when the advocate in my
court wishes to take instructions on a matter which in my view is entirely within
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the advocate’s professional judgment, and based also on anecdote - I wonder
whether there is in some advocates a misunderstanding of what is meant by taking
the client’s instructions. The client’s instructions are what he tells you the facts
are, and on which you therefore present his defence. The client cannot instruct the
advocate how to advance or conduct his case. The advocate is not the client’s
mouthpiece. When he allows himself to become the mere mouthpiece of those
who are instructing him, whether for the prosecution or the defence, he is no
longer acting as a professional advocate …
There is a fundamental premise to which the entirety of Michael Kalisher’s life
was dedicated: the administration of justice in the Crown Court depends on the
quality of the advocacy deployed on each side. The jury will do its conscientious
best. The judge will make the decisions and give the directions believed by him to
be appropriate. But the analysis of each sides’s case, and all the evidence, and its
importance to the case, so as to enable both judge and jury to exercise their own
responsibilities, depends on high quality advocacy. And we are not discussing
some disembodied theory. This is the day to day stuff of reailty. It is in the public
interest that the guilty should be convicted: it is in the public interest, as well as
the interest of the innocent defendant, that he should be acquitted. For a truly
innocent defendant, to be convicted is a disaster. These disasters happen even in
the best run trials with the best quality advocacy. Poor quality advocacy by either
side simply increases the prospects of the guilty being acquitted, or the innocent
being convicted. In the process of adversarial trial before a jury it really is as stark
and simple as that.”
918. In Hobson [1998] 1 Cr App R 32 at 35 it was indicated that simply
because a client wishes a particular question to be asked or a
particular witness to be called it does not follow that the question
must be asked or the witness called.
919. In R v Glover, Glover and Priestnal (Court of General Gaol Delivery
judgment delivered 25th August 2006) I referred to the duties of
advocates as follows:
“66. In R v C 2003-05 MLR N16 I endeavoured in general terms to outline the
duties of advocates to the court. MTM (Tax Consultants) Limited v Jones and
Morris (CLA 2001/103 judgment 16th February 2006) at paragraphs 88-101
outlined the duties of advocates in respect of the discovery process. Advocates, in
civil and criminal matters, have an overriding duty to the court. Rule 19(1) of the
Advocates’ Practice Rules 2001 provides that:
“Advocates have an overriding duty to the Court to ensure, in the public
interest, that the proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved; they
must assist the Court in justice and must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly
mislead the Court”.
67. Advocates have a duty not to waste time and money and to bring a case to
hearing as quickly as possible (in the civil context see Brennan v Brighton BC
The Times 24th July 1996, and Blyth Valley BC v Henderson (1996) PIQR 64).
English solicitors have been held to have a duty to give reasonable estimates of
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the length of hearings and may be held responsible for costs where adjournments
are caused by non-compliance with that duty (Ibbs v Holloway Bros pty Ltd
[1952] 1 All ER 220). Advocates should take reasonable and timely steps to
ensure that adjournments are not unnecessarily brought about.
68. Moreover counsel should not assume that the amount of time available for
a trial is indefinite. When trial dates are set counsel should ensure that the
availability of all concerned in the case has been carefully checked. Commitments
in other cases will be considered but it should not be assumed that simply because
counsel or witnesses may want to take holidays or be off island on courses or
conferences that such commitments can be accommodated. Court commitments
must take priority if cases are to proceed without undue delay. I should also add
that I can see no reason why defendants should not be expected to enter pleas at
their first appearance at the Court of General Gaol Delivery. Prior to the matter
being listed at the Court of General Gaol Delivery the defendant since arrest and
committal would have had ample time to consider his position. The norm
therefore should be to expect pleas at the first appearance in the Court of General
Gaol Delivery. Let all defendants and defence counsel be aware of that. There are
far too many unnecessary applications for adjournments. Moreover late guilty
pleas may not attract as significant a sentencing discount as early guilty pleas. If a
defendant is guilty the sooner a guilty plea is entered the better for all concerned.
69. It is well established that as part of his responsibility for the management
of a trial a Deemster is expected to control the timetable and is entitled to direct
that the trial ought to be concluded by a specific date. If need be limitations have
to be placed on the time witnesses are to spend in the witness box. Counsel should
concentrate on the main issues. Evidence not in real dispute should be agreed and
sensible concessions made on both sides. No one should assume that trials will be
permitted to take as long or use up as much time as either or both sides might
wish, or think, or assert they need. Time is not unlimited. The entitlement to a fair
trial is not inconsistent with proper judicial control of time. Time is often wasted
by unnecessary applications for adjournments. This case is an unfortunate
example of that.”…
“120. The vacation of trial dates is a serious step to take. It wastes a great deal of
court time and resources and it is a great inconvenience to the court, to the
prosecution, to the defence, to the witnesses, to the jury and to other court users. It
wastes time, valuable resources and costs. It delays justice. It has an impact on
other cases awaiting trial. It impedes an efficient use of valuable judicial time. It
should be avoided. The risk of vacation of trial dates can be significantly reduced
if all counsel focus on the issues in the case at an early stage and ensure that early
preparation in connection with the case is undertaken and not left until the last
moment and that the availability of important witnesses is not overlooked.
121. Advocates should not treat court orders including case management
directions as simply pieces of papers which can be ignored or compliance with
them delayed to suit their convenience. Orders and directions in respect of
contested trials or sentencing hearings should be strictly complied with. Serious
consequences can follow if they are not. The efficient and fair administration of
justice depends on advocates and the parties complying strictly with court orders.
Everyone concerned with the trial process, the prosecution, the defence and all
advocates involved in a case should ensure that court orders including case
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management directions are strictly complied with on a timely basis and that the
case is ready for hearing and proceeds accordingly. Late preparation and late
applications are to be discouraged. They involve delay. They waste time and costs
and they cause inconvenience. There are few reasonable excuses for late
preparation. It is not reasonable to say I did not comply with the court order
because I was too busy or I was only a few days late or other matters took
priority. Compliance with court orders should take priority. If advocates are too
busy and cannot devote sufficient time to existing matters then they should
arrange for additional resources and support or refuse to take on new instructions.
Preparation for a hearing should commence at an early date rather than at a late
date. Proper time and attention should be given to every case. Leaving preparation
until a couple of days or a couple of weeks before trial invites disaster together
with judicial criticism and adverse costs orders or other penalties.”
920. See R v C 2003-05 MLR N16 and the full judgment in respect of
duties of advocates generally. See also English Law Society guidance
entitled Withdrawing from a criminal case.
921. Rule 21 of the Advocates Practice Rules 2001 unless there is a
conflict with the Rules or an Isle of Man statute or decision of the
Courts of the Isle of Man in the construction or interpretation of the
practice rules reference shall be made to the provisions contained in
the Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors of England and
Wales and the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales and
such provisions will be applicable and shall be followed unless they
arise out of some statutory obligation or duty imposed upon solicitors
or barristers in England and Wales which does not apply to advocates.
922. See also English Bar Code of Conduct :
“Conduct in Court
708 A barrister when conducting proceedings in Court:
(a) is personally responsible for the conduct and presentation of his case and must
exercise personal judgment upon the substance and purpose of statements
made and questions asked;
(b) must not unless invited to do so by the Court or when appearing before a
tribunal where it is his duty to do so assert a personal opinion of the facts or
the law;
(c) must ensure that the Court is informed of all relevant decisions and legislative
provisions of which he is aware whether the effect is favourable or
unfavourable towards the contention for which he argues;
(d) must bring any procedural irregularity to the attention of the Court during the
hearing and not reserve such matter to be raised on appeal;
(e) must not adduce evidence obtained otherwise than from or through the client
or devise facts which will assist in advancing the lay client’s case;
(f) must not make a submissions which he does not consider to be properly
arguable;
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(g) must not make a submission which he does not consider to be properly
arguable;
(h) must not make statements or ask questions which are merely scandalous or
intended or calculated only to vilify insult or annoy either a witness or some
other person;
(i) must if possible avoid the naming in open Court of third parties whose
character would thereby be impugned;
(j) must not by assertion in a speech impugn a witness whom he has had an
opportunity to cross-examine unless in cross-examination he has given the
witness an opportunity to answer the allegation;
(k) must not suggest that a victim, witness or other person is guilty of crime, fraud
or misconduct or make any defamatory aspersion on the conduct of any other
person or attribute to another person the crime or conduct of which his lay
client is accused unless such allegations go to a matter in issue (including the
credibility of the witness) which is material to the lay client’s case and appear
to him to be supported by reasonable grounds.”
923. Lord Steyn in The Role of the Bar, the Judge and the Jury PL 1999,
SPR, 51-63 at page 57 stated:
“Skilled advocates
The administration of justice is crucially dependent on competent and well
prepared advocates. Sir Owen Dixon memorably summarized the duty of counsel.
He said :
To be a good lawyer is difficult. To master the law is impossible. But I should
have thought that the first rule of conduct for counsel, the first and paramount
ethical rule, was to do his best to acquire such a knowledge of the law that he
really knows what he is doing when he stands between his client and the court …
That duty counsel owes to his client and to the court. In a criminal case a trial
judge is entitled to well prepared submissions from both counsel for the
prosecution and defence. In some quarters of the Bar it is apparently still thought
acceptable for defence counsel to adopt the strategy of saying “let us leave it to
the judge, if he errs we have a ground of appeal”. In my view that is unacceptable
conduct. For my part there is a general duty not only on counsel for the
prosecution but also on defence counsel to raise any pertinent issues of
substantive law or procedure with the trial judge in the absence of the jury so that,
if possible, justice in accordance with law can be done at the trial. The only
exception I would make is the rare case where counsel for the defence reasonably
feels that the judge has by his unfair conduct of the trial and summing up made
such an intervention unrealistic. In any event, the general moral is: do not expect
sympathy at appellate level about clear errors in a summing up which could have
been corrected at a trial.”
924. Counsel should ensure at all times that they respect the rule of law
and do not fall foul of the law. Lord Carswell at paragraph 28 DP v
Hurnam (Privy Council judgment delivered 25th April 2007), a case
involving a barrister practising in Mauritius conspiring to do an
unlawful act, stated:
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“… it is vital that the standards of probity of practitioners in the criminal courts
should be maintained.”
925. Lawyers must be capable of being trusted to the ends of the earth
(Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 at 518-519).
926. Advocates when arguing points of law should ensure that the relevant
law is referred to and not just rely on extracts from textbooks. In
Scambler (Appeal Division judgment delivered on the 12th January
2004) the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Doyle) in the context of an appeal against conviction stated:
“7. Further, as to the power to set aside a conviction on the ground that the
conviction was unsafe or unsatisfactory, Mrs Jones, who appeared on behalf of
the Appellant at the trial and before this court, reminded us of dicta of Widgery L
J when giving the judgment of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R v
Cooper [1969] 1 QB 267, at 271, when he stated:
‘That means that in cases of this kind the Court must in the end ask itself a
subjective question, whether we are content to let the matter stand as it is, or
whether there is not some lurking doubt in our minds which makes us wonder
whether an injustice has been done. This is a reaction which may not be based
strictly on the evidence as such: it is a reaction which can be produced by the
general feel of the case as the Court experiences it’
8. Whilst in our judgment such dicta are uncontroversial, we cannot overstress
that, such dicta notwithstanding, it is the duty of those representing an appellant to
clearly identify what matters are relied upon by the appellant as supporting his
contention that his appeal against conviction should be allowed. This is
particularly important in a case such as this where the court is supplied with a
complete transcript of the trial. Furthermore it is incumbent on those representing
an appellant to cite, and produce copies of, all authorities relied upon and to
identify what propositions of law are to be relied upon from such authorities. It is
insufficient merely to refer to large sections of Archbold, helpful though Archbold
may be to set the scene for such submissions.”
927. In respect of the citation of authorities generally see the Practice Note
at [2001] 2 All ER 510. See also R v Erskine and Williams [2009]
EWCA Crim 1425 reported by the Times on the 22nd July 2009 under
the headline Excessive citation of decisions in criminal appeals must
cease.
928. As to the width of the decision of the prosecution authorities to
prosecute and the duty not to succumb to improper pressure to
discontinue a prosecution see R v Director of the Serious Fraud Office
and BAE Systems PLC [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). The House of
Lords subsequently allowed an appeal against the decision of the
409
Queen’s Bench Divisional Court. Their opinions are reported at
[2008] UKHL 60. Lord Bingham stated:
“1. The issue in this appeal is whether a decision made by the appellant, the
Director of the Serious Fraud Office, on 14 December 2006, to discontinue a
criminal investigation was unlawful…
The main issue
30. It is common ground in these proceedings that the Director is a public official
appointed by the Crown but independent of it. He is entrusted by Parliament with
discretionary powers to investigate suspected offences which reasonably appear to
him to involve serious or complex fraud and to prosecute in such cases. These are
powers given to him by Parliament as head of an independent, professional
service who is subject only to the superintendence of the Attorney General. There
is an obvious analogy with the position of the Director of Public Prosecutions. It
is accepted that the decisions of the Director are not immune from review by the
courts, but authority makes plain that only in highly exceptional cases will the
court disturb the decisions of an independent prosecutor and investigator…
31. The reasons why the courts are very slow to interfere are well understood.
They are, first, that the powers in question are entrusted to the officers identified,
and to no one else. No other authority may exercise these powers or make the
judgments on which such exercise must depend. Secondly, the courts have
recognised (as it was described in the cited passage of Matalulu)
“the polycentric character of official decision-making in such matters including
policy and public interest considerations which are not susceptible of judicial
review because it is within neither the constitutional function nor the practical
competence of the courts to assess their merits”
Thirdly, the powers are conferred in very broad and unprescriptive terms.
32. Of course, and this again is uncontroversial, the discretions conferred on the
Director are not unfettered. He must seek to exercise his powers so as to promote
the statutory purpose for which he is given them. He must direct himself correctly
in law. He must act lawfully. He must do his best to exercise an objective
judgment on the relevant material available to him. He must exercise his powers
in good faith, uninfluenced by any ulterior motive, predilection or prejudice. In
the present case, the claimants have not sought to impugn the Director’s good
faith and honesty in any way.
33. The first duty of the Director is, in appropriate cases, to investigate and
prosecute…
36. The Divisional Court was right to hold that a person subject to the jurisdiction
of the court who sought to impede an SFO investigation would be at risk of
prosecution for attempting to pervert the course of justice, and also right to hold
that the Saudis were not subject to the court’s jurisdiction. But there is little
assistance to be gained in resolving the present problem from the authority which
the Divisional Court cited …
38. The Divisional Court held (para 68) that “No revolutionary principle needs to
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be created ... we can deploy well-settled principles of public law”. But in para 99
of its judgment the court did lay down a principle which, if not revolutionary, was
novel and unsupported by authority:
“The principle we have identified is that submission to a threat is lawful only
when it is demonstrated to a court that there was no alternative course open to the
decision-maker …
41. The Director was confronted by an ugly and obviously unwelcome threat. He
had to decide what, if anything, he should do. He did not surrender his
discretionary power of decision to any third party, although he did consult the
most expert source available to him in the person of the Ambassador and he did,
as he was entitled if not bound to do, consult the Attorney General who, however,
properly left the decision to him. The issue in these proceedings is not whether his
decision was right or wrong, nor whether the Divisional Court or the House
agrees with it, but whether it was a decision which the Director was lawfully
entitled to make. Such an approach involves no affront to the rule of law, to which
the principles of judicial review give effect (see R (Alconbury Developments Ltd)
v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001]
UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295, para 73, per Lord Hoffmann).
42. In the opinion of the House the Director’s decision was one he was lawfully
entitled to make. It may indeed be doubted whether a responsible decision-maker
could, on the facts before the Director, have decided otherwise.”
929. Lady Hale stated:
“52. I confess that I would have liked to be able to uphold the decision (if not
every aspect of the reasoning) of the Divisional Court. It is extremely distasteful
that an independent public official should feel himself obliged to give way to
threats of any sort. The Director clearly felt the same for he resisted the extreme
pressure under which he was put for as long as he could. The great British public
may still believe that it was the risk to British commercial interests which caused
him to give way, but the evidence is quite clear that this was not so. He only gave
way when he was convinced that the threat of withdrawal of Saudi security co-
operation was real and that the consequences would be an equally real risk to
“British lives on British streets”. The only question is whether it was lawful for
him to take this into account.
53. Put like that, it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that it was
indeed lawful for him to take this into account. But it is not quite as simple as
that. It is common ground that it would not have been lawful for him to take
account of threats of harm to himself, threats of the “we know where you live”
variety. That sort of threat would have been an irrelevant consideration. So what
makes this sort of threat different? Why should the Director be obliged to ignore
threats to his own personal safety (and presumably that of his family) but entitled
to take into account threats to the safety of others? The answer must lie in a
distinction between the personal and the public interest. The “public interest” is
often invoked but not susceptible of precise definition. But it must mean
something of importance to the public as a whole rather than just to a private
individual. The withdrawal of Saudi security cooperation would indeed have
consequences of importance for the public as a whole. I am more impressed by
the real threat to “British lives on British streets” than I am by unspecified
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references to national security or the national interest. “National security” in the
sense of a threat to the safety of the nation as a nation state was not in issue here.
Public safety was.
54. I also agree that the Director was entitled to rely upon the judgment of others
as to the existence of such a risk. There are many other factors in a prosecutor’s
exercise of discretion upon which he may have to rely on the advice of others.
Medical evidence of the effect of a prosecution upon a potential accused is an
obvious example. Of course, he is entitled, even obliged, to probe that evidence or
advice, to require to be convinced of its accuracy or weight. But in the end there
are some things upon which others are more expert than he could ever be. In the
end there are also some things which he cannot do. He is not in a position to try to
dissuade the Saudis from carrying out their threat. Eventually, he has to rely on
the assurances of others that despite their best endeavours the threats are real and
the risks are real.
55. I am therefore driven to the conclusion that he was entitled to take these things
into account. I do not however accept that this was the only decision he could
have made. He had to weigh the seriousness of the risk, in every sense, against the
other public interest considerations. These include the importance of upholding
the rule of law and the principle that no-one, including powerful British
companies who do business for powerful foreign countries, is above the law. It is
perhaps worth remembering that it was BAE Systems, or people in BAE Systems,
who were the target of the investigation and of any eventual prosecution and not
anyone in Saudi Arabia. The Director carried on with the investigation despite
their earnest attempts to dissuade him. He clearly had the countervailing factors
very much in mind throughout, as did the Attorney General. A lesser person
might have taken the easy way out and agreed with the Attorney General that it
would be difficult on the evidence to prove every element of the offence. But he
did not.
56. As to whether the safety of British lives on British streets is a prohibited
consideration under article 5 of the OECD Convention, we do not need to express
a view. Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman and Benjamim Billa of Yale Law School
make a powerful case that there is no implicit exception for “national security”
under the OECD Convention (“Treaties and National Security Exceptions”, Yale
Law School, 2007). But the Director has made it clear that he would have reached
the same conclusion in any event and as a matter of domestic law he was entitled
to do so.
57. For these reasons, although I would wish that the world were a better place
where honest and conscientious public servants were not put in impossible
situations such as this, I agree that his decision was lawful and this appeal must be
allowed.”
930. In Huggins (Privy Council judgment delivered 9th June 2008)
comments were made in respect of the duties of prosecution counsel
as follows:
“18. After the defence counsel had addressed the jury, prosecuting counsel Mr
Rajbansie (who in accordance with the practice in Trinidad and Tobago had the
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last word) closed the prosecution case to the jury in regrettably vigorous and
hyperbolic terms. At the close of his address defence counsel presented a number
of complaints about its content. These were repeated and amplified by counsel for
the appellants before the Board, and may be summarised under several heads:
• attacking the character of the defendants;
• making disparaging and belittling remarks about witnesses and counsel;
• accusing one counsel of being party to concocting his client’s case and coaching
him in his evidence;
• misrepresenting the defence case and parts of the evidence in material respects;
• personally vouching for the correctness of the prosecution case and telling the
jury of the importance of convicting the defendants.
…
27. It was not in dispute in the argument presented to the Board that the function
of prosecuting counsel is to act as a minister of justice, concerned with the
fairness of the trial as well as presentation of his case, and that he should not act
merely as an advocate striving to secure a result for a client. He should bear in
mind in doing so the dignity, seriousness and justness of judicial proceedings:
Boucher v The Queen (1954) 111 Can CC 263, 270, per Rand J. The underlying
reason is to ensure that the defendant is fairly tried, which constitutes an
overriding requirement: Randall v The Queen [2002] UKPC 19, [2002] 1 WLR
2237, 2241, para 10, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
28. The proper approach of an appellate court to complaints of conduct conducing
to unfairness of the trial is well exemplified by Randall v The Queen ...
29. Some assistance may be obtained from a brief consideration of examples of
other cases where the Board has allowed appeals on this ground. In Mohamed v
The State [1999] 1 WLR 552, prosecuting counsel had made a closing speech
when he was not entitled to do so, had repeatedly urged the jury to convict and
had informed them of his view that the defendant was plainly guilty. He made
emotional appeals for sympathy for the deceased and his family and filled his
speech with inflammatory passages. The Board regarded the speech as “wholly
improper” (page 564, per Lord Steyn). Counsel had failed to show proper
detachment and the judge made only “perfunctory” attempts to restrain him. The
Board came to the conclusion, reversing the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and
Tobago, that they could not be satisfied that the jury would inevitably have found
the appellant guilty if the misconduct had not occurred, and so they could not
apply the proviso and uphold the conviction…
32. As appears from the judgments in the cases just cited, their Lordships strongly
deplore behaviour of this nature by prosecuting counsel. They should observe
proper standards of decorum and courtesy in their conduct of the case, their
treatment of the witnesses and the presentation of their addresses to the jury, as
should all counsel in a trial. They should take care not to misrepresent the
evidence given on either side or the case being made on behalf of the defence.
They are of course entitled to make out as effectively as they can the prosecution
case against the defendant, that he is guilty of the crime charged, for that is their
proper function in an adversarial system. They have to be careful, however, not
to allow vigour in presentation of the prosecution case to trespass into the area of
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unfairness by indulging in the type of behaviour exemplified by the cases which
their Lordships have cited. Regrettably prosecuting counsel in the present case
overstepped the mark on a number of occasions, and it would have been
preferable if the judge had pulled him up earlier and made it clear that such
behaviour was unacceptable. The issue is whether his departure from propriety
was of such a nature as to deprive the appellants of a fair trial.
33. Following the complaints from defence counsel, the judge wisely took the
opportunity to correct the misstatements of prosecuting counsel about a number of
matters, in particular concerning the case being made by the defendants. She also
warned the jury to disregard his remarks about the importance of a conviction.
This was done in a separate segment of the trial, so that it had maximum impact
and it could not become submerged in the content of a long and detailed
summing-up. The Court of Appeal took the view, rightly in their Lordships’
opinion, that the corrective statement by the judge removed a good deal of the
potential unfairness.
34. The Court of Appeal were prepared to accept the tone and content of Mr
Rajbansie’s remarks to which their Lordships have earlier referred. They
described him as “somewhat high spirited in his address” and overplaying the
dramatics, but considered that the judge had taken adequate steps to correct any
major errors. Their Lordships feel more doubtful about the impact of counsel’s
more extreme comments, which the judge did not specifically mention in her
corrective directions, though she did warn them to decide the case only on the
evidence and to set aside their emotions in coming to a decision. They are
influenced by the fact that the Court of Appeal, with their knowledge of local
conditions and culture, were of opinion that those remarks would not in influence
a jury in Trinidad to an extent which would make a trial unfair. Applying the
standard in Randall v The Queen, their Lordships have concluded that counsel’s
departure from good practice, although very reprehensible, falls short of being so
gross, persistent or prejudicial as to require them to condemn the trial as unfair.
The convictions accordingly should not be regarded as unsafe on this ground.”
931. In Chief Constable v Matthews (judgment 12th November 2009)
Deputy High Bailiff Montgomerie dealt with an application for costs
and the relevance of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The judgment
contains useful references to the duties of the prosecution in criminal
cases.
932. In Eiley v The Queen [2009] UKPC 39 (a case where the defendant
was convicted of murder in San Pedro a small fishing town on an
island off the coast of Belize) the Privy Council referred to the
difficulties which could arise if prosecution counsel lacked
experience. Lord Phillips stated:
“35. Prosecuting counsel left to a deputy the task of making the closing address
of the prosecution to the jury. As he told the jury, he had only completed his law
studies a year before. His enthusiasm was in inverse proportion to his experience.
Unhappily, much of his address was inappropriate, calling on occasion for
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intervention from the bench. It cannot have afforded the jury the assistance that
they could reasonably expect from the prosecution.”
933. See Burzala v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 67 in respect of the duties
of counsel in the conduct of the case for the defence.
934. See also Smith (Privy Council judgment delivered 23rd June 2008) at
paragraph 19 prosecuting counsel “owe a duty to behave as ministers of
justice rather than partisans seeking to achieve a conviction by any means
possible.” See also Libke v The Queen [2007] HCA 30 (20th June 2007
High Court of Australia).
935. Phillips LCJ and Latham L J in the Court of Appeal Criminal
Division Review of the Legal Year 2007/2008 at paragraph 10.3:
“Counsel are reminded that they should only settle (and indeed persist with)
grounds [of appeal] which they consider reasonable, have some real prospect of
success and are prepared to argue them before the Court. Grounds should not be
settled that cannot be supported merely because of a client’s instruction to do so,
as not only does this create a false hope for applicants but also burdens the Court
with unnecessary work.”
Difficult cases for counsel
936. The courts and informed members of the community appreciate that
counsel in criminal cases are frequently faced with difficult issues and
that much stress and tension is generated in court proceedings. It is no
exaggeration to state that without counsel of integrity and competence
the administration of justice on this Island would suffer. We should all
appreciate the work done by counsel especially in the difficult cases
of which there are many. Counsel frequently have to undertake
difficult cases involving difficult issues and difficult clients. It is
however important that in such cases counsel should ensure that they
comply with their professional duties and assist the court. It is equally
important that the courts and community recognise the difficulties
which counsel face when dealing with certain cases.
937. The English Lord Chief Justice in Fraser Marr Court of Appeal June
13th 1989 (1990) 90 Cr App R 154 at page 156 stated:
“No one could doubt that if the allegations made by the prosecution were true,
this was a singularly unattractive crime, earning the offender no thought of
sympathy.
Likewise the nature of the defence was, to say the very least, most unimpressive.
It is however an inherent principle of our system of trial that however distasteful
the offence, however repulsive the defendant, however laughable his defence, he
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is nevertheless entitled to have his case fairly presented to the jury both by
counsel and by the judge. Indeed it is probably true to say that it is just in those
cases where the cards seem to be stacked most heavily against the defendant that
the judge should be most scrupulous to ensure that nothing untoward takes place
which might exacerbate the defendant’s difficulties.”
938. Sedley J in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Moon 1995 Admin Law Report 477 at 485 stated:
“… it is precisely the unpopular applicant for whom the safeguards of due process
are most relevant in a society which acknowledges the rule of law.”
939. Kirby J in a powerful dissent in Carr v The State of Western Australia
[2007] HCA 47 (23 October 2007) stated (footnotes omitted):
“101. If a person who has committed a serious crime makes admissions
consistent with his involvement in that crime, and those admissions are
accurately recorded, why should the law be concerned to reconsider his
conviction? Above all, why should it contemplate an order acquitting such
a person of a crime when his guilt is seemingly established reliably, by his
own words?
102. The answer to these questions lies in features that are central to the
criminal trial process observed in Australia. Specifically, it derives from
the requirements established by the Parliament of Western Australia for
the conduct of trials of serious offences in that State, where the conviction
of an accused person rests on evidence of that person’s admissions to
police. As is often said, the rule of law is relatively easy to accord to
popular people who are, or may be, innocent of a crime. It is tested when
its principle is invoked by a prisoner who claims to have been convicted
on inadmissible evidence which, it is said, should not have been placed
before the jury. In such a case, upholding the law, and the procedures that
the law mandates, may be more important for the interests of the
community than obtaining, or affirming, the conviction of a person such as
the appellant.
103. There is a second feature of the Australian criminal justice system that
should be mentioned. Trials of serious crimes, such as the present, are
accusatorial in character. Valid legislation apart, it is usually essential to
the proper conduct of a criminal trial that the prosecution prove the guilt
of the accused and do so by admissible evidence. Ordinarily (as here) the
accused does not need to prove his or her innocence.
104. This second feature of the criminal justice system is not always
understood. Yet it is deeply embedded in the procedures of criminal
justice in Australia, inherited from England. It may even be implied in the
assumption about fair trial in the federal Constitution. It serves as a check
on the powers of the state and as an important defence for individual
liberty. It is a reason why countries that observe the accusatorial system
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tend to have a higher quality of liberty than countries that observe
different traditions.
105. Sometimes it falls to this Court to defend these basic features of the legal
system, invoked by unattractive parties, including prisoners who appear to
be, and may indeed be, guilty of the offence charged. In such cases, the
observance of legality is even more important than keeping an individual
such as the appellant behind bars. To the extent that this Court upholds the
rule of law, it offers the protection of the law that is precious for everyone
in the Commonwealth …
168. It is an undeniably uncongenial outcome to discharge a prisoner, evidence
of whose guilt is seemingly established by his own words. Such an order is
not made with enthusiasm. I can understand the tendency of human minds
to resist such an outcome. However, the order is not made only for the
appellant but as an assurance of the adherence of our institutions to the
rule of law; to steadfast observance of the requirements of the accusatorial
system of criminal justice hitherto followed in Australia; and to the neutral
judicial application of the requirements laid down by Parliament in s 570D
of the Code.
169. Section 570D is a strict and unusual provision. It was enacted to deal with
a large and endemic problem. We do the law no service by failing to
observe the requirements that appear in the provisions of s 570D of the
Code because the appellant, who claims their benefit, becomes their
uncongenial beneficiary.
170. This was not a case where a suspect, suddenly apprehended by police,
blurted out incriminating evidence. In such a case different considerations
would arise. Instead, this was a case of a suspect in police custody who
was properly cautioned, formally interviewed and who then insisted on his
right to silence and to consult a lawyer before answering questions.
Knowing of that insistence, police proceeded to override his rights and
privileges. He was a smart alec for whom it is hard to feel much sympathy.
But the police were public officials bound to comply with the law. We
should uphold the appellant’s rights because doing so is an obligation that
is precious for everyone. It is cases like this that test this Court. It is no
real test to afford the protection of the law to the clearly innocent, the
powerful and the acclaimed.
171. The “right to silence” may indeed sometimes evoke “strong but unfocused
feelings”. It is, without doubt, a “shorthand description” of different rules
that apply in the criminal law. But it has not been, at least until now,
meaningless and impotent in Australian law. In default of clear and valid
legislation authorising a contrary course, this Court should uphold the
right to silence in a case such as the present for it is important to the
individual’s true choice to remain silent in the face of the authority and to
the proper control of the conduct of the agents of the state.”
940. Section 570D of the Code provided in subsection (2) that, on the trial
of an accused person for a serious offence, evidence of any admission
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by the accused person should not be admissible unless either the
evidence took a certain form (a videotape recording of the admission)
or the prosecution proved that there was a reasonable excuse for there
not being such a video tape recording or there were exceptional
circumstances which, in the interests of justice, justified the admission
of the evidence.
941. Lord Steyn in Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45 stated:
“Even the most wicked of men are entitled to justice at the hands of the State.”
942. Justice Frankfurter in US v Rabinowitz 339 US 56 (1950) at page 69
stated:
“It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.”
943. As the English Court of Appeal stated in R v Cordingley [2007]
EWCA Crim 2174 every defendant was entitled to be tried fairly,
courteously and with due regard for the presumption of innocence.
Robust case management and the sensible use of court time was to be
endorsed but exchanges between judges and counsel should not be
rude or discourteous. The overriding objective is for criminal cases to
be dealt with justly. Delays however must be avoided wherever
possible.
944. In R v Ibrahim [2008] EWCA 880 the President of the Queen’s Bench
Division at paragraph 7 stated:
“It is axiomatic that every defendant, even a defendant alleged to be involved in
direct and dangerous violence on the citizens and institutions of this country, is
entitled to a fair trial at which his guilt must be proved. This trial was marked
with conspicuous fairness, and commanding judicial control by Mr Justice
Fulford. The defendants were represented at public expense by leading counsel of
distinction and experience, with absolute clarity about their professional
responsibilities both to their clients, and to the court. The jury’s difficulty in
agreeing verdicts in relation to Asiedu and Yahya demonstrates that they
approached the issues with the open-minded fairness and lack of prejudice which
is one of the customary characteristics of the jury system. Now that the applicants
have been convicted after a fair trial before an impartial tribunal, we are entitled
to record, after a lengthy examination of the evidence, that their defences to the
charge of conspiracy to murder were ludicrous.”
945. The Privy Council in Michel v The Queen [2009] UKPC 40 referred
to R v Nelson [1997] Crim LR 234 and sressed that every defendant
has the right to have his defence, whatever it may be, faithfully and
accurately placed before the jury.
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946. See in a different context the words of Wall L J in F (a child) [2008]
EWCA civ 439 at paragraph 79: “The first point about which the social
workers and the agency’s lawyers in the instant case need to be reminded is that
when dealing with parents, however inadequate and abusive, they are dealing
with human beings who have both feelings and rights.”
947. Lord Hope in RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department) [2009] UKHL 10 stated:
“209. Most people in Britain, I suspect, would be astonished at the amount of
care, time and trouble that has been devoted to the question whether it will be safe
for the aliens to be returned to their own countries. In each case the Secretary of
State has issued a certificate under section 33 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Immigration Act 2001 that the aliens’ removal from the United Kingdom would
be conducive to the public good. The measured language of the statute scarcely
matches the harm that they would wish to inflict upon our way of life, if they
were at liberty to do so. Why hesitate, people may ask. Surely the sooner they are
got rid of the better. On their own heads be it if their extremist views expose them
to the risk of ill-treatment when they get home.
210. That however is not the way the rule of law works. The lesson of history is
that depriving people of its protection because of their beliefs or behaviour,
however obnoxious, leads to the disintegration of society. A democracy cannot
survive in such an atmosphere, as events in Europe in the 1930s so powerfully
demonstrated. It was to eradicate this evil that the European Convention on
Human Rights, following the example of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948,
was prepared for the Governments of European countries to enter into. The most
important word in this document appears in article 1, and it is repeated time and
time again in the following articles. It is the word “everyone". The rights and
fundamental freedoms that the Convention guarantees are not just for some
people. They are for everyone. No one, however dangerous, however disgusting,
however despicable, is excluded. Those who have no respect for the rule of law -
even those who would seek to destroy it - are in the same position as everyone
else.
211. The paradox that this system produces is that, from time to time, much time
and effort has to be given to the protection of those who may seem to be the least
deserving. Indeed it is just because their cases are so unattractive that the law
must be especially vigilant to ensure that the standards to which everyone is
entitled are adhered to. The rights that the aliens invoke in this case were designed
to enshrine values that are essential components of any modern democratic
society: the right not to be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading
treatment, the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial. There is no room for
discrimination here. Their protection must be given to everyone. It would be so
easy, if it were otherwise, for minority groups of all kinds to be persecuted by the
majority. We must not allow this to happen. Feelings of the kind that the aliens’
beliefs and conduct give rise to must be resisted for however long it takes to
ensure that they have this protection.”
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948. Kirby J in R v Tang [2008] HCA 39 at paragraph 69 stated:
“As is often observed, the protection of the law becomes specifically important
when it is claimed by the unpopular and the despised accused of grave wrong-
doing (cf Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67
CLR 116 at 124 per Latham CJ).”
949. Michael Kirby in Honouring Pro Bono Lawyering (2nd April 2009) at
page 9 states:
“The law knows no finer hour than when it defends the rights of the marginalised
and the unpopular.”
950. Despite the challenges that counsel practising in the criminal arena
face it is important that standards are maintained and enhanced. In
addition to the community appreciating that prosecution and defence
counsel have difficult roles to play counsel should also appreciate that
to a large extent the administration of justice on this Island depends
on their integrity and competence.
951. I turn now to consider the issue of costs in criminal proceedings. In
many cases defendants will benefit from legal aid. In others they will
be privately funded. Issues of costs may arise from time to time in
criminal proceedings.
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Costs
Costs orders against public funds
952. In respect of costs orders against public funds see R v Collister
(judgment 16th April 2004). In Collister I referred to the Criminal
Justice (Defence Costs) Rules 2000 and stated that the court may
make a costs order for the payment of defence costs when it is
satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances of any particular
proceedings. Regard should be had to the criteria specified in rule 3(3)
and in particular the court should consider the manner in which the
prosecution and the defence have conducted their respective cases
including conduct which unnecessarily extended proceedings or
resulted in unnecessary expense, the personal conduct of the
defendant before and during the proceedings, the complexity of the
case, the number of offences of which the defendant is accused and if
accused of more than one offence and acquiited of one or more the
fact that he is convicted of others.
953. Under the 2000 Rules it is the Chief Registrar who determines the
amount recoverable by way of defence costs. The fact that a defendant
is insured in respect of costs does not prevent costs being incurred by
the defendant (Collister applying R v Miller [1983] 3 All ER 186). It
is immaterial that the defendant is legally aided (R v Arron [1973] 2
All ER 1221). Under rule 5(4) when determining defence costs there
shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs
reasonably incurred and any doubts which the Chief Registrar may
have as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were
reasonable in amount shall be resolved against the applicant. See also
Vanselow (judgment 15th September 2010).
954. In Collister (judgment 16th April 2004) I stated the following:
“37. Should the costs be awarded against the Treasury? Under section 50(1A)
costs are in effect awarded out of public funds. The order is for payment by the
Treasury out of money provided by Tynwald.
38. The court has a wide discretion in respect of applications for costs. That
discretion must of course be exercised judicially taking into account all relevant
factors and disregarding any irrelevant factors.
39. Where proceedings have been discontinued a Defendant is prime facie entitled
to an award of costs in his favour if the court is of the view that such an award is
appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
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40. This is not a case where the prosecution could reasonably argue that the
Defendant’s conduct has brought suspicion on himself and the Defendant has
misled the prosecution into thinking the case is stronger than it was (see for
example the case of South West Surrey Magistrates Court ex parte James [2009]
Criminal Law Review 690). If anyone has been misled in this case it is the
Defendant. If any criticism is to be made in this case it is against the prosecution
rather than the Defendant.
41. Even where the prosecution have acted properly in bringing the case, the
authorities show that, costs should not always be denied (see for example the case
of Birmingham Juvenile Court ex parte H (1992) 156 JP 445).
42. I note the position in England and in particular the Practice Direction (Crime:
Costs) (1991) 93 Cr.App.R 89. I also note section 16(2)(b) of the Prosecution of
Offences Act 1985 and I note the provisions of the Criminal Justice (Defence
Costs) Rules 2000 and Rule 3(1) and Rule 3(3) (e). The court shall take into
account under rule 3(3)(e) if the accused is accused of more than one offence and
acquitted of one or more, the fact that he is convicted of others.
Blackstone at page 1751 comments that in such a case
“no doubt the court’s decision will in practice depend on whether the accused was
acquitted on the major part of the indictment or only on subsidiary counts”.
43. In the case before me I note that the prosecution have withdrawn count 1 the
manslaughter count - that was the major part of the information and the
prosecution are not proceeding with that count.
44. In exercising my discretion I have had careful regard to the provisions of the
statute and the provisions of the Criminal Justice (Defence Costs) Rules 2000.
45. I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances of these proceedings
to make an order under section 50(1A) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 for
the payment of defence costs namely expenses incurred by the Defendant David
James Collister in carrying on his defence.
46. If the amount of costs cannot be agreed between the prosecution and the
defence then presumably the defence will make a claim for the determination of
the Defendant’s costs by the Chief Registrar pursuant to the Criminal Justice
(Defence Costs) Rules 2000. I do not believe that I have enough information in
my possession to specify the amount of defence costs pursuant to Rule 8 and in
any event I do not have the agreement of the Defendant in this respect. There will
therefore need, in the absence of an agreement between the prosecution and the
defence, to be a determination by the Chief Registrar pursuant to the Criminal
Justice (Defence Costs) Rules 2000.”
955. See generally section 50 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 and the
Criminal Justice (Defence Costs) Rules 2000. Consider the
developing European jurisprudence including Yassar Hussain v UK
(No 8866/06) ECHR 7th March 2006. See also R (Spiteri) v Basildon
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Crown Court [2009] EWHC 665 (Admin) and Dowler v Merseyrail
[2009] EWHC 558 (Admin).
956. Section 50 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides as follows:
“50 Award of trial costs out of public funds
(1) A court may, in relation to any proceedings on information, order the payment
by the Treasury out of money provided by Tynwald of such sums as appear to the
court reasonably sufficient-
(a) to compensate the prosecutor for the expenses properly incurred in
the prosecution, or
(b) to compensate any person properly attending to give evidence for
the prosecution or the defence or both, or called to give evidence at the instance of
the court, for the expense, trouble or loss of time properly incurred or incidental to
his attendance and giving of evidence.
(1A) Where a person is tried in any proceedings on information and acquitted on
any count in the information, the court may, to such extent and subject to such
conditions or limitations as may be contained in rules of court, order the payment
by the Treasury out of money provided by Tynwald of such sums as appear to the
court reasonably sufficient to compensate the defendant for the expenses properly
incurred by him in carrying on the defence.
(1B) Provision may be made by rules of court to specify circumstances in which
an order may or may not be made under subsection (1A).
(2) Where an appellant is acquitted on a retrial, the costs of the defence which
may be ordered to be paid by the Treasury under this section include-
(a) any costs which could have been ordered to be so paid under that
section by the court by which he was originally tried, if he had been acquitted at
the original trial, and
(b) the costs of the appeal.
(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, no expenses shall be allowed to a witness,
whether for the prosecution or the defence, under this section if his evidence is as
to character only.”
Costs orders against advocates
957. In Glover, Glover & Priestnal (judgment 25th August 2006) I stated:
“3. For an order for costs to be made against an advocate personally the court
must be satisfied that the advocate has been guilty of a serious dereliction of duty
or negligence at a sufficiently high level. A simple mistake, or oversight or mere
error of judgment or inadvertence may not of itself be sufficiently serious to
justify an order for costs against an advocate personally. Serious incompetence is
capable of amounting to serious dereliction of duty. Breaches of court orders and
other serious breaches of duty to the court may justify costs orders being made
against advocates personally. It is trite but every case will, of course, depend on
its own facts and circumstances. The court has a wide discretion in relation to
costs. That discretion however must be exercised judicially.
4. When considering making a costs order against an advocate personally the
court should give that advocate a full and fair opportunity of responding to the
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allegations made against him. The application should specify fully and fairly the
grounds on which it is submitted an adverse costs order should be made. The
court may wish to consider the following questions –
(1) is there sufficient evidence and information before the court to determine
the application fairly?
(2) have the grounds of the application been stated clearly and with proper
particularity?
(3) has the advocate had sufficient opportunity of responding to the
application?
(4) has the advocate been guilty of a serious dereliction of his duty to the
court or made a serious mistake in circumstances where significant blame attaches
to the advocate or has the advocate simply committed an inadvertent mistake or
oversight or made an understandable error of judgment?
(5) in cases where a serious dereliction of duty or a serious mistake has been
proved have costs been wasted as a result and are they quantifiable?
(6) is it otherwise fair and appropriate for a costs order to be made against the
advocate personally?
5. There is a clear need for anyone applying for a wasted costs order or for
any court intending to exercise such jurisdiction to formulate carefully and
concisely the complaint and the grounds on which such an order may be made.
The grounds must be clear and particular. The advocate alleged to be at fault must
have sufficient notice of the specific complaint against him and a proper
opportunity to respond to it. It is a useful discipline to treat such applications as a
court would treat a contempt petition. It would usually be inappropriate to
propose that the advocate might forego fees on a voluntary basis. The jurisdiction
to make costs orders against advocates personally must be exercised with great
caution and the court must always be sensitive to the fact that these applications
are never easy for the advocates involved. If however such orders are appropriate
the court should not hesitate to make them…”
958. See also section 7 of the Administration of Justice Act 2008 which
substitutes section 53 (3) of the High Court Act 1991 in respect of
wasted costs in proceedings in the High Court. It should be
remembered that the Court of General Gaol Delivery is not a division
of the High Court. The Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 deals with the
existence of the Court of General Gaol Delivery.
959. In R v Ulcay [2007] EWCA Crim 2379; [2008] 1 All ER 547 it was
held that wasted costs orders would not be imposed in circumstances
where counsel was placed in an awkward situation and simply tried to
do his best e.g. taking on a case at extremely short notice.
Costs orders against defendants
960. Section 48 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that the
court before which a person is convicted on information may, if it
thinks fit, order the offender to pay the whole or any part of the costs
incurred in or in relation to the prosecution and conviction. See also R
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v Northallerton Magistrates Court ex parte Dove (1999) 163 JP 657
Bingham LCJ as applied in BPS Advertising Ltd v London Borough of
Barnet [2006] EWHC 3335 (Admin) and outlining general principles
to the following effect:
(1) An order to pay costs to the prosecutor shall never exceed the
sum which having regard to the defendant’s means and any
other financial order imposed upon him, the defendant is able
to pay and which it is reasonable to order the defendant to
pay;
(2) Such an order should never exceed the sum which the
prosecutor has actually and reasonably incurred;
(3) The purpose of such an order is to compensate the prosecutor
and not to punish the defendant. Where the defendant has by
his conduct put the prosecutor to avoidable expense he may,
subject to his means, be ordered to pay some or all of that sum
to the prosecutor. But he is not to be punished for exercising
his right to defend himself;
(4) The costs ordered to be paid should not in the ordinary way be
grossly disproportionate to the fine. The court should
ordinarily begin by deciding on the appropriate fine to reflect
the criminality of the defendant’s offence, always bearing in
mind his means and his ability to pay and then consider what
if any costs he should be ordered to pay to the prosecutor.
961. See also Attorney General for Gibraltar v Shimidzu (Berllaque
intervening) [2005] 1 WLR 3335 (Privy Council). R v Balshaw
[2009] EWCA Crim 470, [2009] 2 Cr App R 6 dealt with the position
in England and Wales in respect of costs being paid by the accused to
the prosecutor and the circumstances when it is just and reasonable to
make such orders.
962. We now move beyond Court of General Gaol Delivery matters and
into Appeal Division matters.
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Appeals and references
General
963. In McCluskey 2003-05 MLR N 22 (judgment 8th April 2004) the
Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Acting Deemster
King) outlined the jurisdiction of the Appeal Division in criminal
matters. Judge of Appeal Tattersall stressed that the Appeal Division
owed its jurisdiction to statute and that it was crucial to consider the
relevant statutory framework contained in the Criminal Jurisdiction
Act 1993. In that case the appellant endeavoured to reopen an appeal
which had been dismissed by the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Hytner and Deemster Corrin) on the 17th April 1996. Judge of Appeal
Tattersall at paragraph 33 stated:
“… in our judgment there is only one proper statutory interpretation of the
Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. When, in any given case an appeal has been heard
and determined on its merits, then in the absence of any reference under section
39, that is the end of the matter as far as any appeal to this court is concerned.”
964. See now section 19B (1) of the High Court Act 1991 (inserted by
section 4(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 2008) which
provides that subject to rules of court, where the High Court has
finally determined an appeal, it may reopen its determination. Appeal
includes an application for leave to appeal.
965. When an appeal is lodged the matter will normally be listed for
directions. Standard directions would set out a time table for the filing
and serving of a duly paginated record of proceedings together with
skeleton arguments and authorities and a list of issues for
determination by the court. See generally Part 14 of the Rules of the
High Court of Justice 2009 in respect of appeals.
966. Judge of Appeal Glidewell delivering the judgment of the Appeal
Division in Craine v R 1978-80 MLR 233 stated:
“It is something that is not perhaps as generally appreciated as it might be, and
certainly the court must make the obvious point, that it is not for this court to
consider again the rightness of the jury’s verdict. The jury are the judges of fact.
This court’s function is to consider whether, in any respect, the judge who
conducted the trial went wrong in law or in his directions to the jury. Provided
that he did not, it is not open to this court to reconsider whether, on the facts, the
jury came to a right decision.”
967. The following are extracts from the judgment of the Appeal Division
in Hafner (judgment delivered 31st August 2007):
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“Jurisdiction based on statute
23. Let me now turn to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain appeals.
24. This court (differently constituted) inMcCluskey v R 2003-05 MLR N 22
(judgment 8th April 2004) dealing with a second appeal in respect of a conviction
after a trial in the Court of General Gaol Delivery stated at paragraph 9 of its
judgment:
"This court owes its jurisdiction to statute. Hence it is crucial to set out the
statutory framework".
25. The court then set out the material provisions of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act
1993 in particular section 30(1) which provides that a person convicted on
information may appeal to the Appeal Division against his conviction. The
Appeal Division held that it had no jurisdiction to determine a second appeal by
the Appellant.
26. In Stubbs v Gonzales (reasons upon a petition for special leave to appeal
delivered on the 25th May 2005) the Privy Council briefly touched upon
jurisdiction in relation to appeals in the Bahamas which was said (at paragraph 3
of the reasons delivered by Lord Hoffmann) to be "entirely statutory".
27. In R v Jeffries [1969] 1 QB 120 Widgery LJ at page 124 referred to the
powers of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England as deriving from statute.
Widgery LJ stated:
"… the powers of this court are derived from, and confined to, those given to it by
the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907".
28. The decision in Jeffries was approved by the House of Lords in R v Kearley
[1994] 2 AC 414.
29. Dealing with an appeal in a criminal context in the Isle of Man in Harding
and Sands v R 1993-95 MLR 161 this court (Deemster Corrin and Hytner J.A.)
stated at page 166:
"This court is a creature of statute; it has no powers save those granted it by
Tynwald".
30. In Jones v R 1999-01 MLR 369 this court (Deemster Cain and Tattersall J.A)
at pages 376 and 377 stated:
"Mrs Kelly submitted, by reference to s. 18(3)(c) of the High Court Act 1991, s.
1(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1969, s.10(4) of the Criminal Code Amendment
Act 1921 and s. 9(3) of the Judicature Act 1883, that this court has an inherent
power to take into account circumstances which have occurred since a sentence
was imposed. We reject this submission. We reaffirm the view expressed by this
court in Harding v. R (3) (1993-95 MLR at 166) that "this court is a creature of
statute; it has no powers save those granted to it by Tynwald" and (ibid., at 165)
that "Manx courts cannot legislate, nor should they flout the clear intention of the
Manx legislature". We are satisfied that, in exercising its appellate criminal
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jurisdiction on appeals against sentence, this court's powers derive solely from
s.33(4) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993".
31. I would add for the sake of completeness that, although its jurisdiction is
based on statute, the Appeal Division does, of course, have inherent jurisdiction to
deal with procedural matters in the same way that the Privy Council does. See for
example TheBelize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organizations v
The Department of the Environmentand the Belize Electricity Company Limited
(Judgment delivered 13th August 2003 Privy Council Appeal No 47 of 2003),
Jones (judgment of Appeal Division delivered on the 28th January 2000) and
Kailaysur v State of Mauritius [2004] 1 WLR 2316.
32. In Taylor on Appeals at paragraph 10-032 it is stated:
"Whilst the Court of Appeal is essentially a creature of statute with no inherent
jurisdiction, it has the ability, like any other court of record, in certain areas to
control its own procedure".
33. The ability to adjourn in appropriate cases is given as an obvious example
(See Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 2) [1999] 2 Cr App R 444).”
968. Under section 31(1) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 it is
provided that a person convicted on information who desires to appeal
to the Appeal Division shall lodge in the General Registry notice in
writing of appeal stating the grounds of appeal and signed by him or
his advocate. Section 31(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993
provides that a notice under subsection (1) shall be lodged (a) in the
case of an appeal against conviction (except where paragraph (b)
applies), within 28 days beginning with the date of conviction; (b) in
the case of an appeal against sentence, or an appeal against conviction
made at the same time as an appeal against sentence passed on the
conviction, within 28 days beginning with the date of the sentence.
The appellant shall also within that period serve a copy of the notice
on the Attorney General. The Appeal Division may extend the time
within which a notice of appeal may be given.
Appeals against conviction
969. Section 30(1) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that a
person convicted on information may appeal to the Appeal Division
against his conviction. See also section 30 (5), (5A), (6) and (7) of the
Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. Section 31 of the Criminal
Jurisdiction Act 1993 sets out the appeal procedure.
970. Section 33(1) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that
subject to subsection (2) the Appeal Division on an appeal against
conviction shall allow the appeal if it thinks –
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(a) that the conviction of the jury should be set aside on the ground
that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe or
unsatisfactory, or
(b) that the judgment of the court before which the appellant was
convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision of
any question of law, or
(c) that there was a material irregularity in the course of the trial,
and in any other case it shall dismiss the appeal.
971. Under section 33(3) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 the Appeal
Division if it allows an appeal against conviction shall quash the
conviction and either:
(a) direct a verdict of acquittal to be entered, or
(b) if it appears to the Division that the interests of justice so
require order the appellant to be retried and direct the Attorney
General to prefer a fresh information for the purpose.
972. The Privy Council in Trimmington v The Queen (judgment delivered
22nd June 2009) stressed at paragraph 12 of the judgment that there
are few cases in which a judge’s summing up could not be criticised
and improved upon : “but what an appellate tribunal must do is to look at the
thrust of the directions and consider if they have adequately put the several issues
before the jury and given them a proper explanation of their task in relation those
which they have to decide. In particular, the Board must determine whether, if
there has been any defect, there has been a miscarriage of justice which requires
their intervention.”
973. Commenting on Michel v The Queen [2009] UKPC Lord Neuberger
in the 2009 Denning Lecture Rights Responsibilities : Civil Duty and
the Rule of Law (Inner Temple 23rd November 2009) at paragraph 14
stated:
“Judicial exuberance happens sometimes : judges are human beings, and a
rehearing because the trial was unfair is, while regrettable, nothing very
remarkable. However, the striking thing was that the Privy Council thought that
the defendant had been rightly convicted; indeed, they found it difficult to see
how any result other than a guilty verdict could have eventuated. Nonetheless, the
right to a fair trial was considered so fundamental that the point could come, as it
sadly did in that case, that the unfairness alone was enough to undermine the
conviction. In other words, as that case neatly demonstrates, it is more than a
merely protective rule : it is a substantive, free-standing right.”
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Substantial miscarriage of justice and fresh evidence
974. Lord Bingham delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Bain
(Privy Council judgment delivered on the 10th May 2007) stated:
“103. A substantial miscarriage of justice will actually occur if fresh, admissible
and apparently credible evidence is admitted which the jury convicting a
defendant had no opportunity to consider but which might have led it, acting
reasonably, to reach a different verdict if it had had the opportunity to consider it.
Such a miscarriage involves no reflection on the trial judge, and in the present
case David’s counsel expressly disavowed any criticism of Williamson J. It is,
however, the duty of the criminal appellate courts to seek to identify and rectify
convictions which may be unjust. That result will occur where a defendant is
convicted and further post-trial evidence raises a reasonable doubt whether he
would or should have been convicted had that evidence been before the jury.
104. In the opinion of the Board the fresh evidence adduced in relation to the
nine points summarised above, taken together, compels the conclusion that a
substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred in this case. It is the effect
of all the fresh evidence taken together, not the evidence on any single point,
which compels that conclusion. But it is necessary to identify the source of the
Board’s concern in relation to each point.”
And at paragraph 119:
“… In closing, the Board wishes to emphasise, as it hopes is clear, that its
decision imports no view whatever on the proper outcome of a retrial. Where
issues have not been fully and fairly considered by a trial jury, determination of
guilt is not the task of appellate courts. The Board has concluded that, in the very
unusual circumstances of this case, a substantial miscarriage of justice has
actually occurred. Therefore the proviso to Section 385(1) cannot be applied, and
the appeal must under the subsection be allowed. At any retrial it will be decided
whether the appellant is guilty or not, and nothing in this judgment should
influence the verdict in any way.”
975. Lord Bingham at paragraph 115 added that “the issue of guilt is one for a
properly informed and directed jury, not for an appellate court.”
976. See the judgment of the Privy Council in Barlow (judgment delivered
8th July 2009) in respect of the phrase “miscarriage of justice.”
977. R v Hill [2008] EWCA Crim 76 confirmed that it was of central
importance to the law that a person charged should advance whatever
material was available to him at trial. The Court of Appeal would not
ordinarily exercise its powers to admit fresh evidence so as to permit a
defendant to change his account after trial in order to run a different
defence on appeal, in the absence of the witnesses and the jury.
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978. In Teare v R 1993-95 MLR 154 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Hytner and Deemster Corrin) held that the new evidence in that case
was admissible for its credibility to be determined at a retrial since it
was not, and could not reasonably have been, available to the defence
at the trial, either because it had not emerged or because it had not
been disclosed by the prosecution. The Appeal Division also stressed
that it was important for the police to realise, however innocent their
motive, that they were under a duty not to suppress or manufacture
evidence. To do so could result either in an innocent defendant being
convicted or in a guilty defendant, against who a sound case had been
built up, being acquitted because the evidence had been tampered
with. Both potential results were unacceptable.
979. Consider also Kelvin Dial (Privy Council judgment delivered 14th
February 2005) and Dosoruth v Maurituis [2005] Crim LR 475 Privy
Council. Lord Bingham in Bain (Privy Council judgment delivered on
the 10th May 2007) stated:
“34. The third Court of Appeal applied well-settled principles in its approach to
fresh evidence. Thus it referred to the threshold conditions of sufficient freshness
and sufficient credibility, while acknowledging that the overriding requirement is
to promote the interests of justice. The court admitted all the fresh evidence
submitted, and no complaint is made of its ruling on this point.”
980. See also further comments in the judgment in respect of the position
once the fresh evidence has been received. Is the fresh evidence
credible and material to the miscarriage of justice issue? See the
English, New Zealand and Australian authorities referred to in Bain.
981. In respect of the admission on appeal of evidence that was not
adduced at trial see R v Eskine and Williams [2009] EWCA Crim
1425 which deals with the position under the law in England and
Wales. The question for decision in that case was simple : exercising
the jurisdiction provided by section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act
1968 (Act of Parliament), as amended by the Criminal Appeal Act
1995, was it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to
receive evidence which was not adduced at trial? The following are
extracts from the judgment of Lord Chief Justice:
“6. Under s.23 (4), the Court may if they think it necessary or expedient in the
interests of justice, order the examination of any witness whose attendance might
be required under subsection (1)(b) above to be conducted, in a manner provided
by rules of court, before any judge or officer of the Court or other person
appointed by the Court for the purpose, and allow the admission of any
depositions so taken as evidence before the Court.
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7. The powers under this sub-section were used in Stafford & Luvaglio (No.
2) (1972) 57 Cr. App. R. 203 and in Saunders (1973) 58 Cr. App. R. 248, but
have rarely been used since then. In the present appeals, although it was clear that
there were differences in the opinions of the experts, none of the differences
turned on issues of credit. It was desirable to hear these two appeals together, but
very difficult to find a time when all the experts and counsel were available. It
was therefore proposed that the evidence of the expert psychiatrists be heard in
each case by one of the judges who was to hear the appeal on separate days at a
time that was convenient to those in each case. The evidence in relation to
Williams was heard before Thomas L J on 16 March 2009 and in relation to
Erskine on 21 April 2009…
39. The jurisdiction to admit fresh evidence is governed by statute. Section 23
of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 as amended by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995
provides:
"(1) For the purposes of an appeal under this Part of this Act the Court of Appeal
may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice –
…
(c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which
the appeal lies
(2) The Court of Appeal shall, in considering whether to receive any evidence,
have regard in particular to –
(a) whether the evidence appears to the court to be capable of belief;
(b) whether it appeals to the court that the evidence may afford any ground for
allowing the appeal
(c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from
which the appeal lies on an issue which is subject to the appeal;
(d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the
evidence in those proceedings."
Virtually by definition, the decision whether to admit fresh evidence is case and
fact specific. The discretion to receive fresh evidence is a wide one focussing on
the interests of justice. The considerations listed in sub-section (2)(a) – (d) are
neither exhaustive nor conclusive, but they require specific attention. The fact that
the issue to which the fresh evidence relates was not raised at trial does not
automatically preclude its reception. However it is well understood that, save
exceptionally, if the defendant is allowed to advance on appeal a defence and/or
evidence which could and should have been but were not put before the jury, our
trial process would be subverted. Therefore if they were not deployed when they
were available to be deployed, or the issues could have been but were not raised at
trial, it is clear from the statutory structure, as explained in the authorities, that
unless a reasonable and persuasive explanation for one or other of these omissions
is offered, it is highly unlikely that the "interests of justice" test will be satisfied.
The cases included in the bundles of authorities
40. As we have seen the statutory framework is uncomplicated. The question
for decision identified in paragraph 1 of this judgment is stark. In this section of
the judgment we shall illustrate the way in which a series of decisions of the court
addressing this stark question in individual cases appear to have developed a
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jurisprudential momentum of their own. It is a process which has become
commonplace in many different areas of the criminal law.
41. The first authority provided was R v Kooken (1982) 74 Cr App R 30. This
court considered and quoted the essential reasoning in Dodd June 10 1971
(unreported) and Melville (1976) 62 Cr App R 100. The court doubted whether
the trial judge had any discretion to call evidence to support a possible defence of
diminished responsibility which the defendant herself did not wish to advance.
The suggestion that, pursuant to section 23 (1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968,
it was "necessary or expedient in the interests of justice" for the medical evidence
supporting diminished responsibility to be called as fresh evidence when,
notwithstanding that the applicant was not "mentally sound" she did not wish any
such argument to be advanced was rejected. Although she was not mentally sound
and her power to reach the right decision in her own interests was diminished, she
was not unfit to plead. Her objection to the admission of the evidence was
"invincible". The application was dismissed. The observation that whether
convicted of murder or manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility,
the applicant would continue to be detained in Broadmoor, was incidental to the
refusal of the application for permission to appeal, and would not have led to its
refusal if it would otherwise been appropriate to grant it.
42. In R v Campbell (No1) (1987) 84 Cr App R 255 it was again emphasised
that diminished responsibility is an optional defence, to be advanced, if he so
wishes, by the defendant. The principle now encapsulated in R v Coutts [2007] 1
Cr App R 6, [2006] UKHL 39, that any available defence should be left to the
jury for its consideration, had no application to diminished responsibility. Some
10 years later Campbell was again before the Court of Appeal, when, as we shall
see, it took a different turn.
43. R v Straw [1995] 1 All ER 187 was decided in June 1987. So, although
reported in 1995, it is chronologically the next authority requiring consideration.
It was common ground between the psychiatric experts that at the time when the
applicant killed her husband, her responsibility was materially diminished. The
prosecution were prepared to accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter on this
ground. The applicant refused to tender such a plea and gave express instructions
that she would plead not guilty. After conviction she wished diminished
responsibility to be reconsidered. Her application to introduce fresh evidence was
dismissed. The court referred to the decisions in Dodd, Kooken and Melville. The
applicant was "sufficiently capable" of tendering her plea and fully advised as to
her position. "Although she may not have been a normal person, she was capable
in law of making the decision". In reality this decision added nothing to the
principle identified in Kooken, and its absence from any formal law report for the
next 8 years did not represent a significant gap in the relevant jurisprudence.
44. In R v Ahluwalia [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 diminished responsibility was
not raised at trial. The principle that "ordinarily, of course, any available defence
should be advanced at trial," and that if medical evidence to support such a plea
was available, it should be adduced at trial, was emphasised. Defendants were not
permitted to run a defence at trial in the belief that after conviction, the court
would allow a different defence to be raised. However evidence which would
have supported diminished responsibility and was available at trial was
"overlooked" and not "further pursued" at trial. The appellant herself "was not
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consulted" and she did not, in any real sense, decide that the defence should not
be advanced. This judgment underlined the scepticism with which evidence to
support diminished responsibility based on "wholly retrospective medical
evidence" would be approached. However the evidence was admitted because the
decision not to advance the defence was not made by the appellant.
45. In R v Arnold (1996) 31 B.M.L.R. 24, following the appellant's conviction
of two murders in 1987, the court addressed evidence of diminished
responsibility. The court considered and quoted extracts from the judgments in
Dodd, Melville, Ahluwalia, and Richardson (9 May 1991, unreported) and
referred to the decisions in Kooken and Campbell (No 1), and decided that
evidence which would have supported diminished responsibility should not be
admitted. Psychiatric evidence was available at trial which would have supported
the defence. Fresh psychiatric evidence confirmed the availability of the defence.
All this, was, however, was subject to the defendant establishing a proper factual
basis for the defence. Without that evidence from the appellant, who at trial
denied any involvement in the killing, the fresh evidence should not be admitted.
The court took the opportunity to doubt the correctness of observations in Dodd,
repeated in Melville, that to be admitted on appeal the evidence that the appellant
was subject to diminished responsibility should be "really overwhelming".
However it was emphasised that "Whether the trial be civil or criminal, parties
must be required as a matter of the administration of justice to present their case
at the trial and not be permitted, one case having failed, to run a different and
inconsistent case in the appellate court based on different evidence…However,
very exceptionally, these considerations can be treated as not conclusive".
46. We must now return to R v Campbell [1997] 1 Cr App R 199. Noting that
at the time of the trial there was clear evidence that the appellant suffered from an
abnormality of mind at the time of the killing, and on the basis that medical
science in the intervening period had advanced, the court admitted further
psychiatric evidence. A defence of diminished responsibility, if advanced at trial
on the basis of the evidence then before the Court of Appeal, might well have
succeeded. The evidence was admitted, and the conviction quashed. The court
addressed the principle "repeatedly underlined" that in criminal trials the
defendants must "advance a full defence before the jury and call any necessary
evidence at that stage. It is not permissible to advance one defence before the jury
and, when that has failed, to devise a new defence, perhaps many years later, and
then seek to raise that defence on appeal". The court was influenced by the fact
that the absence of a defence of diminished responsibility at trial was not what
was described as "a matter of tactical decision" but one of "practical necessity"
because there was no expert evidence to support the defence. Save to record the
earlier conclusion in Campbell (No 1), no reference was made to earlier
authorities or previous decisions. The application was to be judged exclusively by
reference to what the interests of justice required "in all the circumstances". This
judgment demonstrates that justice can be done without the need for any learned
parade of jurisprudence.
47. In R v Borthwick [1998] Crim LR 274 on appeal there was clear and
undisputed evidence, unknown at trial which demonstrated diminished
responsibility. Prior to the trial the appellant had been examined by a psychiatrist,
but he refused to allow a more detailed examination to be undertaken and pleaded
not guilty on the basis that he denied responsibility for the killing. He was
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convicted. Shortly afterwards he admitted that he was responsible for the
homicide. The court was concerned that B's state of mind may have reduced his
ability to give rational instructions about his defence. Repeating Melville and
Campbell (No 2) the court held that there was "overwhelming" or "clear
evidence" that the defence of diminished responsibility would have succeeded at
trial, and that the reason why the defence had not been advanced was itself
consequent on the mental illness of the defendant. In other words, as the telling
commentary in the Criminal Law Review by Dr David Ormerod put it "…D's
mental illness may have affected his judgment to the extent that it could not be
said that he was exercising an option not to run the defence at trial…".
48. In R v Gilfillan, 7 December 1998 (unreported), the defendant did not
advance diminished responsibility at trial. He gave no instructions which would
have supported the defence and, because he made no relevant disclosure to the
medical experts, there was no medical evidence which would have supported the
defence. Accordingly it was not "fully explored" before the trial. After the
appellant's conviction, new facts emerged which supported diminished
responsibility. The explanation for the failure to advance the defence at trial was
"to be found in the very mental condition" of the defendant himself. He was
"fearful of the possible consequences of a finding that he was mentally ill, and,
more importantly, did not consider that he was". The true state of his mental
condition was concealed from his professional advisers as well as his parents. The
Crown did not oppose the admission of the evidence.
49. In R v Weekes [1999] 2 Cr App R 520 the defendant refused to follow
advice that it would be in his best interests to plead guilty to manslaughter on the
basis of diminished responsibility. There was powerful evidence to support it.
Instead he suggested that he had acted in self-defence and under provocation.
These defences were rejected by the jury. He appealed against conviction, seeking
leave to adduce the medical evidence which was available at trial together with
further psychiatric evidence that his ability to make a sensible judgment whether
to advance diminished responsibility would have been adversely affected by his
mental illness. Accordingly his decision not to advance diminished responsibility
could not be treated as a "reasoned decision". The case was particularly stark
because the prosecution would have accepted a plea to manslaughter on the basis
of diminished responsibility, and so indicated to the appellant's counsel. As it
happened this was Mr Nigel Rumfitt QC, counsel for Williams in the present
case. The appeal was heard on 8th February 1999, shortly before Williams'
conviction in this case. On that occasion counsel had plainly given detailed and
meticulous advice on the issue to Weekes. We have no doubt that the same robust,
clear thinking approach was adopted by Mr Rumfitt when he was acting for
Williams.
50. In the judgment Dodd and Melville were re-examined. Attention was
drawn to Straw [1995] 1 All ER 187 and Steven (Jones) [1997] 1 Cr App R 86 as
well as Borthwick. Shah 30 April 1998, (unreported) was analysed in some detail.
The passages quoted from the judgment in Shah referred to Ahluwalia, and the
passages cited from Straw referred to Kooken. InWeekes the essential fact was the
"plain and undisputed" evidence at trial that the defendant's decision not to allow
diminished responsibility "to be canvassed" was significantly affected by his
mental illness. The court would have been much less impressed with the argument
if the evidence in support of diminished responsibility only emerged after the
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trial. However the court's unequivocal conclusion was that "in the last analysis as
appears from all these decisions each case turned on its own facts".
51. R v Criminal Cases Review Commission ex parte Pearson [2000] 1 Cr
App R 141, involved an application for judicial review of a decision by the
Criminal Cases Review Commission not to refer the applicant's conviction for
murder to this court. The Commission decided that the evidence of diminished
responsibility on which the applicant was seeking to rely would not be admitted in
evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended by the
Criminal Appeal Act 1995. Lord Bingham CJ noted that the Commission and the
court were referred to a number of earlier decisions. These included Dodd and
Melville, which were set out in detail in his judgment. He referred to Straw, and
Richardson, again quoting passages from the judgments. He addressed the
reasoning in Ahluwalia, Binning (unreported April 12 1995) and Arnold, again in
detail, and concluded that the unreported decision in Arnold contained the "fullest
and clearest judicial consideration" of the court's approach to the issues which
arise here. The judgment then examined Steven Jones and Campbell, in the
context both of the 1987 and 1997 decisions, and then Borthwick, Hobson and
Shah and finally Weekes.
52. This examination of the previous decisions could not have been more
comprehensive. Lord Bingham suggested that the cases identified a number of
features which would be likely "to weigh more or less heavily against the
reception of fresh evidence". These included "a deliberate decision by a defendant
whose decision-making faculties are unimpaired not to advance before the trial
jury a defence known to be available; evidence of mental abnormality or
substantial impairment given years after the offence and contradicted by evidence
available at the time of the offence; expert evidence based on factual premises
which are unsubstantiated, unreliable or false, or which is for any other reason
unpersuasive". In the ultimate analysis the jurisdiction under section 23 of the
1968 Act provides the means by which justice can be done in the individual case.
The end result, and the principle to be extracted from it, is that the statutory
discretion could not be constrained by "inflexible mechanistic rules".
53. Next in the bundles of authorities is R v Martin [2002] 1 Cr App R 27.
There was no medical evidence at trial to support diminished responsibility.
Indeed the evidence on the issue was said to be "negative". After conviction two
new experts were instructed on behalf of the appellant. This was credible
evidence, not available at trial, and the court decided that the evidence should be
admitted. The conviction was quashed. Although the case was and to some extent
remains notorious, the court did not decide any issue of legal principle in relation
to diminished responsibility. The case can only have been reported for reasons
unconnected with this defence.
54. R v Gilbert [2003] EWCA 2385 arose from another much earlier murder
conviction in 1994. The court was invited by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission, to consider fresh evidence relating to diminished responsibility. The
court referred to Dodd, Melville, Steven Jones, Gilfillan, Straw, Ahluwalia, both
Campbell decisions, Borthwick, Shah and Weekes. After these references to the
earlier decisions, the conclusion was that when diminished responsibility was not
raised at the trial, it would only be in an "exceptional case that the court will hold
that a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in the
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proceedings has been demonstrated". However, even in the absence of some
reasonable explanation for this failure, the court was still obliged to consider
whether it was "necessary or expedient" to receive the evidence in the interests of
justice. The court admitted the evidence. At the hearing of the appeal in the
following year, the conviction was upheld. – see [2004] EWCA 2413. Neither
decision was reported. We are unsurprised: no issues of principle were raised.
55. R v Hendy [2006] 2 Cr App R 33 was decided in April 2006. In 1993 the
appellant was convicted of murder. The essential issue examined in the judgment
was the impact of R v Dietschmann [2003] 2 Cr App R 4 in the context of self
induced intoxication. The conviction was quashed on the grounds of misdirection.
The court also addressed the ground of appeal based on fresh medical evidence
"obtained retrospectively". The court considered the review of the authorities
carried out in Gilbert, and decided that notwithstanding the reluctance of the court
to admit evidence to support a defence which was not raised at trial, and the
necessary scepticism with which to approach fresh evidence of diminished
responsibility where the issue was canvassed at trial, the evidence should be
admitted. This plainly was a factual decision based on the court's judgment of the
interests of justice.
56. R v Neaven [2006] EWCA Crim 955, [2007] 2 All ER 891, [2006] Crim
LR 909 was decided in May 2006. In 2001, the appellant was convicted of
murder. Unknown to himself or his legal advisers, at the time of the offence his
responsibility for his actions was diminished. Fresh evidence substantiated that
contention. The Crown's position was that the decision not to advance diminished
responsibility, but to rely on self-defence, was a tactical decision. The appellant
was offered the opportunity of a medical assessment and declined. This was said
to be a form of "shut-eye knowledge" of what the assessment would or might
reveal. It was not however contended that the appellant or his legal advisers knew
or ought to have known of the schizophrenia from which he was suffering.
57. The court examined the "relevant jurisprudence". Extracts from Dodd,
Kooken, Straw, Ahluwalia, Borthwick, Shah and Weekes were set out in the
judgment. The court then summarised the "guidance" to be derived from the
authorities.
"(1) That the obligation on a defendant to advance his whole case at trial and the
scepticism directed towards tactical decision remains fundamental. (2) That it
therefore takes an exceptional case to allow it to be in the interests of justice to
admit and give effect to fresh evidence, not relied on at trial, designed to promote
a new defence of diminished responsibility. However, subject to this (3) each case
turns on its own facts. (4) Therefore where the evidence of mental illness and
substantial impairment is common ground or otherwise clear and undisputed, it
may be in the interests of justice (in the absence of opposition from the appellant
himself – (see Kooken) to admit it. (5) This is especially so if the potential advice
of tactical decision is met by undisputed evidence that such decisions were
affected by the defendant's illness itself. (6) The emergence only after conviction
of evidence of mental illness and of the potential of a defence of diminished
responsibility is of little weight, unless perhaps there is unanimity as to the
conditions necessary for such a defence at the time of the offence. From this
connection it may be observed that only in the special case of Kooken was clear
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and undisputed fresh evidence on appeal of a good defence of diminished
responsibility to the killing not acted upon in this court."
58. The court then addressed two further factors which were said not to have
arisen in the earlier cases cited to the court. "The first is that, although the
evidence of diminished responsibility is common ground, it was unknown at the
time of the trial. The second is that, although there is evidence both that his
mental illness and his ignorance of his illness affected the appellant's decision
making at trial, that evidence is not undisputed". "In principle, knowledge of a
defendant's mental illness and its effect on him for the purposes of his defence
should make it very difficult to introduce such evidence for the first time on
appeal …even so, where the illness also affects the ability to give rational
instructions, the interests of justice may still require a different result". The appeal
was allowed because it could not be said that the appellant or his legal advisers
had "made a tactical decision with knowledge or insight which should be
considered to bind him". In short the ultimate decision was a factual decision
based on all the subtleties and nuances of the individual case. The case did indeed
turn on its own facts.
59. In Latus [2006] EWCA Crim 3187 the applicant for leave to appeal was
convicted of murder. Diminished responsibility was not advanced at trial. Later
evidence suggested that at the time of the offence he was suffering from
diminished responsibility. The court considered Borthwick, Ahluwalia, Straw and
the guidance in Neaven. The application was refused. No reasonable explanation
was given for the failure to introduce the evidence at trial. The decision not to do
so was a deliberate tactical decision made by an appellant who "hoped to get
away" with his crime, and denied involvement in. The decision was not caused by
the illness but by a tactical decision not to allow the defence of diminished
responsibility to be investigated. No point of principle was involved.
60. In Diamond [2008] EWCA Crim 923 [2008] MHLR 124 the appellant was
convicted of murder in 1999. There was an extensive pre-trial psychiatric history.
However before trial he refused to undergo a medical assessment into the
possibility that he was suffering from mental illness as well as personality
disorder. Instead he advanced a defence that he had not committed the murder,
and he sought to provide an innocent explanation for the powerful evidence
linking him to the crime. By the time the case was referred to the Criminal Cases
Review Commission, he admitted his responsibility for the homicide. There was
said to be strong evidence that at the time of the killing his responsibility for his
actions was substantially impaired by abnormality of mind and that when he was
giving instructions to his legal advisers for the purposes of the trial his mental
capacity was significantly impaired by mental illness at the time
61. The court examined the relevant guidance. After repeating the
fundamental principle "that a defendant must advance all aspects of his case at
trial and the court will not admit fresh evidence to enable a defendant to run a
different case if that case could have been run first time round", a proposition
sustained by reference to Ahluwalia and Shah, the judgment then examined a
"series of cases" which were said to provide guidance about the principles which
should govern the exercise of the court's discretion to admit evidence under
section 23 of the 1968 Act where diminished responsibility was not advanced at
trial. These were "very helpfully and clearly stated in R v Neaven". The court then
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referred to a number of specific features relevant to the case of Diamond itself,
which were derived from Straw, Kooken, Shah, Borthwick, Gilfillan, Hadan
[2003] EWCA Civ 284 and Ashton [2006] EWCA Crim 1267, as well as Weekes
and Ahluwalia, Sharp [2003] EWCA Crim 3870, Shickle [2005] EWCA Crim 181
and Latus . Reference was also made to Lord Bingham's observation in R v
Criminal Cases Review Commission that "the more unpromising the context from
which the appellant seeks to adduce fresh evidence, the more compelling the
evidence would have to be (all things being equal) before the Court of Appeal
would receive it". In the end, the emphasis was that "each case will depend upon
its own facts".
62. The court concluded that the appellant's decision not to advance
diminished responsibility was a tactical decision made at trial which was not
materially connected with the appellant's mental condition at the time.
Accordingly there was no reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the
evidence which would have supported diminished responsibility. The appeal was
dismissed…
Conclusion - Erskine
95. This is a straightforward case. It is overwhelmingly clear that at the time
when the appellant appeared at trial, there was unequivocal contemporaneous
evidence that his mental responsibility for his actions at the time of the killing was
substantially impaired. In addition, there was contemporaneous evidence which
suggested that as a result of reduced mental acuity, not amounting to unfitness to
plead, but part and parcel of his illness, the decision not to advance the defence
was irremediably flawed. There was nothing his legal advisers could do about it,
and in reality nothing he could do about it himself. The interests of justice require
us to admit the fresh evidence. We have examined it with care. We are satisfied
that the convictions for murder were unsafe. We shall substitute convictions of
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
Sentence - Erskine
96. Mr Edward Fitzgerald QC suggested that following a conviction for
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility the principle or
convention had been established that a sentence of imprisonment for life should
not be imposed, but that the appropriate course would be to make a hospital order
under section 37 of the Mental Health Act to which a restriction on release under
section 41 should be attached. We disagree. To begin with, it is not unknown for a
successful defence of diminished responsibility to be advanced by an individual
whose mental state at the date of sentence was not so subject and who represented
and continues to represent a considerable danger to public safety. In other words,
no medical disposal would be available and, simultaneously, the danger to public
safety was undiminished. In any event, however, even if medical evidence were
available to support a hospital order, a sentence of life imprisonment may
nevertheless be appropriate. In making these decisions the court will no doubt be
influenced not only by the considerations of long-term public safety, but also the
nature of the homicide or homicides, and the circumstances in which they were
committed, and the extent to which the defendant's mental responsibility for his
actions was diminished. In some of these cases a significant element of
responsibility remains, an aspect which was recently addressed in R v Woods
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[2009] EWCA Crim 651. We need not address the point further because in the
present case we are in effect reflecting on the appropriate sentence for
manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility over 20 years after
conviction, and 20 years or so after the appellant was removed from prison into a
maximum security hospital where he has remained ever since. We cannot ignore
these realities. The medical evidence is clear. For present purposes we remind
ourselves of Dr Chesterman's conclusion that "…it would not be appropriate to
consider releasing him into the community for the foreseeable future given that
the risk of further similar re-offending cannot be regarded as insignificant". It is
Dr Horne's view that if a hospital order were now to replace the order of life
imprisonment, it should be subjected to appropriate statutory restrictions on any
possible release under section 41.
97. Subject to the oral evidence required for these purposes, we shall make a
hospital order, and in the interests of public safety, we shall attach a restriction for
an indefinite period under section 41.
Conclusion - Williams
98. This is a very different appeal to Erskine. The issue of a possible defence
of diminished responsibility was closely examined before the appellant chose to
plead guilty to murder. The plea was a deliberate and properly informed decision.
Although the issue was carefully examined, nothing was revealed at the time to
suggest that the defence was available. The appellant was seeking to gain some
advantage from his plea. The material which has emerged since the trial is
unconvincing, particularly in relation to any potential mental impairment which
might have led to the decision to plead guilty to murder. The interests of justice
require that the conviction returned on the basis of the appellant's own guilty plea
should be upheld. This appeal is dismissed.”
Lurking doubt
982. Lord Rodger in Dookran v The State (Privy Council judgment 7th
March 2007) stated:
“28...Although reference to lurking doubt has been criticised from time to time as
an unwarranted gloss on the language of the statute regulating appeal proceedings
in England and Wales, it is really just one way in which an appeal court addresses
the fundamental question: Is the conviction safe? In the vast majority of cases the
answer to that question will be found simply by considering whether the rules of
procedure and the rules of law, including the rules on the admissibility of
evidence, have been applied properly. Very exceptionally, however, even where
the rules have been properly applied, on the basis of the “general feel of the case
as the Court experiences it”, there may remain a lurking doubt in the minds of the
appellate judges which makes them wonder whether justice has been done: R v
Cooper [1969] 1 QB 267, 271, per Widgery LJ. See Archbold, Criminal Pleading
Evidence and Practice (2006), paras 7-47 – 7-49. In reality, Mr Jennings was
submitting that this was an exceptional case of that kind.
29. As Widgery LJ indicates, any impression of this kind is something which the
judges in an appeal court will tend to form for themselves on the basis of an
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overall view of the specific features of the particular proceedings. As such, it is
unique to those proceedings and will not be replicated in other cases.”
983. At paragraph 36 Lord Rodger indicated that their Lordships:-
“cannot avoid a residual feeling of unease about whether justice has been done in
Malharri’s case and so about the safety of her conviction.” [appeal allowed and
conviction quashed]
984. Is the alleged incompetence of counsel a ground of appeal? It is easy
for unsuccessful defendants to blame counsel for their plight. It will
only be in rare cases that the incompetence of counsel will form the
sole ground of a successful appeal.
985. One of the main issues will be whether the incompetence of counsel
has prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. See Appeal
Division judgment in McCluskey 2003-05 MLR N 22 (judgment
delivered on the 18th April 2004) Bally Sheng Balson (Privy Council
judgment 2nd February 2005), Flanagan (Appeal Division judgment
29th July 2004), Bhola (Privy Council judgment 8th March 2006) and
Nudd v R [2006] HCA 9 (9th March 2006). In Bally Sheng Balson
(Privy Council judgment 2nd February 2005) the following test was
referred to at paragraph 36 – the question is whether the conduct of
counsel has become so extreme as to result in a denial of due process
to his client. Examples are given in Boodram v The State [2002]
UKPC 20, [2002] 1 Cr App R 12. Lord Justice General Hope in
Anderson v HM Advocate 1996 JC 29 at 44 stated:
“The question depended not upon a qualitative assessment of the degree of
incompetence by counsel or the nature of his conduct but upon the effect of the
failure on the accused’s right to a fair trial. It can only be said to have resulted in a
miscarriage of justice if it has deprived the accused of his right to a fair trial. That
can only be said to have occurred where the conduct was such that the accused’s
defence was not presented to the court. This may be because the accused was
deprived of the opportunity to present his defence, or because his counsel or
solicitor acted contrary to his instructions as to the defence which he wished to
put or because of other conduct which had the effect that, because his defence was
not presented to the court, a fair trial was denied to him.”
986. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Flanagan (judgment 29th July 2004) made reference to
Doherty & McGregor v R [1997] 2 Cr App R 218 at 220. These
authorities now need to be read in light of Boodram and the
subsequent authorities on the point. In Doherty it was stated that
unless in the particular circumstances it can be demonstrated that in
the light of the information available to him at the time no reasonably
competent counsel would sensibly have adopted the course taken by
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him at the time when he took it grounds of appeal on the basis of
criticism of counsel should not be advanced. The Appeal Division in
Flanagan stated that this was rightly a high test and added at
paragraph 39:
“Without such a test it is easy to ignore the difficulties faced by an advocate under
the immediate pressure of the trial process and to be seduced by the easily made
submission that the case could have been conducted in a different way to the
defendant’s benefit. We agree that the cases where it will be appropriate to quash
a conviction on the basis of criticisms of a defence advocate’s conduct must
inevitably be very rare.”
987. In respect of appeals and allegations of defective legal representation
see Woodside v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 19 and an article by
Shiels Professional Conduct and the Solicitor Advocate 2009 Crim
LR 794.
988. The Appeal Division (Deemster Kerruish and Deemster Doyle) in
Hall (judgment 16th March 2007) considered the facts of that case and
some of the relevant law as follows:
“[10] The Appellant maintained that immediately prior to his appearance before
the High Bailiff on 5th December 2006, the advocate had indicated that if the
Appellant pleaded guilty he would seek to have the disqualification limited to a
couple of months with a reasonable fine. The Appellant further maintained that
reliant upon such alleged indication, he contacted his then employer with whom
he was employed as a driver, and received confirmation that such disqualification
would not cause his employment to be terminated. According to the Appellant,
the indications allegedly given by the advocate, and the response he received from
his employer, led him to decide to plead guilty to the charge.
[11] We record that since the Appellant appeared in person before us, we did not
have benefit of assistance from the advocate. However, if such alleged advice was
given then it flies in the face of the courts' sentencing powers relevant to an
offence under section 2 of the Act. Pursuant to Schedules 6 and 3 of the Act,
following a guilty plea or conviction for an offence under section 2,
disqualification for a period of not less than twelve months is obligatory unless
there are special reasons. A 'special reason' is one, which is special to the facts of
the particular case, in other words, a mitigating or extenuating circumstance, not
amounting in law to a defence to the charge, yet directly connected with the
commission of the offence, and one which the court ought properly to take into
consideration when imposing punishment see Williams v Culverhouse (SOGD
judgment 27th July 2004), and Whittall v Kirby [1947] KB 194. There were no
special reasons raised by the advocate in his mitigation. Further, under Schedule
3, upon such a conviction, the court is obligated to require that the disqualification
continues until the offender passes his test.
[12] The courts have made it clear that there are only very restricted
circumstances in which a court will interfere with a conviction or sentence on the
grounds of the alleged conduct, or competence of Counsel. In Flanagan - v - The
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Attorney General on behalf of the Queen (SOGD) judgment 29th July 2004, this
Court stated at paragraphs 38 and 39:-
"38. … Unless in the particular circumstances it can be demonstrated that in the
light of the information available to him at the time no reasonably competent
counsel would sensibly have adopted the course taken by him at the time when he
took it, these grounds of appeal should not be advanced.
39. Such is a high test and rightly so. Without such a test it is easy to ignore the
difficulties faced by an advocate under the immediate pressure of the trial process
and to be seduced by the easily made submission that the case could have been
conducted in a different way to the defendant's benefit. We agree that the cases
where it will be appropriate to quash a conviction on the basis of criticisms of a
defence advocate's conduct must inevitably be very rare."
[13] This particular issue was considered more recently in Bally Sheng Balson –v-
The State [PC Appeal No. 26 of 2004]. We refer to the judgment of that court
delivered by Lord Hope of Craighead and in particular those parts at paragraph 36
and part of paragraph 37 which read:-
“36. Their Lordships have had in mind the formulation of the test to be applied
where counsel's conduct is called into question which was formulated by de la
Bastide CJ in the Court of Appeal in Boodram v The State [2002] UKPC 20;
[2002] 1 Cr App R 12 and which was endorsed by the Board in that case: para 39.
The question, as the Chief Justice put it, is whether the conduct of counsel has
become so extreme as to result in a denial of due process to his client. Among the
examples he gave was the case where counsel conducted the defence without
taking his client's instructions. His formulation of the test is consistent with the
approach which has been taken in several other jurisdictions. The comparative
jurisprudence on this issue was examined in depth by the High Court of Justiciary
in Scotland in Anderson v HM Advocate, 1996 JC 29. Among the cases referred
in that judgment were R v Clinton [1993] 1 WLR 1181, R v McLoughin [1985] 1
NZLR 106, R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677, Sankar v The State [1995] 1 WLR
194 and Mills v The Queen [1995] 1 WLR 511. The Lord Justice General (Hope),
delivering the opinion of the court, said at p 43 that the question depended not
upon a qualitative assessment of the degree of incompetence by counsel or the
nature of his conduct but upon the effect of the failure on the accused's right to a
fair trial. At p 44 he said of such conduct:
‘It can only be said to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice if it has deprived
the accused of his right to a fair trial. That can only be said to have occurred
where the conduct was such that the accused's defence was not presented to the
court. This may be because the accused was deprived of the opportunity to present
his defence, or because his counsel or solicitor acted contrary to his instructions as
to the defence which he wished to be put or because of other conduct which had
the effect that, because his defence was not presented to the court, a fair trial was
denied to him.’
37. …There is no question in this case of the appellant having been deprived of
the opportunity to present his defence or of his being deprived of a fair trial.” ”
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989. ConsiderMuirhead (Privy Council judgment delivered 28th July 2008)
allowing the appeal and criticising counsel’s failure to assist in respect
of the defendant’s allegations against counsel.
990. Lord Carswell delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in Bernard
on the 10th May 2007 and the following are extracts:
“23. A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to a fair trial at common law, and
the constitutional right to due process of law and the protection of the law under
section 4 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago will, if infringed, also entitle
a citizen to a remedy: cf Boodram v The State [2001] UKPC 20; [2002] 1 Cr App
R 103. In a case like that under appeal, the danger which may arise from
inadequate representation is that in the absence of effective conduct of the
defence, the conviction may be unsafe and there may be a miscarriage of justice.
24. Their Lordships do not consider that it could ever be justifiable to appoint
counsel of three months’ standing to defend a client on his own in a capital
murder trial. Even when one cannot readily point to specific matters with which
he failed to deal effectively, it cannot be supposed that he has the maturity of
judgment and experience of tactics, handling of evidence and presentation to be
able to make correctly the myriad of necessary decisions in the course of a major
trial , many of which require instant and sure reaction for which experience alone
fits an advocate…
27. … It does not inevitably follow that a conviction will be set aside
on the ground of unfairness if there have been some errors in the conduct of the
trial. It is a matter of degree, but factors which may affect one’s conclusion are
the seriousness of the defects, bearing in mind the gravity of the charges faced by
the defendant, and on the other hand the weight of the prosecution case against
him. Lord Bingham of Cornhill expressed the principle in Randall v The Queen
[2002] UKPC 19, [2002] 1 WLR 2237, 2251, para 28:
“While reference has been made above to some of the rules which should be
observed in a well-conducted trial to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, it
is not every departure from good practice which renders a trial unfair. Inevitably,
in the course of a long trial, things are done or said which should not be done or
said. Most occurrences of that kind do not undermine the integrity of the trial,
particularly if they are isolated and particularly if, where appropriate, they are the
subject of a clear judicial direction. It would emasculate the trial process, and
undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal justice, if a
standard of perfection were imposed that was incapable of attainment in practice.
But the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is absolute. There will come a
point when the departure from good practice is so gross, or so persistent, or so
prejudicial, or so irremediable that an appellate court will have no choice but to
condemn a trial as unfair and quash a conviction as unsafe, however strong the
grounds for believing the defendant to be guilty. The right to a fair trial is one to
be enjoyed by the guilty as well as the innocent for a defendant is presumed to be
innocent until proved to be otherwise in a fairly conducted trial.” ”
[conviction set aside and bearing in mind the lapse of time since the killing of Mr
Saroop in February 1990 the Privy Council did not regard it as appropriate that
there should be a retrial]
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991. In Burzala v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 67 the Scottish High Court
of Justiciary held that an appeal based on defective representation
could only succeed where there had been a miscarriage of justice,
which could only have occurred if the conduct of the defence
deprived the appellant of his right to a fair trial. That in turn could
only be said to have occurred if the appellant’s defence was not
presented in court, but the manner in which a defence was conducted
was a matter for the professional judgment of counsel and criticism of
strategic or tactical decisions as to how the defence should be
presented was not sufficient to support an appeal on the ground of
defective representation if those decisions were reasonably and
responsibly made by counsel in accordance with his or her
professional judgment.
992. The Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v Washington
466 US 668 (1984) dealt with issues in respect of allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The benchmark for judging any
claims of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. The same
principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding in the United
States of America. The proper standard for judging attorney
performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all
the circumstances. When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance the defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential and a fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the
time. A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. With regard to the showing of prejudice the proper
standard requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A
court hearing on ineffectiveness claims must consider the totality of
the evidence before the judge or jury. See also Wiggins v Smith 539
US 510 (2002) and Rompilla v Beard 545 US 374 (2005). Kelly
Green in There’s less in this than meets the eye: Why Wiggins doesn’t
fix Strickland and what the court should do instead 29 Vt.L.Rev 647
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provides some interesting comments in respect of the position in the
United States of America.
993. Where one of the grounds of appeal is an allegation that counsel at the
trial deliberately disobeyed his instructions it is important that those
acting for the appellant take some steps to ascertain from counsel
concerned what he has to say about the matter. In Roberto Malasi
[2008] EWCA 2505 Thomas L J stated:
“14 We shall proceed to determine the case on the basis that those instructions
were given and were not followed by his counsel. However, it is very important
that we make the following observation because we wish it to be acted upon by
those responsible for the proper conduct of the affairs of the Bar of England and
Wales.
15 It is invariably the course that where criticism is made of counsel, particularly
eminent and experienced leading counsel, and particularly criticism of the gravity
made in this case, namely that counsel did not follow the instructions of someone
on trial for murder, that before an appeal is brought on that basis, and certainly
before it is renewed before this court, that some steps are taken to ascertain from
counsel concerned what he has to say about that matter. The reasons are obvious.
16 Unfortunately, in this case, when new solicitors and counsel, whom we shall
not name in public, were instructed, although they wrote numerous letters to this
court complaining about the refusal of the registrar to grant more legal aid, it
appears from what we have been told today, but we know not whether it is correct
or not, no one took the elementary step of asking leading counsel what had
happened. It is always difficult for this court when dealing with cases of this kind
to trespass into areas of professional privilege, but it is normally the case that
where criticism is made privilege is always waived and the most careful steps are
taken. This is not a case where it is alleged that what was done by counsel was
merely not in accordance with is proper standards, it is case where it is alleged
that he deliberately disobeyed the instructions of his client. That is a very grave
allegation to make against such a distinguished counsel and on which to pursue an
application for appeal. We do not think, for our part, that it is proper for such an
application to be pursued or made without those elementary steps being taken. We
did not want to delay the further conduct of this appeal, because, as we have said
and as we shall further explain in a moment, we have proceeded on the basis that
counsel deliberately disobeyed the instructions, but it is a matter of concern to us
and the professional standing of those involved, not counsel here today, as to how
this matter has come to this court in this way when such a grave allegation is
made against a member of the Bar and no steps have been taken to see what he
has to say about it.
17 We proceed, as we have said, to consider the matter on the basis that counsel
deliberately disobeyed his client’s instructions on a charge of murder on a matter
so central to the trial of the case, namely whether the jury that was to try him
should be discharged.”
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994. On appeal defence counsel cannot blow hot and cold (Lucas [1991]
Crim LR 844, and R v Smith [2005] UKHL 12). The defendant should
present his case at trial and not keep any cards up his sleeve to play
for the first time at appeal (R v Neaven [2007] 2 All ER 891). In
Watterson 1978-80 MLR 105 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Glidewell and Deemster Eason) held that if were to be argued that a
fair trial was not possible because of media coverage the point might
properly to be raised before the trial commenced and not merely on
appeal. Criminal defence lawyers should not hold cards up sleeves
and the court should bear in mind the advantage of the court at first
instance seeing the witnesses (AG v Steinhoff Privy Council judgment
delivered on the 19th July 2005).
995. In Pitman v The State (Privy Council judgment 3rd March 2008) the
following was stated at paragraph 24:
“It is the duty of the court in a criminal appeal to take account of all the grounds
which could reasonably be advanced on behalf of an appellant, whether or not
they have been sufficiently argued.”
996. In respect of appeals against conviction on guilty pleas see paragraph
2-195 of Archbold to the effect that if a plea of guilty is tendered in a
summary court was an unequivocal plea (i.e. a plea which could not
be described as a “guilty but…” plea) then once the sentence has been
passed by the summary court and the conviction is accordingly
complete it is too late for any court to entertain an application for a
change of plea.
997. In Hall (Appeal Division judgment 16th March 2007) the appellant
before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction had pleaded guilty to a
charge of dangerous driving and endeavoured to appeal against
conviction and sentence. The Appeal Division (Deemster Kerruish
and Deemster Doyle) stated:
“[14] We refer to section 103(1) Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989, which provides:
“103 Right of appeal against conviction or sentence
(1) A person convicted by a court of summary jurisdiction may appeal to the High
Court –
(a) if he pleaded guilty, against his sentence;
(b) if he did not, against the conviction or sentence or both.”
At first sight, such provision prevents the Appellant seeking to appeal his
conviction.
[15] The equivalent statutory provision in England and Wales to section 103 is
section 108(1) Magistrates Courts Act 1980, the origin of which was section 36
Criminal Justice Act 1948. Such latter provision was the subject of consideration
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in R -v- West Kent Quarter Sessions Appeal Committee ex parte Files 2 All ER
(1951) 727 and again by Lord Goddard CJ in his judgment in R -v- Durham
Quarter Sessions ex parte Virgo 1 All ER (1952) 465. In that case Lord Goddard
CJ reviewed his earlier judgment in West Kent. In particular we refer to that part
of Lord Goddard's judgment in Durham at 469d which part reads:-
“I think the concluding words of my judgment go too far. Where the question in
the case is whether or not the plea which was put in by the prisoner at the hearing
before the justices amounted to a plea of Guilty or Not Guilty, that is a matter
which the court can entertain. It would be putting it too high against an
unrepresented prisoner who, when first charged, had said that he pleaded Guilty
but, before being sentenced, had made to the court a statement which showed that
he meant to deny that he had acted feloniously or criminally, to say: 'You said you
were Guilty, and, therefore, there is an end of it'. It must not be taken that the
concluding words of my judgment in the West Kent case preclude courts of
quarter sessions from considering whether the plea which was made before the
court of summary jurisdiction, taking all that the prisoner said together, was a plea
of Guilty or Not Guilty."
Lord Goddard then continued at 469h:-
“Quarter sessions came to the conclusion that the plea of Guilty was wrongly
recorded, not because the defendant did not understand or did not intend to plead
otherwise than he did, but because, taking the whole of his plea together, they
were satisfied that in law it amounted to a plea of Not Guilty. I think they were
right in entertaining the appeal to that extent and that, as the defendant had never
been tried on a plea of Not Guilty, they were entitled to treat the conviction as a
nullity as the court did in R -v- Ingleson. ([1915] 1 KB 512).”
[16] The authorities make it clear that if a plea of “guilty” tendered in a court of
summary jurisdiction was an unequivocal plea that is a plea which could not be
described as a "guilty but …" plea, then once sentence has been passed by that
court and the conviction is accordingly complete, it is too late for an appellate
court to entertain an application for a change of plea, see S (an Infant) -v-
Manchester City Recorder (1971) AC 481 HL. Also, a plea is not equivocal
because it is based upon incorrect or corrupted evidence, see R -v- Bolton J ex
parte Scally (1991) 1 QB 537DC, where relief was available on judicial review.
We refer to Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (2007) paragraphs
2-195 to 197. This Court is entitled to enquire into the question whether the plea
entered before the summary court was equivocal. However, unless there is
something which prima facie raises the issue of an equivocal plea having been
tendered before the court of summary jurisdiction, this Court ought not to make
inquiry. The issue of equivocality is confined to what went on before the court of
summary jurisdiction. If the evidence reveals that nothing occurred there to render
the plea equivocal that is the end of the matter and this Court will proceed to hear
the appeal against sentence, if pursued. In a case of an appellant producing some
prima facie and credible evidence tending to show that the plea before the court of
summary jurisdiction was equivocal, this Court may seek assistance from a
transcript of the proceedings in the court below, or, if it is considered more
conducive to justice, from such court as to what happened before that court and
only after considering such assistance should this Court decide the issue. In P.
Foster (Haulage) Limited -v- Roberts, 67 Cr.App.R. 305, DC it was said that the
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Crown Court should ask itself three questions, (a) was the plea itself equivocal?,
(b) if not, did anything occur during the proceedings which should have led the
justices to consider whether they should exercise their discretion to invite or
permit a change of plea?, (c) if so, had it been shown that by not inviting a change
of plea the justices had exercised their discretion wrongly? As to the second issue,
such court stated that if the defendant is legally represented, it will be rare that it
can be said that it ought to have been apparent to the justices that they should
consider exercising their discretion to invite a change of plea. If, however, the
mitigation, other than general assertion in mitigation, is inconsistent with the legal
ingredients of the offence, or with the plea, then the court of summary jurisdiction
should not shy from doing so.
[17] The transcript records two exchanges between the Appellant, and the High
Bailiff. We refer to the first such exchange:
"HIGH BAILIFF: Mr Lee David Hall it's alleged that on the 3rd of June this year
on the Snaefell Mountain Road at Kate's Cottage you drove a motorcycle
dangerously. What do you say to that? Guilty or not guilty?
MR HALL: Not guilty to speeding No Sir.
HIGH BAILIFF: You're not charged with speeding, you're charged with
dangerous driving.
MR. HALL: Guilty Sir.
HIGH BAILIFF: Okay thank you, sit down."
After the imposition of the sentence, the following exchange is recorded:-
"Mr. Hall: Can I just say that I've been coming for the last ten years and I've
never, ever had a black mark on my record over here in anything.
High Bailiff: Yes.
Mr. Hall: I mean, I don't even drink when I'm over here on purpose. I mean I am
very careful, it was just I come down the hill, saw the straight, saw the 60 zone, I
looked in my mirrors first and then braked. If I wouldn't have looked in my
mirrors ..
High Bailiff: I appreciate what you're …
Mr. Hall: I would not have been getting caught speeding. I am a safe rider."
Later Mr. Hall states:-
"Mr. Hall: That's why I've come today and I've pleaded guilty. Because I know,
yes I know I've been speeding. I was 26 foot inside. If I wouldn't have looked in
my mirrors I would have stopped."
Such exchanges might be taken to indicate some doubt, or confusion in the
Appellant's mind.
[18] We also refer to section 2(A) of the Act which provides:-
“2A Meaning of dangerous driving
(1) For the purposes of sections 1 and 2 a person is to be regarded as driving
dangerously if (and, subject to subsection (2), only if) -
(a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and
careful driver, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way
would be dangerous.
(2) A person is also to be regarded as driving dangerously for the purposes of
sections 1 and 2 if it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that
driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous.
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(3) In subsections (1) and (2) 'dangerous' refers to danger either of injury to any
person or of serious damage to property; and in determining for the purposes of
those subsections what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and
careful driver in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the
circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to
circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.
(4) In determining for the purposes of subsection (2) the state of a vehicle, regard
may be had to anything attached to or carried on or in it and to the manner in
which it is attached or carried.
We record that there was no concern raised by the prosecution as to the state of
the Appellant's motorcycle. It is also important to keep in mind the high threshold
set by section 2A, see R –v- Conteh (2004) RTR 1, CA.
[19] The summary of facts and the transcript demonstrate that the prosecution
before the High Bailiff relied solely upon speed. Indeed such was readily accepted
by Miss Braidwood. Speed alone cannot found an offence of dangerous driving.
The question of speed must be placed within the context of all the circumstances
of the alleged offence, see Archbold 2007 at paragraph 32-17. In this particular
case, placing the Appellant's speed within the context of all the circumstances was
very material, but not raised by defence. We are content that the Appellant's
appreciation was that speed alone was sufficient to found the offence. Also, whilst
in this appeal we had not benefit of assistance from the advocate, a reading of the
transcript without such assistance could lead to the conclusion that it was
considered by him that the court had a general discretion as to the minimum
period of disqualification it could impose. In all the circumstances, we concluded
that the Appellant's plea of "guilty" was an equivocal plea, and, in what we
viewed to be a rare and exceptional case, determined to allow the appeal against
conviction. Accordingly, we quashed the conviction and sentences imposed, and
remitted the matter to the High Bailiff's court.”
998. In respect of appeals and assertions of inconsistent verdicts see R v
Volante (Appeal Division judgment 5th September 2008).
The proviso and retrials
999. Section 33(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that the
Appeal Division, even though it thinks that the point raised in the
appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, may dismiss the
appeal if it considers that no miscarriage of justice has actually
occurred. This provision is frequently referred to as the proviso.
1000. In Watterson v R 1978-80 MLR 105 Judge of Appeal Glidewell
delivering the judgment of the Appeal Division came to the
conclusion that part of Deemster Luft’s summing up contained a
misdirection and at page 112 added:
“That means that the court has had to consider whether it should apply the
proviso. The test, as the court sees it, is whether it can say that it is satisfied, using
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the usual criminal standard of proof that a jury properly directed in this respect
but directed exactly as it was directed in every other respect would have
convicted. The court’s view is that there was a very strong case for the
prosecution here and that it is very likely that a jury would have convicted but it
can not say that it is satisfied that a jury would so have convicted.”
1001. See Stafford v The State [1999] 1 WLR 2026, 2029-2030 Lord Hope
and Dookran v The State (Privy Council judgment 7th March 2007) in
respect of the proviso and retrials. Lord Rodger commented at
paragraphs 12 and 14 to the effect that if the appeal court decides that
some of the evidence was inadmissible it will uphold the conviction
only if the appeal court is satisfied that without that evidence a
reasonable jury would inevitably have convicted. See also the
judgment of the Privy Council in Barlow (judgment delivered on the
8th July 2009) in respect of the application of the proviso. The Privy
Council referred to Matenga [2009] NZSC 18 and stated that there
could be no question of applying the proviso if what went wrong at
the trial made the trial unfair. The fairness of the trial has to be judged
in the light of the proceedings as a whole. In Barlow the Privy
Council held that the introduction of certain inadmissible evidence
was not such a departure from the essential requirements of the law
that it went to the root of the proceedings. The Privy Council went on
to consider whether the potentially adverse effect of the introduction
of some inadmissible evidence on the result of the trial may actually,
that is in reality, have occurred. In doing so the Privy Council
considered whether in light of all the admissible evidence,
notwithstanding the miscarriage of admitting the unsustainable part of
some of the expert evidence, the guilty verdict was inevitable in the
sense of being the only reasonably possible verdict of that evidence
(see paragraph 59 of the Privy Council’s judgment). The Privy
Council for this purpose took into account the relevant evidence as a
whole both tending to incriminate the defendant and that in his favour.
1002. See Flanagan (Appeal Division judgment 29th July 2004) at
paragraphs 43-45 and section 33(2) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act
1993. Consider whether any miscarriage of justice has actually
occurred. Was the evidence against the defendant overwhelming?
Were convictions inevitable even without the inadmissible evidence
or error? See High Court of Australia judgments in Libke v R [2007]
HCA 30 regarding the application of the proviso.
1003. In R v Newbery (judgment 30th September 2004) the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) accepted the trial
judge’s assessment that the defendant had been convicted on “quite
overwhelming evidence.” The Appeal Division felt that there was
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formidable evidence against the appellant. The Appeal Division had
“absolutely no doubt that his convictions are safe and satisfactory and that there
was no miscarriage of justice.”
1004. In Pipersburgh v The Queen (Privy Council judgment 21st February
2008) reference was made to the issue of the proviso in the
circumstances of that case at paragraph 30 of the judgment.
Identification evidence was in issue in that case. Crucial evidence by
way of dock identifications was given by Crown witnesses. Evidence
of the appellants’ disappearance and flight to Mexico soon after the
murders was striking indeed. But it was legally significant only when
taken along with the evidence on which the Crown relied to show that
the appellants had been on the scene and involved in the murders.
Since the judge failed to direct the jury properly on the approach
which they should adopt when considering the key identification
evidence, and in particular, failed to tell them that they required to
approach it with great care, the Board could not affirm that, even if
properly directed, the jury would inevitably have reached the same
verdicts. The convictions were regarded as unsafe. The Privy
Council’s advice was that the appeals should be allowed and the
matter remitted to the Court of Appeal with a direction to that court to
quash the convictions and to consider whether a retrial should be
ordered, the appellants remaining in custody meanwhile.
1005. See Devo (Appeal Division judgment delivered on the 29th October
2008) in respect of the proviso. At paragraph 166 the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) stated that they
“did not consider that no miscarriage of justice had actually occurred and thus we
were not entitled to, and did not, apply the proviso.” At paragraph 167 the
Appeal Division referred to the long and complicated trial, large
number of counts eventually reduced to 4, late disclosure by the
prosecution, substantial time elapsing since the events in question,
risk of custody and concluded:
“In all those circumstances we could not conclude that the interests of justice
required that there should be a re-trial.”
1006. See also Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 and Nudd v The
Queen (2006) 80 ALJR 614 (judgments of the High Court of
Australia) in respect of appeals and the application of the proviso.
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Appeals in respect of admissibility of evidence decisions
1007. In DPP v Chand [2007] EWHC 90 (Admin) January 17, 2007 it was
stated that:
“The approach to consideration in the Court of Appeal of a Crown Court judge’s
decision, as set out in Hanson, Gilmore and Plckston, The Times, March 24, 2005
(“if a judge has directed himself or herself correctly, this Court will be very slow
to interfere with a ruling as to admissibility … it will not interfere unless the
judge’s judgment as to the capacity of prior events to establish propensity is
plainly wrong, or discretion has been exercised unreasonably in the Wednesbury
sense”) applied equally to consideration of an appeal in the Administrative Court
against a decision by a district judge (magistrates’ court).”
Reluctance to interfere with case management decisions
1008. The authorities indicate that the Appeal Division should be slow to
interfere with case management decisions made by a trial Deemster.
See for example C [2007] EWCA Crim 2532 (in respect of a refusal
by the trial judge to adjourn a trial to enable the prosecutor to arrange
for the attendance of the complainant, whose evidence was vital to the
prosecution case but who had made clear her refusal to attend). It was
emphasized by the English Court of Appeal that trial judges are best
placed to make case management decisions and severe restrictions are
placed on the English Court of Appeal’s powers to interfere.
Appeals by defence against sentence
1009. Under section 33(4) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 on an
appeal against sentence the Appeal Division (a) if it thinks that a
different sentence should have been passed, shall quash the sentence
passed at the trial and pass such other sentence authorised in law by
the verdict (whether more or less severe) in substitution for it as the
Appeal Division thinks ought to have been passed, and (b) in any
other case shall dismiss the appeal. Under subsection (5) it is provided
that the Appeal Division shall not increase a sentence by reason of or
in consideration of any evidence which was not given at the trial.
1010. Section 34 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 concerns the
substitution of verdict or sentence. Section 37 concerns supplemental
powers of the Appeal Division.
1011. In Jones v R 1999-01 MLR 369 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Tattersall and Deemster Cain) held that it could consider
circumstances unknown to the sentencer existing at the time of
sentence but not events subsequent to sentence. In O’Callaghan v
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Teare 1981-83 MLR 103 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal
Hytner and Deemster Luft) held that it would be inappropriate to
grant leave to withdraw the appeal as it raised serious constitutional
questions regarding the legality of the sentence imposed and there was
a need to re-examine the sentence in the light of the appellant’s desire
that it now be executed.
1012. The Appeal Division (Deemster Kneale and Deemster Moore) in
Perry v Clague 1961-71 MLR 162 held that as a general rule the
appeal court would not alter a sentence unless it was so excessive or
so inadequate that it appeared there had been a failure to apply the
right principles.
1013. The Appeal Division also has the power to increase a sentence when
considering a defence appeal against sentence. The power to increase
a sentence should be exercised with great caution.
1014. The Privy Council in Earl Williams (judgment delivered 15th March
2005) dealt with the position where the appellate court was
considering increasing the sentence. In Boyce v Killip 1961-71 MLR
349 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Bingham and Deemster
Moore) indicated that the increase of a sentence on a defence appeal
against sentence was improper unless the appellant had been warned
that an increase was possible. The appellant needs to be warned of
possible increase in sentence on appeal and given an opportunity to be
heard and to consider whether to proceed with his appeal against
sentence. The appellant in such circumstances should be given an
opportunity to ask for leave to withdraw his appeal against sentence.
This was a necessary part of a fair hearing. In O’Callaghan v Teare
1981-83 MLR 103 the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Hytner and
Deemster Luft) indicated that the Appeal Division would normally
exercise its discretion to allow an appellant, who discovered that a
heavier penalty could be imposed on appeal, to withdraw his appeal
against sentence without giving the required notice.
1015. The Privy Council in Oliver (judgment delivered 26th February 2007
in the Bahamas) stated:
“16. …The principles which have now been established can be summarised in the
following propositions:
(a) The power to increase a sentence must be sparingly exercised and then only
in cases where the sentence imposed by the trial court was manifestly inadequate;
in all cases the reasons for exercising this drastic power must be explained:
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Kailaysur v The State of Mauritius [2004] UKPC 23; [2004] 1 WLR 2316, para 9,
per Lord Steyn.
(b) An appellate court which is considering an increase in sentence should
invariably give an applicant for leave to appeal or his counsel an indication to that
effect and an opportunity to address the court on this increase or to ask for leave
to withdraw the application: Williams v The State [2005] UKPC 11, [2005] 1
WLR 1948, para 10; Skeete v The State [2003] UKPC 82, para 44.
In Skeete v The State the appellant had appealed only against conviction and had
not brought any appeal against sentence, while in Williams v The State the matter
before the court was an application for leave to appeal, as distinct from a full
appeal. In Williams their Lordships distinguished on the latter ground the
decision of the Divisional Court in R v Manchester Crown Court, ex parte Welby
(1981) 73 Cr App R 248, in which Lord Lane CJ stated that once the hearing of
an appeal against sentence has started, it will be only in exceptional circumstances
that leave to abandon it will be granted. The reason is clear, that if the law were
otherwise an appellant could attack a sentence and then, if the reaction of the
appellate court was unfavourable and he appeared to be at risk of an increase, he
could withdraw the appeal with impunity. Their Lordships appreciate the
distinction, but consider that the same principles should apply to appeals as to
applications for leave to appeal, save that leave to withdraw a full appeal should
be given rather more sparingly. They have no doubt that in all cases where the
appellate court is considering an increase it should give a clear indication to that
effect and give the appellant or his counsel an opportunity to address them on the
point, since there are specific considerations relating to a possible increase, as
distinct from those relating to the imposition of the original sentence.”
1016. In respect of a defendant appealing on the grounds that a co-defendant
received a more lenient sentence see Lord Bingham in O’Brien v
Independent Assessor [2007] UKHL 10. See also the English Court of
Appeal decision in R v Tate [2006] EWCA Crim 2373 at paragraph
20. The fact that a co-defendant appears to have been extremely
fortunate is not a good ground for imposing a sentence on the
appellant that would be less than the facts of the case merit.
1017. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Roberts (judgment 1st June 2007) stated:
“56. A common-sense test for determining whether there is such disparity as
would justify the intervention of this court was defined by Lawton LJ in R v
Fawcett (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 158 - a case which involved different sentences
imposed by different judges - thus:
‘Would right-thinking members of the public, with full knowledge of all the
relevant facts and circumstances, learning of this sentence consider that
something had gone wrong with the administration of justice?’
57. Mrs Jones agreed that this court should apply such test and we do so.
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58. Having regard to the facts of this case, in our judgment the answer to that
question is ‘No’. These sentences were imposed by the same judge at the same
time. Although we agree with Mrs Jones that, in the context of serious drug
offences, previous good character offers limited mitigation, Deemster Doyle
clearly believed that the personal mitigation available to each defendant was
different and justified a significant difference in the length of the custodial
sentences imposed. We do not disagree. We are satisfied that Deemster Doyle, in
the exercise of his discretion, was entitled to conclude that Roberts who had
committed serious drug offences on three occasions in about 10 years should
receive a significantly longer custodial sentence than Teare who had not
previously offended.”
1018. The Appeal Division will normally only interfere if the sentence was
manifestly excessive or wrong in principle or wrong in law for
example if the court no power to impose it. In Perry v Clague 1961-
71 MLR 162 (an authority frequently cited by the Appeal Division)
Deemster Moore sitting in the Appeal Division in October 1965
referred to R v Ball (1951) 35 Cr App R 164 and applied the dicta of
Hilbery J giving the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in
England as follows:
“In the first place, this Court does not alter a sentence which is the subject of an
appeal merely because the members of the Court might have passed a different
sentence.”
1019. To justify interference the Appeal Division need to be persuaded that
the sentence was unduly lenient (not just lenient) or was manifestly
excessive or that there was a failure to apply the correct principles.
The Deemster at first instance has a sentencing discretion and the
Appeal Division should exercise appropriate restraint when
considering interfering with a sentence. If the sentence is manifestly
excessive or wrong in principle or unduly lenient then the Appeal
Division should interfere. If it is not the Appeal Division should not
interfere with the sentence imposed even if they would have imposed
a different sentence.
1020. Kirby J in Postiglione v R (1997) 189 CLR 295 at 336-337 stated:
“It is well established that when performing their function sentencing judges
must be accorded a wide measure of latitude which will be respected by the
appellate courts so long as the sentencing judge has taken into account the
relevant considerations of law and fact, the appellate court will not ordinarily
intervene. [T]he proper approach is one of vigilance within a context of appellate
restraint.”
1021. The Appeal Division (Deemster Cain and Deemster Kerruish) in
Edwards (judgment 26th February 2001) at paragraph 12 stated:
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“In general and broad terms this Court’s approach to an appeal such as that before
us today is that this Court will interfere with the sentence imposed when (a) the
sentence is not justified by law, in which case it will interfere not as a matter of
discretion but of law; (b) where sentence has been passed on the wrong factual
basis; (c) where some matter has been improperly taken into account or there is
some fresh matter to be taken into account; or (d) where the sentence was wrong
in principle or manifestly excessive. Such categories are not however exhaustive.”
1022. The Jersey Court of Appeal in Harrison v Attorney General 2004 JLR
111 indicated that the Court of Appeal would interfere with a sentence
passed by the Royal Court where:
(a) it was not justified by law;
(b) it was passed on a wrong factual basis;
(c) some matter had been improperly taken into account or some
fresh matter needed consideration;
(d) the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.
1023. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Westhead (judgment 23rd May 2006) dealt with an appeal
in respect of sentences of custody totalling 10 years imposed for
various drug and drug related offences. The judgment is a useful
illustration as to the approach of the Appeal Division in respect of
appeals against sentence. The following are extracts from the
judgment:
“11 … The Appellant was arrested. In interview … In interview he said that he
was holding the drugs for someone in return for the cancellation of a debt.
Deemster Doyle sentenced on that basis although he observed that the Appellant
acted as a minder without compulsion. In this context we remind ourselves what
this court said in Gillies v Attorney General [16th April 2004]:
"[20] A person who acts as a minder, facilitator, warehouseman, or banker for a
drug dealer facilitates the latter in his illegal activity, and assists the latter to
reduce the risk of detection and arrest. Absent proper compulsion, which is
supported by credible evidence, and the lack of significant mitigation, such as
identification of the dealer, the trial court is entitled to view a minder, facilitator,
warehouseman, or banker as having committed an offence for which the
sentencing starting point ought to be the same as that for a dealer in the
appropriate quantity, quality, and type of drug. The sentencing court will then be
entitled to take into account, if it accepts that the offender was a minder,
facilitator, warehouseman, or banker, all relevant mitigating, and aggravating
factors, including, but not limited to, the circumstances, and period[s] of the
facilitation, and the offender's previous convictions."
12. The Appellant pleaded guilty to all offences. The offence of possession of
cocaine with intent to supply had been committed whilst he was on bail for the
offences committed on 1st February 2005. In respect of that offence and that of
production, Deemster Doyle expressly said that he was giving the Appellant
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'some credit' for his guilty pleas but added that such was in the context that he had
little realistic alternative but to plead guilty. In our judgment this was an
appropriate approach which reflects what this court said in Caldwell- Camp v R
[2003-05] MLR 505 when we said this:
"[66] The sentencer will wish to have due regard to a guilty plea and to apply an
appropriate discount. It is in the public interest that the expenditure of time and
money on a full trial is avoided. Although discount will be given we suggest that
where there is no sensible alternative to a guilty plea the discount will be more
limited."
13. Mr. Kermode submitted that the learned Deemster failed to give the Appellant
sufficient credit for his plea of guilty to the money laundering offence. We remind
ourselves that such plea was made in the face of a wealth of prosecution evidence.
Further Mr. Kermode accepted that taking all the circumstances into account, the
sentence of two years custody, absent the question of totality, was not manifestly
excessive and was supported by authority.
14. The Appellant is a man aged 41 years with one conviction in 1990 for the
possession of a controlled drug. He had not previously been sentenced to a term
of custody. It is said on his behalf that he was co-operative with the police.
However in our judgment the Deemster was entitled to observe that these offences
were carefully planned and pre-meditated.
15. It is settled law that the court should only interfere with the exercise of a trial
court's discretion if the sentence imposed is manifestly wrong or so excessive or
inadequate as to appear wrong in principle or if the court erred in principle: see
Perry v Clague [1961-71] MLR 162, at 166.
16. Mr. Kermode, on behalf of the Appellant, made a number of submissions.
17. Firstly, Mr. Kermode submitted that the sentence of 6 years custody for the
offence of possession of cocaine, a Class A drug, with intent to supply, was
manifestly excessive. He relied upon the Appellant's good character, that he was a
minder, his remorse and a disparity with the sentence imposed for possession with
intent to supply on Scott Farthing. Dealing with the latter first, following Lamb v
R [1999-01] MLR N11, we view that the Deemster correctly identified the
offence of possession with intent to supply as secondary to the offence of
production of a Class A drug for which offence he sentenced Mr. Farthing to six
years custody. Any argument as to disparity is thus in our judgment unfounded.
As to the Appellant's good character, whilst it is correct that the Appellant had
only one previous conviction very many years ago, it could not be ignored that for
two years prior to July 2005, he had been involved in drug trafficking of Class B
and latterly Class C drugs from which he had made substantial financial gains. As
to the Appellant being a minder, we note that he acted without compulsion and
failed to identify his principal so that the dicta which we have already cited in
Gillies are apposite. As to the Appellant's remorse, it seems to us that this was
towards his family and himself as opposed to the offences.
18. More importantly, in the light of this court's judgment in Caldwell-Camp, we
regard this submission as wholly unrealistic. In Caldwell-Camp this court, in
setting out guidelines to assist sentencing judges, indicated that it was appropriate
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that there should be bands of starting points and that the starting point, assuming a
conviction after a trial, for a quantity of Class A drug in powder form of 20 - 50
grams, should be between 7 and 9 years. In this case whilst the Appellant had
pleaded guilty, we note that the drugs had been found in the Appellant's home and
consider that he had little option but to plead guilty. In our judgment, on the facts
of this case, Deemster Doyle was entirely justified in imposing a sentence of 6
years custody.
19. Secondly, Mr. Kermode submitted that either or both of the 2 year custodial
sentences imposed for production and money laundering should have been
imposed to run concurrently. In fact the consecutive sentences were imposed for
the offences of money laundering and the possession of cocaine with intent to
supply. As a matter of principle we can see no reason why Deemster Doyle was
not fully entitled to impose consecutive sentences for each of these offences. The
former related to a substantial period of dealing in drugs which was separate to
the offence of production and in our judgment merited a consecutive sentence.
The latter related to the Appellant's possession of cocaine with intent to supply
whilst he was on bail for the offence of production. As this court said in Miller v
Attorney General [1st May 2001], when an offender commits a further offence
whilst on bail, the sentence imposed should normally be consecutive to the
sentence imposed for the offence or offences in respect of which the offender was
on bail. Accordingly we reject this submission.
20. Thirdly, Mr. Kermode submitted that looking at the totality of the offences
committed by the Appellant, the total sentence of 10 years was manifestly
excessive. Whilst we accept that the sentence was long and that a sentencing
judgment must always ensure that the totality of consecutive sentences imposed is
not excessive [see Skillen v R [1972-77] MLR 331 and Hartley v Cain [1978-80]
MLR 196], it seems to us that such a long sentence was the inevitable
consequence of the longer sentences which are likely to result from our decision
in Caldwell-Camp, the extent of the Appellant's criminality and the fact that he
had committed three separate groups of offences, one of which whilst he was on
bail. We expressly reject Mr. Kermode's submission that because all the offences
involved financial benefit from drug dealing that these offences were of the same
character and thereby justified some lesser overall sentence [see Purcell v Oake
[1990-92] MLR 185].In such circumstances we do not conclude that the overall
length of the sentence imposed on the Appellant was too long and we can see no
legitimate reason to interfere with the sentences imposed by Deemster Doyle.
21. It follows that this appeal is dismissed.”
1024. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Clinton (judgment 29th October 2009) at paragraph 78
applied the well established principles in relation to defence appeals
against sentence and concluded:
“78. Having regard to all such matters, whilst we recognise that the sentence of
15 years custody imposed on this Appellant was a severe sentence, particularly
where the only custodial sentence which he had previously served was for 3
months, we are not satisfied that the sentences imposed were manifestly wrong or
so excessive as to appear wrong in principle or that the judge erred in principle. In
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such circumstances we are not entitled to interfere with the sentencing judge’s
exercise of discretion.”
References on points of law
1025. Section 40(1) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 provides that
where a person tried on information has been acquitted the Attorney
General may, if he desires the opinion of the Appeal Division on a
point of law which has arisen in the case, refer the point to that
Division, who shall consider the point and give its opinion on it. For
the purpose of considering the point the Appeal Division shall hear
argument (a) by the Attorney General and (b) if the acquitted person
desires to present any argument to it, by an advocate on his behalf or,
with leave, by the acquitted person himself. A reference under section
40 does not affect the trial in relation to which the reference is made
or any acquittal in that trial.
1026. See the Attorney General v Hatcher Pharmaceuticals Limited (Appeal
Division judgment delivered 16th April 2008) in which the Attorney
General unsuccessfully challenged a ruling of the trial Deemster on an
issue of the correct interpretation of section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs
Act 1976. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and
Deemster Kerruish) in Hatcher dealt with interesting issues of
statutory construction in the context of criminal offences and set out
the correct approach to the construction of a penal statute.
1027. The Appeal Division in Hatcher concluded as follows:
“73. Acting Deemster Sullivan adjuded that, on the plain meaning of the words
in section 20, a person or company could not assist or induce itself to
commit a crime and that it was stretching the normal use of the words in
section 20 to conclude otherwise.
74. We entirely agree.
75. It follows that for the reasons set out above the answer to the question
posed by the Attorney General is that an offender cannot commit an
offence under section 20 Misuse of Drugs Act 1976 acting alone and that
it is a prerequisite for a conviction that the offender must have assisted or
induced another party in the commission of an offence outside the
Island.”
Unduly lenient sentences
1028. The relevant parts of section 41 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993
provide as follows:
“(1) If it appears to the Attorney General that -
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(a) the sentencing of a person sentenced by a court for any offence has been
unduly lenient; or
(b) a court has erred in law as to its powers of sentencing for such an offence,
he may, with leave of the Appeal Division, refer the case to it for review of the
sentencing of that person.
(2) On such a reference in relation to any person the Appeal Division may -
(a) quash any sentence passed on him by the court in the same proceedings; and
(b) in place of it pass on him such sentence as it thinks appropriate for the case
and as the court had power to pass in dealing with him.
…
(5) For the purpose of this section, any 2 or more sentences are to be treated as
passed in the same proceedings if -
(a) they are passed on the same day; or
(b) they are passed on different days but the court in passing any one of them
states that it is treating that one together with the other or others as substantially
one sentence,
and consecutive terms of custody and terms which are wholly or partly concurrent
are to be treated as a single term.”
1029. In R v Coleman Snr. (judgment delivered on the 29th October 2002)
the Appeal Division (Acting Deemster Carter and Acting Deemster
Scholes) stated:
“[4] The principles that we have to apply are accepted by both parties as being
exactly the same as the United Kingdom. In Attorney General’s reference number
4 of 1989 (1989) 11 Crim. App. R. (S) 517 the Court of Appeal had to consider
the correct approach to section 36 which is the equivalent section in the United
Kingdom. The then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, said at page 521
“The first thing to be observed is that it is implicit in the section that this
Court may only increase sentences which it concludes were unduly lenient. It
cannot, we are confident, have been the intention of Parliament to subject
defendants to the risk of having their sentences increased – with all the anxiety
that that naturally gives rise to – merely because in the opinion of this Court the
sentence was less than this Court would have imposed. A sentence is unduly
lenient we would hold, where it falls outside the range of sentences which the
judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider
appropriate. In that connection regard must of course be had to reported cases,
and in particular for the guidance given by this Court from time to time in the so-
called guideline cases. However it must always be remembered that sentencing is
an art rather than a science; that the trial judge is particularly well placed to assess
the weight to be given to various competing considerations, and that leniency is
not in itself a vice. That mercy should season justice is a proposition as soundly
based in law as it is in literature”.”
1030. In Patterson 2001-03 MLR N 26 the Appeal Division (Judge of
Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Cain) held that a sentence could be
considered “unduly lenient” only if it fell outside the range of sentences
which the judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could
reasonably consider appropriate, in light of the reported cases,
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especially the so-called “guideline cases”. Moreover the court should
bear in mind that leniency per se was not a vice; sentencing was an art
rather than a science; and that the trial judge was particularly well
placed to weigh the various competing considerations.
1031. If the Appeal Division increases the sentence it will take into account
the principle of double jeopardy. In effect the Appeal Division will
bear in mind that the offender has gone through the stress of having to
be sentenced twice over. This may be of significant impact in an
appeal where the Appeal Division is varying a non-custodial sentence
to a custodial sentence.
1032. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster
Kerruish) in Volante (judgment 5th September 2008) stated:
“86. In our judgment an appropriate sentence for each of these offences would
have been one of not less than 18 months custody. Notwithstanding the mitigation
put forward by Mr Quinn and the fact that the Appellant had been in custody for 6
weeks we do not believe that it was appropriate to suspend the custodial sentence.
We are thus satisfied that it is appropriate that we should quash each of the
sentences of 3 months custody suspended for 12 months and substitute therefore
longer custodial sentences which must be served forthwith.
87. However in determining the length of the custodial sentences to be imposed
we must have regard to the principles of double jeopardy. The Appellant upon his
conviction of the 4 counts surrendered his bail and was remanded in custody for 6
weeks and then sentenced in a manner which allowed his immediate release. Until
the Attorney General’s application for a review he would have believed that there
was no risk of him returning to custody and thereafter he will have suffered
anxiety as to whether his sentence might be increased necessitating his return to
custody. Whilst we have little sympathy for the Appellant, given that his
misfortune is far less than that suffered by the girls, the law requires that we take
such matters into account and we do so.
88. In all these circumstances we impose a sentence of 9 months custody on each
of the 4 counts in respect of which the Appellant was convicted, such sentences to
be served concurrently, Such sentences require that the Appellant is returned
immediately to prison to serve the balance of the sentence not yet served.”
1033. In Freeman the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and
Deemster Doyle) quashed a sentence of 5 years and substituted for it a
sentence of 7 years custody on the basis that the sentence of 5 years
was unduly lenient. The Appeal Division in a judgment delivered on
the 15th July 2003 stated:
“23. Those who commit wanton and pre-meditated acts of violence must
understand that when convicted they will be punished severely. Further those who
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are tempted to commit acts of violence must be deterred from so doing by the
sentences which the courts impose.
24. Having considered all the factors in this case, we have concluded that the
appropriate sentence after a plea of guilty in this case, was 7 years custody. We
have reached that conclusion, having taken into account the principle of double
jeopardy, which has reduced the sentence which might otherwise have been
appropriate.
25. Accordingly we quash the sentence imposed by the learned Deemster and we
substitute for it a sentence of 7 years custody. To that extent this reference by the
Attorney General succeeds and the sentence on this Defendant is so varied.”
1034. In Christian the Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and
Deemster Kerruish) in a judgment delivered on the 28th September
2004 stated:
“[14] Miss Braidwood, on behalf of the Attorney General, seeks to persuade this
court that it should review such sentences. The grounds are essentially these:
firstly, Deemster Doyle should have imposed a further custodial sentence for the
breach of the combination order and, secondly, that the learned Deemster should
have imposed consecutive sentences for the offences of possession with intent to
supply and handling. It was submitted that a substantially longer sentence would
not offend the principle of totality.
[15] The Attorney General can only refer the case to this court with the court's
leave. Whilst we readily accept Miss Braidwood's observation that there should
be public confidence in the administration of justice including the imposition of
not unduly lenient sentences, on the facts of this case we decline to grant leave.
We think that no significant points of principle arise in this case for the
consideration of the court, we think that this case turns on its own facts, we regard
the grounds put forward as inherently weak and doomed to fail and we think that
it is inappropriate to grant leave.”
1035. In Attorney General’s Reference No 77 of 1999 [2000] 2 Cr App R(S)
250 the English Court of Appeal did not interfere with a probation
order imposed on an individual who had been convicted of three
counts of indecent assault. The headnote to the report summarises the
position as follows:
“ … the sentencer was well aware that such offences usually merited immediate
imprisonment, especially where there was a breach of trust. The sentencer added
that he had decided that that was not appropriate in the present case. He took into
account the fact that the defendant had no previous convictions of the same
nature, that he had shown remorse and had accepted what he had done. The judge
was told there was a real prospect of rehabilitation. He concluded that it was an
unusual case in which an unusual course should be taken. In the light of these
considerations, the Court was not persuaded that the sentence passed, albeit
lenient, was unduly lenient. Sentencing was an art, not a science. There were
cases within the residual discretion of the sentencing judge where it was
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appropriate to take an exceptional course. This was such a case. The sentence,
though lenient, was not unduly lenient.”
1036. The Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Acting
Deemster Lockett) in Roberts 2001-03 MLR N 28 dealt with a
reference by the Attorney General pursuant to section 41(1)(a) of the
Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. The Deemster at first instance on the
7th May 2002 imposed a sentence of 12 months custody suspended for
two years in respect of five offences of theft and five offences of false
accounting. The Deemster at first instance was asked to and did take
into consideration 71 other offences of theft and false accounting. The
defendant was also ordered to pay compensation of £2,225.26. The
defendant who was a supervisor employed at a bank stole £13,231.98
from her employers over a period of about three and a half months.
The Appeal Division stated:
“[11] We accept that there was considerable mitigation in this case. The
Defendant was highly regarded, very highly regarded, by many. She admitted her
guilt. We are satisfied that she was and still is genuinely remorseful. She has
recently married and has a young baby. She is a woman of good character who
had no previous convictions. We are satisfied that it is very unlikely that she will
ever re-offend. That said, this was a very significant breach of trust by a person in
a position of some responsibility. Not only did the Defendant’s dishonesty bear
the hallmarks of planning, it continued for a period in excess of three months.
[12] In such circumstances we have come to the conclusion that the proper
sentence in this case was inevitably a custodial sentence which took immediate
effect, albeit that such was for a relatively short period. We think that such
sentence should have been 6 months custody.
[13] The real difficulty which we face is to reflect the question of double
jeopardy, especially in this case where a non-custodial sentence was imposed,
even though it is less than 2 months since the sentence was imposed. This has
much troubled us. Ultimately we have decided that although the proper sentence
would have been a sentence of 6 months immediate custody, we do not think it
would be just to now impose such sentence.
[14] In all the circumstances of this case we are not prepared to say that this
Defendant must now serve an immediate but short term of imprisonment.
Accordingly we decline to review this sentence and it will stand as it is.”
1037. See also Attorney General’s References [2005] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 76 at
377. Lord Phillips in AG’s Reference No 8 of 2007 [2007] EWCA
Crim 922 at paragraph 16 stated:
-
“ 16. We wish to make one thing clear. The oath taken by a judge to administer
justice “without fear or favour, affection of ill-will” extends to imposing what the
judge concludes to be the appropriate sentence, without being deterred by the fear
of an Attorney’s reference. That is not to say that a judge should not pay careful
regard to sentencing guidelines, whether laid down by this court or by the
Sentencing Guidelines Council. But these are only guidelines. There will be cases
where there is good reason to depart significantly from the guidelines. In
particular, this may be appropriate where the facts of the offence diminish its
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seriousness in comparison to the norm, or where there is particularly powerful
personal mitigation. In such circumstances it is quite wrong for the judge to
refrain from imposing the sentence that he considers appropriate because of
apprehension that this may cause the Attorney General to intervene. We have no
doubt that the Attorney General recognises that a departure from the guidelines,
even if it is substantial, is not of itself to justify his intervention. The test for
intervention is not leniency, but undue leniency. Leniency where the facts justify
it is to be commended, not condemned.”
1038. See Lord Justice Judge’s comments in Attorney General’s Reference
No 83 of 2001 (Stephen David Fidler) [2002] 1 Cr App R(S) 139 in
respect of the imposition of a community rehabilitation order for the
offence of robbery:
“On paper this sentence was lenient, but sentencing is not and never can be an
exercise on paper; each case, ultimately, is individual… The sentence which he
imposed was not, in our judgment, unduly lenient.”
1039. Phillips LCJ in the Court of Criminal Appeal Criminal Division
Review of the Legal Year 2007/2008 states:
“A challenge on the ground that a sentence is unduly lenient should be reserved
for the very rare case where the judge appears to be significantly out of line.”
1040. In Crosbie (judgment 23rd September 2009) the Appeal Division
(Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish) declined to grant
leave to the Attorney General to refer the case to the Appeal Division
for the review of the sentences and stated:
“25. Part of the consideration for the granting of leave is whether there is a
pattern of sentencing in the lower courts which may cause public concern or
whether there is an overriding public interest which would otherwise require leave
to be granted in this case. On the facts of this case neither such consideration
applies and accordingly we decline to grant leave to the Attorney General to refer
the case to this court for review of the sentencing of the Respondent.”
Appeals under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008
1041. Under section 91 (1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 if the Court
of General Gaol Delivery makes a confiscation order the prosecutor
may appeal to the Appeal Division in respect of the order. Under
section 91(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 if the Court of
General Gaol Delivery decides not to make a confiscation order the
prosecutor may appeal to the Appeal Division against the decision.
Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to an order or decision made by
virtue of sections 79, 80, 87 or 88.
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1042. Section 92 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 makes provision for the
Appeal Division’s powers on appeal. The Appeal Division may
confirm, quash or vary the confiscation order.
1043. Section 99(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 provides that if on
an application for a restraint order the court decides not to make one,
the person who applied for the order may appeal to the Appeal
Division against the decision.
1044. Section 115(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 provides that if on
an application for an order under any of sections 103 to 106 the court
decides not to make one, the person who applied for the order may
appeal to the Appeal Division against the decision.
1045. Section 137(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 provide that an
appeal to the Appeal Division under Part 2 lies only with the leave of
that Court.
No Stay
1046. In criminal matters the fact that an appeal has been lodged is not a
reasonable excuse for failing to comply with a community order (W
Midlands Probation Board v Sadler [2008] EWHC 15). Once a
sentence has been passed it is in force and enforceable in the absence
of specific provisions to the contrary. An appeal in general does not
operate so as to suspend the operation of any sentence or order (R v
May [2005] EWCA Crim 367).
Appeals in respect of pre-trial rulings
1047. Prior to 1st January 2009 there were no appeals in criminal matters on
interlocutory points before the conclusion of the trial. Prior to the 1st
January 2009 an appeal by the defence was only after conviction (see
section 30 of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993) or after acquittal (by
the Attorney General if he desired an opinion of the Appeal Division
on a point of law pursuant to section 40(1) of the Criminal
Jurisdiction Act 1993). See also Harding v R 1993-95 MLR 40. In
Hedworth [1997] 1 Cr App R 421 at 429 it was stated that it was
important that criminal trials get under way as expeditiously as
possible and are not bedevilled by appeals in relation to interlocutory
matters which are very much the province of the trial judge.
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1048. See now however section 29 of the Administration of Justice Act
2008 which inserts section 42A of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993
as follows:
“42A. (1) In this section a ruling is a pre-trial ruling if it relates to a trial on
information and the ruling is given—
(a) after the information is issued; but
(b) before the start of the trial.
(2) Where a judge of the High Court has made a pre-trial ruling in respect of any
question, an appeal against the ruling shall lie to the Appeal Division but only
with the leave of the Appeal Division.
(3) Notwithstanding that leave to appeal has been granted under subsection (2),
the jury may be sworn and the trial continued unless the Appeal Division orders
otherwise.
(4) On the termination of the hearing of an appeal, the Appeal Division may
confirm, reverse or vary the ruling appealed against.
(5) There is no appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of the Appeal Division
under subsection (4).
(6) Subsection (5) does not –
(a) prevent an appeal against conviction; or
(b) affect the right of the Attorney General to make a reference under section 40.
(7) For the purposes of this section the start of a trial on information occurs when
a jury is sworn to consider the issue of guilt or fitness to plead or, if the court
accepts a plea of guilty before a jury is sworn, when that plea is accepted.
(8) This section applies in relation to pre-trial rulings made on or after the day on
which this section comes into operation.”
[By the Administration of Justice Act 2008 (Appointed Day) Order 2008 section
29 came into operation for all purposes on 1st January 2009]
1049. Pre-trial rulings are rulings which are made after the information is
issued but before the start of the trial. For the purposes of the section
the start of the trial occurs when a jury is sworn to consider the issue
of guilt or fitness to plead or if the court accepts a plea of guilty
before a jury is sworn when that plea is accepted. An appeal against a
pre-trial ruling only lies to the Appeal Division with the leave of the
Appeal Division.
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1050. The English Court of Appeal in C [2007] EWCA Crim 2532
emphasised that trial judges are best placed to make case management
decisions and severe restrictions are placed on the powers of the
English Court of Appeal to interfere. See also DPP v Chand [2007]
EWHC 90 (Admin) where it was accepted that the approach of the
Court of Appeal to a Crown Court judge’s decision in respect of the
admissibility of evidence was: “if a judge has directed himself or herself
correctly, this Court will be very slow to interfere with a ruling as to
admissibility… it will not interfere unless the judge’s judgment … is plainly
wrong, or discretion has been exercised unreasonably in the Wednesbury sense.”
1051. Some further guidance may be obtained from Rose L J in the English
Court of Appeal in Jennings (1994) 98 Cr Ap R 308 where he stated
at page 310:
“There has, to the knowledge of this Court in recent weeks been a plethora of
applications to this Court for leave to appeal against judges’ rulings at preparatory
hearings. Those applications, by their very nature, have to be dealt with as a
matter of urgency …There is, we emphasise, a clear duty on barristers and
solicitors, underlined where public funding is involved, to scrutinise with
particular care:
(1) whether there is jurisdiction in this Court to entertain an appeal, and
(2) whether, in an appropriate case, there is any real prospect of
successfully arguing that the judge’s exercise of discretion was
fundamentally flawed.
If it appears to this Court that such anxious scrutiny has not taken place, this
Court will not be slow to make appropriate orders with regard to costs.”
1052. It should be noted that the wording of section 42A of the Criminal
Jurisdiction Act 1993 is not identical to the wording of the various
English statutory provisions regarding interlocutory appeals in respect
of preparatory hearings. The guidance offered by the English Court of
Appeal in respect of appeals on interlocutory matters is however of
some assistance pending detailed guidance from the Appeal Division
on section 42A of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. See now
Dobbie (Appeal Division judgment 13th January 2010).
1053. The comments falling from the lips of English Court of Appeal judges
should however not be taken as a discouragement to parties to
criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction who have good grounds for
appeal in respect of pre-trial rulings. If a party in this jurisdiction has
good grounds for appeal in respect of a pre-trial ruling covered by
section 42A of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 that could
fundamentally affect the trial then such party should of course make
an urgent application for leave to appeal under section 42A of the
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Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993. Whether such leave would be granted
is entirely a matter for the Appeal Division. Applications for leave to
appeal under section 42A should however, where they are to be
pursued, be pursued with urgency. They should not be used as a
device to delay the commencement of the trial.
1054. In R v TR [2009] EWCA 1035 the English Court of Appeal dealt
with a decision by Calvert-Smith J pursuant to section 44 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Act of Parliament). Calvert-Smith J was
not sure that the likelihood that jury tampering would take place was
so substantial as to make it necessary in the interests of justice for the
trial to be conducted without a jury. The Lord Chief Justice of
England and Wales stated:
“28. It was further argued that, whatever the outcome of the submission based on
the inadequacy of the opportunity for the respondents to address the issues, this
court should not interfere with Calvert-Smith J’s conclusion in relation to the
second condition unless it was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. We must of
course pay close attention to Calvert-Smith J’s decision and the reasons for it. The
ruling was made in the course of a preparatory hearing. Our jurisdiction is to
confirm, reverse or vary the decision. The decision itself does not represent the
exercise of a discretion, rather it requires the judge to decide whether the statutory
conditions have been established. If his assessment was wrong, the appeal should
succeed and an order for trial by judge alone would follow.”
1055. The Lord Chief Justice added:-
“29. This part of the argument led naturally to consideration of the extent of the
requirement, if any, that the judge making the order for trial by judge alone under
section 44 (rather than section 46) should himself be that judge. In view of the
provisions in section 45 this application is decided as part of a preparatory hearing
under section 29 of the 1996 Act. We have taken due note of the well known
decision in R v Crown Court at Southwark, ex parte Commissioners of Custom
and Excise [1993] 97 CAR 266 where Lord Justice Watkins observed that the
“judge presiding at the preparatory hearing must be the judge who, save in
exceptional circumstances, is to conduct the trial”. He ruled out administrative
convenience as a sufficient reason for changing the judge between the preparatory
hearing and the jury trial. The contention on behalf of the respondents was that
unless the judge who ordered trial by judge alone was himself the trial judge,
there was a real danger that a second judge who did not agree with the order
would be nevertheless obliged to conduct a juryless trial.
30. We have examined the reasoning in R v Crown Court at Southwark. Its basis
is readily understood. A preparatory hearing is part of the trial. Where a judge is
assigned to take the trial who has not conducted the preparatory hearing “it will be
necessary for the second judge during the hearing before the jury to consider. . .
whether decisions of the first judge at the preparatory hearings relating to
questions such as the admissibility of evidence should be reconsidered by him”.
The purpose of a preparatory hearing is to address and decide as many questions
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as possible relevant to the conduct of the trial. That, however, is not the purpose
of section 44. In truth, crucial as the judicial decision may be, it is concerned with
what for the purposes of R v Crown Court at Southwark would be described as an
administrative question. Either there will be trial by judge and jury or there will
be trial by judge alone. The evidence on this issue will be self-contained and it
will very rarely have any bearing on the ultimate verdict. In short, the reasoning
behind the decision in R v Crown Court at Southwark does not apply to the
present situation. We need not address the question whether modern case
management requirements may compel fresh consideration of the broad
understanding that the same judge must conduct both the preparatory hearing and
the trial.”
1056. R v Al-Ali [2009] 1 Cr App R 21 (an English Court of Appeal case)
concerned section 53 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where the
prosecution sought leave to appeal the trial judge’s ruling that there
was no case to answer. The English Court of Appeal refused leave to
appeal. It was held that in deciding whether to grant leave the court
should apply a broader interest of justice test rather than just to ask
itself whether the prosecution appeal was arguable or had some
prospect of success. It was also important for the court to look ahead
to see what the various options were for the court in the event that the
appeal succeeded. See also R v I [ 2009] EWCA Crim 1793.
1057. Section 10(2) of the High Court Act 1991 provides that for the
avoidance of doubt, it is declared that the High Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions of doleance in respect of
any matter in, or proceedings of, the Court of General Gaol Delivery.
See also Thompson 1996-98 MLR N 8 and Winnell 1996-98 MLR 32
and 77.
Criminal appeals and leave to appeal out of time
1058. Archbold at paragraph 7-182 refers to appeals which are not lodged
within the requisite time period and states that substantial grounds
must be given for the delay before the court will exercise its power to
extend the time allowed for lodging an appeal, and the longer the
delay the more onerous such task will be. See R v Rigby 17 Cr App R
111, R v Lesser 27 Cr App R 69 and R v Hawkins [1997] 1 Cr App R
234. The court will take account of matters other than the reason for
the delay.
1059. See also R v Marsh 25 Cr App R 49. In deciding whether to grant an
extension of time, the court will be influenced by the likelihood of a
successful appeal if the extension is granted. The court will have
regard to the policy behind the time limits for appeals but will also be
anxious to ensure that justice is done. It should not be quick to shut
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out a meritorious appeal simply because it is out of time by a short
period of time.
1060. R v Jones (No 2) 56 Cr App R 413 dealt with the position where a
defendant absconds, then returns and wishes to appeal. See also R v
Charles [2001] 2 Cr App R 15.
1061. In exceptional circumstances where it is apparent that there are
matters worthy of consideration an extension of time in which to
appeal may be granted even where the delay is “inordinate” and
unexplained. See R v King [2000] Crim LR 835.
1062. R v Kansal (No 2) [2001] 3 WLR 751 indicated that it is not the
practice of the court to permit convictions to be re-opened on account
of developments in the law since the date of conviction.
1063. In R v Ballinger [2005] 2 Cr App R 29 it was held that there was
nothing incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights in the imposition of time limits on the institution of appellate
proceedings, provided that they were not too short or too rigorously
enforced; and an applicant seeking an extension of time for leave to
appeal on the ground of violation of the provisions of Article 6 had to
show more than that there had been a breach of Article 6; he had also
to show that he had suffered a substantial injury or injustice.
1064. In relation to a strict approach to time limits and appeals see
Hampshire Police Authority v Smith [2009] EWHC 174 (Admin).
Bail pending appeal
1065. There are two decisions of the Appeal Division which are of
assistance in respect of applications for bail pending appeals. The first
one is Whipp 1981-83 MLR 284 and the second one is Constantinou
1987-89 MLR 312. Both decisions stress the undesirability of
granting bail pending an appeal. The court deplored the situation of a
man serving part of a gaol sentence and then coming back into the
community pending the appeal and then as a result of a failed appeal
being returned to prison. This is not a desirable situation at all. Nor is
it desirable for an appellant to be remanded in custody if at the end of
the day that appellant’s appeal against conviction is successful or an
appeal against sentence is successful to the extent that the appellant
ends up spending more time in custody than he is eventually
sentenced to. Sometimes however for the protection of the public and
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the interests of justice the court may be faced with the inevitable risk
that a sentence will be served at the time an appeal is heard.
1066. As indicated in McStein (CLA 2003/49 judgment delivered 9th April
2003) dealing with bail applications generally, a remand in custody
followed by an acquittal or a remand in custody for a period longer
than the eventual sentence creates a manifest, sometimes an
unavoidable, injustice.
1067. Applications for bail pending appeal create additional difficulties and
present the court with a very difficult balancing exercise. The courts
in the Isle of Man have indicated their reluctance to grant bail pending
appeal and have indicated that the preferred method to deal with such
matters is on the basis of an expedited appeal where possible and
appropriate.
1068. In Parker (Appeal Division judgment delivered 31st October 2003) it
was held that the Appeal Division had jurisdiction to grant bail
pending an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
1069. In the English case of Joseph Watton [1979] 68 Cr App R 293 it was
indicated that special circumstances (i.e. where it appears, prima
facie, that the appeal is likely to be successful or where there is a risk
that the sentence will be served by the time the appeal is heard) need
to exist before granting bail pending appeal. Lane LCJ stated: “the
true question is – are there exceptional circumstances which would drive the
Court to the conclusion that justice can only be done by the granting of bail.”
1070. Inevitably the court will also be conscious of the reality of the
situation and what it considers are the potential chances of success of
the appeal. In considering the chances of success of any appeal the
court may be hampered at the early bail hearing stage by the lack of
full information in respect of the case as it would be unusual for a full
record of proceedings to be before the Appeal Division at the bail
hearing stage. At the bail hearing stage the court should not, of
course, endeavour to prejudge the merits of the substantive appeal or
attempt to come to preliminary views on inadequate information and
without benefit of full submissions or the luxury of time to consider
the case thoroughly. It would however be to fly in the face of reality,
common sense and human nature not to openly recognise that in
dealing with an application for bail pending appeal the court may well
take into account the apparent merits of the appeal.
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Citation of authorities in respect of appeals
1071. Counsel should ensure that the relevant leading authorities are
referred to the Appeal Division. These would include authorities
decided by the courts in the Isle of Man and indeed in other common
law jurisdictions worldwide. It is insufficient simply to rely on
extracts from textbooks. The underlying authorities must be referred
to (Scambler Appeal Division judgment delivered on the 12th January
2004). The relevant legal principles and the leading authorities
supporting such principles should be referred to.
1072. There should however be no excessive citation of authorities. This
does not yet appear to be a problem we suffer from in this jurisdiction.
The English Court of Appeal Criminal Division in R v Erskine and
Williams [2009] EWCA Crim 1425 referred to the problem which had
arisen in England and Wales. The Lord Chief Justice of England and
Wales stated:
“1 These appellants were properly convicted of murder in unconnected trials
many years ago. They now argue that their convictions should be quashed and
substituted by convictions for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished
responsibility. In Erskine there was powerful evidence available at trial which
would have supported the defence: in Williams there was none. Neither advanced
the defence: indeed Williams pleaded guilty to murder. The question for decision
is simple: in relation to each appeal, exercising the jurisdiction provided by
section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended, do we think it necessary
or expedient in the interests of justice to receive evidence which was not adduced
at trial?
2. This simple question has involved the preparation of a substantial bundle
of authorities and extensive citation and analysis of previous decisions of this
court. We imply no criticism of distinguished leading counsel. Their forensic
technique has been sanctioned by this court. It has become the modern way of
addressing legal principle both on appeal and in the Crown Court itself.
3. Various factors have contributed to the process. These include the stark
reality that every single judgment of this court is now available to the advocate,
whether it was reserved or unreserved, whether reported or unreported.
Understandably, the advocate doing his duty by his client seeks to identify each
and every case which even remotely appears to bear on the principle under
consideration or which has some passing factual similarity to the one with which
he is immediately concerned. The development of legal argument in the criminal
justice process is therefore both much more complex and, we venture to suggest,
more rebarbative and less focussed than it used to be. Added to these
considerations, there has been something of a convention that this court should at
least mention authorities referred to by the advocate in oral submissions, and this
tends to add yet one more authority to the existing compendium. And so, like
Topsy, the process has grown, and lengthened, and continues to grow and
lengthen without the slightest discernable improvement in the doing of justice in
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the individual case and to the delay and disadvantage of the administration of
justice generally. What is abundantly clear is that without a fresh approach to the
way in which authorities are used in the course of forensic argument the
administration of criminal justice will be suffocated. ..
The citation of authority
63. The practice of lengthy citation of authority has arisen because this court,
explaining the reasons for the exercise of its powers under section 23 of the 1968
Act in an individual case, has frequently made reference to its previous decisions,
no doubt because it was referred to them. As our review demonstrates, what might
be termed "a line of authorities" has developed. This is neither necessary nor
desirable. The principles for the exercise of the statutory power are set out in the
statute. No further elaboration is necessary. Each case depends upon the
application of the powers as set out in the statute in the context of specific facts in
the individual case, no more and no less. Examples rarely assist, and some 40
years after its enactment, the essential framework and the over-arching test
contained in section 23(1) (after due consideration of the factors identified in
section 23(2)), should be well understood without recourse to previous decisions
of the court which do no more than evidence the application of those provisions to
factual situations.
64. Although each of the cases referred to in this present judgment was
included in the bundles of authorities with which we were provided in one or
other or both of these appeals, yet, as we have seen, some of them were
unreported, and others were reported because they threw light on issues other than
diminished responsibility. Time and time again the court has endeavoured to
summarise the guidance given by the earlier decisions yet each of these cases has
emphasised the fact specific nature of the decision whether to admit evidence
under section 23 of the 1968 Act, and somehow or other, notwithstanding the
repeated attempts to provide comprehensive guidance, time and time again the
court has been invited to and has traversed many, and sometimes all of the
previous decisions. This process can no longer be justified.
65. The problem is not new: it is just getting worse.
66. In 1863, WTS Daniel QC, who led the movement which resulted in the
founding of the official Law Reports, set out in a letter to the Solicitor General,
the problems of expense, prolixity, delay and imperfection in the then system of
law reporting that then existed. He continued:
"To these I would add a further evil…. That of reporting cases indiscriminately
without reference to their fitness or usefulness as precedents, merely because,
having been reported by rivals, the omission of them might prejudice circulation
and consequently diminish profit."
Nathaniel Lindley (later Master of the Rolls) in a supporting paper expressing the
view of the Chancery Bar suggested that the cases to be reported were:
"1. All cases which introduce, or appear, to introduce a new principle or a new
rule.
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2. All cases which materially modify an existing principle or rule
3. All cases which settle or materially tend to settle a question upon which the law
is doubtful.
4. All cases which for any reason are peculiarly instructive".
He urged that there should be excluded:
"Those cases which are substantially repetitions of what is reported already"
67. These guidelines were those which the official Law Reports published by
the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting have endeavoured to follow.
68. In 1939, concern expressed as to the increase in the number of law reports
led to the establishment of a Committee under Simonds J which reported to the
Lord Chancellor in 1940. Among the topics it considered was the suggestion that
too many cases were reported. It referred to the difficulty in deciding what should
be reported, but rejected a suggestion that cases which had not been reported in
the official reports should not be cited. Professor Goodhart's dissenting report
recommended that all judgments should be transcribed, indexed and held
centrally.
69. In 1977, Lord Diplock spoke of the "superfluity of citation" and followed
up his concerns in Lambert v Lewis [1982] AC 225 at 274 where he observed :
"…the respect which under the common law is paid to precedent makes it
tempting to the appellate advocate to cite a plethora of authorities which do no
more than illustrate the application to particular facts of a well-established
principle of law that has been clearly stated …in those cases that are no more than
illustrative, however, there are likely to be found judicial statements of principle
that do not follow the precise language in which the principle is expressed…, but
use some paraphrase of it that the judge thinks is specially apt to explain its
application to the facts of a particular case. The citation of a plethora or
illustrative authorities, apart from being time and cost-consuming, present the
danger of so blinding the court with case law that it has difficulty in seeing the
wood of legal principle for the trees of paraphrase".
Lord Roskill made the same point in Pioneer Shipping v B.T.P. Trioxide [1982]
AC 724 at 751, where he stated:
"I hope I shall not be thought discourteous or unappreciative of the industry
involved in the preparation of counsel's arguments if I say that today massive
citation of authority in cases where the relevant legal principles have been clearly
and authoritatively determined is of little or no assistance, and should be firmly
discouraged."
The consequence was lengthened hearings and increased costs "without in any
way leading to the avoidance of judicial error".
70. In Roberts Petroleum Limited v Bernard Kenny Limited (In liquidation)
[1983] 2 AC 192 at 201, and with the enthusiastic support of each member of the
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House, Lord Diplock identified the nature of the problem in yet greater detail, and
imposed significant limits on the deployment of unreported judgments of the
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) before the House of Lords. There was some
criticism of this approach. Alternative suggestions, such as allowing a case to be
citable only if the court directed that it was citable were made. There was no
consensus. Nevertheless in 1996, the Court of Appeal Civil Division laid down a
similar rule to that in Roberts Petroleum in its Practice Direction (Court of
Appeal: Authorities) [1996] 1 WLR 854.
71. Undoubtedly the problem of excessive citation of authority grew with the
ready availability on the internet of most High Court and all Court of Appeal
decisions. In Michaels and another v Taylor Woodrow Development Limited and
others [2001] Ch 493, Laddie J pointed out that
"…the recent growth of computerised databases has made it an even more
frequent and extensive occurrence. There are now significantly more judges, more
cases and more databases than there were even two decades ago. Until
comparatively recently, this was not a substantial problem…now there is no pre-
selection. Large numbers of decisions, good and bad, reserved and unreserved,
can be accessed…it seems to me that the common law system, which places such
reliance on judicial authority, stands the risk of being swamped by a torrent of
material…"
72. After consideration of the issue and consultation, a further Practice
Direction was issued in relation to all civil courts: Practice Direction (Citation of
Authority) [2001] 1 WLR 1001. It did not appear to have solved the problem.
Moreover, in any event, it did not apply to criminal courts.
73. Speaking extra judicially at the First Symposium on Law Reporting, Legal
Information and Electronic Media in the New Millennium in March 2000, Lord
Bingham, then Lord Chief Justice, observed
"The quick, effortless and relatively inexpensive availability of vast new swathes
of material hitherto inaccessible, unorganised, unfiltered, unedited, presents a
very real risk to the system which may…simply succumb to the weight of the
materials presented. "
74. There is no doubting the problem. It is not confined to this particular type
of case, but is a feature of all types of appeal against conviction and sentence.
Repeating that we imply no criticism of counsel in either case, these appeals
illustrate it. The question is whether this judgment will merely be one more
plaintive lament against what has become an irreversible process, or whether
action should be taken to avoid the impending crisis identified by Lord Bingham.
If that is the choice, the answer is self-evident. We must do more than complain.
Even if, long term, this issue must be examined again and the various differing
views considered, there can be little doubt that firm measures are immediately
required, at least in this court, to ensure that appeals can be heard without an
excessive citation of or reference to many of its earlier, largely factual decisions.
75. The essential starting point, relevant to any appeal against conviction or
sentence, is that, adapting the well known aphorism of Viscount Falkland in 1641:
if it is not necessary to refer to a previous decision of the court, it is necessary not
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to refer to it. Similarly, if it is not necessary to include a previous decision in the
bundle of authorities, it is necessary to exclude it. That approach will be rigidly
enforced.
76. It follows that when the advocate is considering what authority, if any, to
cite for a proposition, only an authority which establishes the principle should be
cited. Reference should not be made to authorities which do no more than either
(a) illustrate the principle or (b) restate it. Detailed rules are set out in paragraphs
II.17 and II.19 of the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction.
77. II.17 specifies the requirements for skeleton arguments and paragraph
II.19 incorporates the detailed provisions relating to the citation of authority in the
Court of Appeal (Civil Division). We propose to highlight the most significant
features.
Conviction Appeals
78. Advocates must expect to be required to justify the citation of each
authority relied on or included in the bundle. The court is most unlikely to be
prepared to look at an authority which does no more than illustrate or restate an
established proposition.
79. It is good practice for advocates on each side to agree a list of relevant
authorities and prepare a joint bundle. If authorities are copied for the use of the
court, they must (a) be copied from the principal law report in which the case
appears, with headnote: and (b) have marked by sidelining the passage(s) relied
on. Authorities should only be copied if they do in fact identify or represent a
principle or the development of a principle.
Sentence
80. Advocates must expect to be required to justify the citation of any
authority. In particular where a definitive Sentencing Guidelines Council
guideline is available there will rarely be any advantage in citing an authority
reached before the issue of the guideline, and authorities after its issue which do
not refer to it will rarely be of assistance. In any event, where the authority does
no more than uphold a sentence imposed at the Crown Court, the advocate must
be ready to explain how it can assist the court to decide that a sentence is
manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
81. If authorities are reported in the Criminal Appeal (Sentencing) Reports,
that reference should be given. If authorities are copied for the use of the court,
they must (a) be copied from the principal law report in which the case appears,
with headnote: and (b) have marked by sidelining the passage(s) relied on.
Authorities should only be copied if they do in fact identify or represent a
principle or the a development of a principle.
Fitness to Plead
82. In the present context notwithstanding the forensic difficulty of raising
mutually inconsistent defences which involve denial of involvement in the killing
on one hand, and diminished responsibility for the killing on the other, the trial
477
process demands that the defendant, no doubt after considering legal advice, must
decide which defence to advance. In an ideal world, of course, if he were
responsible for the killing, he would admit it. But even if he is responsible, he
may, and often does, choose to plead not guilty. What he cannot do is to advance
such a defence and then, after conviction, seek to appeal in order to advance an
alternative defence, such as diminished responsibility. There is one trial, and that
trial must address all relevant issues relating to guilt and innocence. Once
convicted by the jury, he is guilty of the murder he has denied committing. The
defence suggestion that he is not guilty has been rejected, and he has elected not
to advance diminished responsibility. If he pleads guilty to murder, he has ignored
the opportunity available to him to advance diminished responsibility as a
defence. The trial process is concluded.
83. We are therefore dealing with rare occasions when it will be contended
that fresh evidence shows that the appellant's responsibility at the time of the
killing was indeed sufficiently diminished to fall within the terms of section 2 of
the Homicide Act and that there is a persuasive reason why the defence was not
advanced at trial. It is inevitable that in these rare cases that consideration by the
court of applications to adduce fresh evidence will be distressing for all involved,
particularly the family of the deceased, but where there is a persuasive reason it
was not adduced at trial, the need to do justice requires this.
84. In this context we must address what appears to be a new but increasing
tendency in this class of case for the appellant to advance fresh evidence, not
merely to support the defence, but to suggest further, that at the time of the trial,
he was either unfit to plead, or virtually so. This is said to provide the necessary
explanation for the failure to advance diminished responsibility at trial.
85. The issue of a defendant's fitness to plead is concerned with his mental
state not at the moment of the killing, but at the time of the trial. The process is
now governed by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, as amended in
1991 and 2004. However the principles for determining whether he was fit to
plead are those of the common law, set out in 1835 in R v Pritchard 7 Car and P
304 by Alderson B. These principles were said in R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325 to
be "firmly embodied in our law". Ignoring for present purposes problems which
may arise where the defendant is "mute of malice" or physically incapable of
pleading to the indictment, the question is whether:
"He is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial,
so as to make a proper defence – to know that he might challenge (the jurors) to
whom he may object – and to comprehend the details of the evidence, which in a
case of this nature must constitute a minute investigation, upon this issue,
therefore, if you think that there is no certain mode of communicating details of
the trial to the prisoner, so that he can clearly understand them, and be able
properly to make his defence to the charge; you ought to find that he is not of sane
mind."
86. In Podola further assistance was given about the meaning of "make a
proper defence" and "comprehend" in the context in which Alderson B. was using
them. Lord Parker CJ explained:
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"As to the word "comprehend", we do not think that this word goes further in
meaning than the word "understand". In our judgment the direction…is not
intended to cover and does not cover a case where the prisoner can plead to the
indictment and has the physical and mental capacity to know that he has the right
of challenge and to understand the case as it proceeds."
87. The issue may be raised by either the prosecution or the defence, and, to
ensure that a weak prosecution case may be examined and if appropriate
dismissed, the court can postpone consideration of the question at any time up to
and including the close of the prosecution's case. In 1988 when Erskine was tried,
the consequences for a defendant successfully raising the issue were twofold. First
it meant that the defendant would be unable to advance a defence of his own, and
second, he was to be detained in hospital, indefinitely. In practice this issue is still
rarely raised, although the number of cases rose after the statutory amendments
made in 1991: see Continued upturn in unfitness to plead- more disability in
relation to the trial under the 1991 Act [2007] Crim LR 530.
88. It is obviously desirable, and in accordance with principle, not least the
operation of the defendant's personal autonomy, that if it is humanly possible, the
defendant should tender his own plea and advance such defence as he wishes to
advance, and that he should not be shut out from doing so on the grounds of
unfitness. Provided the defendant can understand the proceedings, he will be
deemed fit to plead. It is clear from the authorities that the test for fitness to plead
is very different from the test applied to determine a defendant's mental
responsibility for his actions at the time of the killing. The test applies even if the
defendant may act against what appears to others to be his own best interest. (R v
Robertson (1968) 52 Cr App R 690.) and even if he is "highly abnormal" at the
time of trial it does not follow that he was incapable of "following a trial or giving
evidence or instructing counsel and so on". (R v Berry (1970) 66 Cr App R 156).
In other words, a defendant is not to be deemed unfit to plead merely because he
will not accept what appears to be eminently sensible advice from his legal
advisers. It is therefore for him, not his legal advisers or the court, to decide at the
time of the trial whether to advance a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the
grounds of diminished responsibility.
89. Assuming that the defendant is legally represented (and in cases like these,
he will normally be represented by leading and junior counsel, as well as
solicitors) his legal representatives are the persons best placed to decide whether
to raise the issue of fitness to plead, and indeed to seek medical assistance to
resolve the problem. There is a separate and distinct judicial responsibility to
oversee the process so that if there is any question of the defendant's fitness to
plead, the judge can raise it directly with his legal advisers. Unless there is
contemporaneous evidence to suggest that notwithstanding his plea and the
apparent satisfaction of his legal advisers and the judge that he was fit to tender it,
and participate in the trial, it will be very rare indeed for a later reconstruction,
even by distinguished psychiatrists who did not examine the appellant at the time
of trial, to persuade the court that notwithstanding the earlier trial process and the
safeguards built into it that the appellant was unfit to plead, or close to being unfit
or that his decision to deny the offence and not advance diminished responsibility
can properly be explained on this basis. The situation is, of course, different if, as
in Erskine, serious questions about his fitness to plead were raised in writing or
expressly before the judge at the trial.
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Diminished Responsibility
90. Subject to these broad considerations, where it is proposed to raise
diminished responsibility for the first time on appeal, the court is examining the
appellant's mental state at the time of the killing in accordance with section 2 of
the Homicide Act 1957. It should normally be necessary to refer the court to no
more than the terms of s.23 of the 1968 Act, and the approach suggested in R v
Criminal Cases Review Commission Ex Parte Pearson [2000] 1 Cr App R 141 at
page 164:
"Wisely and correctly, the courts have recognised that the statutory discretion
conferred by section 23 cannot be constrained by inflexible, mechanistic rules.
But the cases do identify certain features which are likely to weigh more or less
heavily against the reception of fresh evidence: for example, a deliberate decision
by a defendant whose decision-making faculties are unimpaired not to advance
before the trial jury a defence known to be available; evidence of mental
abnormality or substantial impairment given years after the offence and
contradicted by evidence available at the time of the offence; expert evidence
based on factual premises which are unsubstantiated, unreliable or false, or which
is for any other reason unpersuasive. But even features such as these need not be
conclusive objections in every case. The overriding discretion conferred on the
Court enables it to ensure that, in the last resort, defendants are sentenced for the
crimes they have committed and not for psychological failings to which they may
be subject."
91. If reference to earlier decisions or historical analysis happens to be
required, the present judgment, where the vast majority of all the relevant
decisions have been collected, will normally suffice. We emphasise that the
provisions of s.23 do not require any further judicial exegesis; the court will
positively discourage references to previous decisions which exemplify but do not
alter the principles identified by Lord Bingham in Pearson.
92. The court will normally expect the parties to provide a detailed analysis of
the facts to assist it in the application of the statutory test, including an analysis of
the following:
i) The psychiatric and/or psychological evidence or other information in relation
to the appellant's mental state which was available at the time of trial.
ii) The evidence which has become available since the trial, and an explanation
why it was not available at trial.
iii) The circumstances in which the appellant sought to raise on the appeal (a) the
evidence available at the time of the trial and (b) evidence that has become
available since the trial
iv) The reason why such evidence or information as was available at the time of
the trial was not adduced or relied on at trial. This will ordinarily include details
of the advice given, the reasons for the appellant's decision at trial and, subject to
paragraph …, any relevant evidence of the mental condition in the period leading
up to and at the time of the trial and its impact on his decision making capacity.
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v) The impact of the fresh evidence on the issues argued at trial and whether and
the extent to which it involves a re-arguing of issues considered at trial.
vi) The extent to which the opinions of the experts are agreed and where they are
not.
93. These heads of analysis will not all necessarily apply in every case; in
some cases additional areas of analysis may be required. However, any such
analysis should suffice to assist and inform the court in its task of applying the
provisions of s.23 (1) of the 1968 Act.”
1073. Hopefully common sense and pragmatism will continue to prevail on
this Island and counsel will ensure that the relevant authorities are
referred to the court and that there is no excessive citation of
authorities.
1074. Much will depend on the circumstances of the case. If the Appeal
Division is being asked to depart from previous well established
authorities then counsel may have to provide assistance by referring to
numerous relevant authorities and tracing the history and prior
justification for the well established authorities and whether other
common law jurisdictions have followed such authorities or not.
However if the appeal is a relatively straightforward appeal against
sentence it may be sufficient to refer to the leading guideline case and
focus submissions on why it is stated that the sentence imposed was
manifestly excessive.
Privy Council and criminal appeals
1075. There have been very few appeals in criminal matters from the Isle of
Man to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London.
Section 24(1) of the High Court Act 1991 provides that judgments
and orders of the Appeal Division may be appealed from to Her
Majesty in Council with either (a) the leave of the Appeal Division; or
(b) with special leave of Her Majesty.
1076. In Aldred 1522-1920 MLR 295 the Judicial Committe of the Privy
Council considered a case in which the appellant had been convicted
of fraud in the Court of General Gaol Delivery. He petitioned for
special leave to appeal submitting that the evidence did not justify the
jury’s conclusion that he had fraudulent intent. The Board indicated
that it did not require submissions from the Crown. The petition was
dismissed on the 24th July 1901 and it was held that special leave to
appeal would not be granted since no appellate court could set aside
the conviction on the ground put forward by the applicant. The jury’s
verdict was supported by the evidence and it could not be set aside
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simply because the appellate court would have come to a different
conclusion on the same evidence. Lord Halsbury delivering the
opinion of the Board stated:
“Whether or not their Lordships would have formed the same opinion and found
the same verdict, is not the question. If they would not, that it (sic) is not enough
to set aside the verdict of the jury which has been arrived at.”
1077. See also the interesting Privy Council decision in Attorney General v
Cowley and Kinrade 1522-1920 MLR 107.
1078. In Christian v Nowell 1522-1920 MLR 5 the Privy Council dealt with
a petition by George Christian for a remedy in respect of the death of
his father William Christian. The Privy Council (including Sir
Matthew Hale) dealt with interesting submissions in respect of the Act
of Free and General Pardon, Indemnity and Oblivion 1660. The first
respondent was the Deputy Governor of the Island at the time.
Deemster Edward Christian is recorded as having protested against
the illegal proceedings in the Isle of Man and to have withdrawn
himself and came to England to “solicit his Majesty and implore his
justice.” The order of the Privy Council made on the 5th August 1663
poignantly records that:
“And to the end the guilt of that blood which hath been unjustfly spilt may in
some sort be expiated, and his Majesty receive some kind of satisfaction for the
untimely loss of a subject, it is ordered that the said Thomas Norris and Hugh
Cannell [two judges, by them in that Island called Deemsters] who decreed this
violent death, be and remain prisoners in the King’s Bench, to be proceeded
against in the ordinary course of justice so as to receive condign punishment
according to the merit of so heinous a fact …”
1079. In Nelson v R 1522-1920 MLR 311 the Privy Council dealt with an
appeal in respect of section 218 of the Criminal Code 1872. Mr
Nelson faced a charge of having fraudulently appropriated to his own
use money of the Dumbell’s Banking Company. It was held on the
12th February 1902 that the Deemster had failed to give the jury
adequate directions when they requested guidance on the significance
of the appellant’s solvency which had led to his wrongful conviction.
On the facts of the case there was insufficient evidence to convict him
of the section 218 charge and the conviction would therefore be set
aside.
1080. In Frankland and Moore v R 1987-89 MLR 65 the Privy Council
dealt with two appeals from the Appeal Division and held that the trial
Deemsters had been wrong to direct the juries that they were entitled
to ascertain the intent of the accused by reference to an objective test
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since the decision in DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, insofar as it laid
down an objective test of intent in the crime of murder, did not
accurately represent English common law. The Privy Council also
held that decisions of the English courts, in particular the House of
Lords, although not binding were of persuasive authority in the Isle of
Man in the absence of any local case law or statute to the contrary or
any particular local condition making them inapplicable. In Bitel
(Chancery Division judgment delivered 30th November 2007) I
referred to the modern Manx law position in relation to precedents
from other jurisdictions and stated:
“Precedent
529. Counsel have referred to authorities from various jurisdictions including the
Isle of Man, England and Wales, Jersey, Guernsey, the United States of America,
Australia, Canada and the British Virgin Islands. In such circumstances it may be
of some assistance to set out the Manx law position in relation to precedents from
other jurisdictions.
530. If a point of law is covered by local Isle of Man authority especially if that
authority is from the Appeal Division or the Privy Council dealing with an appeal
from the Isle of Man then it is to that authority which the court should turn in the
first instance.
531. If however there is no local binding authority then it is appropriate for
counsel and the court to look beyond local frontiers.
532. Lord Ackner sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
Frankland and Moore v R 1987-89 MLR 65 at page 80 stated:
"Decisions of English courts, particularly decisions of the House of Lords and the
Court of Appeal in England, are not binding on Manx courts, but they are of high
persuasive authority, as was correctly pointed out by Glidewell, J.A. in giving the
judgment of the Staff of Government Division (Criminal Jurisdiction). Such
decisions should generally be followed unless either there is some provision to the
contrary in a Manx statute or there is some clear decision of a Manx court to the
contrary, or, exceptionally, there is some local condition which would give good
reason for not following the particular English decision. The persuasive effect of a
judgment of the House of Lords, which has largely the same composition as the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the final Court of Appeal from a Manx
court, is bound to be very high".
533. Manx law has developed significantly since Lord Ackner uttered those words
over twenty years ago now.
534. The traditional position in relation to English precedent in Manx law was
briefly set out at pages 449-463 of Solly's Government and Law in the Isle of Man
(1994). At page 463 a relatively young advocate endeavoured to summarise the
position as follows:
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"In summary, it is clear that English decisions are not strictly binding on Manx
courts but that they are of high persuasive value and will frequently be followed
in the absence of special circumstances or local precedent to the contrary.
It is to be hoped that Manx common law will develop independently in
accordance with the needs, requirements and interests of the inhabitants of the Isle
of Man and indeed the international community of which the Island is a part. It is
to be hoped that Deemsters will not slavishly follow English decisions, which in
certain cases may not be in the best interests of the Island, in areas where it would
be more appropriate to develop Manx law in a different way to the way in which
English law has developed and is developing".
535. Judge of Appeal Hytner in Barr and Anglo International Holdings Limited
1990-92 MLR 398 at page 409 stated:
"Since this court is not in any way bound by decisions of the English courts it
should not be assumed that we would follow dicta abandoned by Parliament".
536. In City and International Securities Limited 2001-03 MLR 239 Deemster
Cain had little difficulty in not following the majority judgments in Home Office v
Harman [1983] A.C. 280 (House of Lords) which had been challenged before the
European Commission of Human Rights.
537. In Aguilar v Anglican Windows (IOM) Limited 1987-89 MLR 317 at 325 an
advocate endeavoured to persuade Deemster Corrin not to follow the Privy
Council decision in Selvanayagam v University of W Indies on the grounds that it
had been the subject of criticism and that their Lordships had confused
remoteness and mitigation. Deemster Corrin at page 325 stated that the decision
"is, nevertheless, a decision of the Privy Council and, if not actually binding, is
very persuasive authority in this court, and I propose to follow it".
538. Deemster Corrin in Cusack, Cotter v Scroop Limited (judgment 16th January
1997) stated at page 9:
"The Isle of Man is an active member of the Commonwealth and whilst
historically it has tended to follow English law I feel quite free to look for
guidance to other Commonwealth countries as there is no binding or persuasive
authority to the contrary in England".
539. The High Court of Australia in Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376 at 390
stated:
"…The history of the country and of the common law makes it inevitable and
desirable that the courts of this country will continue to obtain assistance and
guidance from the learning and reasoning of United Kingdom courts just as
Australian courts benefit from the learning and reasoning of other great common
law courts".
540. Thanks in the main to Deemster William Cain and to Dr Alan Milner of Law
Reports International the Island has had an excellent system of local law reporting
for some many years now. Increasingly it is to our own local judgments that we
are turning in dealing with the legal issues of the day.
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541. In addition to applying our own local precedents Manx courts will also
continue to benefit from the learning and reasoning of judgments of the English
courts and "other great common law courts" including the High Court of
Australia.”
1081. Whilst on the question of precedent consider the judgment of the
Appeal Division (Judge of Appeal Tattersall and Deemster Kerruish)
in Clinton (judgment 29th October 2009) in respect of submissions by
the Attorney General that the Appeal Division was, subject to certain
exceptions, bound to follow its own decisions pursuant to the
principle of stare decisis. The exceptions were : firstly, where the
court has to decide which of two conflicting decisions it will follow;
secondly, where in the light of a decision of a superior court it is
bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which has not been
expressly overruled; and thirdly where the court is satisfied that its
decision was given per incuriam. The principle of stare decisis is less
strictly applied in criminal cases than in civil cases. In Clinton the
Appeal Division was invited to consider its decision in Caldwell-
Camp 2003-05 MLR 505. The Appeal Division in Clinton at
paragraph 28 of the judgment stated:
“… we are satisfied that this court is entitled to review sentencing guidelines
which it has given although, absent a change in the context in which such
guidelines were given, the more recent such guidelines were given, the less likely
it is that any such review will produce a different result.”
1082. The Privy Council have from time to time referred to the way in
which they will consider appeals in respect of criminal matters. Lord
Carswell in DPP v Hurnam (Privy Council judgment delivered 25th
April 2007) at paragraph 23 stated:
“The second, and more general, principle is that in criminal appeals brought as of
right to the Judicial Committee from Mauritius, the Board will follow the long
established practice, originally formulated to govern special leave to appeal in
criminal cases, that “some clear departure from the requirements of justice” must
be shown to exist. The practice was regarded as the usual rule as far back as 1885:
Riel v The Queen (1885) 10 App Cas 675, 677, per Lord Halsbury LC, and was
reaffirmed in Ibrahim v The Queen [1914] AC 599, 614-5, per Lord Sumner. It
was adopted and followed by the Board in Badry v Director of Public
Prosecutions [1983] 2 AC 297 in deciding the first appeal as of right from
Mauritius under section 70A of the Courts Act. The Board again accepted the
applicability of the rule in Buxoo v The Queen [1988] 1 WLR 820.”
and at paragraph 28 in respect of appeals against sentences:
“There remains only the matter of sentence. Their Lordships appreciate the force
of the contention that it may bear harshly on the respondent to have to serve a
prison sentence after such a lapse of time since the commission of the offence.
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They are conscious, however, of the content of the practice direction issued by
Viscount Dunedin (1932) 48 TLR 300 and accepted as still correct by the Board
in the Mauritian appeal of Badry v Director of Public Prosecutions [1983] 2 AC
297, 303. That laid down that for the Board to interfere with a criminal sentence
there must be something “so irregular or so outrageous as to shake the very basis
of justice”. Their Lordships do not consider that this test is satisfied in the present
case. The charge on which the respondent was convicted was one of great
seriousness, for it is vital that the standards of probity of practitioners in the
criminal courts should be maintained and falsification of an alibi is a most
reprehensible attempt to interfere with the proper administration of criminal
justice. The delay since May 2000 has undoubtedly been considerable, but to a
large extent it has been occupied by the process of trial and appeals, but it would
in their Lordships’ view be undesirable if a defendant who has engaged
unsuccessfully in a series of appeals could then claim that the passage of time
entitled him to relief against a sentence which was correctly imposed by the trial
court.”
1083. In Muirhead (Privy Council judgment delivered 28th July 2008) at
paragraph 39 it was stated that “the Privy Council will not act as a court of
criminal appeal and will only set aside a conviction if there has been a grave
miscarriage of justice.” In that case the Privy Council allowed the appeal
as they could not be satisfied that the conviction was safe.
1084. Lord Phillips delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in Eiley v
The Queen [2009] UKPC 39 and criticised the prosecution for failing
to appear on the appeal as follows:
“2. The prosecution have not thought fit to appear on this appeal. The Board
understands that the reason for this may be simply the cost that representation on
the appeal would have involved. This is regrettable. Prosecuting authorities of
countries that have preserved the right of an appeal to Her Majesty in Council
should recognise the importance that the Board attaches to receiving appropriate
assistance where appeals are brought against criminal convictions, especially
where these are against convictions for an offence as serious as murder.”
1085. In respect of procedural matters see the Judicial Committee
(Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 2009 made on the 11th February
2009 and which came into force on the 21st April 2009 except for
article 4(2) which came into force on the 1st October 2009.
1086. Rule 11(2) of the Rules provides that an application for permission to
appeal must be filed within 56 days from the date of the order or
decision of the court below or the date of the court below refusing
permission to appeal (if later). Under rule 5(1) the Registrar is given
power to extend or shorten any time limit set by the rules or any
relevant practice direction (unless to do so would be contrary to any
statutory provision).
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1087. See the various practice directions and other useful information
contained at www.privycouncil.gov.uk.See also Civil Court Practice
The Green Book 2009 edited by Lord Neuberger and Louise di
Mambo and published in August 2009. The special issue includes the
rules and practice directions for the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council with a commentary.
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The future
1088. The Island is fortunate to have a society in which the vast majority of
people respect the law. We have and sometimes take for granted
something that not all countries in the world possess. We have an
independent judiciary and an independent legal profession. We have
prosecution and defence counsel who respect the rule of law and
conduct themselves in accordance with the onerous professional
duties placed upon their shoulders. We have passionate people who
work hard to help victims of, those charged with and those convicted
of criminal offences. Very many people on this Island work hard to
protect the public, to safeguard our quality of life and to assist in the
rehabilitation of offenders and to help those who are the victims of
criminal conduct.
1089. We have a fair criminal justice system. We have the presumption of
innocence and we have the concept of a fair trial. A trial that is fair to
the defence, fair to the prosecution and fair to the community
generally. We have a generous legal aid system. We should not take
all these matters for granted. We should appreciate the fortunate
position which prevails on this Island but we should not be
complacent. Improvements can always be made to any system of
justice. We should not be afraid of change. We should embrace it
enthusiastically. We should all work together to improve the system
of criminal justice on this Island.
1090. Criminal law and procedure does not remain static. The system must
continue to be enhanced to ensure that justice continues to be
provided to the community, victims and defendants. The paramount
considerations must be the protection of the public and the fairness
and efficiency of the proceedings to all concerned. We must also
remember that the rehabilitation of offenders, where it can be
achieved, has an important role to play in the long term protection of
the public.
1091. In legal proceedings brevity, simplicity and speed are the friends of
justice. Length, complexity and delay are its enemies. Trials must be
kept manageable and must take place within a reasonable time. There
is no need for matters to be unduly complicated or to take undue time.
Counsel and the court should focus on the main issues rather than be
distracted by peripheral issues. There needs to be an earlier disclosure
of the main issues in a case without unduly prejudicing the position of
the defendant. It is in the interests of justice and fairness to all that the
focus should be on the main issues of a case and that we all openly
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acknowledge that the time and money that can be devoted to any one
case is not limitless. If too much time is devoted to one case others
suffer. No more than a reasonable amount of time should be allocated
to each case. Too many trials are taking up too much time because the
parties are not focusing on the main issues. Unnecessary witnesses
are being called when they could have been agreed in advance of the
trial. Insufficient admissions are being made on matters that should
not be in dispute.
1092. Moreover counsel must ensure that case management orders of the
court in respect of sentencing hearings and trials are complied with on
a timely basis. In the past such orders have not always been complied
with on a timely basis and in such circumstances there is a risk that
the administration of justice will suffer. All those involved in
sentencing hearings and trials must ensure that they are fully prepared
well in advance of such hearings and trials. Proceedings need to be
fair and efficient. Increased efficiency will not sacrifice fairness
whereas inefficiencies can have an adverse impact on the fairness of
trials. Fairness is not all one sided. Fairness extends to the defence, to
the complainants, to the prosecution, to the witnesses, to the jury, to
the media, to other court users and to the community generally.
1093. It is in the best interests of the community and of those guilty of
criminal conduct that guilty pleas are entered at the first available
opportunity. Too many guilty pleas are left until shortly before the
trial. Too many trials are vacated due to late guilty pleas. Defendants
and those representing them must take futher steps to ensure that any
guilty pleas are entered at the first available opportunity.
1094. There has been a significant increase in the number and complexity of
cases coming before the Court of General Gaol Delivery in recent
times. It is not anticipated that the number of cases will decrease in
the future. In such circumstances the cooperation and assistance of
prosecution and defence advocates is absolutely crucial to the fair and
efficient administration of justice on this Island. The courts depend on
the integrity, competence and efficiency of advocates who, as officers
of the court, are duty bound to assist the court in the administration of
justice. That assistance includes the need to make more efficient use
of the limited time and resources available on the Island.
1095. An independent and well resourced Manx Bar including competent
prosecution and defence advocates are vital elements in the pursuit of
the enforcement of the rule of law, the protection of the liberty of the
subject and the protection of the public. The administration of justice
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is crucially dependent on competent and well prepared advocates.
With the continuing assistance and cooperation of advocates fairness
and efficiency will remain central components in the development of
Manx criminal law and procedure in the future.
1096. I finish this book by recording my thanks to prosecution and defence
advocates and to all those involved in the criminal justice system on
this Island for the valuable assistance the judiciary have received
from them to date. The judiciary looks forward to that assistance
continuing into the future.
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